1. Introduction
Can a Colorado public employee lose governmental immunity for consciously disregarding the risk of reputational or economic harm, even when nobody faces physical danger? In Gasser v. Coffey, the Tenth Circuit answered yes. It also concluded that allegations of knowingly false financial-misconduct accusations were sufficiently plausible to defeat an immunity-based motion to dismiss.
Matthew Gasser, a Senior Athletics Supervisor for the Town of Castle Rock, sued Sheryl Coffey, the Town’s Human Resources Manager, over accusations arising from an investigation into altered procurement-card receipts. His claims against Coffey were defamation and defamation per se, tortious interference with contract, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.
Factual background
According to the complaint, the Town retained forensic accounting firm FORVIS after receiving reports that an employee had altered purchase receipts. The alterations allegedly concealed sales tax the tax-exempt Town had paid by removing tax entries and increasing listed item prices. The Town also initiated a criminal investigation through Detective Mike Williams, with whom Coffey worked.
Gasser alleged that both investigations cleared him of financial wrongdoing. The forensic investigation nevertheless cost at least $100,000, and possibly $150,000; the police investigation identified approximately $3,000 in unnecessary sales-tax payments.
After reviewing investigative material, Coffey drafted a letter purporting to terminate Gasser immediately. It cited several grounds, including photographs and messages on his work phone, alleged financial fraud involving an altered receipt, irregularities concerning his spouse’s company, and alleged misuse of work time. Gasser’s supervisor, Jeff Brauer, refused to sign because he believed the letter contained false statements and misrepresentations.
Gasser submitted a response disputing or explaining the accusations. Discussions among Town officials did not produce agreement on termination. After Town Manager David Corliss reported that Coffey and Williams supported termination on character grounds, Brauer again refused to support dismissal. Gasser subsequently declined an invitation to resign.
Several months later, Gasser received a disciplinary letter drafted by Coffey and signed by Brauer. It omitted most accusations of theft, fraud, and criminal conduct, but imposed a ten-day suspension and made Gasser ineligible for a pay increase for almost a year. Gasser also alleged that Coffey and Williams had been having an affair during the investigations and that personal animus and embarrassment over the investigation’s expense motivated Coffey’s actions.
These were allegations, not findings after trial. The appellate court accepted well-pleaded allegations and reasonable inferences for purposes of reviewing dismissal.
Procedural setting
Gasser initially sued in Colorado state court. Besides his claims against Coffey, he asserted First Amendment retaliation and contract claims against the Town. Following removal, the federal district court dismissed the Town’s contract claims but allowed the First Amendment claim to proceed. It also denied Coffey’s motion to dismiss.
Coffey immediately appealed the denial of immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”). The appeal concerned her immunity, not the merits of the surviving constitutional claim against the Town.
3. Analysis: Legal Reasoning and Precedents Cited
A. The statutory framework and the court’s predictive role
Colorado Revised Statutes § 24-10-118(2)(a) generally protects public employees against tort liability arising from conduct within their employment duties and scope of employment, unless the injury-causing act or omission was “willful and wanton.” The statute does not define that phrase.
The dispute therefore concerned the meaning of the exception, rather than whether the alleged injuries sounded in tort. Coffey argued that the exception required conscious disregard of physical danger. The court rejected that limitation.
Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1288 (10th Cir. 2020), supplied the rule that CGIA immunity questions receive de novo review. It also supported applying Colorado substantive law to the state-law claims within the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction.
Amparan v. Lake Powell Car Rental Cos., 882 F.3d 943, 947–48 (10th Cir. 2018), established the method for resolving an unsettled state-law question: follow the state’s highest court when it has spoken; otherwise predict its answer, giving substantial weight to intermediate appellate decisions unless persuasive evidence indicates that the highest court would disagree.
This framework matters to the decision’s reach. The Tenth Circuit did not claim that Colorado’s Supreme Court had already expressly resolved the physical-versus-nonphysical distinction. It predicted that court’s answer from existing Colorado authority.
