Ambiguity, AEDPA Deference, and Batson/Powers Challenges: A Commentary on Garrey v. Kelly

I. Introduction

The First Circuit’s decision in Garrey v. Kelly, No. 21‑1197 (1st Cir. Dec. 12, 2025), sits at the intersection of three powerful strands of modern criminal procedure:

the constitutional prohibition on racially discriminatory jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky and Powers v. Ohio,
the high deference federal habeas courts must give to state-court adjudications under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and
the practical problem of making constitutional sense out of a sparse, ambiguous trial record.

In 1999, a Massachusetts jury convicted James Garrey, a white defendant, of first‑degree murder for the fatal stabbing of co‑worker Corey Skog after a bar altercation. During jury selection, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror (Juror 6‑7) whom defense counsel identified as the only African‑American in the venire. Garrey objected under Batson, and by implication under Powers, to the strike. The trial judge allowed the challenge after a colloquy that:

elicited the prosecutor’s race‑neutral justification (the juror’s occupation as a guidance counselor),
included judicial commentary about the perceived “liberal” or rehabilitative attitudes of people in that occupation, and
made explicit reference to the fact that neither the defendant, the victim, nor the witnesses were members of a racial minority.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed Garrey’s conviction in 2002, rejecting his Batson arguments and addressing Powers in a footnote. After extensive state post‑conviction litigation, Garrey sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that:

the SJC unreasonably determined the facts when it described what the trial judge had done and why, and
the SJC unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, namely Batson and Powers.

The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the First Circuit (Judges Lipez, Howard, and Kayatta, with Judge Howard writing) affirmed. The opinion is not a radical doctrinal departure, but it crystallizes an important principle: when the state supreme court adopts a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous trial record in a Batson/Powers context, AEDPA’s “fairminded disagreement” standard effectively insulates that interpretation from federal habeas reversal—even if another reading would strongly suggest constitutional error.

The decision also clarifies, within the First Circuit, that:

a brief, occupation‑based explanation (here, “guidance counselor”) can satisfy step two of Batson,
a trial judge may comment on why that occupation might correlate with certain attitudes without necessarily “supplying” the prosecutor’s reason in violation of Batson, and
trial courts do not commit Powers error merely by referring to the race of the defendant, victim, and witnesses in assessing a Batson challenge, so long as the defendant’s standing to raise the challenge is not conditioned on racial congruence with the struck juror.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Core Holdings

The First Circuit’s decision rests on two AEDPA prongs:

Unreasonable determination of facts — § 2254(d)(2)
The court holds that the SJC’s factual characterizations of what the trial judge did and why he did it were not “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” Even though the trial transcript is ambiguous in crucial respects, the SJC’s inferences are plausible, and that is sufficient to defeat relief under § 2254(d)(2).
Unreasonable application of clearly established law — § 2254(d)(1)
The court further holds that the SJC did not unreasonably apply:
- Batson’s three‑step framework (prima facie showing, race‑neutral explanation, and pretext analysis), or
- Powers’ rule that a defendant may challenge race‑based strikes even if the defendant and the struck juror are of different races.
Hence, no habeas relief is available.

B. Key Points in the Court’s Reasoning

On the facts: The SJC reasonably read the trial judge’s phrase “I’m going to allow the challenge on that finding” as referring to his acceptance of the race‑neutral, occupation‑based justification, not to his remark that all participants were non‑minority. Similarly, it reasonably treated the judge’s comments about rehabilitation‑minded occupations as step‑three analysis, not as the improper invention of a new, prosecutor‑side justification at step two.
On step two of Batson: The prosecutor’s statement that she challenged Juror 6‑7 because the juror was a guidance counselor, not because of race, is facially race‑neutral and sufficient to clear the low threshold of step two.
On step three of Batson: The trial judge’s discussion of the issue with both counsel, combined with his explicit approval of the occupation‑based rationale, constitutes an adequate (if imperfectly articulated) step‑three finding that the strike was not racially motivated.
On alleged “shifting reasons”: The prosecutor’s brief confusion about whether it was the juror or her husband who was a guidance counselor did not meaningfully undermine the occupation‑based justification or reveal pretext.
On Powers: The trial judge’s references to the fact that the defendant, victim, and witnesses were not minorities did not amount to an impermissible denial of standing under Powers. Rather, those facts were considered as part of the broader, fact‑sensitive Batson analysis that other circuits have also endorsed.
On the record-keeping: The court is openly critical of the “casual and truncated” way the trial judge handled the Batson inquiry and urges more explicit, structured on‑the‑record findings in the future, but concludes that under AEDPA this less-than-ideal process still passes constitutional muster as the SJC reasonably understood it.

