Accrual of §1983 Due Process Claims from Revoked Certificates of Occupancy: Discrete Acts and Statute of Limitations Clarified

Introduction

Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) is a Second Circuit summary order addressing when a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 procedural and substantive due process claim accrues in the land-use context. Plaintiff‐appellant Philip G. Potter sued the Village of Ocean Beach and several municipal officials, alleging that: (1) his seasonal dwelling’s Certificate of Occupancy (“CO”) was improperly revoked; (2) he was criminally cited in 2012 for building‐code violations; (3) his rental‐permit applications for 2016, 2017 and 2018 were denied; and (4) the Village refused to conduct a hearing ordered by a state court. The district court dismissed all claims as time‐barred under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Second Circuit affirmed.

Key issues:

What triggers accrual of a § 1983 claim challenging revocation of a CO?
How do discrete vs. continuing violations affect the statute of limitations?
When is a land‐use due process claim ripe for review?
What role do doctrines like equitable estoppel and issue preclusion play?

Summary of the Judgment

The court reaffirmed that § 1983 claims borrow the state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations (three years in New York) but rely on federal law to determine accrual. Under federal common‐law principles, a claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Here:

Citations issued in early 2012 and rental‐permit denials in 2016–2018 plainly fell outside the August 29, 2020 cut‐off for a suit filed August 29, 2023.
Plaintiff’s due process claims concerning CO revocation likewise accrued when the Village repeatedly denied his rental‐permit applications on the ground that he lacked a valid CO. By the third denial (2018), Potter had “reason to know” the Village treated the revocation as final.
Continuing‐violation and equitable‐estoppel doctrines did not save the time‐barred claims.

Accordingly, all claims were dismissed as untimely, and the judgment was affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The panel drew on a line of Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases on § 1983 accrual, ripeness in land‐use disputes, and pleading standards:

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) – accrual occurs when a claim “is complete and present.”
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) – § 1983 borrows state limitation periods.
Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) – confirming three-year period under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998) – accrual when plaintiff knows enough “critical facts of injury and causation.”
Ateres Bais Yaakov Acad. of Rockland v. Town of Clarkstown, 88 F.4th 344 (2d Cir. 2023) – ripeness and de facto finality in land‐use decisions.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) – discrete acts are not saved by continuing-violation doctrine.

These authorities collectively establish that § 1983 claims, even in land‐use cases, accrue when a municipal actor communicates a final, definitive position inflicting concrete injury.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court applied a two‐step framework:

Identify the limitation period (three years under New York law);
Determine when the claim accrued under federal common‐law principles.

Discrete adverse actions (criminal citations; rental permit denials) “start the clock” upon notice. Potter’s 2012 citation and three permit denials between 2016 and 2018 plainly predated the August 29, 2020 accrual date for a suit filed in 2023. As for the CO revocation, the Building Inspector’s 2011 letter was not final because a Village Board hearing process remained open. However, once the Village repeatedly denied Potter’s rental permits on grounds that his CO was invalid, he was on notice of the Board’s de facto final decision. By 2018, he possessed “reason to know” all critical facts and thus could have sued.

The court rejected:

Continuing Violation Doctrine – applies only to claims that accrue incrementally; discrete permit denials are separate causes of action.
Equitable Estoppel – inapplicable where plaintiff did file a state suit in 2019 to challenge the CO revocation.
Issue Preclusion – not raised by parties, and New York law disfavors sua sponte preclusion.

3. Impact

This decision clarifies several important points for land‐use litigators and municipal defendants:

Challenging a CO revocation under § 1983 must be filed within three years of the first instance a municipality treats the revocation as final.
Each discrete administrative act (e.g., permit denial) triggers a separate accrual date.
Plaintiffs should monitor administrative processes closely and seek judicial review promptly upon receiving concrete notice of adverse land‐use decisions.
Municipalities may rely on subsequent administrative actions (denials, letters) to argue that a plaintiff had constructive knowledge of an adverse, final determination.

Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Federal statute allowing suit against state or local officials for civil-rights violations.
Accrual – The point in time when a legal claim becomes actionable and the statute of limitations begins to run.
Statute of Limitations – A deadline for filing suit. In New York, most § 1983 personal-injury claims must be filed within three years.
Discrete vs. Continuing Violations – A discrete violation is a single injurious act; a continuing violation accrues over time. Only the former “start the clock” immediately on notice.
Ripeness – A constitutional claim is ripe when the plaintiff faces a final, definitive decision causing actual harm.
Equitable Estoppel – A doctrine that may delay accrual when a defendant’s wrongful conduct prevents timely filing.
Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel) – Bars relitigation of an issue already decided in state court.

Conclusion

Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach reinforces that § 1983 due process claims in the land-use context accrue when a municipal authority conveys a final determination that inflicts concrete harm. Repeated permit denials based on an allegedly revoked Certificate of Occupancy suffice to trigger the statute of limitations—even if a formal hearing remains pending. Discrete administrative acts cannot be aggregated under a continuing-violation theory, and equitable estoppel offers no rescue if the plaintiff pursues parallel state-court remedies. Practitioners should treat each adverse land-use decision as a potential accrual event and act promptly to preserve constitutional claims.

This ruling will guide lower courts in dissecting accrual dates for § 1983 actions arising from local zoning, building codes, and occupancy disputes, ensuring that claims are brought within the statutory window.