Charge-Based Juror Bias Requires Unequivocal Rehabilitation, Not General Assurances of Following Instructions

Case: People v Mulverhill, 2026 NY Slip Op 06588
Court: Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department
Decided: November 12, 2026
Opinion: Powers, J.; unanimous concurrence

This commentary addresses the supplied opinion, which is designated uncorrected and subject to revision.

1. Introduction

In People v Mulverhill, the Third Department reversed a judgment convicting Robert J. Mulverhill of ten offenses arising from a violent robbery and the victim’s involuntary transportation from Franklin County to Canada and back. Although the court sustained the verdict against a weight-of-the-evidence challenge, it ordered a new trial because prospective jurors who expressed charge-based assumptions of guilt were not adequately rehabilitated.

The decision applies established impartial-jury principles to two recurring problems: a prospective juror’s assumption that numerous charges indicate guilt, and a prospective juror’s belief that an accused person is in court “for a reason.” Its central instruction is that questioning must meaningfully address the particular bias disclosed. A general agreement to follow instructions does not necessarily establish impartiality.

The opinion also provides important retrial guidance concerning recorded police interviews. The prosecution cannot circumvent a ruling limiting the use of a defendant’s criminal history by introducing an interview recording containing that history without an independent determination of admissibility.

Factual and procedural background

The victim testified that he had a romantic relationship with codefendant Emily Lamay, whom he had supplied with transportation, money, and a sedan. On the night at issue, Lamay drove the victim’s pickup truck while the victim occupied the passenger seat. Mulverhill and codefendant Timothy Delaney subsequently joined them.

According to the prosecution’s evidence, the victim repeatedly objected to traveling to Canada. Delaney nevertheless choked him while Mulverhill punched him, burned him with cigarettes, and took his wallet. Lamay used the victim’s debit card to withdraw money. When the victim attempted to call 911, Mulverhill forcibly took and broke his cellphone.

The group continued into Canada, where the pickup truck was exchanged for crack cocaine. They returned in the sedan previously given to Lamay, with Delaney continuing to choke the victim during the journey. After the sedan broke down, the three defendants left the victim inside and departed on foot. A passerby discovered him and summoned emergency assistance.

The indictment contained 36 counts, divided equally among the three defendants and alleging concerted action. Two of Mulverhill’s twelve counts were dismissed before submission to the jury: one strangulation count and one criminal-mischief count. The jury convicted him of the remaining ten counts. As a second violent felony offender, he received concurrent sentences, the longest being 18 years’ imprisonment followed by 15 years of postrelease supervision.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Evidence: The legal-sufficiency challenge was unpreserved, but the convictions survived weight-of-the-evidence review.
  • Police statements: The probable-cause challenge was abandoned and unpreserved. The preserved challenge to the voluntariness of Mulverhill’s statements failed.
  • Disclosure: The objections concerning the codefendants’ presentence reports were unpreserved, and the court declined interest-of-justice relief.
  • Jury selection: The trial court improperly denied challenges for cause to two prospective jurors whose statements raised unresolved doubts about their impartiality. Because Mulverhill exhausted his peremptory challenges, reversal was required.
  • Prior misconduct: For purposes of retrial, the court explained that admitting the unredacted interview’s references to criminal history, parole status, and drug use without an independent admissibility hearing was error.

The judgment was reversed on the law, and the matter was remitted to Franklin County Court for a new trial. The court did not dismiss the prosecution or conclude that the evidence required an acquittal.

3. Analysis: Legal Reasoning

A. The decisive error: unresolved doubts about juror impartiality

CPL 270.20 (1) (b) permits a challenge for cause where a prospective juror’s state of mind is likely to prevent an impartial verdict based on the trial evidence. Once a prospective juror makes statements creating serious doubt about impartiality, the court must conduct an appropriate follow-up inquiry. Unless the juror unequivocally establishes an ability to remain fair and impartial, the challenge should be granted.

The opinion emphasizes caution rather than experimentation with doubtful impartiality. Excusing a questionable juror ordinarily substitutes another qualified juror; retaining that person risks compromising the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

Prospective juror No. 94: the number of charges and the failure to plead guilty

Prospective juror No. 94 initially expressed “a very dim view of substance abuse.” Although he denied that the involvement of drugs would affect him, subsequent questioning revealed a different concern: he had already formed an opinion after hearing the charges and wondered “why [defendant] didn’t take the plea.” When counsel explained that an innocent person might decline a plea, the prospective juror responded that “[12] charges is a lot of charges.”