III. Factual and Procedural Context

A. The Underlying Offense

In March 1997, Garrey encountered co‑worker Corey Skog and Skog’s girlfriend, Doreen D’Amelio, at a Franklin, Massachusetts bar. Garrey had recently learned that Skog had been having sexual relations with Garrey’s former girlfriend. The opinion recounts:

Garrey told D’Amelio he “would kill to have a girl like you” and asked if she would mind if he hit Skog;
When Skog tried to leave with D’Amelio, Garrey blocked their exit and repeatedly punched Skog until pulled away;
Garrey then pulled a knife, stabbed Skog, and kicked Skog’s head three times;
Skog died of his injuries; Garrey was apprehended at the scene.

A jury convicted Garrey of first‑degree murder in April 1999, and he received a mandatory life sentence.

B. Jury Selection and the Peremptory Strike of Juror 6‑7

During voir dire, the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror 6‑7. Defense counsel promptly objected:

Mr. Carney (defense): Your Honor, I would ask the Court to inquire further. She is the only African-American juror that I see. … I believe she may be the only one in the entire pool, and so I would ask that the Court inquire further as to the basis for the challenge.

The trial judge initially stated that he had not even noticed whether Juror 6‑7 was African‑American, and inquired whether any parties or witnesses were minorities (they were not, with the later‑clarified exception of a Hispanic medical examiner). He then asked the prosecutor for her reason:

The Court: Could you tell us what the reason is for the challenge?

Ms. Corcoran (prosecutor): If you're inquiring, yes, your Honor. Her husband is a guidance counselor at a public school. That was my reason. It has nothing to do with her race.

After further colloquy, the prosecutor corrected herself to say that it was the juror’s own occupation:

Ms. Corcoran: Actually, her — I'm looking at her occupation. It was her occupation. I'm sorry. I meant to say her occupation.

The Court: Okay. She's a guidance counselor.

Ms. Corcoran: Yes.

The judge then elaborated on why such an occupation might legitimately concern a prosecutor:

The Court: Oh, I can tell you that people's occupation, whether they're — whether they're — whether they're people who try and rehabilitate everybody and feel sorry for them and all that business can certainly be a legitimate challenge on behalf of the Commonwealth or the defendant. You don't think?

Defense counsel argued that:

the only African‑American juror was being struck on a flimsy ground,
other public employees had not been challenged, and
the guidance‑counselor rationale was “not a good enough reason.”

The judge brought Juror 6‑7 over and, in a notably awkward but candid exchange, asked if she was a “minority person.” She answered yes. The judge then stated:

The Court: So, basically, as I understand this, counsel for the defendant is — is asking for me to inquire of what the reasons were why this woman was struck and the answer given, that she was a guidance counselor at the Boston public schools. … I'm going to — I'm going to allow the challenge on that finding. I may very well make written findings on that issue before we finish this case.

He “also” wanted the record to show that there were “absolutely no minorities as either the victims, the witnesses or the defendant in this case.” No separate written findings were ever made.

C. State Appellate and Post‑Conviction Proceedings

On direct appeal to the SJC (under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E), Garrey raised two principal Batson claims:

The judge “supplied the missing detail” of the prosecution’s reason by articulating the stereotype that guidance counselors tend to “rehabilitate everybody and feel sorry for them,” thereby undermining the required neutral explanation from the prosecutor herself.
The explanation that a Black juror was a guidance counselor with a “liberal attitude” was “per se inadequate” as a basis to exclude her.

He also inserted a brief footnote citing Powers for the proposition that race is irrelevant to standing to raise a Batson objection, but made no developed Powers argument that the trial judge had actually denied him standing based on race.

The SJC rejected the challenge, holding:

Occupation-based reasons are not categorically insufficient to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination (citing United States v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071 (6th Cir. 1998)),
The judge did not independently suggest his own reason; he merely explored the prosecutor’s reason and gave defense counsel a chance to contest it, and
In a footnote, that although “the defendant, the victim, and the witnesses were Caucasian,” that fact was not dispositive because both defendants and prospective jurors are entitled to a discrimination‑free selection process (citing Powers).

