Bailey v. City of Ada: Municipal Failure-to-Train Claims Require Evidence of Inadequate Training

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Decision date: November 9, 2026
Case number: 25-7088
Disposition: Affirmed.

Precedential status: This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited for its persuasive value. The decision applies established municipal-liability principles rather than announcing a new binding rule.

1. Introduction

In Bailey v. City of Ada, the Tenth Circuit addressed the evidence necessary to sustain a municipal failure-to-train claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Its central conclusion was straightforward: a plaintiff must produce evidence that the municipality’s training was inadequate. Uncertainty about the precise content of training, without more, does not shift the burden to the municipality to prove that its training was adequate.

The litigation arose from the fatal shooting of Jeffrey Peterson inside his apartment. Officer Marcus Beale responded to Megan Timmons’s report that Peterson had taken her property and expelled her from the apartment. Timmons and Beale approached the apartment to retrieve her belongings. Their accounts differed concerning the ensuing encounter at the door. Timmons testified that she pushed the door slightly open and Peterson closed it. Beale testified that Peterson closed the door on his arm and warned that he would treat Beale as an intruder. Beale drew his weapon and requested assistance. After backup arrived, officers breached the door, and Beale shot and killed Peterson.

Christy Bailey, acting as personal representative of Peterson’s estate, sued Beale, Officers Jussely Canada, Michael Meeks, and Phillip Vogt, and the City of Ada. Her claims included unlawful entry, excessive force, municipal failure to train, and state-law causes of action.

The appeal presented two principal questions:

  1. Whether the evidence created a genuine factual dispute about the adequacy of the City’s training on warrantless entry into private residences.
  2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to retain the state-law claims after all federal claims had been resolved.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Procedural background

The district court initially granted summary judgment to the backup officers on all claims and to the City on the failure-to-train claim. It granted Beale summary judgment on excessive force but allowed the unlawful-entry claim against him to proceed. Certain state-law claims against the City also remained because their viability depended on the surviving claim against Beale.

In an earlier interlocutory appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that Bailey had not shown that Beale’s entry violated clearly established law and directed the district court to grant him qualified immunity. On remand, the district court entered summary judgment disposing of the remaining federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

The appellate court’s conclusions

  • Insufficient evidence of inadequate training: The training records and testimony did not support a reasonable finding that the City’s training was deficient. Their lack of detail was not affirmative proof of inadequate instruction.
  • No reversal of the evidentiary burden: The City did not have to prove affirmatively that every relevant subject had been adequately taught. Bailey retained the burden of producing evidence supporting her claim.
  • No need to reach single-incident deliberate indifference: Without sufficient evidence of inadequate training, the court did not need to decide whether an obvious risk could establish municipal liability without a prior pattern of violations.
  • Proper relinquishment of state-law claims: Once the federal claims were gone, the district court acted within its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Municipal liability and failure to train

Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

This decision supplies the foundation for Bailey’s municipal claim. A municipality’s liability under § 1983 depends on its own policy or custom causing a constitutional injury, rather than merely on its employment of an officer who allegedly violated the Constitution. The present opinion therefore examined the City’s training arrangements, not simply Beale’s conduct during the encounter.

George ex rel. Bradshaw v. Beaver Cnty. ex rel. Beaver Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 32 F.4th 1246 (10th Cir. 2022)

This case provided much of the opinion’s governing framework. The court relied on it for the requirement of an official policy or custom, causation of a constitutional injury, and deliberate indifference. It also supported the propositions that municipalities answer only for their own acts and that deliberate indifference ordinarily requires evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations by untrained employees.

Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2013)

Cited through George, this decision reinforced the elements connecting municipal policy, injury, and deliberate indifference. Its significance lies in preventing municipal liability from becoming a substitute for ordinary employer liability: a plaintiff must identify the municipality’s actionable responsibility for the injury.

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011)

The court used this decision to emphasize that municipal liability is “most tenuous” when based on failure to train. It also supplied the demanding deliberate-indifference standard: disregard of a known or obvious consequence. The opinion drew on Connick both for the usual requirement of a prior pattern and for the narrow possibility of liability without such a pattern.

Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2019)

This case framed the single-incident exception. A prior pattern may be unnecessary in a narrow range of circumstances where unconstitutional consequences are highly predictable and patently obvious. The court acknowledged that route but did not apply it because Bailey first failed to establish a genuine dispute about inadequate training.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)

This decision supplied the analytical starting point: whether the municipality provided an adequate training program. That threshold inquiry controlled the appeal. The court did not proceed to determine whether an established deficiency reflected deliberate indifference because Bailey had not produced sufficient evidence of the deficiency itself.

Carr v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2003)

This was the principal authority for allocating the burden of proof. The plaintiff must prove inadequate training. Accordingly, gaps in course descriptions and witnesses’ imperfect recollections could not require the City to disprove an otherwise unsupported allegation.