These statements suggested that the juror treated the prosecution’s charging decisions, and the defendant’s decision to contest them, as indications of guilt. The earlier answer concerning drugs did not resolve this separate concern. Nor did defense counsel’s explanation of possible reasons for rejecting a plea produce an unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

The trial court nevertheless found that defense questioning had rehabilitated the juror, without conducting its own inquiry. The Appellate Division disagreed: the record contained no actual rehabilitation addressing the expressed assumption of guilt.

Prospective juror No. 178: being “here for a reason”

Prospective juror No. 178 responded to a question about whether the number of charges indicated guilt by stating that Mulverhill was “here for a reason.” The trial court explained that an indictment involved a different standard from the standard at trial and obtained an affirmative answer when asking whether the prospective juror could follow instructions and disregard the indictment.

The Appellate Division considered this a closer question but still found the inquiry inadequate. The questioning did not meaningfully address the specific concern expressed or secure assurances of impartiality. An agreement to follow instructions was insufficient in the context of the unresolved suggestion that the prosecution’s decision to bring the case itself carried evidentiary weight.

The decision does not prescribe a mandatory verbal formula. It requires an inquiry whose substance addresses the disclosed bias and produces an unequivocal assurance that the juror can decide the case impartially.

Why the errors required a new trial

Mulverhill exhausted his peremptory challenges when excusing prospective juror No. 178. Under CPL 270.20 (2), that exhaustion made the erroneous denials of the challenges for cause reversible. The court did not require an additional showing that a biased juror actually participated in deliberations.

The practical protection is important: a defendant should not have to expend a limited peremptory challenge to accomplish what a properly granted challenge for cause should have achieved.

B. Weight of the evidence: a sustainable verdict can follow an unfair selection process

Mulverhill failed to preserve his legal-sufficiency arguments because his trial dismissal motion did not identify the specific deficiencies later asserted and was not renewed after all proof closed. Nevertheless, weight-of-the-evidence review required the appellate court to examine whether the prosecution had established the elements of the offenses.

The court first accepted that a different verdict would not have been unreasonable. It then assessed the relative strength of the testimony and competing inferences, viewing the evidence neutrally while respecting the jury’s credibility determinations.

The defense emphasized the victim’s credibility and the codefendants’ favorable plea agreements. The victim’s daughter described him as dishonest, while Lamay and Delaney acknowledged their incentives to cooperate. These circumstances furnished grounds for skepticism, but the court did not find the witnesses inherently unbelievable or incredible as a matter of law.

The victim’s account was substantially supported by the codefendants’ testimony. The emergency medical technician described the victim’s injuries and his statement identifying an assailant by the same surname as Mulverhill. Mulverhill’s police interview also acknowledged the trip to Canada and Delaney’s choking of the victim, although Mulverhill attributed the beating to others.

Conviction Evidence supporting the verdict
Kidnapping in the second degree The defendants forcibly transported the victim to Canada despite his repeated objections, supporting the abduction finding under Penal Law § 135.20.
Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree The involuntary restraint and associated use of deadly force supported liability under Penal Law § 135.10. The court relied on the dangerous circumstances of the restraint, not merely the absence of consent.
Assault in the second degree Mulverhill’s conduct, the victim’s injuries, and their respective ages satisfied the age-related assault provision in Penal Law § 120.05 (12).
Grand larceny in the third degree The defendants took the pickup truck without permission and exchanged it for drugs. The victim’s testimony that he paid $5,000 supported the value element under Penal Law § 155.35 (1).
Robbery in the first degree The forcible taking accompanied by serious injuries creating a substantial risk of death supported Penal Law § 160.15 (1).
Two counts of strangulation in the second degree Mulverhill struck the victim during one choking episode and forcibly removed his wallet during another. These coordinated acts established the community of purpose necessary for accessorial liability under Penal Law §§ 20.00 and 121.12.
Grand larceny in the fourth degree The unauthorized taking of the wallet containing the debit card supported the card-theft provision in Penal Law § 155.30 (4).
Conspiracy in the fourth degree Delaney described a prior plan to rob the victim, and Mulverhill’s subsequent participation supplied an overt act advancing the conspiracy under Penal Law § 105.10 (1).
Criminal mischief in the fourth degree Breaking the cellphone while the victim attempted to call 911 supported the emergency-communication offense under Penal Law § 145.00 (4).

