Allen Charges: Omission of the “Honest Belief” Admonition as Plain Error Requiring New Trial

1. Introduction

In United States v. Rolex Bryan Bruno (11th Cir. July 10, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit vacated a federal carjacking conviction after the district court responded to a reported deadlock by delivering a substantially non-pattern Allen charge that did not tell jurors they need not surrender their “honest beliefs.” The defendant, Rolex Bryan Bruno, had been tried on two counts: carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) (Count One) and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count Two).

The central appellate issue was not whether an Allen charge could be given, but whether this particular charge—issued after the jury stated it was “hung” on Count One—was impermissibly coercive, and whether the defendant could obtain relief under plain-error review given the lack of a contemporaneous objection to the content of the charge.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The majority (per curiam) held:

  • Because Bruno did not object to the contents of the charge when given, review was for plain error under United States v. Anderson and United States v. Hill.
  • The district court’s non-pattern Allen charge was plainly erroneous because it failed to include any instruction that jurors were not expected to give up their honest beliefs about the evidence.
  • The error affected Bruno’s substantial rights, particularly in light of the post-charge split verdict (guilty on carjacking, not guilty on the firearm count) and the perceived inconsistency between those outcomes given how the case was tried.
  • The court exercised discretion to correct the error, vacated the carjacking conviction, and remanded for a new trial on Count One.

Judge Branch dissented, arguing that the majority misread circuit law on what is “plain,” that the “honest belief” admonition was already given in the initial jury instructions, and that neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has held the admonition must appear in the Allen charge itself.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion’s outcome is best understood as the intersection of two lines of authority: (i) how the Eleventh Circuit polices coercion risks in Allen charges (especially deviations from approved language) and (ii) the strict requirements for relief under plain-error review.

A. Standards of review and preservation

  • United States v. Bush: Cited for the general proposition that Allen-charge challenges are typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, but that framework depends on preservation.
  • United States v. Anderson: Supplies the Eleventh Circuit’s plain-error formulation and is also used to reiterate that Allen charges must not coerce jurors to abandon honest beliefs.
  • United States v. Hill: Critical on preservation—objecting to giving an Allen charge (e.g., as “premature”) is not the same as objecting to its content. Under Hill, failure to object to the contents triggers plain-error review.
  • United States v. Johnson and United States v. Cenephat: Used to define when an error is “plain”—it must be obvious under controlling precedent (or unequivocal statute/rule text), and must be “specifically resolved” by Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court precedent.

B. Coercion risks in Allen charges and scrutiny of deviations

  • Rubinstein v. Yehuda: Frames the core concern—Allen charges can pressure minority jurors to conform.
  • United States v. Woodard: Cited to show repeated approval of the Eleventh Circuit’s pattern Allen instruction.
  • United States v. Alonso: Provides the “close scrutiny” principle—because of coercion risks, modifications to accepted Allen language are examined carefully.
  • United States v. Amaya: Emphasizes the appellate difficulty of evaluating prejudice when trial courts vary from approved language.
  • United States v. Cheramie: (Former Fifth Circuit) underscores that departures from the model charge invite correction; the majority uses it to justify strict oversight when the trial judge “strays from the pattern Allen charge.”
  • United States v. Scruggs: The majority’s key “plainness” anchor. It quotes Scruggs for the proposition that the circuit “require[s] trial judges, when giving any version of Allen, to make it clear to each juror” that the juror must adhere to an honest opinion. On that basis, the majority deems the omission of the “honest belief” admonition plain error.
  • Bonner v. City of Prichard: Explains why former Fifth Circuit decisions (pre-Oct. 1, 1981) bind the Eleventh Circuit, which is essential to the majority’s reliance on Scruggs.

C. Prejudice/substantial rights and split verdicts

  • United States v. Demarest: Held that a split verdict does not necessarily show coercion when a pattern Allen charge is given. The majority distinguishes Demarest because the charge here was non-pattern and omitted the key “honest belief” safeguard.

D. The dissent’s competing precedent framing

Judge Branch’s dissent draws on additional authorities (within the opinion text) to argue the majority’s “plainness” analysis is too aggressive:

  • United States v. Davis and Allen v. United States: For the basic permissibility of supplemental instructions urging continued deliberation.
  • Lowenfield v. Phelps and United States v. Grow: For evaluating coercion in “context and under all the circumstances,” including earlier instructions given before deliberations.
  • United States v. Lejarde-Rada: For the proposition that there is no plain error absent Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent directly resolving the issue.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why the court treated the issue as plain-error (not abuse-of-discretion)

Although Bruno objected to giving an Allen charge and argued it was “premature,” the majority—relying on United States v. Hill—held that Bruno did not preserve an objection that the language of the charge was coercive. As a result, Bruno bore the elevated burden of proving: (1) error, (2) plainness, (3) effect on substantial rights, and (4) that the error seriously affected fairness/integrity/public reputation.