Garrey’s petition for rehearing was denied. He then filed his federal habeas petition in 2003, pressed various state post‑conviction motions (all unsuccessful), and ultimately returned to federal court. A magistrate judge first found a Powers violation but deemed it harmless in light of First Circuit precedent treating such error as non‑structural (Chakouian v. Moran, 975 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Casey, 825 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016)). The district court, however, concluded there was no Powers or Batson error and denied the petition outright.

The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) only as to the Powers claim; the First Circuit expanded the COA to include both Batson and Powers.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. The AEDPA Framework

The opinion begins by situating the case within AEDPA’s strict limitations on federal habeas relief from state convictions, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d):

§ 2254(d)(1): Relief is available if the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”
§ 2254(d)(2): Relief is also available if the state court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

The First Circuit draws heavily on Supreme Court gloss:

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000): “Clearly established” law means Supreme Court holdings; an “unreasonable application” occurs when the state court identifies the correct rule but unreasonably applies it to the facts.
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (2014): Even clear error is not enough; the error must be so severe that no “fairminded jurist” could agree with the state court.
Shoof v. Twyford, 596 U.S. 811 (2022): Emphasizes that AEDPA’s inquiry is about reasonableness, not simple correctness.
Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290 (2010); Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015): For § 2254(d)(2), an unreasonable factual determination is one no reasonable fact‑finder could reach on the record; mere disagreement is insufficient.

The court also notes, but does not resolve, the often‑discussed tension between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1). Section (e)(1) presumes state fact‑finding correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here, the panel assumes without deciding that the somewhat “more petitioner-friendly” standard under (d)(2) governs, and finds Garrey cannot prevail even under that more favorable lens.

B. The Batson and Powers Framework

1. Batson’s Three-Step Inquiry

The court recites the classic three‑step Batson rubric, drawn from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and later refinements:

Step One: Prima facie case
The defendant must show circumstances giving rise to an inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptories based on race.
Step Two: Race‑neutral explanation
If step one is satisfied (or bypassed), the prosecutor must give a facially race‑neutral reason for striking the juror. The explanation need not be persuasive or plausible; it must merely be non‑racial on its face (Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995)).
Step Three: Pretext and intent
The trial court must consider the prosecutor’s reason in light of all circumstances to decide whether the defendant has proved purposeful racial discrimination. This is a credibility-based, “fact‑driven evaluation” (Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008)).

The First Circuit underscores that:

At step two, an explanation can be implausible or “fantastic” and still be “race‑neutral” for purposes of moving the inquiry to step three (Purkett).
The “ultimate burden of persuasion” as to racial motivation rests with the opponent of the strike and “never shifts” (Purkett).

2. Powers v. Ohio and Third-Party Standing

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), extended Batson by holding that a criminal defendant may object to race‑based juror exclusions even when the defendant and the excluded juror are of different races. The rationale is twofold:

Defendants are entitled to a jury selected by nondiscriminatory criteria; and
Prospective jurors themselves have an equal protection right not to be excluded on the basis of race, a right the defendant is permitted to assert.

Thus, as the First Circuit later explained in United States v. Casey, 825 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016), it is a Powers error for a trial court to reject a Batson objection on the mistaken belief that the defendant and stricken juror must share the same race. In Casey, the district court did just that, explicitly invoking the absence of same‑race identification as a reason to deny the challenge.

In Garrey, by contrast, the question is subtler: whether the trial judge’s references to the races of the participants and witnesses, and his ultimate comment “I’m going to allow the challenge on that finding,” reflect a misapplication of Powers or are instead permissible contextual considerations within the Batson framework.

C. The Factual Disputes Under § 2254(d)(2)

Garrey mounted a frontal attack on the SJC’s factual understanding of what the trial judge did. The First Circuit isolates two critical factual questions and finds that on both, the SJC’s view is at least reasonable.

1. What Did “That Finding” Refer To?

Near the end of the colloquy, the judge said:

“And I also want the record to maintain that there is absolutely no minorities as either the victims, the witnesses or the defendant in this case. I'm going to — I'm going to allow the challenge on that finding.”