B. The central precedent: Martinez v. Estate of Bleck
Martinez v. Estate of Bleck, 379 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2016), provided the governing conceptual standard. That case involved a police officer’s unintentional discharge of a firearm during an encounter with a suicidal man.
The Colorado Supreme Court considered three formulations of willful and wanton conduct, drawn from Black’s Law Dictionary, Colorado’s exemplary-damages statute, and its automobile guest statute. Rather than select one formulation, it identified their shared requirement: “a conscious disregard of the danger.”
The crucial distinction in Martinez was between negligence and conscious disregard. The trial court had applied a “should have realized” standard. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected that approach and remanded for application of the more demanding conscious-disregard standard.
Coffey relied on references to “safety” and “danger” in Martinez to argue for a physical-harm requirement. The Tenth Circuit treated those references as applications of the standard to the firearm-related facts, not as restrictions on the kinds of injury covered by the CGIA exception.
The court also corrected Coffey’s characterization of the disposition. Martinez did not definitively award the officer immunity despite a reckless shooting. It required reconsideration under the correct standard. Accordingly, Coffey could not establish immunity merely by arguing that her conduct was less physically dangerous than the officer’s conduct there.
C. The decisive persuasive authority: Southway v. Crone
Southway v. Crone, No. 24CA0219, 2024 WL 5162947 (Colo. App. Dec. 19, 2024), directly addressed the disputed question in a defamation setting. It concluded that the danger consciously disregarded need not be physical.
The Tenth Circuit found its statutory reasoning persuasive for three connected reasons:
- The employee-immunity provision extends broadly to claims for injury that lie, or could lie, in tort.
- The CGIA’s definition of injury includes nonphysical injuries actionable against private persons.
- Damage to reputation caused by defamatory statements is a recognized tort injury.
From this structure, the court reasoned that an immunity covering physical and nonphysical tort injuries should not have a willful-and-wanton exception artificially confined to physical danger. The same conscious-disregard standard applies across the relevant categories of harm.
Southway v. Crone also explained why this interpretation was consistent with Martinez: a standard broad enough to cover conscious disregard of danger does not become exclusively physical merely because the case articulating it involved a gunshot.
Coffey argued that this interpretation effectively eliminated the willful-and-wanton requirement for intentional torts and that something beyond intent, conscious disregard, or “actual malice” should be necessary. The Tenth Circuit rejected a heightened requirement inconsistent with Martinez. It did not, however, announce that every intentional tort automatically defeats employee immunity. Its conclusion depended on allegations plausibly demonstrating conscious disregard of the relevant harm.
D. Supporting Colorado decisions
- Lee v. Colo. Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 230 (Colo. 1986)
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This decision held that loss of consortium constitutes an injury under the CGIA and interpreted statutory injury broadly to include injuries actionable in tort if inflicted by a private person. It supported the premise that the Act is not limited to physical injury. The Tenth Circuit nevertheless recognized that it did not itself expressly resolve whether conscious disregard of nonphysical danger satisfies the willful-and-wanton exception.
- Sigalla v. Meidhof, No. 23CA1810, 2025 WL 415470 (Colo. App. Feb. 6, 2025)
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This decision applied Martinez to allegedly defamatory conduct by a public employee. It offered additional support for applying the conscious-disregard standard outside physical-injury cases, although it did not expressly decide the precise physical-danger question. The opinion notes that certiorari was denied.
- Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276, 282 (Colo. App. 2005)
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As discussed through Southway v. Crone, this earlier decision applied a similar standard to a defamation claim against a public employee. It reinforced the conclusion that evaluating willful and wanton conduct in a reputational-injury setting was compatible with Colorado law.
E. Why Rowan v. Vail Holdings, Inc. did not change the result
Coffey also invoked Rowan v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 889, 900 (D. Colo. 1998), which described willful and wanton behavior as knowingly choosing conduct recognized as highly hazardous and strongly likely to injure another.
