“Apparent Conflict” Limits: No DOT–VE Conflict Where Security Guard DOT Excludes Heights/Machinery and Claimant Relies on a “Rabbit Trail” of Definitions

1. Introduction

In Robert Battle v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to Robert Lewis Battle. Battle alleged disability beginning February 28, 2021, based on cardiac and related conditions (including congestive heart failure and hypertension), and challenged the Administrative Law Judge’s step-four finding that he could return to his past relevant work as a security guard.

The appeal presented a focused issue: whether the ALJ failed to discharge the duty to identify and resolve an “apparent” conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony (that Battle could perform security-guard work) and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)—particularly where Battle attempted to derive a conflict through linked definitions in Department of Labor companion materials concerning “other environmental conditions.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that no “apparent” conflict existed between (a) Battle’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) limitation against exposure to “hazards such as unprotected heights and hazardous machinery” and (b) the DOT description for security guard, which explicitly indicates that exposure to “moving mechanical parts” and “high exposed places” does not exist for the job.

The court rejected Battle’s attempt to manufacture a conflict by following what it described as a “rabbit trail of definitions” through the Selected Characteristics of Occupations to argue that “other environmental conditions” could include risk of bodily injury from law violators. Because there was no apparent DOT–VE conflict to resolve, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s step-four determination.

The panel also declined to consider Battle’s separate argument about his ability to perform the security-guard job “as actually performed” because he failed to raise it in the district court.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Rodriguez v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 118 F.4th 1302 (11th Cir. 2024)
    Role in this opinion: Establishes that when the Appeals Council denies review, the court of appeals reviews the ALJ decision as the Commissioner’s final decision. This framed the court’s focus on the ALJ’s reasoning (not the district court’s), including in a footnote addressing the district court’s discussion of state agency consultant opinions.
  • Walker v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 987 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Role in this opinion: Supplies the standard of review: whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether correct legal standards were applied; legal conclusions reviewed de novo. This is the doctrinal lens through which the “apparent conflict” dispute is evaluated.
  • Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2018)
    Role in this opinion: Provides two key propositions used here: (1) ALJs consult the DOT and vocational expert testimony in assessing job requirements, and (2) the ALJ has an “affirmative duty” to identify and resolve “apparent” conflicts between VE testimony and the DOT. Battle’s claim rose or fell on whether the alleged mismatch was “apparent” under Washington.
  • Buckwalter v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Role in this opinion: Reinforces that neither the DOT nor VE testimony “automatically trumps” the other and that failure to resolve an “apparent” conflict means the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The court applied Buckwalter to clarify that the duty attaches only if an “apparent” conflict exists; the court then held none did.
  • Viverette v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 1309 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Role in this opinion: Supplies the definition of an “apparent” conflict as something “ascertainable or evident.” This definition is decisive: the court concluded that Battle’s proposed conflict was not evident from the DOT’s own environmental descriptors and instead depended on layered inferences from other materials.
  • Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004)
    Role in this opinion: Governs issue preservation on appeal. The court used it to deem forfeited Battle’s argument that the evidence did not support his ability to perform the security-guard job “as actually performed,” because he did not raise it in the district court and no exceptional conditions justified review.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Step-four framework and sources of job information.
    At step four, the ALJ decides whether the claimant can perform “past relevant work” given the RFC. The ALJ may rely on the DOT and vocational expert testimony.
  2. The “apparent conflict” trigger.
    Under Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. and Buckwalter v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., the ALJ must identify and resolve conflicts only if they are “apparent”—i.e., “ascertainable or evident” under Viverette v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec..
  3. Direct comparison: RFC hazard limitation vs. DOT environmental conditions.
    Battle’s RFC barred exposure to “hazards such as unprotected heights and hazardous machinery.” The court compared that limitation to the DOT listing for “security guard,” which states that exposure to “moving mechanical parts” and “high exposed places” does not exist. Because the DOT’s own descriptors align with the RFC restriction, the court found no evident mismatch.
  4. Rejecting an inferential, cross-publication conflict theory.
    Battle argued that the DOT’s “other environmental conditions” field (as elaborated through definitions in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations) could include patrolling and risk of bodily injury from law violators, and that this risk should count as a “hazard” barred by the RFC. The court rejected that approach, emphasizing that the DOT security-guard description already contemplates protective/patrolling duties and that Battle’s claimed conflict required an attenuated “rabbit trail” rather than an “apparent” inconsistency the ALJ was required to spot and resolve.
  5. Issue preservation as an independent limiting principle.
    The court separately applied Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co. to refuse consideration of an argument not raised below, keeping the appellate inquiry confined to the preserved DOT–VE conflict theory.

C. Impact

Although unpublished and therefore not precedential in the strict sense, the decision is practically significant for Social Security litigation in the Eleventh Circuit in three ways:

  • Constraining “apparent conflict” arguments to what is evident. The opinion signals skepticism toward conflict claims that depend on multi-step definitional extrapolations across DOT companion materials rather than clear inconsistencies between VE testimony and the DOT’s described job requirements.
  • Clarifying “hazards” in environmental limitations. Where an RFC limits exposure to hazards “such as unprotected heights and hazardous machinery,” and the DOT indicates those exposures do not exist, courts may treat the DOT–RFC alignment as straightforward—absent a concrete, job-requirement contradiction.
  • Reinforcing forfeiture rules in benefits appeals. The use of Access Now underscores that claimants must present all theories to the district court; reframing the dispute on appeal risks dismissal regardless of merits.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): The most a claimant can still do in a work setting despite medical impairments and related limitations (e.g., limits on climbing, temperature exposure, or hazards).
  • Step Four (Past Relevant Work): A stage in the SSA’s five-step process asking whether the claimant can still perform a prior job. If yes, the claimant is found not disabled.
  • DOT (Dictionary of Occupational Titles): A Department of Labor reference describing typical duties and conditions for jobs. ALJs often use it to understand job demands.
  • Vocational Expert (VE): A labor-market and job-requirements specialist who testifies at hearings about what work a person with a given RFC can do.
  • “Apparent conflict” (Eleventh Circuit doctrine): A mismatch between VE testimony and the DOT that is evident on its face—something the ALJ is expected to notice and reconcile without speculative inference.
  • Substantial evidence: A deferential review standard—more than a scintilla—asking whether the record contains enough relevant evidence that a reasonable person could agree with the ALJ’s conclusion.
  • Issue forfeiture on appeal: Arguments not raised in the district court generally cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed because the alleged DOT–VE conflict was not “apparent.” Battle’s RFC restricted exposure to hazards like unprotected heights and hazardous machinery, while the DOT’s security-guard listing expressly indicates no exposure to high exposed places or moving mechanical parts. The court refused to treat an inferential chain through companion definitions about “other environmental conditions” as creating an evident conflict the ALJ had to resolve. The opinion also reiterates the importance of issue preservation under Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co..