The strangulation analysis is particularly significant. Mulverhill did not need to perform the choking personally to incur liability. His active assistance during the choking episodes supported a shared criminal purpose; the court did not rely on mere presence or association.

C. Suppression: probable cause and voluntariness remained distinct questions

The court separated two challenges that Mulverhill presented together. A Dunaway inquiry concerns the legality of police detention or arrest and its consequences for resulting evidence. A Huntley inquiry addresses the admissibility of statements, including voluntariness and compliance with custodial-interrogation safeguards.

Mulverhill abandoned his request for a probable-cause hearing by failing to pursue it or alert the trial court that it remained unresolved. His appellate probable-cause argument was therefore unpreserved. This was not a merits determination that the arrest was lawful.

His challenge to the denial of statement suppression was preserved. The prosecution bore the burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, including the administration and knowing waiver of Miranda rights before custodial interrogation.

The record showed that police almost immediately removed Mulverhill’s handcuffs at the station and administered warnings before substantive questioning. Considering those circumstances and the remaining hearing evidence, the court upheld the finding of a voluntary statement and knowing waiver. Its conclusion rested on the hearing record as a whole, not on a rule that warnings alone establish admissibility.

D. Presentence reports: preservation and acquiescence limited review

The prosecution received Lamay’s and Delaney’s presentence reports during their separate prosecutions and disclosed that receipt on the record. Mulverhill did not raise the specific discovery and Brady objections later advanced on appeal. He also expressly accepted the trial court’s decision to seal the reports while directing that the codefendants’ statements be provided to him.

Those circumstances left the appellate arguments unpreserved. The Third Department also declined corrective action in the interest of justice, referring to the confidentiality framework in CPL 390.50 (1).

This portion of the opinion should not be read as categorically exempting presentence reports from disclosure obligations. The court resolved the challenge against the background of nonpreservation, affirmative acquiescence, the disclosure arrangement, and statutory confidentiality.

E. Recorded interviews cannot bypass limits on criminal-history evidence

Although the jury-selection ruling already required a new trial, the court addressed another problem likely to recur. Mulverhill’s recorded interview included references to his criminal history, parole status, and drug use. The prosecution introduced the recording despite an earlier Sandoval ruling limiting permissible cross-examination about his criminal history.

The court held that an independent admissibility hearing should have preceded introduction of this material. A Sandoval ruling principally regulates impeachment if the defendant testifies; it does not resolve every possible substantive use of the same information. Conversely, the prosecution cannot evade the ruling simply by placing the information before the jury through its own evidence.

The required inquiry is whether the underlying misconduct evidence has an independently proper basis for admission, rather than inviting the jury to infer guilt from bad character. The opinion does not declare every reference automatically inadmissible. It requires the admissibility question to be addressed before the jury hears the prejudicial information.

Because Mulverhill did not object at trial, this discussion is best understood as explicit guidance for retrial, not as a separate preserved ground on which the judgment was reversed.

F. Other issues were not resolved on their merits

The remaining contentions were generally rendered academic by the new-trial order. The court nevertheless clarified that the claim of a duplicitous first-degree robbery count was unpreserved and did not warrant interest-of-justice review. It likewise found the constitutional challenge to recidivist sentencing unpreserved to the extent that issue remained live.

Accordingly, the opinion neither determines that the robbery count was duplicitous nor resolves the constitutionality of New York’s repeat-offender sentencing framework.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion principally applies existing doctrine rather than announcing a departure from precedent. The following authorities explain its different analytical steps; their significance is described according to the use made of them in the supplied opinion.

