Biglow v. Dell Technologies: Verification Duty for AI-Generated Citations and the Narrow Path to Vacatur Under the FAA

I. Introduction

Parties: Kevin Lee Biglow (pro se employee; later briefly represented in arbitration) v. Dell Technologies Inc. (employer).
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Posture: Biglow appealed (1) the district court’s order compelling arbitration under a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims (“MAA”) and (2) the district court’s order denying his motion to vacate an arbitration award entered for Dell.

Background: Dell hired Biglow in 2012. In 2018, Dell presented employees with the MAA; Biglow signed it. After Dell terminated him in 2019, Biglow sued in federal court in 2020 following an EEOC right-to-sue letter, alleging underpayment, discriminatory work assignments, and retaliation under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and Kansas law. Dell moved to compel arbitration; the district court granted the motion.

Arbitration: The arbitration proceeded through JAMS. After an administrative error involving a struck arbitrator (Hon. Robert L. McGahey (Ret.)), the arbitration moved to JAMS San Francisco and proceeded before Hon. James Ware (Ret.). Arbitrator Ware granted Dell’s motion for summary disposition and entered a final award for Dell. Biglow moved to vacate; the district court denied the motion.

Key issues on appeal: (i) whether the district court erred in compelling arbitration; (ii) whether any FAA vacatur ground was shown; and (iii) whether Biglow’s appellate filings, containing apparently fabricated citations, warranted concern or sanctions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Compelling arbitration affirmed: The court rejected Biglow’s arbitrability arguments largely on waiver/forfeiture grounds and because the district court itself decided arbitrability (no “improper delegation”).
  • Denial of vacatur affirmed: Applying the “great deference” standard to arbitration outcomes, the court held Biglow did not establish any statutory basis under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), nor any recognized non-statutory basis (even assuming such bases survive Hall Street).
  • AI-citation warning: The panel identified multiple fabricated or mismatched citations in Biglow’s briefs and motions, likely attributable to misuse of generative AI (i.e., “AI hallucinations”). The court warned that parties must verify authority and noted sanctions—including dismissal—can be imposed for such misrepresentations, though it declined sanctions here.
  • Motions denied: The court denied Biglow’s motions to strike, for summary disposition, for sanctions, and for an “investigation” and further record supplementation.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards for construing pro se submissions and appellate briefing discipline

  • Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005): Cited to emphasize that although pro se filings receive liberal construction, the court will not serve as a litigant’s advocate. This framing supported the court’s refusal to repair Biglow’s underdeveloped arguments (notably his Clause 3(c) arbitrability theory).
  • Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020): Applied to hold that perfunctory or inadequately developed arguments in the opening brief are abandoned/waived. This was dispositive of Biglow’s Clause 3(c) contention because he did not explain how it barred arbitration.
  • United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019): Provided the waiver rule for unpreserved issues on appeal: if a party fails to raise an argument below and then fails to argue plain error on appeal, the appellate court ordinarily deems the issue waived and will not review it at all. This was central to rejecting Biglow’s “knowing and voluntary” Title VII arbitration argument because it was not raised in the district court and no plain-error argument was presented.

2. Motion to compel arbitration: standard of review

  • Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995): Set the de novo standard for reviewing a district court’s order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration. This governed the panel’s review of the threshold arbitration ruling.

3. Pleadings vs. motions; affirmative defenses and waiver

  • Bentley v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 41 F.3d 600, 604 (10th Cir. 1994): Quoted for the general rule that failure to plead an affirmative defense can waive it. The panel invoked Bentley but distinguished it on procedure: Dell filed no answer (a pleading) because it moved to compel arbitration.
  • Fontenot v. Crow, 4 F.4th 982, 1057 n.46 (10th Cir. 2021): Used to reinforce that “An answer is a pleading, but a motion is not.” This undercut Biglow’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) theory that Dell had to “plead” waiver/forfeiture-type arguments in the district court in order to raise them on appeal.

4. Review of arbitration awards: deference and vacatur standards

  • Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 931-32 (10th Cir. 2001): Provided (i) de novo review for legal questions and clear-error review for factual findings in reviewing denial of a motion to vacate, and (ii) the Tenth Circuit’s articulation of “manifest disregard” as requiring “willful inattentiveness to the governing law.”
  • Dish Network, LLC v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 2018): Anchored the court’s “great deference” approach, describing FAA review as “among the narrowest known to the law,” and recited additional (judicially created) vacatur theories the circuit has recognized (public policy, fundamental fairness, manifest disregard), while also acknowledging later doubts.
  • Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008): Cited for the proposition that FAA §§ 10 and 11 provide the “exclusive grounds” for expedited vacatur/modification, casting doubt on extra-statutory grounds like “manifest disregard.” The panel avoided deciding whether those doctrines survive because Biglow could not win even under them.
  • Mid Atl. Cap. Corp. v. Bien, 956 F.3d 1182, 1190 n.3 (10th Cir. 2020): Quoted to note the Tenth Circuit’s acknowledgment that Hall Street casts doubt on judicially created vacatur grounds.
  • United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987): Used to reject Biglow’s attempt to have the district court revisit equitable tolling and merits-like determinations: parties bargain for the arbitrator’s view of facts and contract meaning, and courts do not sit as appellate reviewers of legal or factual errors.

