Bitcoin-for-Cash Exchanges Are “Transferring Funds” Under 18 U.S.C. § 1960

I. Introduction

In United States v. Goklu (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2026), the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of Mustafa Goklu (a/k/a “Mustangy”) for (1) money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and (2) operating an unlicensed money transmitting business under 18 U.S.C. § 1960. The charges arose from a series of face-to-face, bitcoin-for-cash exchanges with an undercover DEA agent arranged through localbitcoins.com and coordinated via Signal.

The appeal presented three merits issues: (1) whether the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by seating a juror who expressed favorable views toward police and negative feelings about financial crimes; (2) whether a bitcoin-for-cash exchange is “money transmitting” (and “transferring funds”) under § 1960; and (3) whether a post-closing supplemental instruction stating that exchanging bitcoin for U.S. currency can constitute a “transfer” violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. Goklu also challenged aspects of his sentence, but he completed his prison term during the appeal.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• Impartial jury: No abuse of discretion in refusing to strike Juror 30 for cause; the district court reasonably credited the juror’s assurances that he would “try [his] best” to be impartial.
• § 1960 liability: The evidence was sufficient because exchanging bitcoin and cash can constitute “transferring funds,” and Goklu’s conduct satisfied the regulatory concept of money transmission (acceptance of value and transmission to another person or location by any means).
• Rule 30: No reversible error in giving a legally correct supplemental instruction after the defense closing argument.
• Sentencing issues: Challenges to the already-served prison sentence were dismissed as moot because Goklu did not challenge the term or conditions of supervised release.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Jury impartiality and deference to the trial judge

The panel framed the Sixth Amendment inquiry using United States v. Perez, emphasizing that an impartial jury is one that decides “solely on the evidence” and applies the law conscientiously. It then relied on United States v. Kelly (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States) for the trial court’s minimum duty in voir dire: remove jurors unable to follow instructions and evaluate evidence impartially.

The key doctrinal tool was “actual bias” under United States v. Torres, which recognizes actual bias either by a juror’s admission or by the judge’s determination from voir dire answers. Torres also supplies the rationale for appellate restraint: the trial judge’s superior position to assess demeanor and credibility.

The standard of review—reversal only for “clear abuse of discretion”—was reinforced by United States v. Mensah and, in even stronger language, United States v. Ploof, which cautions that appellate courts are especially reluctant to disturb rulings on challenges for cause.

Goklu invoked United States v. Nelson for the proposition that “probable impartiality is not good enough.” The panel distinguished Nelson as involving a juror with case-specific predisposition: the juror knew of a prior acquittal for the same conduct and expressed dissatisfaction with that result, and “never even asserted that he could probably be impartial.” By contrast, Juror 30’s views were generalized and, critically, the trial court found him sincere when he said he would try his best—an assessment to which Torres instructs deference.

2. Statutory interpretation / sufficiency in the § 1960 context

For the interpretive posture, the panel cited United States v. Ho for de novo review whether framed as statutory interpretation or sufficiency of evidence.

The court addressed the relationship between § 1960 and Treasury/FinCEN regulations through United States v. Mazza-Alaluf, which warns against mechanically “import[ing]” a regulatory definition into § 1960. Still, the panel treated the regulatory definition as sufficient to establish “transferring funds” for § 1960 purposes, reasoning that a business meeting the implementing-regulation definition is necessarily engaged in transfers by “any and all means.”

On whether bitcoin can qualify as “funds,” the panel relied on United States v. Freeman, which collected cases and concluded that bitcoin “nicely fits the definition of ‘funds’” because it is used as a currency for purchases and sales.

On the mechanics of moving value electronically, the panel analogized to United States v. Gilboe, recognizing that “[e]lectronic signals” can be “the means by which funds are transported.”

3. Supplemental instructions and Rule 30

The court drew from United States v. Civelli for the proposition that, if a supplemental charge is legally correct, the district court has “broad discretion” regarding how and when to deliver it—even after closings—especially as a curative response to an argument that risks misleading the jury on the governing law.

4. Vagueness and fair notice (raised in response to defense concerns)

Though not central to the holding, the opinion addressed an overbreadth/vagueness-style concern by invoking United States v. Concepcion for the standard: whether a statute provides fair notice or authorizes discriminatory enforcement. The panel rejected the defense’s “buying bitcoin to hold” hypothetical as mismatched to the record: Goklu operated for commissions as an exchange service.

5. Mootness of sentencing challenges

The panel invoked United States v. Williams for the appellate court’s independent obligation to consider mootness even if the government does not argue it. It then relied on United States v. Simmons for the rule that completion of imprisonment typically moots challenges to that custodial term, and that supervision keeps a controversy live only if there is more than a “remote and speculative possibility” that a remand could yield reduced supervised release. Because Goklu did not challenge supervised release at all, the court dismissed the sentencing portion as moot.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Seating Juror 30: “actual bias” and credibility-based discretion

The court treated Juror 30’s initial uncertainty (“not sure”) as a common voir dire moment rather than a conclusive admission of partiality. Two features drove the result:

1. Rehabilitation through continued questioning: After being reminded of his oath, Juror 30 repeatedly stated he would “try [his] best,” and indicated he could assess officer testimony impartially if presented neutrally.
2. Trial-court credibility finding: The district judge found the juror “seems sincere,” and the panel treated that demeanor assessment as the kind of determination Torres places beyond easy second-guessing.

Importantly, the panel did not create a rule that “try my best” is always enough. Rather, it held that on this record—general attitudes without case-specific predisposition, plus a trial judge’s credibility finding—there was no clear abuse of discretion.

