Bright-Line Predicate Rule: Criminal Violation of a Protection Order Qualifies as a “Crime Against Another Person or Property” for Second-Degree Burglary

I. Introduction

People v. Dilka arises from a preliminary-hearing ruling in Weld County binding Robert Joe Dilka over for trial on second degree burglary after he allegedly entered his ex-wife’s home while subject to a mandatory criminal protection order. The central legal issue was narrow but consequential: whether a criminal violation of a protection order under section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S. (2025), categorically constitutes the “crime against another person or property” predicate required by Colorado’s second degree burglary statute, section 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. (2025).

The People (plaintiff) argued that this question was controlled by People v. Rhorer, 967 P.2d 147 (Colo. 1998), which approved a burglary conviction predicated on intent to violate a no-contact order. Dilka (defendant) contended that Rhorer did not create a categorical rule and that whether a protection-order violation is a “crime against” a person or property requires a fact-specific inquiry (especially where the alleged conduct is nonviolent and non-destructive).

Exercising extraordinary original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21, the Colorado Supreme Court used this case to clarify the scope of Rhorer and to confirm a bright-line rule for burglary prosecutions involving protection-order violations.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court discharged the order to show cause and remanded for further proceedings, holding that under a bright-line rule established in People v. Rhorer, a criminal violation of a protection order under section 18-6-803.5 is, as a matter of law, a “crime against another person or property” and therefore may serve as the predicate offense element of second degree burglary under section 18-4-203(1).

The Court rejected Dilka’s attempt to limit Rhorer to the question whether a protection-order violation is a “crime” at all, and it reasoned that the text and purpose of section 18-6-803.5 confirm that protection orders are designed to prevent harm or threatened harm to protected persons, premises, and property (including animals). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding probable cause at the preliminary hearing based on evidence of unlawful entry coupled with intent to violate the order.

III. Analysis

A. Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

The case came to the Supreme Court through C.A.R. 21 (original jurisdiction). The Court emphasized that Rule 21 relief is extraordinary and is used when no adequate remedy exists, including when an issue is unreviewable on appeal or is of significant public importance. Because probable-cause determinations at preliminary hearings are generally unreviewable on appeal, the Court found Rule 21 appropriate.

• People v. Justice, 2023 CO 9, ¶ 17, 524 P.3d 1178 (original jurisdiction discretionary) (quoting People v. Cortes-Gonzalez, 2022 CO 14, ¶ 21, 506 P.3d 835).
• People v. Waithour, 2023 CO 55, ¶ 8, 537 P.3d 371 (Rule 21 standards) (quoting People v. Kilgore, 2020 CO 6, ¶ 8, 455 P.3d 746).
• People v. Nichelson, 219 P.3d 1064, 1066–67 (Colo. 2009) (probable cause determinations generally unreviewable on appeal).

On the merits, the Court applied: (1) abuse-of-discretion review to the trial court’s probable-cause decision, but (2) de novo review to the extent that decision turned on statutory interpretation and legal questions.

• White v. MacFarlane, 713 P.2d 366, 369 (Colo. 1986) (probable cause finding reviewed for abuse of discretion).
• People v. Webb, 2014 CO 36, ¶ 15, 325 P.3d 566 (de novo review for legal interpretation underlying probable cause).
• Town of Minturn v. Tucker, 2013 CO 3, ¶ 27, 293 P.3d 581 (plain-meaning statutory interpretation).
• McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶¶ 37–38, 442 P.3d 379 (read statutes in context to give consistent, harmonious effect).

B. The Precedent at the Center: People v. Rhorer

The majority opinion treated People v. Rhorer, 967 P.2d 147 (Colo. 1998), as controlling and clarified what it believes Rhorer decided. In Rhorer, the defendant broke into an ex-girlfriend’s home while subject to a no-contact order. The jury convicted of second degree burglary based solely on intent to violate the order. A split court of appeals reversed.

• People v. Rhorer, 946 P.2d 503 (Colo. App. 1997), rev’d, 967 P.2d 147 (Colo. 1998) (division majority held municipal-order violation not a “crime” and questioned “therein” element).
• People v. Rhorer, 967 P.2d 147 (Colo. 1998) (Supreme Court reversed and held “that a violation of a no-contact order constitutes a predicate crime for purposes of the burglary statute.”).

