Acceptance of Responsibility After Remand: A Renewed Guilty Plea Does Not Erase Earlier Obstruction

Case: United States v. Alexander Leszczynski
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: November 10, 2026
Disposition: Sentence affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion.

1. Introduction

In United States v. Alexander Leszczynski, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a defendant’s guilty plea and rehabilitative efforts following remand required an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction despite substantial earlier misconduct. It also considered whether a below-Guidelines sentence gave insufficient weight to childhood abuse, untreated mental health problems, and the difference between intended and actual financial loss.

The court affirmed a total fraud-related sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment, imposed consecutively to a separate 200-month sentence for attempted murder-for-hire and obstruction of justice. Its central conclusion was that resentencing after remand does not restrict the acceptance-of-responsibility inquiry to the defendant’s most recent conduct. Earlier attempts to shift blame, procure false confessions, and eliminate witnesses remained relevant.

Precedential qualification: The opinion is designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION.” It applies existing sentencing principles rather than announcing a new binding circuit rule. Its significance lies in illustrating how those principles operate when a defendant relies on improved conduct after remand.

2. Background and Issues Presented

The offenses and related obstruction

Leszczynski’s fraud scheme included fraudulent pandemic-related PPP loan applications and a fraudulent warranty deed purporting to transfer homeowners’ property to a fictitious corporation he controlled. While awaiting trial, he attempted to hire someone to kill the homeowners, who were prospective witnesses. The supposed hitman was an undercover agent. That conduct produced a separate prosecution for attempted murder-for-hire and obstruction of justice.

The first plea and successful appeal

Initially, Leszczynski agreed to plead guilty to two wire-fraud counts and one bank-fraud count in exchange for dismissal of the remaining fraud charges. After pleading before a magistrate judge, but before the district court accepted the plea, he sought withdrawal. He asserted that another person was responsible and that he had been coerced into pleading guilty. His subsequent statements about whether he wished to maintain the plea were inconsistent.

The district court accepted the plea and imposed a 210-month sentence. On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(1) permitted withdrawal before the district court accepted the plea “for any reason or no reason.” The case returned to the district court.

Resentencing after remand

On remand, Leszczynski entered an open guilty plea to all eight fraud-related counts: three wire-fraud counts, two bank-fraud counts, and three illegal-monetary-transaction counts. An open plea meant that he pleaded guilty without a plea agreement governing the disposition.

The presentence investigation report calculated an offense level of 36 and criminal history category II, producing an advisory range of 210 to 262 months. It included a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement based on attempts to persuade others to confess and declined to recommend an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.

Leszczynski requested an 87-month sentence concurrent with his murder-for-hire sentence. He relied on his guilty plea, educational courses, church attendance, claimed institutional improvement, childhood abuse, mental health history, and the substantial difference between intended loss and actual loss. The government sought 262 months, consecutively imposed, emphasizing the fraud, threats, attempted witness killings, and efforts to recover seized funds through a forged presidential pardon.

The district court denied the acceptance reduction but varied downward to 168 months, followed by five years of supervised release. It expressly credited the intended-loss concern, unstable upbringing, childhood trauma, and untreated mental health issues.

The appellate questions

  1. Did the district court clearly err by denying a two-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)?
  2. Was the 168-month sentence substantively unreasonable because the district court gave insufficient weight to mitigating circumstances?

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit rejected both challenges.

Acceptance of responsibility: A guilty plea is important evidence of acceptance, but it does not create an entitlement to the reduction. The sentencing court could assess Leszczynski’s conduct as a whole, including his earlier claims that someone else committed the offenses, efforts to secure substitute confessions, and attempted murder of witnesses. His unchallenged obstruction enhancement further supported denial.

Substantive reasonableness: The record contradicted the assertion that the district court disregarded mitigation. The court expressly relied on the principal mitigating considerations when imposing a sentence below the advisory range. Leszczynski’s disagreement with the extent of the variance did not establish an abuse of discretion.

The appellate court did not resolve the disputed significance of letters concerning a presidential pardon. Because the district court had expressly denied the reduction independently of those letters, the earlier conduct supplied a sufficient basis for affirmance.