B. Error: deviation from the pattern instruction, plus omission of the “honest belief” protection

The majority emphasized the Eleventh Circuit’s approved pattern instruction, which includes: “Remember at all times that no juror is expected to give up an honest belief about the weight and effect of the evidence.” The trial court’s charge contained no equivalent language. In the majority’s view, that omission created a coercion risk because Allen charges inherently pressure holdouts, and the “honest belief” admonition is a core mitigation.

C. Plainness: the majority’s use of United States v. Scruggs

The majority found the error “plain” because United States v. Scruggs states that trial judges must make clear, in “any version of Allen,” that each juror must adhere to an honest opinion. Through Bonner v. City of Prichard, Scruggs is binding Eleventh Circuit authority.

The dissent contests this move: it characterizes the quoted Scruggs language as dicta, arguing Scruggs actually decided timing/sua sponte issues, not whether omission of the “honest belief” line is per se impermissible. This disagreement matters because “plain error” turns on whether precedent directly resolves the issue.

D. Substantial rights: why the split verdict mattered here

Under Hill, Bruno had to show the error likely affected the outcome. The majority held he did, pointing to the sequence: deadlock note → improper Allen charge → split verdict.

The majority acknowledged United States v. Demarest (split verdict not necessarily coercion) but distinguished it on the ground that the present charge lacked the pattern instruction’s key safeguard. The court also treated the verdicts as inconsistent given Bruno’s argument that the government did not present a meaningful “carjacking without a weapon” theory. The implicit logic is that the charge may have induced jurors to compromise—resolving the deadlock by convicting on Count One while acquitting on Count Two.

E. Discretionary correction

Having found plain error affecting substantial rights, the majority exercised its discretion to correct it and ordered a new trial on Count One. It did not reach sentencing issues.

3.3. Impact

Even though the disposition is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion’s reasoning signals several practical consequences in Eleventh Circuit trial practice:

  • Heightened risk in non-pattern Allen charges: The majority reinforces the circuit’s longstanding suspicion of improvisational Allen instructions (see United States v. Alonso and United States v. Cheramie). Trial judges are effectively warned that omitting the “honest belief” safeguard can be reversible—potentially even under plain-error review.
  • Preservation lesson for litigants: Objecting that an Allen charge is “premature” may not preserve a challenge to coercive content (see United States v. Hill). Defense counsel (and prosecutors, where appropriate) should make content-based objections on the record and propose curative language.
  • Use of verdict structure as prejudice evidence: The majority’s reliance on the split verdict as showing “substantial rights” harm—distinguishing United States v. Demarest—may encourage future appellants to argue that a post-Allen compromise verdict is circumstantial proof of coercion, particularly where the counts are factually interdependent.
  • Doctrinal tension over what is “plain”: The dissent’s “dicta vs. holding” critique of United States v. Scruggs highlights a recurring fault line in plain-error cases: whether general statements in earlier opinions can “specifically resolve” an issue for United States v. Cenephat purposes. That tension may surface in future en banc or Supreme Court petitions, especially where pattern-instruction elements are treated as mandatory.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Allen charge: A supplemental instruction given when a jury reports difficulty reaching a unanimous verdict. Its aim is to encourage further deliberation, but it is scrutinized because it may pressure minority jurors to conform.
  • “Honest belief” admonition: A key cautionary statement (embedded in the Eleventh Circuit pattern instruction) reminding jurors they should not abandon sincerely held views about the evidence just to reach unanimity.
  • Plain-error review: A demanding appellate standard applied when a party did not properly preserve an objection. The appellant must show an obvious legal error that likely affected the outcome and seriously undermined the proceeding’s fairness.
  • Split verdict: A verdict in which the jury convicts on some counts and acquits on others. It can reflect careful count-by-count analysis—or, as argued here, a compromise under perceived pressure.
  • Pattern jury instructions: Standardized model instructions approved for general use. Courts may depart from them, but deviations—especially in sensitive contexts like Allen charges—invite closer appellate scrutiny.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Rolex Bryan Bruno underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s insistence that Allen charges must be crafted to minimize coercion. The majority treats the “honest belief” admonition not as a stylistic nicety of the pattern instruction, but as a required safeguard whose omission can constitute plain error warranting a new trial—particularly where the post-charge verdict suggests potential compromise or inconsistency.

The dissent highlights a countervailing principle: coercion must be evaluated “in context,” and “plainness” should not be found unless precedent directly mandates the specific disputed language in the Allen charge itself. That debate—over whether pattern-instruction components are effectively mandatory under plain-error doctrine—may be the opinion’s most significant jurisprudential ripple, even in an unpublished disposition.