Anders Withdrawal After Guilty Plea: Counsel Must Confront Record-Supported Competency Questions, Though Rule 11 Colloquy Can Defeat Plain-Error Relief

Introduction

In United States v. Dennis Cheston (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 2026) (nonprecedential), Dennis Cheston appealed his conviction and 151-month sentence imposed by the District of New Jersey after he pleaded guilty to heroin distribution and felon-in-possession charges. Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief seeking to withdraw, asserting there were no nonfrivolous issues.

The core issues were procedural rather than merits-based: (1) whether counsel satisfied the Anders framework and Third Circuit requirements for withdrawal; (2) whether any arguable challenge existed to the validity of Cheston’s guilty plea—particularly given later-raised claims of cognitive impairments; and (3) whether the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. A collateral background issue involved shifting assumptions about Cheston’s “career offender” status after the district court decision in United States v. Lewis, No. CR 20-583, 2021 WL 3508810 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2021) was vacated by the Third Circuit in United States v. Lewis, 58 F.4th 764 (3d Cir. 2023).

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed both the conviction and sentence. The court held that counsel’s submission was adequate under the Anders process, and the court’s independent review revealed no nonfrivolous appellate issues.

Notably, the panel identified an issue counsel should have addressed: whether statements about Cheston’s mental limitations (raised at sentencing) could undermine the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty plea. The court nevertheless concluded that, under plain-error review, the plea colloquy and written plea materials provided sufficient assurance of competence and voluntariness, leaving no viable basis for relief.

On sentencing, the court held the 151-month sentence (bottom of the applicable Guidelines range at offense level 29) was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable. The panel also corrected counsel’s mistaken waiver analysis, explaining the sentencing agreement’s appellate waiver threshold (offense level 12) did not bar this appeal, though the appeal still lacked merit.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1 967): Established that appointed counsel seeking to withdraw must file a brief identifying anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, enabling meaningful judicial review and protecting the defendant’s right to “substantial equality and fair process.”
  • United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 585-86 (7th Cir. 1997)): Provided the Third Circuit’s operational test for Anders briefs: counsel must show a thorough search of the record and explain why potential issues are frivolous.
  • United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996)): Articulated the two-step Anders review: (1) adequacy of counsel’s brief under local rules; (2) independent judicial review for nonfrivolous issues, with the scope of review guided by the brief if it is adequate.
  • McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988): Defined “nonfrivolous” issues as those having “any basis in law or fact.”
  • United States v. Brookins, 132 F.4th 659, 667 n.9 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569, 575 (1989)): Limited the typical post-guilty-plea appellate universe to jurisdiction, plea validity, and sentence legality. This framing narrowed the panel’s search for potentially arguable issues.
  • Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 430 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)): Supplied the competency standard: sufficient understanding of proceedings and ability to consult with counsel. The panel used this to assess whether the “brain virus” and learning-disability claims could even arguably implicate competency.
  • United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59 (2002)): Established that unpreserved plea-colloquy/Rule 11 issues are reviewed for plain error, setting a high bar for Cheston.
  • Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969): Anchored the constitutional requirement that guilty pleas be knowing and voluntary; the panel found the plea colloquy met Boykin’s demands.
  • United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 566-67 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc): Provided the Third Circuit’s procedural/substantive reasonableness framework for sentencing review.
  • United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc): Supported plain-error review for unpreserved procedural-sentencing objections.
  • United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 194, 196 (3d Cir. 2006)): Restated the sentencing sequence: calculate Guidelines range, address departures, and meaningfully consider § 3553(a) factors.
  • United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2007)): Recognized a presumption of substantive reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences, reinforcing affirmance here.
  • United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 105-53 (10th Cir. 2007)): Emphasized that if the sentence is reasonable in light of § 3553(a), the appellate court must affirm.
  • United States v. Lewis, 58 F.4th 764 (3d Cir. 2023) and United States v. Lewis, No. CR 20-583, 2021 WL 3508810 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2021): Functioned as the doctrinal backdrop to the parties’ attempted sentencing recalibration; once vacatur occurred, Cheston’s career-offender status “remained intact,” driving the offense-level 29 range used at sentencing.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Anders adequacy and independent review: Applying United States v. Marvin and United States v. Youla, the court assessed whether counsel thoroughly scoured the record and explained the frivolousness of potential issues. While noting imperfections (failure to discuss jurisdiction and a waiver misstatement), the panel treated them as non-fatal because jurisdiction plainly existed under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and the waiver error did not create a meritorious appellate claim.
  2. Plea validity and competency as a “missed” but ultimately meritless issue: The panel itself identified a more serious omission: counsel did not address whether sentencing-era assertions about cognitive limitations could implicate competency and thus plea voluntariness. Using Taylor v. Horn and Dusky v. United States, the court acknowledged competency could be an arguable issue in principle. But because it was not raised at the plea stage, the court applied plain-error review per United States v. Lessner and United States v. Vonn. The record defeated the claim: Cheston stated in the plea agreement he was not mentally incompetent; he participated coherently in the plea colloquy (including asking a clarifying question); and counsel affirmed voluntariness. The court concluded the plea satisfied Rule 11 and Boykin v. Alabama.
  3. Sentence legality and reasonableness: Under United States v. Tomko, the court reviewed procedural and substantive reasonableness. With no preserved objection, procedural issues were evaluated for plain error under United States v. Flores-Mejia. The district court followed the Gunter sequence: calculated the Guidelines range, invited departure motions, considered § 3553(a), and provided allocution. Substantively, the bottom-of-range sentence triggered the Handerhan/Rita presumption of reasonableness, and nothing in the record rebutted it.
  4. Appellate waiver clarification: The panel corrected counsel’s claim that the waiver barred the appeal. The sentencing agreement set the waiver trigger at the Guidelines range for offense level 12; the 151-month sentence exceeded that range, so the appeal was not waived. The court nonetheless affirmed because the appeal lacked any nonfrivolous merits issues.