4. Analysis: Precedents Cited

United States v. Leszczynski, No. 23-13335, 2024 WL 3103305

This unpublished decision supplied the procedural foundation for the present appeal. It established that Leszczynski could withdraw his original plea before district-court acceptance under Rule 11(d)(1), without showing a substantive justification. The current opinion did not retreat from that ruling. Instead, it addressed the separate question of whether his overall conduct demonstrated acceptance of responsibility at the later sentencing.

The distinction matters: a procedural right to withdraw a plea does not itself establish entitlement to a sentencing reduction after a subsequent plea.

United States v. Leszczynski, No. 24-14067, 2025 WL 2826935

This separate unpublished decision supplied background concerning the attempted murder-for-hire prosecution and its 200-month sentence. Its role here was principally factual and procedural. It explained the connection between the fraud victims, the attempted killings, and the separate sentence to which the fraud sentence would run consecutively. The present appeal did not reconsider that separate judgment.

United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2005)

United States v. Moriarty supplied the principal acceptance-of-responsibility framework. Although a guilty plea can be significant evidence of acceptance, conduct inconsistent with responsibility may outweigh it. The case also established the demanding appellate threshold: denial should not be set aside unless the record clearly establishes acceptance.

That framework defeated Leszczynski’s attempt to make his post-remand plea and rehabilitation dispositive. The court evaluated those favorable circumstances alongside his earlier obstruction rather than treating the latest plea as conclusive.

United States v. Roosevelt Coats, 8 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2021)

United States v. Roosevelt Coats established that the factual findings underlying denial of the reduction receive clear-error review. It described acceptance as a flexible, fact-sensitive inquiry entitled to substantial deference. This precedent explained why the appellate court did not independently reweigh Leszczynski’s conduct: the question was whether the sentencing court’s assessment was clearly erroneous, not whether another assessment was possible.

United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 2002)

United States v. Singh supported the general proposition that an acceptance reduction is not warranted when the defendant’s conduct produces an obstruction-of-justice enhancement. Leszczynski did not challenge that enhancement, making it an additional reason to uphold the denial.

The opinion used a general rule, not an absolute prohibition. It did not hold that obstruction invariably makes later acceptance legally impossible.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)

Gall v. United States supplied the governing abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing substantive reasonableness in light of the totality of the circumstances. Its influence was structural: the appellate court’s task was to assess whether the sentence fell within permissible sentencing discretion, not to select the sentence it would have imposed itself.

United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015)

United States v. Rosales-Bruno provided much of the substantive-reasonableness analysis. It established that sentencing factors need not receive equal weight and that their relative importance ordinarily belongs to the district court. It also identified three ways a sentence can become substantively unreasonable: failure to consider a sufficiently important relevant factor, significant reliance on an improper or irrelevant factor, or a clear error of judgment in weighing proper factors.

The decision further emphasized the challenger’s burden and the rarity of successful substantive challenges, particularly to downward-variance sentences. Here, the district court’s express reliance on mitigation prevented Leszczynski from showing that those matters had been overlooked.

United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022)

United States v. Butler reinforced that appellate courts do not second-guess reasonable allocations of weight among the statutory factors. It supported the refusal to substitute appellate judgment for the district court’s assessment of how much mitigation Leszczynski’s circumstances warranted.

United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), and United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008)

The opinion cited United States v. Irey, quoting United States v. Pugh, for the ultimate reversal standard: the reviewing court must have a definite and firm conviction that the sentencing court’s weighing produced a sentence outside the range of reasonable sentences permitted by the facts.

United States v. Pugh thus appeared through the formulation adopted in United States v. Irey, rather than through a separate factual comparison. Together, they framed the demanding showing Leszczynski failed to make.

United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008)

United States v. Gonzalez supported treating a sentence below the applicable statutory maximum as an additional indicator of reasonableness. The court used that consideration to corroborate its conclusion, not as a substitute for reviewing the statutory sentencing factors.

5. Analysis: Legal Reasoning

A. Acceptance requires more than entry of a guilty plea

Section 3E1.1(a) permits a two-level reduction when a defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility. Its commentary expressly rejects an automatic reduction merely because the defendant pleads guilty. Relevant considerations include truthful admission of the offense and accountable relevant conduct, as well as the timeliness of acceptance.

The court therefore distinguished between acknowledging guilt in court and demonstrating responsibility through conduct. Attempts to recruit others to confess and to kill prospective witnesses directly undermined the significance of the later plea. Educational activities and religious attendance were favorable considerations, but they did not compel a finding that the defendant had clearly accepted responsibility.

