Booze v. State — Constructive-Force Rape Requires No “Intent to Use Force”; Drake v. State Dictum Disapproved

1. Introduction

In Booze v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia, June 16, 2026), Jerome Antonio Booze, a Lyft driver, appealed his Cobb County rape conviction arising from intercourse with E.F., a heavily intoxicated passenger he drove home from a bar. Booze raised four primary issues: (1) whether Georgia’s rape statute, OCGA § 16-6-1(a)(1), is void for vagueness as applied where the alleged victim is voluntarily intoxicated; (2) whether the evidence was constitutionally sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia; and whether the trial court erred in jury instructions concerning (3) mistake of fact and (4) constructive force—specifically Booze’s request for an added requirement that the State prove an “intent to use force.”

The Court affirmed, while making a clarifying doctrinal move: it rejected any suggestion that “constructive force” rape requires proof of a defendant’s specific “intent to use force,” and it expressly disapproved any reading of Drake v. State adopting such a requirement.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Vagueness (as-applied) rejected: The Court held that OCGA § 16-6-1(a)(1)—“carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will”—is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Booze, given long-standing Georgia law treating intercourse with a woman whose will is lost due to intoxication as rape and the “obvious” signs of extreme intoxication shown by the evidence.
  • Sufficiency affirmed: The Court held the evidence sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, concluding a rational jury could find E.F. incapable of consenting due to extreme intoxication, thereby satisfying “forcibly” via constructive force as Georgia law has long recognized.
  • Mistake-of-fact charge upheld: The trial court did not err by adding appellate-language explaining that mistake of fact is not a defense if “superinduced by the fault or negligence” of the defendant.
  • Constructive-force instruction upheld; key clarification: The Court rejected Booze’s requested instruction that the State must prove an “intent to use force” in constructive-force cases; it held that rape is a general-intent crime and Georgia law does not add this specific-intent element. The Court further stated that to the extent Drake v. State could be read to require such proof, it is disapproved.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Constitutional vagueness framework and Georgia’s presumption of constitutionality

  • Metz v. State, Reyes v. State, and Williams v. Powell anchored the Court’s starting position: statutes are presumed constitutional and the challenger carries a heavy burden. The majority reiterated the “clear and palpable” formulation quoted in Metz v. State.
  • State v. Newsom and Smallwood v. State supplied the modern vagueness test—fair notice and protection against arbitrary enforcement—and the as-applied sequencing principle (no facial vagueness if as-applied fails).
  • United States v. Lanier and Davis v. State supported a critical move in the analysis: courts assess “fair notice” not only from statutory text, but from the statute “as construed” by prior decisions.
  • The Court distinguished Johnson v. Athens-Clarke County and Thelen v. State as cases involving subjective, parameterless standards (a “known drug area”; noises that “annoy”), unlike a rape statute with a long common-law lineage and consistent judicial construction.
  • The Court relied on Derrico v. State (as-applied vagueness rejected where conduct clearly fell within the statute) and analogized to Cook v. State (1964) (terms like “under the influence” have a well-recognized meaning) to reinforce that a statute need not quantify every threshold where ordinary understanding and settled construction provide notice.
  • In concurrence, the Court’s tradition of deference to legislative enactments was emphasized through Stephens v. State and the historical line from Craig v. Maltbie and Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, underscoring the demanding nature of constitutional invalidation.

B. Constructive force and incorporation of the common law definition of rape

  • Gore v. State (1904) was the doctrinal keystone. It established (and the Court reaffirmed) the principle that “intercourse with a woman whose will is temporarily lost from intoxication … is rape,” and that when the defendant does not suppose he has consent, “the force required” inherent in the carnal act suffices—i.e., constructive force.
  • State v. Collins was invoked for the proposition that, by enacting the 1968 criminal code, Georgia “adopted the common-law definition of rape.” The Court used this to answer Booze’s statutory-text argument: OCGA § 16-6-1(a)(1) carries forward the settled common-law construction.
  • Evans v. State
  • The Court reinforced the interpretive premise with McIver v. State (legislature presumed to enact statutes knowing existing case law) and Olevik v. State (prior-construction canon), concluding the General Assembly’s materially identical wording incorporated the established judicial meaning.

C. Sufficiency of evidence for intoxication-based incapacity and constructive force

  • The Court applied Weems v. State and Ridley v. State to frame Jackson v. Virginia review: evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict; credibility is for the jury.
  • The Court found persuasive parallels in Court of Appeals decisions upholding rape convictions based on extreme intoxication/incapacity, including Arroyo v. State, Rendon-Villasana v. State, and Cook v. State (2016), as well as Johnson v. State (2019) (similar “temporarily lost will” concept in sexual battery context).
  • The Court relied on Foots v. State for the principle that if a jury disbelieves a defendant’s testimony, it may treat it as substantive evidence of guilt when corroborated—relevant given Booze’s evolving explanations and denial of visible intoxication.