A. Impartial juries and rehabilitation

People v Everett, 231 AD3d 1296, 1301 [3d Dept 2024]
This supplies the central rehabilitation rule: statements raising serious doubt about impartiality require follow-up, and the prospective juror must unequivocally affirm an ability to remain fair. It provides the governing standard against which both challenged jurors’ answers were measured.
People v Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138, 151 [3d Dept 2025]
Cited alongside People v Everett, this reinforces the obligation to investigate disclosed bias and obtain an adequate assurance of impartiality. It supports treating rehabilitation as a substantive inquiry, not a procedural formality.
People v Edmunds, 252 AD3d 1815, 1818 [3d Dept 2026]
This authority performs two functions. It supports resolving doubts in favor of excusing questionable jurors, and it connects an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause with the statutory consequence of exhausted peremptory challenges.
People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600, 616 [2000]; People v Rios, 192 AD3d 1336, 1338 [3d Dept 2021]; People v Jackson, 176 AD3d 1312, 1315 [3d Dept 2019]
These decisions support the conclusion concerning prospective juror No. 94: once his statements disclosed a prejudgment, the absence of an unequivocal impartiality assurance left the problem unresolved. The Court of Appeals authority in People v Johnson anchors that conclusion in higher-court precedent, while the other decisions reinforce its application within the Department.
People v Young, 119 AD3d 970, 971-972 [3d Dept 2014]
This is the closest stated analogue for prospective juror No. 178. The quoted principle requires questioning to address the concern actually expressed and obtain assurances of impartiality. It explains why a generalized promise to follow instructions did not cure the particular charge-based inference of guilt.

B. Preservation, weight review, and credibility

People v Oates, 222 AD3d 1271, 1272 [3d Dept 2023]; People v Baber, 182 AD3d 794, 795 [3d Dept 2020]
These authorities establish the preservation requirements governing legal-sufficiency challenges: the trial motion must identify the specific alleged deficiency and be renewed when required after the proof closes. People v Oates also supports examining offense elements during weight review despite the preservation defect.
People v Stover, 178 AD3d 1138, 1139 n 1 [3d Dept 2019]
This supports the distinction between an unavailable, unpreserved sufficiency challenge and the element-by-element examination necessarily involved in weight-of-the-evidence review. It explains why the court still evaluated all ten convictions.
People v Alger, 206 AD3d 1049, 1050-1051 [3d Dept 2022]; People v Goberdhan, 241 AD3d 992, 993 [3d Dept 2025]
These provide the two-stage weight-review framework: ask whether another outcome would have been unreasonable and, if not, weigh conflicting testimony and competing inferences. They structure the court’s examination rather than predetermine its result.
People v Ashe, 208 AD3d 1500, 1501 [3d Dept 2022]; People v Furman, 152 AD3d 870, 875 [3d Dept 2017]
These explain the reviewing court’s posture: neutral consideration of the evidence coupled with deference to the jury’s credibility judgments. They support sustaining the verdict despite substantial reasons to question individual witnesses.
People v Hartfield, 250 AD3d 1234, 1237 [3d Dept 2026]
Cited when acknowledging that a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, this confirms that the first stage of weight review can favor further examination without requiring reversal.
People v Zakrzewski, 249 AD3d 1314, 1319 n 1 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Evans, 250 AD3d 1665, 1665 [4th Dept 2026]
These support rejecting the contention that the prosecution witnesses were inherently unbelievable or incredible as a matter of law. They help distinguish ordinary credibility weaknesses, which jurors assess, from testimony legally incapable of supporting a verdict.

