Asylum and Administrative Closure: Independent Eligibility Defects and Speculative Waiver Prospects Sustain Denial

A. The Reviewable Decision and the Limits of Appellate Fact Review

The court first identified which agency reasoning controlled. Under Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009), a separately reasoned Board opinion ordinarily constitutes the final agency determination under review. The opinion expressly acknowledges that Khalili v. Holder was abrogated on other grounds, as recognized in Seldon v. Garland, 120 F.4th 527, 531 (6th Cir. 2024). That qualification preserves the limited proposition for which the earlier case was cited without suggesting that all its reasoning remains intact.

Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015), supplies the complementary rule: when the Board adopts the Immigration Judge’s reasoning, the court also examines that reasoning. Together, these authorities explain why the court could review the Immigration Judge’s alternative merits findings while treating the adverse credibility determination as immaterial to the Board’s decision.

The governing factual-review standard was highly deferential. Spindola v. Blanche, 184 F.4th 852, 858 (6th Cir. 2026), states that agency findings remain conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the contrary conclusion. Abdurakhmanov v. Holder, 735 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2012), quoting Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S., 146 F.3d 384, 388 (6th Cir. 1998), frames the inquiry as whether reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence supports the agency’s findings on the whole record.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992), reinforces the distinction between finding an alternative interpretation plausible and establishing reversible error. An appellate court may not replace agency findings merely because another interpretation also has substantial support. Similarly, Klawitter v. I.N.S., 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992), requires evidence that actually compels a contrary conclusion.

Legal questions remained subject to independent, or de novo, review under Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1148 (6th Cir. 2021). The opinion thus distinguishes factual deference from legal review rather than treating every aspect of the agency’s decision as discretionary.

B. Asylum Required More Than Credible Evidence of Serious Violence

Asylum eligibility requires past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution connected to a statutorily protected ground, including political opinion. Sebastian v. Blanche, No. 25-3736, 2026 WL 1166895, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2026), provides the introductory comparison between asylum and withholding: both protect against removal based on persecution connected to protected characteristics.

Gomes-Batista’s principal emphasis was the political nature and severity of the attacks. The court nevertheless treated two other requirements as independently decisive: the adequacy of governmental protection and the availability of internal relocation.

Under Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 793 (6th Cir. 2020), an applicant relying on nongovernmental persecution must establish that the persecutor is aligned with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable to control the persecutor. Ortiz v. Garland, 6 F.4th 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2021), similarly connects the legal determination of persecution by private actors to governmental inability or unwillingness to protect.

These authorities explain why the existence of serious assaults did not end the inquiry. The agency had to assess not only what the attackers did, but also whether the evidence sufficiently connected their conduct to a failure of state protection.

The record included police reports, but the court found no evidence that Gomes-Batista reported the May 2009 beating itself. Reporting the threatening call earlier that day did not necessarily notify police of the later assault. The reports concerning the other incidents also described the assailants vaguely as “unknown.” The agency could therefore infer that investigative failure reflected limited identifying information rather than unwillingness to act. Gomes-Batista also had not followed up with police.

The threatening officer’s discouragement and the unsuccessful reports were relevant, but the court concluded that they did not compel rejection of the agency’s assessment. This is an evidentiary holding, not a categorical rule requiring every asylum applicant to report every attack. The Immigration Judge also considered whether reporting would have been futile and found the showing inadequate here.

Ortiz-Cervantes v. Holder, 596 F. App’x 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2015), supplied the procedural consequence: once a dispositive eligibility requirement fails, the agency need not resolve every remaining asylum issue. Accordingly, the court did not have to decide whether the attacks otherwise established the necessary political nexus or degree of harm.

C. One Unsuccessful Local Move Did Not Establish That Relocation Throughout Brazil Was Unreasonable

The relocation issue independently supported denial of protection. Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 401, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2025), explains that the ability to avoid persecution through internal relocation defeats the relevant showing for asylum and withholding. Ibrahim v. Holder, 544 F. App’x 635, 639 (6th Cir. 2013), expresses the same principle for a well-founded fear of persecution.

Gomes-Batista argued that relocation had already failed: the same men allegedly found and attacked him after he moved to another city. The court accepted that this experience was relevant but found it insufficient to compel the conclusion that relocation elsewhere in Brazil would also fail. A move approximately ninety minutes away did not necessarily demonstrate that the attackers could reach him in another state, including an area outside the PT Party’s control.

The important distinction is between evidence that one relocation attempt failed and proof that reasonable relocation alternatives are unavailable. The court did not establish that moving farther away is always safe or reasonable. It upheld the agency’s assessment because the evidence presented did not compel a contrary finding.

For withholding of removal, El Ghorbi v. Mukasey, 281 F. App’x 514, 516 (6th Cir. 2008), citing I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984), supplies the “clear probability” standard. Ben Hamida v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 741 (6th Cir. 2007), supports the court’s conclusion that failure to establish asylum eligibility on these shared substantive grounds also defeated withholding’s higher burden.

That conclusion should not be generalized to every asylum denial: some asylum-specific barriers do not necessarily defeat withholding. Here, however, the defects concerned protection and relocation requirements relevant to both forms of relief.