D. Jury instruction law: mistake of fact and constructive force

  • Review standards and “charge as a whole” doctrine came from Eubanks v. State, Campbell v. State, and Gold v. State.
  • For mistake of fact, the additional “superinduced by fault or negligence” language was supported by Crawford v. State and Gabriel v. State. The Court also cited Hudson v. State for the “legal, apt, precisely adjusted, and authorized by the evidence” requirement for requested charges.
  • For constructive force, the Court rejected Booze’s reliance on Drake v. State, using Schoicket v. State to explain why broad-sounding language outside a case’s factual context is not binding holding.
  • The Court cited Wright v. State (rape is a general-intent crime) and Woschula v. State (no error refusing an incorrect instruction) to uphold the trial court’s refusal to add a specific-intent requirement.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why the vagueness challenge failed

The Court’s approach was decisively as-applied. It acknowledged Booze’s argument that OCGA § 16-6-1(a)(1) does not mention intoxication and provides no “standards” for when intoxication negates consent. But the Court held that fair notice can derive from the statute as construed through long-settled precedent. With Gore v. State as the anchor, the Court concluded Georgia has long treated intercourse with a woman whose will is lost by intoxication as rape, and thus the statute gave adequate warning.

Critically, even if there might be closer cases at lower intoxication levels, Booze’s case was not one: the evidence showed highly visible, extreme impairment (inability to walk without help, slurred/incoherent speech, repeated vomiting, sleep/unconsciousness). The Court therefore held Booze did not meet his burden to show lack of fair notice for his conduct.

B. Why the sufficiency challenge failed: OCGA § 16-6-1(a)(1) incorporates common law constructive force

Booze attempted to reframe the sufficiency issue as one of statutory meaning: he contended appellate cases importing constructive force into intoxication cases were inconsistent with the statute’s text. The Court rejected that premise by tracing statutory continuity (1895 to present) and interpretive continuity (Gore v. State, Evans v. State) and invoking the presumption that the 1968 legislature adopted existing judicial constructions (McIver v. State).

With the elements clarified—carnal knowledge, forcibly, against her will; and where intoxication incapacity supplies constructive force—the Court held the evidence easily met Jackson v. Virginia.

C. Why the instruction issues failed—and the opinion’s main doctrinal clarification

On mistake of fact, the Court held the trial judge could supplement the pattern instruction with a correct limitation recognized in case law: mistake of fact is not a defense if caused by the defendant’s negligence. The Court rejected Booze’s separation-of-powers framing, emphasizing there is no rule that a pattern charge cannot be modified with correct legal principles.

On constructive force, the Court’s most consequential move was rejecting Booze’s proposed “intent to use force” gloss. The Court reasoned that (1) rape is not treated as a specific-intent offense in Georgia (Wright v. State), (2) the long-settled constructive-force doctrine does not include an additional intent-to-use-force element, and (3) Drake v. State did not control because it arose in a different context (rape of a child with intimidation) and any broader treatise-derived language about “intent to use force” exceeded its holding (Schoicket v. State).

Finally, the Court went further: it stated that to the extent Drake v. State “can be read” to adopt a requirement that the State prove a specific intent to rape if “fraud or stupefaction should fail,” it is disapproved. This is the opinion’s clearest statement of new precedent: Georgia constructive-force rape doctrine does not import an extra specific-intent-to-use-force element.

3.3. Impact

  • Stabilizes intoxication-based rape prosecutions under OCGA § 16-6-1(a)(1): By reaffirming Gore v. State and the “as construed” notice principle from United States v. Lanier, the Court signals that the statute’s silence on intoxication does not create constitutional vagueness where incapacity is obvious and the doctrine is long-settled.
  • Clarifies jury-instruction battles in constructive-force cases: Trial courts are less likely to face (or feel pressure to give) an “intent to use force” instruction in intoxication/incapacity cases; defendants cannot rely on Drake v. State to demand it.
  • Doctrine-cleanup regarding Drake: The express disapproval reduces the risk that litigants will extract specific-intent requirements from older treatise language, aligning constructive-force rape with the general-intent framework.
  • Signals continued strong deference in constitutional challenges: The concurrence’s emphasis (via Metz v. State and Stephens v. State) underscores the Court’s insistence on the “clear and palpable” threshold, likely influencing future constitutional litigation strategy and trial-court framing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Void for vagueness” (as-applied): A defendant argues a law is unconstitutional as applied to him because it did not give fair notice that his specific conduct was criminal or allowed arbitrary enforcement. Here, the Court said that long-standing case law and obvious signs of extreme intoxication provided adequate notice.
  • “Constructive force”: In rape law, “force” can be “constructive” when the victim cannot give meaningful consent (for example, due to extreme intoxication, unconsciousness, or similar incapacity). The “force” is satisfied by the force inherent in the act of penetration when the victim’s will is absent.
  • General intent vs. specific intent: A general-intent crime typically requires intent to do the act; a specific-intent crime requires an additional particular purpose (e.g., intent to achieve a further result). The Court treated rape as a general-intent crime and rejected adding a special “intent to use force if resisted” element.
  • Pattern jury instructions: These are recommended templates, not immutable text. A trial judge may supplement them with correct legal principles when authorized by the evidence.

5. Conclusion

Booze v. State reaffirmed Georgia’s long-standing doctrine that intercourse with a woman whose will is lost due to extreme intoxication can satisfy the “forcibly and against her will” elements through constructive force, and it rejected an as-applied vagueness challenge where the incapacity was obvious and the doctrine well established. Most importantly, the Court clarified that constructive-force rape does not require proof that the defendant had a specific “intent to use force,” expressly disapproving any contrary reading of Drake v. State. The opinion thus both fortifies the continuity of Georgia rape doctrine under OCGA § 16-6-1(a)(1) and narrows an argument defendants might otherwise raise to impose a heightened mens rea requirement in incapacity-based rape prosecutions.