Binding Internal Termination Procedures Create Fifth Amendment Property Interests in Reassignment and Appeal Rights for Intelligence Officers

1. Introduction

John Doe 1 v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (4th Cir. July 2, 2026) addresses whether career intelligence officers—statutorily subject to broad “deem necessary or advisable” termination authority under the National Security Act—nevertheless possess Fifth Amendment procedural due process protections when their agencies adopt and apply mandatory internal termination procedures.

Nineteen career officers at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) were selected for termination after executive-branch directives targeted DEIA-related offices and positions for elimination. The officers sought to invoke two protections in Agency Regulation 4-16 (“Termination Regulation”): (1) an opportunity to pursue internal reassignment when termination is due to “excess personnel” (a reduction in force, or RIF), and (2) an internal appeal process for most terminations. When the Agencies indicated they would not honor these procedures (especially at CIA), the officers sought a preliminary injunction requiring compliance with the Regulation.

The key issues on appeal were: (a) whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the officers’ constitutional challenge despite statutory discretion over national-security terminations; (b) whether the Regulation’s reassignment and appeal provisions created constitutionally protected “property interests”; and (c) whether the district court appropriately granted and tailored preliminary injunctive relief under Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc..

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction requiring CIA and ODNI to follow their own Termination Regulation by providing (i) reassignment consideration procedures for RIF-like terminations and (ii) internal appeal rights.

  • Jurisdiction: Under Webster v. Doe, although the National Security Act precludes APA review of CIA/ODNI termination decisions, it does not clearly preclude constitutional claims; therefore, courts may hear Fifth Amendment challenges.
  • RIF finding: The district court plausibly found the terminations were carried out as RIFs, triggering the Regulation’s “excess personnel” provisions.
  • Merits: The Regulation’s mandatory language created protected property interests in reassignment consideration and appeal; denying those procedures likely violated the Fifth Amendment.
  • Irreparable harm: Likely constitutional deprivation is irreparable harm; however, the panel rejected reputational harm as a valid injunction-specific basis because the injunction did not remedy that injury.
  • Scope: The injunction was sufficiently narrow: it compelled compliance with two regulatory procedures and required notice to the court before implementing terminations to ensure compliance.

Judge Niemeyer dissented, arguing (1) the Regulation is irrelevant to Director-level terminations because it does not constrain the Directors’ statutory discretion; (2) procedures do not create property interests; and (3) the injunction improperly intrudes on executive national-security authority.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Judicial review and national-security termination discretion

  • Webster v. Doe: The cornerstone for jurisdiction. The panel relied on Webster’s distinction between (i) unreviewability of termination decisions under the APA due to the “deems” standard and (ii) continued availability of a judicial forum for constitutional claims absent clear congressional preclusion. This enabled the court to reach the Fifth Amendment question without second-guessing the substantive termination rationale.

B. The preliminary injunction framework and appellate deference

  • Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.: Provided the four-factor test. The panel’s affirmance tracks Winter’s structure and emphasizes that each factor must be satisfied.
  • Real Time Med. Sys., Inc. v. PointClickCare Tech., Inc.: Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard and “plausible in light of the record” deference for factual findings, supporting affirmance of the district court’s RIF characterization.
  • Roe v. Dep't of Def.: Cited repeatedly for (i) deference to district courts in injunction crafting, (ii) consideration of public interest/balance of equities together when the government is a party, and (iii) the option to affirm based on one merits theory without reaching alternative theories.
  • Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, and Lord & Taylor, LLC v. White Flint, L.P.: These cases were used to justify district-court discretion in tailoring equitable relief and weighing harms.

C. Procedural due process and “property interests” created by rules

  • Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann: Established that property interests arise from “rules and understandings” that create a legitimate entitlement, not from abstract desires.
  • Stewart v. Bailey: Supplied the Fourth Circuit’s formulation: a regulation creates an entitlement when it mandates an outcome upon satisfaction of conditions; no entitlement exists where decisionmakers retain complete discretion.
  • Strickland v. United States: Provided the panel’s key analogy: internal employment rules that repeatedly use “rights” language and constrain decisionmakers can create protectable property interests; the panel used Strickland to frame reassignment and appeal as enforceable entitlements when regulatory conditions are met.
  • Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Emps.' Supplemental Retirement Sys. II: Cited (via Strickland) for the “minimum measure of procedural protection” formulation.
  • U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Ind. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc.: Used for holistic interpretation—supporting the majority’s reading that disclaimers in the Regulation did not negate specific mandatory reassignment/appeal mechanisms triggered by RIF-like terminations.

D. Irreparable harm from constitutional deprivation

  • Elrod v. Burns and Ross v. Meese: Supported the proposition that denial of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable harm.
  • Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump and Mills v. District of Columbia: Reinforced the linkage between likelihood of success on constitutional claims and irreparable harm.
  • Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. Soc. Sec. Admin.: Provided the panel’s correction on reputational harm: preliminary injunctions address incremental irreparable harm that would occur absent the injunction; reputational injury from the Executive Orders was not prevented by the injunction and thus could not support this factor.

E. Additional context precedents (background)

  • United States v. Fausto: Cited for the Civil Service Reform Act framework and the fact that CIA/ODNI employees are excluded, emphasizing the importance of internal agency procedures as the operative protections.
  • Shook v. NCG Acquisition, LLC: Used by the district court in the earlier TRO phase to describe at-will employment.