The court distinguished that decision on several grounds. It concerned a private ski company, a liability-release agreement, and whether sufficient evidence supported submitting a willful-and-wanton claim to a jury—not CGIA employee immunity. It also predated Martinez.
More fundamentally, its references to hazardousness and injury did not establish that those concepts must always be physical. The physical nature of the fatal skiing accident in that case did not supply a universal limitation for public-employee tort claims.
F. Pleading conscious disregard: facts, documents, and reasonable inferences
The court next considered whether Gasser’s allegations plausibly met the standard. Because Coffey’s dismissal motion attacked the allegations rather than presenting a developed factual dispute, the review resembled an ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.
Three cited decisions framed this inquiry:
- Schmitz v. Colo. State Patrol, 841 F. App'x 45, 54 (10th Cir. 2020), explained that review of a pleading-based attack on the CGIA exception mirrors Rule 12(b)(6) review. The court cited this unpublished decision for its persuasive value.
- Morphew v. Chaffee Cnty., 172 F.4th 802, 813 (10th Cir. 2026), supported accepting well-pleaded allegations as true, construing them favorably to the plaintiff, and considering complaint attachments.
- Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2012), supplied the distinction between unsupported information-and-belief assertions and allegations made plausible by factual context. Information-and-belief pleading was not categorically disallowed.
The complaint alleged that Coffey accused Gasser of financial crimes despite knowing that the investigations had cleared him. It further alleged that she knowingly transmitted false statements and enlisted Williams to provide character opinions supporting termination.
Coffey emphasized that the complaint sometimes said she “had or should have had” the investigative reports. Standing alone, a “should have” allegation might suggest negligence rather than conscious disregard. But the court assessed the surrounding factual context rather than isolating those words.
Two sources supported an inference of actual access to the investigative results:
- In her dismissal motion, Coffey acknowledged receiving evidence from both investigations and reviewing it before drafting the initial letter.
- The initial letter itself described the forensic investigation and recounted what appeared to be its results.
Accepting the alleged exoneration as true, the court found it reasonable to infer that Coffey possessed the complete investigative results when she accused Gasser of financial wrongdoing. This made conscious disregard plausible rather than merely speculative.
The court added an alternative rationale: even without possession of the results, accusing Gasser of financial fraud before awaiting verification demonstrated conscious disregard in the pleaded circumstances. That observation should be read alongside the court’s express distinction between negligence and conscious disregard—not as a categorical rule that every failure to investigate defeats immunity.
G. Why legitimate discipline and later revisions were insufficient defenses
Coffey argued that the complaint disclosed legitimate, nonpretextual grounds for discipline. She also contended that Gasser received an opportunity to respond and that the later letter omitted the criminal accusations, demonstrating due process rather than willful and wanton conduct.
The court regarded those arguments as addressing a different question. Legitimate grounds for some employment action do not establish that separate, allegedly false accusations were made without conscious disregard of injury. Nor does a subsequent revision necessarily eliminate the significance of an earlier communication.
The relevant inquiry concerned the initial accusations and their potential reputational or economic consequences. The court did not decide whether the Town’s disciplinary process independently satisfied any constitutional due-process requirement.
H. Interlocutory jurisdiction and the limits of the appeal
Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med., LLC v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 832, 837 (10th Cir. 2003), established appellate jurisdiction over the immunity ruling. A denial of CGIA immunity from suit is immediately appealable under the federal collateral order doctrine because postponing review could defeat the protection against undergoing litigation.
That jurisdiction did not automatically encompass every other reason Coffey advanced for dismissing the tort claims. She separately argued that Gasser had not adequately alleged the involvement of a third party. The opinion identified the authorities underlying those arguments:
| Authority |
Proposition relevant to Coffey’s argument |
| Williams v. Dist. Ct., 866 P.2d 908, 911 n.4 (Colo. 1993) |
Defamation requires publication of the challenged statement to a third party. |
| Galleria Towers, Inc. v. Crump Warren & Sommer, Inc., 831 P.2d 908, 912 (Colo. App. 1991) |
Tortious interference with contract requires a valid and enforceable contract involving a third party to the alleged interferer. |
| Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1117 (D. Colo. 2004) |
Interference with prospective economic advantage concerns intentionally inducing or causing a third party not to enter or continue a business relationship. |
These authorities identified unresolved merits questions; the Tenth Circuit did not apply them to decide whether Gasser’s claims ultimately satisfied those elements.