5. Arbitration procedure: summary disposition and discovery/hearing limits

  • Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001): A key procedural precedent: if claims are facially deficient and no relevant evidence would change that, an arbitration panel may dismiss without discovery or an evidentiary hearing. This directly supported affirmance against Biglow’s “no hearing/no discovery” misconduct theory.

6. Evidentiary hearings in district court on a motion to vacate

  • Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1286 (10th Cir. 1998): Supported denial of Biglow’s request for an evidentiary hearing because he did not show that new, critical information would be presented.
  • United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1263 (10th Cir. 1999): Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard governing whether to hold an evidentiary hearing.

7. Fraud/undue means and the required link to the award

  • Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990): Cited for the “nexus” requirement under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1): the alleged corruption/fraud/undue means must procure the award. This was decisive in rejecting Biglow’s complaints about appointment irregularities involving Arbitrator McGahey, because McGahey did not decide the dispositive motion and Ware’s award lacked a demonstrated causal link to the alleged improprieties.

8. Cumulative error doctrine

  • Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1113 (10th Cir. 1998): Applied to reject cumulative error where no individual error was established.

9. AI hallucinations, fabricated citations, and sanctions risk

  • Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489, 497 (D. Wyo. 2025): Cited for the now “well-known” proposition that AI tools can generate fake cases, supporting the court’s inference that Biglow’s false citations likely resulted from generative AI misuse.
  • Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 164 F.4th 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2026): Cited to define an AI “hallucination” as output that is fictional, inaccurate, or nonsensical.
  • Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2023): Cited for the systemic harm of fabricated citations: wasting judicial resources, imposing costs on opponents, and undermining the legal system’s credibility.
  • Grant v. City of Long Beach, 96 F.4th 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2024): Cited as an example of appellate sanctions authority for misrepresentations; paired with the court’s reference to Fed. R. App. P. 38 and 10th Cir. R. 46.5(B), (C) to underscore that sanctions (including dismissal) are available.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Compelling arbitration: waiver/forfeiture did much of the work

The panel affirmed the order compelling arbitration not by deeply re-litigating contract formation and enforceability, but by applying appellate preservation rules to Biglow’s presentation:

  • Clause 3(c) arbitrability theory (Issue One): waived due to inadequate briefing under Sawyers v. Norton. The panel stressed that merely pointing to contractual text is not an argument; the appellant must explain how the clause changes the arbitrability result.
  • Knowing/voluntary Title VII arbitration and “effective vindication” (Issue Three): waived because not raised below and no plain-error argument on appeal, under United States v. Leffler.
  • “Improper delegation” (Issue Eleven): rejected on the merits because the district court actually “ruled on arbitrability,” so there was no delegation of threshold questions to the arbitrator.

The opinion also clarifies a recurring procedural confusion: arguments about appellate waiver/forfeiture are not “affirmative defenses” that must be pleaded under Rule 8(c) in the district court. Using Fontenot v. Crow, the panel explained that motions are not pleadings, and Dell’s motion practice did not obligate it to “plead” defenses in a nonexistent answer.

2. Vacatur: the FAA’s narrow grounds and extreme deference controlled

On the motion to vacate, the panel’s logic was structured around the FAA’s limited vacatur grounds in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) and the “great deference” described in Dish Network, LLC v. Ray.

a. “Arbitrator misconduct” arguments failed absent a showing of material prejudice

Biglow argued Arbitrator Ware denied him due process by not ruling on discovery-related requests, by proceeding without a hearing, and by not addressing a “letter of inquiry” alleging serious misconduct. The panel treated these as, at most, complaints about case management.

  • Citing Sheldon v. Vermonty, the panel emphasized that summary disposition without discovery or an evidentiary hearing is permissible when claims are “facially deficient” and no material evidence could change the legal outcome.
  • The panel stressed the missing connective tissue: Biglow did not show how additional discovery, a hearing, or a response to the letter would have altered the dispositive legal bases (e.g., untimeliness, lack of a private right of action) on which the arbitrator ruled.
b. District-court evidentiary hearing: not required without a concrete proffer

The panel upheld denial of an evidentiary hearing on the motion to vacate because Biglow did not identify what new, material evidence he would present that was not already included in his written submission and exhibits. Robinson v. City of Edmond and United States v. Nichols supported the discretionary nature of that decision.

c. “Manifest disregard” and limitations: disagreement is not vacatur

Biglow asserted Arbitrator Ware “manifestly disregarded the law” on the 90-day Title VII filing deadline. Applying Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., the panel held manifest disregard requires “willful inattentiveness,” not mere alleged error. The arbitrator cited the MAA’s incorporation of applicable statutes of limitation and applied the 90-day right-to-sue period, rejecting equitable tolling. Even if debatable, this did not meet the high threshold for “manifest disregard.”