In Dilka, the Court read Rhorer as doing more than labeling the violation “a crime.” It emphasized Rhorer’s concluding formulation: the defendant’s intent to violate the no-contact order “constituted an ‘intent to commit therein a crime against [a] person or property’ and fulfilled that element” of second degree burglary. On this basis, Dilka holds that Rhorer created a categorical (bright-line) rule: a criminal protection-order violation under section 18-6-803.5 is itself a qualifying burglary predicate.

C. Statutory Text and Legislative Purpose: Why the Court Considered the Bright-Line Rule “Consistent”

The burglary statute requires unlawful entry (or unlawful remaining) with intent to commit “therein a crime against another person or property.” The Court noted the legislature did not define that phrase in section 18-4-203(1) and did not limit it to particular code articles. It therefore adopted a plain-language approach: an offense involving harm or threatened harm to a person or property.

The Court then anchored its analysis in the definition and function of protection orders in section 18-6-803.5, especially the statutory definition:

“Protection order” includes orders prohibiting contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, or touching a protected person or animal, and prohibiting entering or remaining on premises, or coming within a specified distance—i.e., provisions “to protect … from imminent danger to life or health.” § 18-6-803.5(1.5)(a.5)(I).

The Court treated this definitional breadth as demonstrating that protection orders exist to prevent harm or threatened harm to persons, premises, and property, so that violating them is inherently a “crime against” those protected interests. It further relied on:

• Section 13-14-100.2 (legislative declaration) emphasizing protection orders “promote safety, reduce violence,” and address coercive control, trauma from unwanted contact, and distress from stalking.
• Section 18-1-1001 (mandatory criminal protection orders) highlighting the risk of harm, intimidation, retaliation, and witness tampering, and authorizing restrictions on contact, locations, firearms, and alcohol where linked to safety.

In short, the Court’s interpretive move was to treat the statutory purpose of protection orders (safety and harm prevention) as supplying the “against a person or property” character required by the burglary statute—without requiring a case-by-case determination that the particular violation involved force, threats, property damage, or theft.

D. The Dissent’s Competing Framework (and the Majority’s Rejection)

Justice Gabriel’s dissent framed the dispute as an elements problem: burglary requires intent to commit a “crime against another person or property,” and the dissent contended that not every protection-order violation qualifies under ordinary meanings of “against persons” or “against property.” The dissent relied on the court of appeals’ definitional approach in People v. Poindexter, 2013 COA 93, ¶ 11, 338 P.3d 352, which used Black’s Law Dictionary definitions tying “crimes against persons” to use/threat of force or crimes against the body, and “crimes against property” to seeking unlawful benefit or damage.

• People v. Poindexter, 2013 COA 93, 338 P.3d 352 (dictionary definitions; risk of physical harm does not necessarily make an offense a crime against a person).

The dissent warned that a bright-line rule lowers the prosecution’s burden in all burglary cases involving protection orders and could yield “absurd and unjust results” (e.g., technical entry into a protected space to retrieve one’s own property, absent threats, force, or property damage). It also argued Rhorer decided only that a municipal-court no-contact order violation could count as a “crime,” not that it always satisfies the “against person or property” element.

The majority, however, treated Rhorer as having already resolved the “against person or property” question categorically, and it declined to adopt the dissent’s fact-specific approach. Instead, it reaffirmed a bright-line rule, grounded in the legislature’s criminalization and protective purpose of section 18-6-803.5.

E. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Beyond Rhorer, the Court’s cited authorities served three distinct roles: (1) jurisdictional gatekeeping under C.A.R. 21, (2) standards of review and interpretive method, and (3) statutory-history support for a broad reading of burglary predicates.

• Original jurisdiction and adequacy of remedies: People v. Justice; People v. Cortes-Gonzalez; People v. Waithour; People v. Kilgore; People v. Nichelson.
  Influence: legitimized Supreme Court intervention at the preliminary-hearing stage.
• Review standards and statutory interpretation: White v. MacFarlane; People v. Webb; Town of Minturn v. Tucker; McCoy v. People.
  Influence: supported de novo resolution of the legal meaning of “crime against another person or property.”
• Burglary statutory history / breadth: Cooper v. People, 973 P.2d 1234 (Colo. 1999).
  Influence: via the majority’s statutory-history discussion (including the 1971 criminal code overhaul and official comments), bolstered an inference that “crime against a person or property” was meant to be read broadly.
• Competing interpretive lens (dissent): People v. Poindexter.
  Influence: provided the dissent’s narrower, dictionary-based definitions; the majority did not adopt it as controlling.

