Chapple v. State: Daubert Admissibility of Infrared Gunshot-Deposits Testing on Polyester and “Original Documentary Evidence” Treatment of Crime-Lab Reports

1. Introduction

Case: Chapple v. The State (S25A1158), Supreme Court of Georgia (decided Feb. 17, 2026).
Parties: Johnny Chapple (appellant/defendant) vs. the State of Georgia (appellee).
Charges and posture: Chapple was tried for the shooting death of Latoria Waller. The jury acquitted him of malice murder but convicted him of felony murder (predicated on aggravated assault) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Core factual dispute at trial: whether Chapple shot Waller, or Waller shot herself (and allegedly placed the handgun into a dresser drawer before becoming incapacitated).

Issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and OCGA § 24-7-702(b) concerning infrared photography testing on black polyester fabric; (2) whether the trial court applied the correct admissibility standard (Daubert vs. Harper); (3) whether sending certain crime lab reports into the jury room violated the “continuing witness” rule; and (4) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Chapple’s convictions. The Court held:

  • The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting GBI Special Agent Bryan Smith’s expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and OCGA § 24-7-702(b), including his infrared-photography experiment on black polyester fabric.
  • Although Chapple argued the court used the older Harper v. State standard, the record showed the court applied Daubert/OCGA § 24-7-702(b).
  • The trial court did not violate the continuing witness rule by allowing three crime lab reports to go out with the jury, because the reports were original documentary evidence rather than written testimony.
  • Chapple failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, and his cumulative-error claim failed because there were no errors or deficiencies to aggregate.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Expert admissibility: Daubert in Georgia criminal cases

  • Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (509 U.S. 579 (1993))
    The foundational federal decision requiring trial courts to serve as “gatekeepers” to ensure expert testimony is both relevant and reliable. In Chapple, the Court framed the trial judge’s role in classic Daubert terms (testability, peer review/publication, error rate, general acceptance, and the expert’s experience/training).
  • Arnold v. State (321 Ga. 434 (2025))
    The Court relied on Arnold to emphasize that, after the 2022 amendment to OCGA § 24-7-702, Georgia has extended “the federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony articulated in Daubert ... and its progeny” to criminal proceedings. Arnold also supplied the standard of review—manifest abuse of discretion—and the structure of the gatekeeping inquiry (qualifications + relevancy + reliability).
  • Harper v. State (249 Ga. 519 (1982)) and Garrison v. State (319 Ga. 711 (2024))
    Chapple claimed the trial court used Harper rather than Daubert. The Court acknowledged the argument and pointed to Garrison, which noted Georgia had “not yet” fully analyzed how Daubert and Harper differ, but clarified they are “not the same.” Still, the dispositive point in Chapple was practical: whatever the trial court mused about “leniency,” its written ruling showed it actually applied the Daubert/Rule 702 framework.

2) Jury-room documents: the continuing witness rule and “original documentary evidence”

  • Lofton v. State (310 Ga. 770 (2021)) (disapproved in part on other grounds by Outlaw v. State (311 Ga. 396 (2021)))
    Lofton supplied the Court’s description of the continuing witness rule as governing what writings may accompany the jury during deliberations. Outlaw is cited only to note partial disapproval on unrelated grounds.
  • Muse v. State (316 Ga. 639 (2023))
    Muse articulated the fairness rationale: it is unfair to allow jurors repeated access to “written testimony” that was read to them when oral testimony is heard only once.
  • Robinson v. State (308 Ga. 543 (2020))
    Central to Chapple, Robinson stands for the proposition that writings that are themselves relevant evidence—rather than “written testimony” deriving value solely from the maker’s credibility—may qualify as “original documentary evidence” and can go out with the jury. Chapple analogized the crime lab reports to such original evidence.
  • Adams v. State (284 Ga. App. 534 (2007)) and Tanner v. State (259 Ga. App. 94 (2003))
    Both Court of Appeals decisions supported the proposition that scientific test reports can be original documentary evidence because they are direct evidence of how a test was conducted and the resulting measurements/findings.
  • Roberts v. State (282 Ga. 548 (2007))
    Chapple relied on Roberts, where a documents examiner report was deemed not original documentary evidence because it largely summarized the test and provided an opinion, without evidencing the manner of testing. Chapple distinguished Roberts: the reports here specified the types of tests and results and did not embed the analyst’s opinion in the same way.