C. Authorities supporting the individual offenses

People v Harrell, 251 AD3d 1167, 1175 [3d Dept 2026]
Cited with Penal Law § 135.20, this supports the kidnapping analysis based on forcibly transporting the victim to Canada against his expressed wishes.
People v Rosario, 157 AD3d 988, 991 [3d Dept 2018]
This supports the first-degree unlawful-imprisonment conclusion, connecting the victim’s restraint with the dangerous force used during it.
People v Heffernan, 247 AD3d 1644, 1645 [4th Dept 2026]
This supports applying Penal Law § 120.05 (12) through the combined proof of assaultive conduct, injury, and the relevant age relationship.
People v Butcher, 192 AD3d 1196, 1199 [3d Dept 2021]
This is cited in support of third-degree grand larceny, where the unauthorized taking and disposal of the pickup truck were coupled with evidence of its purchase price.
People v Saunders, 176 AD3d 1384, 1388 [3d Dept 2019]
This supports the first-degree robbery finding based on serious injuries inflicted during the taking of property, including injuries creating a substantial risk of death.
People v Smith, 231 AD3d 1302, 1304-1305 [3d Dept 2024]; People v Lavayen, 200 AD3d 1069, 1070-1071 [2d Dept 2021]; People v Shuaib, 111 AD3d 1055, 1057 [3d Dept 2013]
These collectively support accessorial liability for strangulation. Their role is to connect Mulverhill’s coordinated violence and theft with Delaney’s choking through the necessary community of purpose, rather than requiring proof that Mulverhill personally compressed the victim’s neck.
People v Khalil, 206 AD3d 1300, 1305 [3d Dept 2022]
This supports fourth-degree grand larceny based on the taking of the victim’s debit card within his wallet. The relevant statutory basis is the card’s character, not simply the location from which the wallet was removed.
People v Law, 231 AD3d 1306, 1307-1308 [3d Dept 2024]
This supports finding conspiracy from the prior agreement to rob and the subsequent overt conduct advancing that plan. It links Delaney’s account of the agreement with Mulverhill’s actual participation.
People v Stevens, 114 AD3d 483, 484 [1st Dept 2014]
This supports criminal-mischief liability for disabling the cellphone during an attempted emergency call. Its significance lies in interference with emergency communication, not merely ordinary property damage.

D. Suppression authorities

People v Collier, 146 AD3d 1146, 1147 [3d Dept 2017]
This supplies the abandonment rule for an unpursued request for a probable-cause hearing. It explains why merely having requested a hearing did not preserve the arrest challenge when counsel failed to obtain a ruling or bring the omission to the court’s attention.
People v Fox, 244 AD3d 1510, 1511 [3d Dept 2025]
This states the prosecution’s beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden to establish voluntary statements, including warnings and a knowing Miranda waiver for custodial interrogation.
People v Daniels, 247 AD3d 1257, 1262 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Prusinski, 242 AD3d 1427, 1431 [3d Dept 2025]
These establish the substantial deference afforded suppression-hearing findings, especially credibility determinations. They explain why the appellate court would not disturb those findings without a record-based reason to regard them as clearly erroneous.
People v Rainey, 251 AD3d 1271, 1277 [3d Dept 2026]
This supports the ultimate conclusion that the hearing evidence established voluntariness and a knowing waiver. It applies the governing burden to the circumstances of the interrogation.

E. Disclosure, confidentiality, and acquiescence

People v Albert, 85 NY2d 851, 852-853 [1995]
Cited generally, this supports the preservation consequence of accepting the trial court’s handling of an issue. Mulverhill’s express acquiescence in sealing the reports undermined his later appellate objection to that arrangement.
People v Sessoms, 193 AD3d 1181, 1182 [3d Dept 2021]; People v Fishel, 128 AD3d 15, 19 [3d Dept 2015]
These accompany CPL 390.50 (1) in the court’s refusal to grant interest-of-justice relief over the presentence reports. Their use places the dispute within the statutory confidentiality framework without establishing a categorical exemption from favorable-evidence disclosure.

F. Prior misconduct and the limits of evidentiary workarounds

People v Jones, 278 AD2d 246, 248 [2d Dept 2000]
This supplies the explicit prohibition against circumventing a Sandoval ruling through the prosecution’s case-in-chief. It is the central authority for the court’s warning about the recorded interview.
People v Osman, 228 AD3d 1007, 1014 [3d Dept 2024]; People v Sellars, 74 AD2d 551, 551-552 [1st Dept 1980]
These reinforce the need to assess the independent admissibility of prejudicial criminal-history evidence rather than allow its admission merely because it appears within otherwise relevant prosecution material.

G. Issues left unresolved

People v Allen, 24 NY3d 441, 448-450 [2014]
Cited generally in the footnote concerning the robbery count, this supports treating the trial-evidence-based duplicity argument as unpreserved. It does not supply a merits ruling that this particular count was defective.
People v Buchanan, 251 AD3d 1301, 1306 [3d Dept 2026]
This supports declining discretionary interest-of-justice intervention on that unpreserved duplicity claim.
People v Hernandez, 43 NY3d 591, 597-598 [2025]; People v Cox, 237 AD3d 1405, 1409 [3d Dept 2025]
These support the preservation ruling on Mulverhill’s constitutional challenge to repeat-offender sentencing. Their procedural role is important: the court did not use them to resolve the underlying constitutional question.
Erlinger v United States, 602 US 821 [2024]
The opinion cites this decision only generally in connection with the recidivist-sentencing challenge. It supplies constitutional context concerning jury factfinding in enhanced sentencing, but the Third Department does not determine its substantive effect on the New York scheme.