2. The core § 1960 holding: bitcoin-for-cash exchanges can be “transferring funds”

The opinion’s principal doctrinal contribution is its functional, text-based understanding of “transferring funds” in the virtual-currency exchange setting.

The panel proceeded in three moves:

1. Connect § 1960 to registration duties: § 1960 covers money transmitting businesses that fail to comply with federal registration requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 5330 or its implementing regulations.
2. Use the implementing regulation to identify “money transmission services”: Under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A), money transmission includes accepting “currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency” from one person and transmitting currency/funds/value “to another location or person by any means.”
3. Apply to the exchange mechanics: Goklu accepted bitcoin (funds/value) from the agent and transmitted cash back, taking a commission. The court treated (a) wallet-to-wallet bitcoin movement and (b) physical handoff of cash as transmissions “by any means.” Even apart from the agent transactions, the record included evidence Goklu also sold bitcoin to other customers, which involves accepting cash and transmitting bitcoin electronically.

Two interpretive clarifications stand out:

• “Another location” is not limited to geographic remittances: The panel reasoned that location can be functional: funds start in a digital wallet and end as physical cash in the recipient’s possession. That change in situs is sufficient to satisfy “location,” even if the transfer is face-to-face.
• Physical cash handoffs are not exempt: The court stressed the breadth of “by any means” in § 1960, § 5330, and the regulation, noting that § 1960 itself lists “courier” and § 5330 expressly includes “currency exchange” services, both of which naturally encompass physical transfers.

3. Role of agency guidance (FinCEN) as confirmatory, not substitutive

The panel’s interpretation “accord[ed] with FinCEN’s interpretive guidance,” citing FIN-2013-G001 (Mar. 18, 2013). It treated Goklu as an “exchanger” (a business exchanging virtual currency for real currency) and noted FinCEN’s view that such exchangers are money transmitters unless an exemption applies. The opinion used the guidance to confirm the “natural reading” of the text, rather than as the sole basis for criminal liability—an important move in criminal cases where fair notice concerns are common.

4. Rule 30: curative instruction after closing argument

The panel accepted the district court’s characterization that the defense closing newly suggested a “third-party transfer” requirement. Against that risk of juror misunderstanding, Civelli supplied the governing principle: a legally correct supplemental charge may be given in the court’s discretion. Because the panel held that exchanging bitcoin for cash “can qualify as a transfer,” it followed that the supplemental instruction was legally correct and thus within the court’s discretion notwithstanding Rule 30’s general sequencing requirement.

5. Sentencing mootness: custody-only challenges after release

Even though Goklu raised sentencing theories (duplicity and Guidelines calculation of “value of the laundered funds”), the court dismissed them as moot because the requested remedy was resentencing of a custodial term already served. Under Simmons, ongoing supervised release does not keep the appeal alive absent a non-speculative possibility that a remand would reduce supervision—and here there was no challenge to the supervised release term or conditions.

C. Impact

1. Practical expansion/clarification of § 1960 exposure for OTC-style crypto exchanges

The opinion strongly signals that commission-based, in-person bitcoin-for-cash dealing—especially arranged via online marketplaces—fits comfortably within “money transmitting” and “money transmission services” when the business accepts value and returns value by any means. For the Second Circuit, the decision reduces room for defenses that attempt to recharacterize such conduct as mere “currency exchange” outside § 1960, or as non-transmission because the exchange is immediate and face-to-face.

2. “Another location” as functional situs

By treating the movement from a crypto wallet to cash-in-hand as transmission to “another location,” the decision may influence future cases involving:

• same-person conversions (e.g., swapping one store of value for another) where the “location” changes form rather than geography;
• peer-to-peer transactions that resemble retail exchange rather than traditional remittance.

3. Trial practice: closing arguments can invite curative instructions

The Rule 30 discussion illustrates a recurring tactical risk: if a closing argument pushes a legal limitation not reflected in the agreed or previewed instructions, a court may respond with a supplemental instruction. Civelli’s “broad discretion” framing makes reversal difficult when the supplemental statement is legally correct.

4. Appellate practice: preserving sentencing issues post-release

The mootness holding underscores that defendants who complete their custodial terms during appeal should, where supported by the record and law, explicitly connect alleged sentencing errors to supervised release and seek relief as to supervision; otherwise, custody-focused challenges risk dismissal under Simmons.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Actual bias” (jury): A juror is actually biased if their state of mind suggests they cannot be impartial. Trial judges decide this largely based on answers and demeanor; appellate courts rarely overturn.
• “Money transmitting business” (§ 1960): Not limited to wires or international remittances. It can include transferring value “by any and all means,” including currency exchange-like activity, when coupled with required registration duties.
• “Another location” (FinCEN regulation): The court treated “location” as the place/value-store where the funds reside (wallet vs. physical possession), not only a different city or person.
• Rule 30 (jury instructions timing): Courts should announce instructions before closings, but may still give legally correct supplemental instructions to cure confusion caused by arguments or developments at trial.
• Mootness (sentencing appeals): Courts decide only live disputes. Once a prison term is served, an appeal aimed solely at shortening that already-served term usually becomes non-justiciable unless it could realistically affect ongoing supervised release.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Goklu meaningfully clarifies Second Circuit law on cryptocurrency exchange activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1960: a commission-based bitcoin-for-cash exchange can constitute “transferring funds,” including where the “transmission” occurs through wallet transfers and/or physical cash handoffs, and where “another location” is satisfied by a change in the situs or form of the value (wallet to cash-in-hand). The decision also reinforces (1) substantial deference to trial judges on juror-bias determinations grounded in credibility assessments, (2) broad discretion to issue legally correct curative instructions even after closing argument, and (3) strict mootness limits on custody-only sentencing appeals once imprisonment ends.