Garrey argued that “that finding” can only sensibly refer to the immediately preceding statement about the absence of minorities among the parties and witnesses, meaning the judge explicitly allowed the strike because the case itself lacked racial overtones—a direct Powers problem. The SJC, however, understood the judge to be:

ultimately relying on the occupation‑based rationale (“the answer given, that she was a guidance counselor”), and
mentioning the racial composition of the participants merely “also” for the record, not as the decisive basis for his ruling.

The First Circuit acknowledges that the transcript “does not allow us to reconstruct this element of the trial judge’s reasoning with perfect confidence.” Still, it emphasizes two key points:

The judge had just summarized the prosecutor’s reason as “that she was a guidance counselor at the Boston public schools,” then immediately pivoted to race with “And I also want the record to maintain that…”. The connective “also” suggests a distinct, additional observation.
In light of that structure, it was at least plausible for the SJC to read “that finding” as referring to the guidance‑counselor rationale, not to racial composition.

Under Brumfield and Wood, the fact that a federal court might read the transcript differently, or even think Garrey’s reading is more likely, does not suffice. A state factual determination is not “unreasonable” simply because a different inference might be more persuasive; the standard demands that no fairminded jurist could have drawn the state court’s inference.

2. Did the Judge “Supply” the Prosecutor’s Reason?

Garrey also challenged the SJC’s finding that the judge did not “independently … suggest his … own reason why a juror should not serve.” The focus here is on the judge’s comment about certain occupations:

“[P]eople who try and rehabilitate everybody and feel sorry for them and all that business can certainly be a legitimate challenge on behalf of the Commonwealth or the defendant.”

Garrey claimed:

the prosecutor initially offered a bare label—“guidance counselor”—without rational connection to the case,
the judge then injected the “rehabilitate everybody and feel sorry for them” stereotype as the critical missing logical link, and
under Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), a judge cannot cure a Batson problem by inventing a neutral rationale the prosecutor never articulated.

The First Circuit again finds that the SJC’s contrary reading is reasonable. It reasons that:

The prosecutor did supply a “reason” at step two: she identified the occupation as the basis for the strike. Under Purkett, a simple reference to an occupation can be enough to pass step two; elaboration is not required.
Once the prosecutor had identified the guidance‑counselor role, the judge’s comments can reasonably be seen as step‑three analysis—an evaluation of whether that reason is genuinely non‑pretextual, not the creation of a new reason.
The SJC explicitly described the judge as “engag[ing] both the prosecutor and defense counsel in a full discussion on the issue” and concluded that he “gave the matter meaningful consideration.” That description is consistent with a valid step‑three exercise.

Again, because reasonable jurists could see this as either an impermissible “supplying” of a reason or as permissible elaboration within step three, AEDPA requires deference to the SJC’s choice among those interpretations.

D. Application of Batson under § 2254(d)(1)

1. Step Two: Was the Prosecutor’s Explanation Adequately Race-Neutral?

On the legal side, Garrey argued that the SJC unreasonably applied Batson by treating the guidance‑counselor explanation as sufficient at step two. The First Circuit disagrees, emphasizing:

Step two is a low bar; the prosecutor need only articulate a facially race-neutral reason “related to the particular case.”
Courts (including the SJC and Sixth Circuit) have upheld occupation-based rationales, including guidance counselors, as legitimate non‑racial justifications (see United States v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998)).
The prosecutor explicitly denied any racial motive and tied her challenge to the juror’s job; she did not rely solely on a naked denial.

The court notes that while a general claim about a person’s occupation can sometimes be “facially insufficient” to rebut a Batson prima facie case (as the SJC itself recognized), it is not per se inadequate. Here, the SJC’s acceptance of the explanation as race‑neutral at step two lies well within the bounds of fairminded disagreement.

2. Step Three: Was the Reason Pretextual?

Garrey’s more serious argument is that the explanation was pretextual and that the SJC unreasonably failed to see as much. He points to:

the prosecutor’s momentary confusion about whether the juror or her husband was a guidance counselor,
the lack of any record support that guidance counselors actually have pro‑defense attitudes, and
the removal of the only Black juror.