Summary-judgment standards

BNSF Ry. Co. v. Hiett, 22 F.4th 1190 (10th Cir. 2022)

The court cited this decision for de novo review, consideration of the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, and the absence-of-a-genuine-dispute standard. These principles required an independent appellate assessment of whether Bailey’s evidence could support a verdict, not merely acceptance of the district court’s factual characterization.

US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2010)

Cited through BNSF Ry. Co. v. Hiett, this case supported de novo review of summary judgment. The appellate court therefore reviewed the legal sufficiency of the record without deferring to the district court’s conclusion.

Tesone v. Empire Mktg. Strategies, 942 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2019)

Also cited through BNSF Ry. Co. v. Hiett, this decision supplied the requirement to view the evidence favorably to the nonmoving party. The court nevertheless distinguished reasonable favorable inferences from speculation based on an absence of specific recollection.

In re MDL 2700 Genetech Herceptin (Trastuzumab) Mktg. & Sales Prac. Litig., 960 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2020)

This authority, again cited through BNSF Ry. Co. v. Hiett, supported summary judgment where no genuine issue of material fact exists. Its role was procedural: uncertainty in the record mattered only if it could support a material finding necessary to Bailey’s claim.

Training certification and the earlier appeal

Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2006)

The court cited this case for the background proposition that Oklahoma requires law-enforcement certification through the Council on Law Enforcement Education and Training, or CLEET. It supplied context for the City’s reliance on recognized training programs, rather than an independent rule that certification conclusively establishes adequate training.

Jones v. Hacker, 2015 WL 1279363 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2015)

The district court had relied on this decision as supporting the sufficiency of CLEET certification to sustain a finding of adequate training. The appellate opinion described that reasoning but resolved the appeal through Bailey’s failure of proof. It should not be read as adopting a categorical appellate rule that certification always defeats a failure-to-train claim.

Bailey v. Beale, 2025 WL 1662004 (10th Cir. 2025)

This earlier appeal established Beale’s entitlement to qualified immunity because Bailey had not shown a violation of clearly established law. Its role here was procedural: it explained why no federal claims remained after remand. A failure to establish clearly established law is not equivalent to a determination that the entry was constitutional.

Supplemental jurisdiction

Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984 (10th Cir. 2020)

This decision provided both the abuse-of-discretion standard and the principle that supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, not a plaintiff’s entitlement. It governed review of the district court’s refusal to retain the state-law claims.

Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2006)

Cited through Strain v. Regalado, this case supported deferential appellate review of the supplemental-jurisdiction decision. The question was whether the district court exceeded its permissible discretion, not whether the appellate judges would independently have retained the claims.

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)

The court invoked this decision’s characterization of supplemental jurisdiction as “a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” That principle supported allowing state-law disputes to leave federal court once the federal basis for the litigation had disappeared.

Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2011)

This decision supplied the usual practice: district courts generally should decline jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims. It directly supported affirmance on the second issue.

Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm'n, 149 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 1998)

Cited through Koch v. City of Del City, this authority reinforced that usual practice. Neither case makes relinquishment automatic; both support the discretionary choice made in this litigation.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Inadequate training must be demonstrated, not presumed

The court’s decisive distinction was between evidence that training was inadequate and evidence that did not comprehensively describe the training. Bailey relied substantially on the latter. She argued that transcripts, manuals, training forms, and deposition answers did not specifically identify instruction on the legal standards and procedures for warrantless residential entry.

The court held that this omission did not support the inference she sought on this record. A course title need not list every topic covered, and a witness’s inability to remember detailed instruction does not establish that the instruction never occurred.

This reasoning concerns the plaintiff’s burden on an essential claim element. It does not eliminate the City’s ordinary procedural obligations as a summary-judgment movant. Rather, the City was not required to assume Bailey’s ultimate burden of proving the quality and completeness of its training.

2. The evidence was neutral or supported the existence of relevant training

College-based certification. Beale obtained CLEET certification through the Collegiate Officer Program, or COPs, while earning a criminal-justice degree. His transcript included courses addressing law enforcement, criminal investigation, criminal procedure, and related subjects. Although the transcript did not expressly identify warrantless residential entry, it did not establish that the subject was omitted.

Beale’s recollection. Beale testified that several college classes covered case law relevant to entering private residences, although he could not identify a particular class. He did not recall whether the coursework included the more specifically described legal standards or procedures. The court reasoned that an inability in 2022 to recall details of education completed before his 2015 graduation was insufficient to establish inadequate training. Drawing the opposite conclusion would require speculation.

The police chief’s testimony. Chief Carl Allen described COPs as equivalent to CLEET basic training in coursework and hours. He explained that CLEET’s legal instruction covered the relevant subjects and inferred that CLEET-approved COPs instruction did likewise. The court acknowledged that Allen lacked personal knowledge of the COPs curriculum. His testimony therefore was not definitive proof of adequate training, but it also did not demonstrate a deficiency.