Impact

Although expressly “NONPRECEDENTIAL” under I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion supplies practical guidance in three recurring areas:

  • Anders practice in guilty-plea appeals: The decision reinforces that Anders counsel must address not only the standard plea/sentencing issues but also any record-suggested competency concern—especially where counsel raised cognitive limitations at sentencing. Even if ultimately meritless, the issue should be surfaced and analyzed to satisfy the “conscientious examination” mandate.
  • Competency vs. later-developed mitigation narratives: The panel implicitly distinguishes (a) mental-health or intellectual-functioning mitigation offered for variance purposes from (b) a bona fide competency problem undermining the plea. The court treated the latter as theoretically available but, on this record, foreclosed by the plea colloquy and defendant’s own assurances.
  • Waiver drafting and appellate screening: The opinion highlights how modifications to appeal waivers (here, via a sentencing agreement) can be misunderstood. Future Anders briefs in similar posture should parse the operative waiver instrument carefully before asserting waiver.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders brief
A filing by appointed counsel who believes an appeal has no nonfrivolous issues; counsel must identify potential issues and explain why they lack merit, allowing the court to independently verify that the appeal is truly frivolous.
Plain error review
A demanding appellate standard used when an issue was not raised in the trial court. The appellant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
Competency to plead guilty (Dusky standard)
The defendant must understand the proceedings and be able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. A history of learning difficulties does not automatically mean incompetency; the record must show inability to understand or participate.
Rule 11 plea colloquy
The judge’s in-court questioning to ensure the plea is voluntary, knowing, and supported by an adequate factual basis. A thorough colloquy often defeats later claims that the plea was uninformed or involuntary.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness
Procedural reasonableness concerns the steps the judge followed (correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of arguments, § 3553(a)). Substantive reasonableness concerns whether the final sentence length is reasonable given the facts and statutory factors.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed Cheston’s guilty-plea conviction and bottom-of-Guidelines sentence while granting appointed counsel’s withdrawal. The key lesson is methodological: in an Anders guilty-plea appeal, counsel must engage with any plausible competency concern suggested by the record—even if raised later at sentencing—yet a detailed Rule 11 colloquy and the defendant’s own statements of competence will often preclude relief under plain-error review. The opinion also underscores careful attention to modified appellate waivers and confirms that within-Guidelines sentences, properly imposed, are difficult to disturb on appeal.