The First Circuit, however, views these factors as insufficient to render the SJC’s acceptance of the state courts’ finding of no discriminatory intent “objectively unreasonable” under AEDPA:

Shifting justification? Unlike the dramatic shifts in Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016) (completely new reason offered later) or United States v. Bowles, 751 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2014) (changing explanations from “nothing to do with the fact she’s Asian American” to “I don’t like her” to “her age”), the supposed “shift” here—from husband’s occupation to juror’s own occupation—is minor and does not alter the basic nature of the rationale. It does not, by itself, compel a finding of pretext.
Misstatement of the record? In Flowers, the prosecutor made repeated factually incorrect assertions about jurors in ways that suggested discriminatory selection. Here, the prosecutor corrected her own minor mistake without prompting, and the misstatement did not meaningfully relate to race. The First Circuit cites Flowers’ own caution that mistakes in the “back and forth” of a Batson hearing are “understandable” and not automatically indicators of racial animus.
Occupational correlation? Even if the link between being a guidance counselor and harboring sympathy for defendants is tenuous or stereotypical, the Supreme Court’s cases make clear that step three is about whether the prosecutor is honestly relying on that (even irrational) view, not whether the view is empirically well-founded.

Crucially, the First Circuit reads the SJC as having actually performed step three, even if in a sparse way: it noted the judge’s discussion with counsel, the nature of the occupation-based reason, and the absence of direct evidence of racial motive. Given AEDPA’s deference, that is enough.

E. The Powers Claim

The Powers issue arises from the trial judge’s emphasis that “the deceased nor the plaintiff are black people” and his statement that there were “absolutely no minorities” among the defendant, victim, or witnesses. Garrey claimed that:

the SJC unreasonably minimized this as non‑dispositive in a footnote,
the judge effectively treated the lack of racial overtones as a reason to discount a Batson/Powers claim, and
this contradicts Powers’ holding that defendants may challenge race‑based strikes regardless of their own race.

The First Circuit recognizes the concern but, applying AEDPA, concludes the SJC reasonably interpreted the trial judge’s conduct as not a denial of Powers standing. The court emphasizes:

The SJC explicitly said the racial homogeneity of defendant, victim, and witnesses was “not dispositive” and cited Powers for the proposition that defendants and jurors are entitled to nondiscriminatory selection.
In context, the SJC read the judge’s reference to these racial facts as part of his evaluation of whether there was a discriminatory motive at all (step one and step three of Batson), not as an insistence that Garrey lacked standing.
The SJC evidently believed that the judge proceeded to step two—asking the prosecutor for a reason—precisely because he recognized that the absence of same race did not end the Batson inquiry.

The First Circuit supports this reading by invoking:

Ayala v. Alves, 85 F.4th 36 (1st Cir. 2023): federal courts must give state appellate opinions the “benefit of the doubt” and can treat issues as implicitly addressed even if not labeled as such.
Decisions from other circuits recognizing that the race of the defendant, victim, and witnesses can be relevant data in assessing both whether a prima facie case exists and whether a proffered explanation is pretextual (e.g., Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2005); Keel v. French, 162 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 788 F. App’x 654 (11th Cir. 2019)).

This line of authority underscores a key distinction:

Impermissible under Powers: Using race differences between defendant and juror to deny the defendant the right to raise a Batson challenge at all (as in Casey).
Permissible under Powers (but potentially risky): Considering the racial context of the case as one among many circumstances relevant to whether the prosecution likely had a racially discriminatory motive.

The First Circuit concludes that Garrey falls into the second category: Garrey’s standing was never questioned, he was allowed to fully litigate his Batson objection, and the SJC reasonably treated the judge’s racial references as part of a (flawed but constitutionally adequate) contextual inquiry rather than a threshold standing determination.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Supreme Court and First Circuit AEDPA Cases

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) — Provides the foundational definitions of “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1).
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (2014) — Emphasized that only objectively unreasonable applications of clearly established law warrant relief; “clear error” is insufficient. This supports the court’s insistence on “fairminded disagreement” as the benchmark.
Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290 (2010) & Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015) — Clarify that a state factual finding is not “unreasonable” merely because a federal court might think a different conclusion is more likely. These cases directly underpin the court’s deference to the SJC’s reading of the ambiguous phrase “that finding.”
McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002) & Clements v. Clarke, 592 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2010) — Discuss the presumption of correctness for state fact‑finding under § 2254(e)(1) and its application to trial and appellate courts alike. They inform the court’s overarching deference to the SJC’s factual synthesis.
Porter v. Coyne-Fague, 35 F.4th 68 (1st Cir. 2022) — Reinforces the “fairminded disagreement” standard and is cited for the proposition that even clear error doesn’t necessarily equal unreasonableness under AEDPA.
Ayala v. Alves, 85 F.4th 36 (1st Cir. 2023) — Illustrates how federal courts should interpret state decisions charitably and infer implicit reasoning where possible, a methodology applied to the SJC’s brief Powers discussion.