D. Assumed Credibility Removed the Credibility Dispute, but Not the Need to Address Hearing Fairness

The Board assumed Gomes-Batista’s credibility and rejected his claims on independent merits grounds. The Sixth Circuit accordingly described his attack on the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination as moot. In context, this meant that changing that determination would not alter the operative agency rationale; it did not mean that the entire petition presented no live controversy.

The court separately examined his contention that restrictions on testimony demonstrated bias. Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 979 (6th Cir. 2009), recognizes an Immigration Judge’s broad discretion to manage removal hearings. Kada v. Barr, 946 F.3d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 2020), identifies the constitutional limit: proceedings become fundamentally unfair when an applicant is prevented from reasonably presenting the case.

Applying those decisions, the court upheld the focus on experiences in Brazil, the country of feared persecution, rather than on trauma during travel to the United States. This conclusion was record-specific. It does not establish that travel-related trauma can never matter to credibility or the ability to testify; the court found no fundamental unfairness affecting the assessment of these claims.

E. Preservation Rules Narrowed the Claims Available for Review

The opinion also demonstrates that mentioning a claim is not equivalent to developing it. Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi, 154 F.4th 880, 883–84 (6th Cir. 2025), supported treating the Convention Against Torture and cancellation claims as forfeited.

For the Convention Against Torture claim, Gomes-Batista recited the standard and included the claim in a heading, but supplied no meaningful substantive analysis. Independently, the Board had already deemed that claim waived on administrative appeal. The court cited Cruz-Ibarra v. Lynch, 632 F. App’x 824, 829 (6th Cir. 2015), in declining to review it in those circumstances.

A similar problem affected his assertion that Brazil maintained a pattern or practice of persecuting similarly situated people. The Board found that this theory had not been presented to the Immigration Judge. Relying on Reyes-Cardona v. Holder, 565 F. App’x 366, 368 (6th Cir. 2014), the court declined to consider it.

These rulings concern presentation and preservation, not substantive rejection of all possible torture or pattern-or-practice theories. They underscore the need to articulate each ground at the appropriate administrative stage and then develop it in appellate briefing.

F. Administrative Closure Required a Supported Assessment of the Proposed Immigration Pathway

Administrative closure temporarily removes a case from active adjudication. It does not itself grant immigration status or determine eligibility for a waiver.

Privett v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 865 F.3d 375, 378 (6th Cir. 2017), explains the role of an I-130 petition in a potential progression toward a visa and permanent residence. Its significance here was limited: approval established progress along that pathway, not entitlement to complete it.

Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland, 999 F.3d 986, 991–93 (6th Cir. 2021), recognizes that administrative closure can be appropriate to facilitate pursuit of a Form I-601A provisional unlawful-presence waiver. But the availability of closure does not create a right to it.

The governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(l)(3)(i), identifies eight nonexclusive considerations:

1. The reason closure is requested.
2. The basis for opposition.
3. Whether closure is required to file or obtain the proposed relief from DHS.
4. The likelihood of success on that proposed relief.
5. The anticipated duration of closure.
6. Responsibility for existing or anticipated delay.
7. The anticipated ultimate outcome of the proceedings.
8. The applicant’s ICE detention status.

No single factor is dispositive. The court nevertheless found that the Board had considered several relevant factors rather than treating one as automatically controlling.

The central evidentiary omission concerned extreme hardship. Under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), the anticipated unlawful-presence waiver required a qualifying-relative hardship showing. Gomes-Batista’s initial motion did not explain how he would establish that requirement, and the later notice of I-130 approval supplied no supporting hardship evidence. The Board also referred to the Immigration Judge’s finding that a substantial support network in Brazil could mitigate hardship associated with relocation.

Review was for abuse of discretion under Matias-Cifuentes v. Whitaker, 755 F. App’x 539, 542 (6th Cir. 2018). Trujillo Diaz v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 2018), defines the relevant defects as a lack of rational explanation, an unexplained departure from established policy, or reliance on an impermissible basis. Citing Young Hee Kwak v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 2010), the court concluded that denying closure on the evidence actually presented fell within the Board’s discretion.

The court also relied on the uncertain duration of closure and the Board’s assessment that entry of a removal order would not itself preclude pursuing the waiver. Mohamady-Abdelghaffar v. Att’y Gen., No. 25-1848, 2026 WL 2475900, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 2026), supported both the relevance of whether closure was necessary and the proposition that the Board need not discuss every factor in detail if it weighs the relevant considerations.

The resulting rule is not that a removal order never affects waiver procedures, nor that likely waiver success alone controls closure. It is that the Board rationally weighed the relevant circumstances in this case, including the absence of evidence supporting the proposed waiver.

G. Later Developments Belonged Before the Board Through Reopening

Gomes-Batista attempted to strengthen his position by asserting that a later-approved Form I-212 application had involved evidence of medical, psychological, and financial hardship to his wife. The court found the timing unclear and the record incomplete: it lacked the full approved application and the evidence underlying it.

More fundamentally, Ndayisaba v. Holder, 457 F. App’x 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2012), supported presenting post-decision evidence through a motion to reopen before the Board. The court would not substitute appellate consideration of new material for that administrative process.

The opinion therefore did not decide that the alleged hardship evidence was inadequate on its merits. Nor did it treat approval of permission to reapply for admission as equivalent to approval of a provisional unlawful-presence waiver. It held that the asserted later development did not establish error in the Board’s earlier decision on the record then available.