F. Legal Reasoning: The Rule Announced (and What It Does)

The Court’s reasoning can be reduced to a syllogism:

1. Second degree burglary requires intent to commit “therein a crime against another person or property.” § 18-4-203(1).
2. Violating a protection order is a standalone crime under § 18-6-803.5, and protection orders are defined and designed to prevent harm or threatened harm to protected persons, premises, and property.
3. Therefore, intending to violate a protection order while unlawfully entering/remain in a building satisfies the burglary predicate element as a matter of law.

Crucially, Dilka frames this as a bright-line rule. That characterization matters because it displaces case-specific inquiry into whether the particular protection-order violation involved force, threats, property damage, or theft—an approach the dissent preferred.

G. Impact

1) Charging and proof in burglary cases. After Dilka, when the prosecution can show an unlawful entry (or unlawful remaining) and intent to violate a protection order “therein,” it can satisfy the burglary predicate element without separately proving that the intended conduct meets a narrower, force/damage-based definition. This simplifies burglary predicates in protection-order contexts and reduces litigation over the “crime against another person or property” phrase—at least when the predicate is § 18-6-803.5.

2) Enhanced exposure and plea leverage. The decision may increase felony burglary exposure for conduct that might otherwise be charged as trespass plus protection-order violation. The dissent’s concerns highlight a likely practical effect: more cases in which the burglary charge becomes available (and thus more leverage) even where the underlying behavior is arguably “technical” rather than overtly violent or destructive.

3) Doctrinal clarity (and rigidity). The Court’s explicit reaffirmation of Rhorer as a bright-line rule provides clarity and uniformity. But it also reduces room for trial courts to filter burglary charges at the preliminary-hearing stage based on a fact-specific assessment of the “against person or property” element.

4) Future litigation vectors. While the rule is clear for § 18-6-803.5, defendants may shift challenges to other elements: (a) whether entry/remaining was “unlawful,” (b) whether the defendant had the requisite “intent” at the moment of entry, and (c) the scope/terms/validity of the protection order itself (including notice and what conduct constitutes a “violation”).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Predicate crime” (burglary context): Burglary is not just unlawful entry. It is unlawful entry (or unlawful remaining) plus intent to commit a further qualifying crime inside. That “further crime” is the predicate. In second degree burglary, it must be a “crime against another person or property.”
• “Crime against another person or property”: The phrase is not defined in § 18-4-203(1). The majority reads it broadly to cover offenses involving harm or threatened harm to persons/property. The dissent urged narrower dictionary-based categories focusing on force/threat-of-force (persons) and unlawful benefit/damage (property).
• Protection order / no-contact order / restraining order: Different labels for court orders restricting contact, proximity, and presence on premises to protect someone from harm. Violating qualifying orders is criminalized by § 18-6-803.5.
• “Bright-line rule” vs. “case-by-case” approach: A bright-line rule resolves the legal question categorically—if X, then Y—reducing factual litigation. A case-by-case approach asks whether the specific facts meet the statutory element in that particular prosecution.
• C.A.R. 21 original proceeding: A discretionary, extraordinary procedure allowing the Supreme Court to intervene before final judgment, typically when normal appellate review is unavailable or inadequate.
• Preliminary hearing probable cause: A screening stage where the court determines whether probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the charged felony. It is not a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

V. Conclusion

People v. Dilka cements and clarifies Colorado law: a criminal violation of a protection order under § 18-6-803.5 is categorically a “crime against another person or property” and may serve as the predicate offense for second degree burglary under § 18-4-203(1). The Court reads People v. Rhorer as having already established this bright-line rule and reaffirms it as consistent with both the burglary statute’s language and the protective purposes animating Colorado’s protection-order regime.

The dissent highlights a competing vision—one that would preserve fact-specific scrutiny of whether a given protection-order violation is truly “against” a person or property— and warns of overbreadth and potentially harsh outcomes. For now, however, Dilka prioritizes administrable clarity and legislative-purpose reasoning, making burglary predication significantly easier to establish whenever unlawful entry is paired with intent to violate a protection order.

Holding (as confirmed): A criminal violation of a protection order under § 18-6-803.5 serves as a predicate crime for second degree burglary because it constitutes a “crime against another person or property.”