B. Batson-Line and Jury Discrimination Cases

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) — The foundational case prohibiting race‑based peremptory challenges and establishing the three‑step framework.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) — Extends Batson to allow cross‑racial challenges to discriminatory strikes.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) — Clarifies that step two requires only a facially race‑neutral explanation, however implausible, and that credibility is a step‑three question.
Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019) — Emphasizes that courts must consider “all of the relevant facts and circumstances” in evaluating pretext and notes that mistaken explanations in the heat of voir dire should not automatically be conflated with discrimination.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) & Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) — Provide frameworks for assessing pretext and for comparing struck jurors with similarly situated jurors who were not struck. Dretke is cited for the rule that judicially supplied reasons cannot substitute for the prosecutor’s burden at step two.
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) — Confirms that a reviewing court must evaluate all circumstances bearing on racial animus.
United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512 (1st Cir. 1994) — Early First Circuit application of the three-step Batson test.
Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2014) & 808 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2015) — Affirm that simple, facially neutral reasons (such as a juror’s age) suffice at step two and that the step‑three inquiry is fact‑intensive.
Yacouba-Issa v. Calis, 22 F.4th 333 (1st Cir. 2022) — Reaffirms that at step three courts must assess explanations and other factors to determine purposeful discrimination.
Hollis v. Magnusson, 32 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2022) — Illustrates that even very succinct explanations can be treated as adequate at step two.
United States v. Bowles, 751 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2014) — Demonstrates how markedly shifting rationales can signal pretext; used here as a contrast to the minor confusion in Garrey.
United States v. Casey, 825 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016) — Clear example of Powers error: denial of a Batson challenge based on the defendant not sharing the juror’s race. Garrey distinguishes itself by noting that Garrey’s standing was never questioned.

C. Other Circuits on Race as a Contextual Factor

By citing decisions from the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the First Circuit situates itself within a national consensus that:

the race of the defendant, victim, witnesses, and the composition of the venire can be relevant in evaluating both the existence of a prima facie Batson case and the credibility of race‑neutral explanations, and
such consideration is distinct from impermissibly limiting a defendant’s standing to raise a Batson challenge.

This reinforces the conclusion that the SJC’s approach was not an outlier or a clear misapplication of Supreme Court precedent.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Peremptory Challenges and Batson Challenges

Peremptory challenge: A party’s right during jury selection to strike a prospective juror without stating a cause. Historically broad, but constrained by the Equal Protection Clause: cannot be used on the basis of race (or later, gender, etc.).
Batson challenge: An objection that the opposing party has used a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory way. Triggers the three‑step inquiry described above.

B. The Three Steps of Batson in Plain Terms

Step One – Is there smoke?
The defense points to circumstances suggesting possible racial bias (e.g., striking the only Black juror). If the judge sees enough “smoke,” the burden shifts.
Step Two – Prosecutor’s explanation:
The prosecutor must say why the juror was struck, in non‑racial terms. The explanation can be weak or unconvincing; it just cannot be openly about race.
Step Three – Is there fire?
The judge decides whether the explanation is genuine or just a cover. This involves comparing with other jurors, looking at patterns, and weighing credibility.

C. Powers and “Standing”

“Standing” refers to a party’s right to raise a legal claim. Powers held that:

Defendants do not have to be of the same race as a struck juror to object to race‑based exclusion.
Denying a defendant the right to mount a Batson challenge because of this racial mismatch is constitutional error.

In Garrey, the defendant is white and the struck juror is Black. The trial judge did not deny the defense objection on that basis; he proceeded to ask for a justification. Thus, no direct Powers violation occurred, even though the judge’s comments about the racial makeup of the participants raised legitimate concerns about his understanding of the doctrine.

D. AEDPA’s “Unreasonable Application” and “Unreasonable Determination of Facts”

Unreasonable application (§ 2254(d)(1)): A state court might misapply Supreme Court law, but federal relief is only available if that misapplication is so off‑base that no reasonable judge could agree with it. It is not enough that the federal court simply thinks the state court was wrong.
Unreasonable determination of facts (§ 2254(d)(2)): A state court’s reading of the trial record must be so implausible that no fairminded person could have drawn the same conclusions. Mere ambiguity or competing inferences are not enough.