3) Ineffective assistance, suppression, and cumulative error

  • Strickland v. Washington (466 US 668 (1984))
    The governing two-prong standard (deficient performance + prejudice). Chapple applies the familiar presumption of reasonable professional judgment.
  • Lofton v. State (309 Ga. 349 (2020)), Scott v. State (306 Ga. 417 (2019)), Thomas v. State (311 Ga. 706 (2021)), Williams v. State (315 Ga. 797 (2023))
    These cases supply Georgia’s modern articulation of deference to trial strategy, the “patently unreasonable” threshold for attacking tactics, and the rule that failure on either Strickland prong ends the claim.
  • Scott v. State (317 Ga. 218 (2023)) and Tyson v. State (312 Ga. 585 (2021))
    Used to uphold counsel’s strategic choice not to object so as not to highlight prejudicial material; and to reinforce that when/how to object is usually strategy, reversible only if no competent lawyer would do it.
  • Moss v. State (322 Ga. 757 (2025)), Copeland v. State (314 Ga. 44 (2022)), State v. Britton (316 Ga. 283 (2023)), Prince v. State (295 Ga. 788 (2014))
    These cases frame probable cause and the “clearly would have succeeded” test for suppression-based ineffectiveness claims. The Court used them to reject the argument that the search warrant lacked a sufficient nexus to the home.
  • Blocker v. State (316 Ga. 568 (2023))
    Applied to reject cumulative error: with no errors or deficiencies found, there is nothing to aggregate.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Daubert/OCGA § 24-7-702(b): Reliability of an applied forensic experiment

The Court treated the trial court’s decision as a classic gatekeeping determination under Daubert and OCGA § 24-7-702(b), reviewed for abuse of discretion. The key reasoning steps were:

  • Qualifications and methodology: Agent Smith testified to extensive study and teaching of infrared/alternate light sources, and a substantial number of prior examinations (80–100). This supported qualification and practical expertise.
  • Scientific grounding: Smith described a “wealth of research” dating back decades, his ongoing review of peer publications, and that infrared is the “primary tool” for examining dark fabrics for gunpowder deposits.
  • Case-specific fit (relevancy): The dispute involved whether the shot was self-inflicted and at what distance; the State’s theory relied on absence/presence patterns of soot/stippling/gunpowder deposits on dark fabric. Smith’s distance-based test pattern on black polyester was therefore probative.
  • “New substrate” does not equal unreliable: Chapple emphasized that the GBI had used infrared on denim/cotton, not polyester. The Court accepted the trial court’s determination that Smith’s experiment addressed that question—whether polyester would “wash out” appropriately and still allow visualization of deposits—while applying generally accepted principles.
  • Not required to replicate every factual detail: Chapple criticized that Smith did not use the actual murder weapon or a swatch from Waller’s specific nightgown. The Court held the test was nonetheless adjusted to the material facts: a 9mm handgun firing through black polyester fabric at varying distances.

Importantly, the Court’s reasoning signals a practical Daubert approach: where the underlying technique is established and the experiment is framed as an empirical, best-practices application to a case-specific question, differences in exact weapon or exact garment go to weight more than admissibility.

2) “Daubert vs. Harper”: the operative question is the standard actually applied

Although the trial court made a remark about whether Harper v. State or Daubert was “more lenient,” the Supreme Court focused on the trial court’s actual analysis and findings. By reciting the Rule 702/Daubert factors and making explicit findings of relevance, sufficient facts/data, reliable methods, and reliable application, the trial court demonstrated it used the correct modern framework.

3) Continuing witness rule: when lab reports may go to the jury

The Court placed the crime lab reports on the permissible side of the line because they were treated as “original documentary evidence.” The core distinctions were:

  • Purpose of the continuing witness rule: to prevent undue emphasis from repeated access to written testimony during deliberations.
  • Nature of the reports: the reports described the tests used and results obtained (e.g., scanning electron microscopy/energy dispersive spectroscopy), rather than functioning as narrative testimony or opinion-laden conclusions.
  • Distinguishing Roberts v. State: unlike the report in Roberts, these reports documented the types of scientific tests and the results, without being merely a conclusory opinion lacking the “manner” of testing.