Field training. The City also required supervised field training. Allen believed residential-entry issues were covered at least generally. Beale testified that he had gone over entering dwellings with his field training officer, although he could not recall the time devoted to it. More concretely, the field-training materials addressed removing occupants from residences and explaining what it means for an officer to be legally present when making an arrest. Those subjects undermined the assertion that relevant instruction was absent.

Continuing education. Beale completed more than the required twenty-four annual hours of CLEET education. His continuing-education transcript did not specifically identify warrantless-entry training. But that omission did not establish a deficiency in his overall preparation, which also included college and field instruction.

The opinion thus did not require acceptance of every assumption made by City witnesses. Even treating portions of their testimony as inconclusive, Bailey still lacked evidence sufficient to establish the necessary training defect.

3. The single-incident theory could not cure the threshold evidentiary gap

Bailey argued that the district court should have considered whether residential entry was a recurring police situation and whether unconstitutional entry was an obvious or highly predictable consequence of failing to provide appropriate training.

The court regarded those questions as premature. The single-incident doctrine addresses when deliberate indifference may be established without a prior pattern of violations. It does not dispense with the need to establish inadequate training. Because the record did not create a genuine dispute on that threshold question, the court had no need to decide whether this case otherwise fit the narrow exception.

The court also expressly declined to determine whether inadequate training could properly be characterized as City policy. Its holding therefore did not resolve every element of municipal liability, nor did it decide the underlying Fourth Amendment merits of the entry.

4. Supplemental jurisdiction remained discretionary

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction. Applying the usual preference for relinquishing remaining state-law claims, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion.

This ruling concerned the proper forum for those claims, not their substantive merits. The opinion did not decide whether Bailey could prevail under state law.

C. Potential Impact

A practical evidentiary lesson for plaintiffs. The opinion illustrates the weakness of relying exclusively on generic course titles, incomplete recollections, or the absence of a specifically labeled training module. Evidence identifying an actual deficiency—such as deficient instructional content, testimony establishing an omission, or evidence explaining why existing instruction was inadequate—would address the issue more directly. The court did not prescribe a mandatory evidentiary checklist.

No certification safe harbor for municipalities. Although recognized certification and field training supported the City’s position, the decision does not establish that state certification necessarily satisfies federal constitutional training obligations. A materially different record demonstrating deficient instruction would present a different question.

A limit on single-incident arguments. The decision reinforces the distinction between proving inadequate training and proving deliberate indifference to its consequences. A plaintiff cannot substitute the asserted obviousness of a risk for evidence that the training program was deficient.

Limited precedential reach. Future courts may find the opinion persuasive when evaluating similarly ambiguous training records. Its express nonprecedential designation, however, limits its authority, and its outcome depends substantially on the particular evidence presented.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Municipal liability under § 1983

A city is not automatically responsible whenever a police officer allegedly violates someone’s constitutional rights. The plaintiff must connect the injury to an actionable municipal policy or custom.

Failure to train

A claim that a municipality’s deficient preparation of its employees caused a constitutional injury. Showing that an officer made a mistake does not, by itself, establish a defective training program.

Deliberate indifference

A demanding standard involving disregard of a known or obvious risk. It requires more than a showing that better training would have been desirable.

Single-incident liability

A narrow route to establishing deliberate indifference without earlier similar violations, where unconstitutional consequences of inadequate training are highly predictable and obvious. It still requires evidence of inadequate training.

Summary judgment

A decision without trial when no genuine dispute of material fact requires a jury’s resolution. Favorable reasonable inferences help the opposing party; speculation does not replace evidence.

Qualified immunity

A protection available to individual officials when the governing requirements are satisfied, including where the plaintiff has not established a violation of clearly established law. Such a ruling does not necessarily establish that the conduct was constitutional.

Supplemental jurisdiction

A federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims alongside federal claims. The court may ordinarily relinquish those state claims once the federal claims are resolved.

Nonprecedential judgment

A decision that may persuade courts but generally does not bind them in unrelated litigation. Its stated exceptions concern the binding effect of judgments and issues already resolved.

5. Conclusion

Bailey v. City of Ada emphasizes that municipal failure-to-train liability begins with evidence of a training deficiency. On this record, nonspecific documents and uncertain recollections did not establish that deficiency, particularly where testimony and field-training materials indicated relevant instruction.

The decision neither makes certification conclusive nor forecloses single-incident liability. Its narrower significance is evidentiary: plaintiffs must establish inadequate training before questions about deliberate indifference can carry the claim forward. The court also confirmed the district court’s discretion to relinquish remaining state-law claims after resolving all federal claims.