F. Dissent’s counter-authorities (and their role)

The dissent’s authorities highlight the doctrinal conflict the majority implicitly resolves at the preliminary-injunction stage: whether internal procedures can create due-process property interests when the Director retains statutory discretion to terminate “without regard” to procedures. The dissent relies on, among others, Doe v. Casey and Doe v. Gates (D.C. Circuit), and invokes the principle from Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill that property cannot be defined by procedures. While the majority does not engage these at length, their presence signals a likely future merits-stage dispute over how to reconcile (i) mandatory internal process language, (ii) sweeping statutory discretion, and (iii) disclaimers purporting to negate enforceable rights.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The “RIF trigger” as the gateway to enforceable procedures

A pivotal move in the majority’s reasoning is factual-legal: the terminations were plausibly characterized as RIFs (“excess personnel functions or needs”) because the record tied them to OPM “Guidance Regarding RIFs of DEIA Offices” and the CIA Director’s declaration that the directives “effectively prescribed terminating” the officers. That characterization matters because the Termination Regulation expressly conditions reassignment assistance on that RIF/excess-personnel premise.

B. Identifying the protected interest: not continued employment, but mandated process entitlements

The court agreed the officers lacked a property interest in continued employment given the National Security Act’s breadth. The constitutional claim instead rested on a narrower theory: the Regulation created enforceable entitlements to (i) reassignment consideration efforts and (ii) internal appeal.

Applying Roth, Perry, and Stewart v. Bailey, the panel focused on whether the Regulation “constrains discretion” and “mandates a particular outcome” once conditions are met. It found:

  • Reassignment consideration (Section II(C)(4)(c)): Mandatory “will” language required the Agency to meet with the employee, determine interest in placement, and “broker an Agency-wide placement effort,” with termination recommended only if the employee declines or placement fails after sufficient time.
  • Internal appeal (Section II(E)): A covered employee “may” appeal unless terminated for revocation of classified access (or excluded by employment category). The Intelligence Officers were not terminated for revoked access, so the appeal channel applied.

C. Handling the Regulation’s disclaimers

The Agencies argued the Regulation disclaimed creating enforceable rights. The majority did not treat disclaimers as dispositive; instead it read the Regulation “holistically” (citing U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Ind. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc.) and concluded the disclaimers best read as reiterating “no property interest in continued employment,” not as nullifying the specific, mandatory reassignment and appeal mechanisms. In effect, the majority treated the Regulation as simultaneously: (i) preserving ultimate termination discretion; yet (ii) binding the Agencies to specified steps before implementing RIF-like separations for covered employees.

D. Why “it’s pointless” and “we didn’t follow the Regulation” failed as defenses

The Agencies argued reassignment/appeal rights were impractical because the Director would ultimately decide the appeal and because the Agencies already failed to follow RIF procedures. The panel rejected both:

  • Impracticality does not negate mandatory regulatory text; appeals may persuade, and reassignment may avoid termination.
  • Prior noncompliance cannot excuse future noncompliance; agencies cannot evade duties by first disregarding the triggering procedures.

E. Irreparable harm and the injunction’s tailoring

The majority affirmed irreparable harm based on likely constitutional deprivation (Elrod v. Burns), but corrected the district court’s reputational-harm analysis by emphasizing the injunction must prevent the harm it is invoked to justify.

On scope, the panel upheld a narrow compliance-focused injunction. The “further Court authorization” requirement was reframed as an advance-notice mechanism to allow verification that reassignment/appeal opportunities were provided, not a categorical bar on termination.

3.3 Impact

  • Internal intelligence-agency rules may have constitutional bite: Even where the National Security Act makes employees effectively at-will as to ultimate retention, mandatory internal procedures governing certain termination contexts can be treated as creating “property interests” in those procedures themselves (reassignment consideration; internal appeal).
  • Drafting and disclaimer strategy: The decision suggests broad “no rights created” disclaimers may not defeat due-process claims when the same instrument contains specific, mandatory procedural guarantees tied to objective triggers (like RIF/excess-personnel terminations).
  • RIF characterization becomes litigable: Agencies may face increased scrutiny over whether a termination is genuinely an individualized discretionary decision or effectively a RIF that triggers internal protections.
  • Remedial posture: Courts may be more willing to impose compliance-oriented injunctions—especially where agencies signal they will not follow their own procedures—without purporting to second-guess the national-security merits of termination decisions.
  • Conflict signal: The dissent’s separation-of-powers framing and reliance on D.C. Circuit authorities indicate a potential inter-circuit (or intra-circuit) tension likely to recur, especially at merits stages or in Supreme Court review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural due process (Fifth Amendment): If the government takes away a protected interest (life, liberty, or property), it must use fair procedures first.
  • Property interest: Not limited to physical property. It includes certain job-related entitlements if rules meaningfully limit government discretion—creating a “legitimate claim of entitlement” rather than a mere expectation.
  • Reduction in Force (RIF): A workforce reduction due to reorganization or elimination of functions/positions. Here, the RIF label mattered because it triggered reassignment-assistance procedures in the Termination Regulation.
  • “Accardi doctrine” (mentioned, not decided): From United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, the idea that agencies generally must follow their own rules. The Fourth Circuit explicitly affirmed based on due process alone and declined to resolve whether Accardi provides an independently constitutional claim here.
  • APA preclusion vs constitutional review: Under Webster v. Doe, a statute can bar ordinary administrative-law review (APA) while still allowing courts to hear constitutional claims unless Congress clearly says otherwise.
  • Preliminary injunction: A temporary court order preserving the status quo while the case proceeds. Under Winter, the plaintiff must show likely success, irreparable harm, favorable equities, and consistency with the public interest.

5. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s published decision establishes a consequential principle for national-security employment law: even where Congress grants intelligence-agency leadership broad termination discretion, an agency’s own mandatory termination procedures—when triggered by the circumstances of the separation—can create constitutionally protected property interests in reassignment consideration and internal appeal rights. The court paired that holding with a compliance-focused remedial approach, approving an injunction that polices adherence to internal rules without purporting to review the national-security merits of the termination decisions themselves.