d. Equitable tolling: not for the district court to re-weigh

In rejecting Biglow’s request for the district court to ensure “time limits operate fairly,” the panel relied on United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. to underscore that courts do not revisit arbitrators’ merits determinations (fact or law) as though on appellate review.

e. Fraud/undue means and arbitrator-appointment irregularities: “procured by” requires a nexus

Biglow’s fraud/partiality theory focused heavily on events surrounding Arbitrator McGahey’s erroneous appointment and alleged communications. The panel did not need to decide whether the allegations were speculative because it found a fatal statutory defect: under § 10(a)(1), the award must be “procured by” the fraud/undue means. Using Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., the panel required a nexus between the alleged wrongdoing and the final award. Because McGahey did not decide the dispositive motion and Ware issued the award, Biglow failed to connect the alleged impropriety to the outcome.

f. Cumulative error: no predicate errors, no accumulation

The panel applied Moore v. Reynolds to reject cumulative error because Biglow did not establish any individual error.

3. AI hallucinations: the court’s warning operates as a procedural integrity holding

Although the decision is labeled “not binding precedent,” the court devoted substantial attention to fabricated or mismatched citations and misquotations in Biglow’s filings—concluding they “appear to stem” from generative AI use without verification. By citing Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, and Mata v. Avianca, Inc., the panel situated the problem within a broader, well-recognized litigation risk: fake citations waste resources and may justify sanctions. The court emphasized it “can sanction litigants,” including dismissing appeals, citing Grant v. City of Long Beach, Fed. R. App. P. 38, and 10th Cir. R. 46.5(B), (C).

Importantly, the court framed the duty as universal: it warned “all pro se litigants and counsel” that they must ensure citations “are not fabrications” and “at least arguably stand for the propositions” asserted. It also added a pointed coda: if the fabrications were not AI-related, they could represent an “even worse transgression—intentional abuse of the judicial process.”

C. Impact

  • FAA vacatur remains extraordinarily constrained: The decision reinforces that dissatisfaction with arbitral procedure (limited discovery, no hearing, expedited dispositive ruling) will not support vacatur absent a statutory ground and a showing of material unfairness or outcome-linked misconduct.
  • “Procured by” is causation-like: By insisting on a nexus under § 10(a)(1), the opinion provides a practical roadmap: alleged improprieties must be tied to the making of the award, not merely to turbulence in the proceedings.
  • Appellate preservation is outcome-determinative: The ruling exemplifies how waiver/forfeiture doctrines can resolve arbitration appeals without reaching broader debates (e.g., “effective vindication,” specialized contractual exclusions).
  • Generative AI use is now squarely in appellate crosshairs: Even while declining sanctions, the opinion signals that the Tenth Circuit will police fabricated authority and may impose penalties. This is a significant practical development for modern briefing norms, especially among pro se litigants.
  • Motion practice constraints are enforced: The denial of Biglow’s “summary disposition” motion illustrates that litigants must conform requests to the limited categories permitted by circuit rules (here, 10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(1)).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Compelling arbitration: A court can require parties to resolve covered disputes in arbitration if a valid arbitration agreement exists and covers the claims.
  • Arbitrability: The “gateway” question of whether a dispute must be arbitrated. Biglow argued the court “delegated” this question, but the panel held the district court itself decided it.
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture (practically): If you do not raise an argument in the district court, you generally cannot raise it on appeal. In the Tenth Circuit, failing to argue “plain error” on appeal for an unpreserved issue usually means the court will not review it at all.
  • FAA vacatur (9 U.S.C. § 10): Courts can vacate an arbitration award only for limited reasons (fraud, evident partiality, serious procedural misconduct, or exceeding powers). Courts do not vacate simply because they think the arbitrator got the law or facts wrong.
  • “Manifest disregard of the law”: A very high bar—more than legal error. It generally means the arbitrator knew the governing law and deliberately ignored it.
  • “Procured by fraud” requires a link: It is not enough to allege wrongdoing occurred somewhere in the process; the wrongdoing must have produced (procured) the award.
  • AI hallucinations: When an AI tool generates plausible-sounding but false citations or quotations. The court’s message: using AI is not a substitute for checking sources; filing fake authority can be sanctionable.

V. Conclusion

Biglow v. Dell Technologies affirms two core principles: (1) arbitration awards are exceptionally difficult to overturn under the FAA absent a clearly established, outcome-linked statutory defect; and (2) modern briefing integrity requires verification of citations, particularly where generative AI may be involved. The opinion’s practical significance lies less in novel arbitration doctrine than in its combined enforcement of preservation rules, deference to arbitral case management (including summary disposition), and an explicit appellate warning that fabricated authority—whether AI-driven or otherwise—risks serious sanctions and undermines the judicial process.