4. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited and Their Role
Self-represented litigants remain responsible for presenting arguments
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), supplied the framework for treating Wakat’s pro se submissions. Courts construe such filings liberally, but do not become the litigant’s attorney by constructing arguments or searching the record for potential claims. Self-represented parties also remain subject to ordinary procedural rules. This principle prevented liberal construction from becoming a substitute for an actual challenge to the dismissal orders.
An opening brief must confront the decision under review
Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366, 1369 (10th Cir. 2015), furnished the court’s central formulation: an appellant’s first task is to explain why the district court was wrong. The opinion used that precedent to emphasize that Wakat’s briefs contained no argument against the grounds actually supporting the dismissals.
In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th 1126, 1181 (10th Cir. 2023), established that an issue may be waived through omission or inadequate argument in the opening brief. Its importance here was direct: identifying grievances against the judicial system did not preserve challenges to unrelated dismissal rulings.
Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 911 (10th Cir. 2012), reinforced the requirement that arguments be clearly made in the opening brief. The panel did not infer a challenge to the dismissals from Wakat’s broader objection to restrictions on his litigation.
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1208 (10th Cir. 2014), supplied the related proposition that omitting an issue from the opening brief generally forfeits appellate consideration. Together, these decisions supported declining substantive review rather than independently developing arguments Wakat had not presented.
Judicial notice does not expand appellate jurisdiction
Bruce v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 57 F.4th 738, 741 n.3 (10th Cir. 2023), permitted the court to take judicial notice of another court’s publicly filed records directly related to the issues presented. General Order 25-09 was not part of the records in the four underlying cases, but the panel could consult it under that authority and Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(1).
This distinction matters: judicial notice allowed the court to identify and examine the order Wakat discussed; it did not make that order appealable in proceedings that otherwise failed to bring it before the court.
Filing restrictions must be challenged through the proper appeal
Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1448 (10th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), identified the proper route for challenging filing restrictions: an appeal from the order establishing them. It supported rejecting Wakat’s effort to obtain review through appeals from separate, earlier dismissals. The decision did not treat filing restrictions as immune from review; it required the appropriate appellate vehicle.
Functional compliance can sometimes satisfy notice requirements
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 119 F.3d 847, 849 (10th Cir. 1997), recognizes that papers filed within the appeal period may function as a notice of appeal if they provide the information Rule 3 requires. The panel considered this potentially accommodating principle rather than insisting solely on a particular document title.
It did not help Wakat. His August notice could not demonstrate an intent to appeal an order not yet entered, and no qualifying subsequent filing within the applicable appeal period expressed an intent to challenge General Order 25-09.
Merger reaches appropriate earlier rulings, not later orders in separate cases
McBride v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2002), explains that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up prior nonfinal orders and rulings that produced the judgment. This supplied the baseline merger rule, also reflected in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(4).
Sines v. Wilner, 609 F.3d 1070, 1075 (10th Cir. 2010), supplied the limiting principle: an order entered in a separate case does not merge into the judgment identified in the notice of appeal. General Order 25-09 failed both the temporal and procedural connections relevant here—it followed the dismissals and arose in a distinct miscellaneous proceeding.
Later orders require an additional appellate step
Art Janpol Volkswagen, Inc. v. Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc., 767 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1985), supported the requirement of a separate notice to obtain review of a later-entered order. Even assuming the restrictions could otherwise be addressed in these appeals, Wakat had not filed an amended notice or its functional equivalent, and the applicable period under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) had expired.
B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning
1. The appellate arguments did not match the appealed judgments
The panel distinguished the subject matter of Wakat’s disputes from the legal grounds for dismissal. To obtain review, he needed to explain why the district court erred in finding no subject matter jurisdiction in No. 25-5127, or why its financial-disclosure requirements and resulting dismissals were erroneous in the other cases.
He did neither. His complaint about the later restrictions could not substitute for arguments addressing those rulings. The court therefore applied what it called appellate-briefing waiver.
This was not a determination that every possible challenge to the dismissals lacked merit. It was a determination that Wakat had not presented such challenges for appellate decision.
2. The filing restrictions were outside the notices’ scope
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) requires identification of the judgment or appealable order being challenged. Wakat’s notices did not identify General Order 25-09. The court considered whether other timely papers could cure that omission, but found none.
The court also rejected merger as an alternative route. A final judgment can carry appropriate earlier rulings into an appeal; it cannot ordinarily carry a later order from an independent proceeding backward into that judgment.
3. Chronology undermined both jurisdiction and Wakat’s causal argument
The timing explained why the August notice could not reach the September order. It also undermined Wakat’s claim that the restrictions had prevented him from prosecuting the four actions: those actions had already been dismissed before the restrictions existed.
The panel described that claimed interference as doubtful. It did not, however, undertake a broader inquiry into whether the restrictions affected other proceedings or satisfied due process.
4. The opinion deliberately left important merits questions unresolved
The court did not decide whether the annexation was unlawful, whether defendants conspired against Wakat, or whether his property and contractual claims were valid. Nor did it determine whether General Order 25-09 afforded adequate procedural protections.
Similarly, the affirmance should not be read as establishing a general rule that an inadequately pleaded federal civil-rights claim necessarily eliminates subject matter jurisdiction. The panel recounted the district court’s reasoning but declined to review it because Wakat had not challenged it.
C. Potential Impact
Appellate practice. The decision illustrates the importance of matching each appellate argument to the specific ruling challenged. Shared facts or related grievances do not replace an explanation of error in the judgment under review.
Self-represented litigants. Liberal construction protects against unduly technical readings, but does not require courts to invent arguments, overlook appeal deadlines, or combine separate proceedings.
Challenges to filing restrictions. The decision emphasizes procedural routing rather than substantive approval. A litigant seeking review must timely appeal the restrictions themselves; an asserted due-process violation does not independently enlarge the scope of another appeal.
Fee-waiver practice. The grants of in forma pauperis status on appeal did not undo the earlier dismissals or resolve whether the district court applications were adequate. Permission to appeal without prepaying fees and entitlement to reversal are separate questions.
Limits on future reliance. Because the disposition is nonprecedential, its principal broader value is persuasive: it brings established briefing, notice, merger, and timing principles together in a recurring procedural setting.