This is why the ambiguity in the phrase “that finding,” and in the judge’s discussion of guidance counselors, ends up favoring the state: as long as the SJC’s interpretation is plausible, AEDPA prevents the First Circuit from substituting its own, possibly more convincing, reading.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. For Federal Habeas Review of Batson/Powers Claims

Garrey v. Kelly underscores just how difficult it is for habeas petitioners to win relief on Batson/Powers grounds when:

the key constitutional question hinges on subtle nuances in an incomplete or ambiguous jury‑selection transcript, and
the state appellate court has articulated a facially reasonable reading of that record and of applicable Supreme Court law.

The decision effectively signals that:

Ambiguities in the trial record—especially about what the judge “meant”—will generally be resolved in favor of the state court’s interpretation, not the petitioner’s.
To obtain habeas relief, petitioners must identify not just plausible alternative readings, but clear, demonstrable misreadings that no reasonable judge could accept.

B. For State Trial Practice and Appellate Review

Although the First Circuit ultimately affirms, it closes by explicitly disapproving the “casual and truncated approach” used by the trial judge. It recommends a clearer procedure in future cases:

Explicit step-one ruling: State whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing of discrimination.
Clear step-two record: Ask the prosecutor for a race-neutral explanation and memorialize it precisely.
Explicit step-three finding: State on the record whether the explanation is accepted as genuine or rejected as pretextual, and why.

This guidance is particularly important in Massachusetts, where trial judges and the SJC are on notice that:

poorly developed Batson records complicate both state review and any later federal habeas review,
ambiguous records may tilt against defendants under AEDPA, and
clear, structured rulings both protect constitutional rights and provide a more solid foundation for appellate affirmance.

C. On the Use of Occupational Stereotypes

The decision confirms that:

Occupation-based rationales (e.g., “guidance counselors tend to be liberal or rehabilitative”) remain acceptable race-neutral explanations at step two, and
Trial courts may articulate why such occupations might correlate with attitudes relevant to a case, as part of step three, without automatically crossing into Batson error.

At the same time, the case illustrates a tension: some occupational stereotypes may themselves track underlying racial or socioeconomic assumptions. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, however, Batson focuses on whether a strike was motivated “in substantial part by discriminatory intent” as to race, not whether the prosecutor’s stereotypes are rational or socially benign.

D. On Powers and Racial Context

Garrey clarifies, at least within the First Circuit, that:

referring to the race of the defendant, victim, and witnesses is not per se a Powers violation, and
those facts may legitimately be considered in a step‑one or step‑three Batson analysis, especially as they relate to the prosecutor’s incentives to discriminate.

But the decision also highlights the importance of:

avoiding any suggestion that a defendant’s right to a discrimination‑free jury depends on racial congruence with the struck juror, and
distinguishing between using racial context as an evidentiary factor and using race as a doctrinal gateway to standing.

VIII. Conclusion

Garrey v. Kelly is not a dramatic reworking of Batson or Powers. Its significance lies in how it sharpens the interaction between those doctrines and AEDPA’s demanding standards.

On one level, the opinion:

affirms that a prosecutor’s simple, occupation‑based explanation can suffice at Batson step two,
treats a trial judge’s brief elaboration on that rationale as permissible step‑three analysis, not an improper substitution of reasons, and
confirms that a trial court does not violate Powers merely by noting the races of the participants and jurors when assessing a potential Batson violation.

On a deeper level, the decision illustrates AEDPA’s central lesson: even when federal judges have serious misgivings about a state trial judge’s methodology or comments, those misgivings do not translate into habeas relief unless the state supreme court’s interpretation of both the facts and the law is outside the range of reasonable judicial disagreement. Ambiguity in the record—particularly in a Batson setting where nuance and tone matter—will usually redound to the state’s benefit.

At the same time, the First Circuit pointedly cautions trial judges against informal, unstructured handling of Batson issues. Going forward, Garrey should encourage:

more precise articulation of each Batson step,
more careful separation between the prosecutor’s own reasons and the judge’s evaluation of those reasons, and
greater sensitivity in discussing race and occupational assumptions in the jury‑selection context.

In the broader legal landscape, Garrey v. Kelly stands as a reminder that the enforcement of equal protection norms in jury selection, particularly at the habeas stage, depends as much on meticulous trial‑level record‑making as on the substantive doctrines of Batson and Powers.