5. Potential Impact

More focused jury-selection inquiries

The most immediate effect is practical. When a prospective juror equates indictment, numerous counts, or rejection of a plea with guilt, courts should identify that inference directly and determine whether it can genuinely be set aside. Earlier assurances about a different subject cannot cure a later-disclosed bias.

The decision also cautions against treating “I can follow instructions” as universally sufficient. The adequacy of rehabilitation depends on the concern expressed and the answers obtained. Trial judges retain discretion over questioning, but the record must demonstrate that the relevant doubt has been resolved.

Preservation remains outcome-determinative

The appeal illustrates the different consequences of trial-level conduct. Specific challenges for cause, rulings, and exhaustion of peremptory challenges produced reversal. By contrast, imprecise dismissal motions, an unpursued hearing request, and acquiescence in a disclosure ruling restricted review of other issues.

Closer screening of police recordings

Prosecutors should review recorded interviews for references to convictions, supervision status, and other misconduct before offering them. Where such material is proposed for admission, the court must address its independent evidentiary basis; redaction may be appropriate when no permissible basis exists. Defense counsel should seek a clear ruling rather than assume a Sandoval determination automatically governs the recording.

A narrow, not revolutionary, precedent

The opinion does not create a new test for juror bias, a blanket ban on criminal-history references, or a general discovery exemption for presentence reports. Its importance lies in enforcing established safeguards against concrete procedural shortcuts.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Challenge for cause
A request to exclude a prospective juror for a legally recognized reason, such as an inability to remain impartial. It does not consume a peremptory challenge.
Peremptory challenge
A limited opportunity to exclude a prospective juror without proving cause, subject to constitutional restrictions against discriminatory use. Exhausting these challenges mattered to the remedy here.
Juror rehabilitation
Follow-up questioning to determine whether an apparent bias can be set aside. An explanation from counsel is not itself rehabilitation; the prospective juror’s answers must establish impartiality.
Legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence
Sufficiency asks whether the evidence can legally establish the offense. Weight review evaluates the persuasiveness of the trial proof and competing inferences. An unpreserved sufficiency argument does not eliminate the appellate court’s separate weight-review function.
Accessorial liability
Responsibility for another person’s offense based on intentional assistance and the required culpable mental state. Active cooperation can establish liability even when someone else performs the central physical act.
Brady material
Evidence favorable to the defense, including qualifying impeachment evidence, that constitutional disclosure rules require the prosecution to provide. Whether a particular document must be disclosed can involve questions beyond its confidentiality label.
Sandoval and Molineux/Ventimiglia inquiries
A Sandoval ruling addresses permissible impeachment through prior misconduct if a defendant testifies. A Molineux/Ventimiglia inquiry concerns the prosecution’s proposed use of misconduct evidence for an independently proper purpose rather than a forbidden inference of criminal propensity.
Preservation and interest-of-justice review
Preservation generally requires a timely, sufficiently specific objection or request for a ruling. Interest-of-justice review permits discretionary correction of some unpreserved errors, but an appellate court need not exercise that power.
Duplicitous count
A single count that improperly encompasses more than one offense, potentially creating uncertainty about whether jurors agreed on the same criminal act. The court did not decide that such a defect occurred here.

7. Conclusion

People v Mulverhill demonstrates that evidentiary support for a conviction cannot substitute for a properly selected, impartial jury. Where prospective jurors infer guilt from the charges or the defendant’s decision to stand trial, courts must obtain meaningful, unequivocal assurances that those assumptions can be put aside.

The decision also reinforces a complementary safeguard: prejudicial criminal-history evidence cannot enter through a recorded interview without independent admissibility scrutiny. Together, these rulings protect the principle that guilt must be decided from properly admitted evidence—not assumptions generated by an indictment, a rejected plea, or a defendant’s past.