The Court thus reinforced a workable trial rule: scientific reports that document testing methodology and results (and are otherwise admissible) may accompany the jury as exhibits, without violating the continuing witness rule.

4) Ineffective assistance: strategic non-objection and suppression claims

  • Non-objection to potentially prejudicial testimony: Agent Maddox mentioned a “Gangster Disciple” drawing and “a suitcase of marijuana.” The Court accepted that an objection could highlight the prejudice; under Scott v. State (317 Ga. 218 (2023)), counsel need not prove the same strategic rationale post hoc so long as a reasonable lawyer might proceed similarly. Additionally, counsel articulated a strategic reason regarding the marijuana reference (possible credibility attack on investigators).
  • Failure to file a motion to suppress: Under Moss v. State, Chapple had to show the proposed suppression motion “clearly would have succeeded.” Applying Copeland v. State and State v. Britton, the Court concluded the affidavit gave a magistrate a “substantial basis” to find a fair probability that evidence (including the handgun) would be found in the home where the shooting occurred.
  • Cumulative error: With no errors/deficiencies established, Blocker v. State foreclosed aggregation.

C. Impact

  • Practical Daubert guidance for applied forensic demonstrations: Chapple supports admissibility where an expert adapts an established forensic visualization tool (infrared photography) to a specific evidentiary substrate (polyester) through an empirical test aligned with field standards. Future litigants challenging “case-specific experiments” will likely need to focus on methodological flaws (controls, documentation, validation, error rate) rather than the mere fact of a new fabric type.
  • Stronger roadmap for trial courts writing Daubert rulings: The opinion rewards clear findings tracking Rule 702’s elements and Daubert’s reliability concepts. This incentivizes detailed gatekeeping orders to insulate admissibility decisions on appeal.
  • Clearer exhibit-handling for lab reports: By distinguishing Roberts v. State and emphasizing methodology-and-results reporting, Chapple will likely be cited to support sending many standard forensic reports (GSR, ballistics comparison documentation) to the jury, so long as they function as original documentary evidence rather than “written testimony.”
  • Limits on post-trial “should have objected” arguments: The Court continues a trend of deferring to the tactical decision not to object where an objection risks emphasizing harmful facts, making Strickland relief harder absent a clear showing of prejudice and lack of reasonable strategy.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Daubert “gatekeeping”: Before jurors hear expert opinions, the judge must ensure the testimony is based on reliable methods and is relevant to the case. It is not enough that the witness is experienced; the method must be trustworthy.
  • OCGA § 24-7-702(b): Georgia’s rule (now applicable in criminal cases) that generally mirrors the federal approach to expert testimony: sufficient data, reliable methods, and reliable application to the facts.
  • Soot vs. stippling vs. gunshot residue (GSR): “Soot” is smoke-like deposit near an entry area (often closer shots). “Stippling” is a speckled abrasion pattern from unburned powder striking a surface (commonly intermediate range). “GSR” testing on hands detects microscopic particles that can be present from firing, being near a discharge, or contact with contaminated surfaces.
  • Contact / close / intermediate / indeterminate range wounds: Medical examiners classify wounds by physical markers (muzzle impression, searing, soot, stippling). If none appear, the range may be “indeterminate” even though other evidence can still support homicide or suicide.
  • Continuing witness rule: Jurors generally cannot take “written testimony” into deliberations because it risks overemphasizing that evidence. But exhibits that are themselves evidence—like many scientific reports documenting tests and results—can go out as “original documentary evidence.”
  • “Clearly would have succeeded” (suppression + Strickland): To prove counsel was ineffective for not filing a suppression motion, the defendant must show the motion was not just arguable, but that it would clearly have been granted.

5. Conclusion

Chapple v. The State reinforces three practical rules in Georgia criminal practice: (1) after the 2022 amendment to OCGA § 24-7-702, Daubert’s reliability-focused gatekeeping governs criminal expert testimony, and applied forensic experiments may be admissible when grounded in established principles and conducted with recognized practices; (2) crime lab reports that document the testing performed and results obtained may be treated as “original documentary evidence” and may accompany the jury during deliberations without violating the continuing witness rule, particularly when distinguishable from the opinion-style report in Roberts v. State; and (3) ineffective-assistance claims remain constrained by deference to reasonable trial strategy and by demanding causation standards for suppression-based Strickland arguments.