Dababneh v. FDIC, 971 F.2d 428, 432 n.6 (10th Cir. 1992), supplied the ordinary rule that denials of motions to dismiss are not immediately appealable. Coffey therefore needed a separate basis for appellate review of her non-immunity arguments.
Her reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) was misplaced. That statute authorizes supplemental jurisdiction in district courts, not appellate review of otherwise nonappealable rulings.
Bustillos v. City of Artesia, 98 F.4th 1022, 1037–38 (10th Cir. 2024), provided the relevant pendent appellate jurisdiction framework. Review is appropriate only when deciding the appealable issue necessarily resolves the nonappealable issue, or when review of the latter is necessary for meaningful review of the former. It also placed the burden on Coffey to establish that jurisdiction.
Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 929 (10th Cir. 1995), reinforced that pendent appellate jurisdiction is generally disfavored. Here, deciding whether nonphysical harm qualified under the immunity exception, and whether conscious disregard was plausibly alleged, did not require resolving the third-party elements of the torts.
The court also identified preservation failures. Coffey had not addressed pendent appellate jurisdiction in her opening brief, and the relevant merits arguments had not been timely presented below. Impact Energy Res., LLC v. Salazar, 693 F.3d 1239, 1246 n.3 (10th Cir. 2012), supported the consequence of failing to raise an issue at the appropriate time. C&M Res., LLC v. Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 159 F.4th 755, 762 (10th Cir. 2025), confirmed that a district court may disregard new reply-brief arguments or allow a surreply. The district court had chosen not to consider Coffey’s newly raised arguments.
I. Public access and the motion to seal
The sealing dispute concerned six complaint exhibits: the initial termination letter, Gasser’s draft and revised responses, an email reporting his refusal to resign, the disciplinary letter, and a confidentiality notice concerning the forensic investigation. Although the district court had restricted access by agreement, that did not establish entitlement to sealing on appeal.
Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1135–36 (10th Cir. 2011), required a party seeking sealing to overcome the common-law presumption of access by identifying a real and substantial countervailing interest. Colony Ins. Co. v. Burke, 698 F.3d 1222, 1242 (10th Cir. 2012), made the presumption particularly strong when documents determine substantive legal rights.
The employment-related exhibits were central to the appeal, and their essential contents already appeared in unsealed pleadings and briefs. The court also saw no identity-related information warranting sealing, apart from Gasser’s address, whose disclosure he apparently did not oppose.
Coffey relied on the Colorado Open Records Act (“CORA”) and Denver Publishing Co. v. University of Colorado, 812 P.2d 682, 684 (Colo. App. 1990), which described broad personnel-file protection under an earlier version of the statute. The Tenth Circuit did not categorically resolve CORA’s relevance to judicial sealing. Assuming relevance, it found the argument insufficient: Coffey was not the records custodian, and CORA would not prevent Gasser from accessing his own personnel file.
Ornelas v. Dep't of Insts., 804 P.2d 235, 238 (Colo. App. 1990), reinforced that an employee is entitled to access his own personnel records. This undermined Coffey’s reliance on personnel confidentiality against the employee whose records were involved.
Coffey also invoked Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978), concerning courts’ reluctance to let their files become repositories of libelous material for press consumption. The Tenth Circuit distinguished that concern because Gasser—the subject of the allegedly defamatory statements—opposed sealing. He sought public access so readers could assess whether the record supported characterizations made in Coffey’s appellate brief.
Finally, the confidentiality notice contained general instructions about truthful participation, confidentiality, retaliation, and compliance. Coffey supplied no concrete reason to shield it from public view. The court denied sealing and directed that the provisionally sealed volume be unsealed after the mandate issued.