B. Remand did not create a clean evidentiary slate

Leszczynski’s principal argument was temporal: the court should focus on his post-remand conduct rather than his earlier actions. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that limitation. The relevant question concerned his overall demonstration of responsibility, not simply whether his conduct had improved during a selected period.

This reasoning does not make earlier misconduct permanently disqualifying. Rather, it permits the sentencing judge to decide whether subsequent acceptance sufficiently outweighs inconsistent conduct. On this record, the contrary evidence was substantial enough that denial was not clearly erroneous.

C. The lawful withdrawal of a plea and the assessment of responsibility are distinct

The earlier appeal established Leszczynski’s procedural entitlement to withdraw his plea. The present opinion should not be read as holding that exercising that entitlement automatically forfeits acceptance credit. The court relied on the substance and context of his conduct—including assertions of another person’s responsibility, attempts to obtain false confessions, and attempted witness killings—not merely the filing of a withdrawal motion.

That distinction preserves the earlier Rule 11 ruling while recognizing that statements and actions surrounding a plea can remain relevant to a later sentencing assessment.

D. The disputed pardon letters were unnecessary to the result

The parties disagreed about letters concerning retrieval of a previously forged pardon and the possibility of paying the President. Leszczynski argued that the remarks were not serious and that seeking a pardon was unrelated to acceptance.

The appellate court expressly declined to resolve those disputes because the district court had supplied an independent basis for denial. Accordingly, the opinion establishes no general rule that seeking a presidential pardon demonstrates failure to accept responsibility.

E. Consideration of mitigation does not require the requested sentencing weight

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court had to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to serve the statutory purposes of sentencing. Those purposes include punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and respect for law. The court also had to consider the offense, the defendant’s characteristics, and unwarranted disparities.

The district court expressly credited the factors Leszczynski claimed it undervalued. Its sentence was 42 months below the bottom of the advisory range. The appellate issue was therefore not whether mitigation had been considered, but whether the district court acted unreasonably in declining to give it still greater effect.

The Eleventh Circuit found no such error. Serious fraud-related conduct and efforts to harm witnesses could reasonably justify a substantial sentence notwithstanding significant personal mitigation.

F. Intended loss supported a variance, not a ruling invalidating the calculation

Leszczynski argued that intended loss inflated the advisory range because actual financial harm was substantially lower. The district court addressed that concern through a downward variance. The appellate court approved the resulting sentence; it did not decide that using intended loss was unlawful or that the Guidelines calculation had to be revised.

The distinction is consequential: a court may find that a correctly calculated advisory range overstates the appropriate punishment in a particular case without declaring the underlying calculation legally erroneous.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

  • Post-remand sentencing: The opinion offers persuasive support for considering earlier obstruction alongside later rehabilitation. A renewed plea does not require the court to disregard the preceding record.
  • Acceptance arguments: Defendants with obstruction enhancements must address the obstructive conduct directly. A guilty plea and constructive institutional activity may not, standing alone, establish clear acceptance.
  • Sentencing explanations: The district court’s express identification of mitigating factors strengthened the sentence on appeal. A clear explanation helps distinguish genuine consideration from mere silence.
  • Fraud-loss mitigation: A large difference between intended and actual loss may support an individualized variance, but this opinion creates no entitlement to one or to a particular reduction.
  • Appellate review: Disagreement over the amount of mitigation ordinarily does not establish substantive unreasonableness when the sentencing court considered the relevant factors and reached a reasonable result.

The limits are equally important. The opinion does not categorically bar acceptance credit after obstruction, decide the propriety of pardon requests, or announce a separate rule governing consecutive sentences. Although it affirmed a consecutively imposed sentence, its reasoning focused on acceptance of responsibility and the overall substantive reasonableness challenge.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Acceptance-of-responsibility reduction
A reduction in the Guidelines offense level for clearly acknowledging responsibility. It changes the sentencing calculation; it does not automatically subtract a fixed number of months.
Obstruction-of-justice enhancement
An increase in the offense level for conduct interfering with the justice process. Here, attempts to persuade others to confess supported the enhancement.
Clear-error review
A deferential review of factual findings. It does not permit reversal simply because the appellate court might have evaluated the evidence differently.
Substantive reasonableness
Whether the sentence’s severity is reasonable in light of the facts and statutory sentencing purposes, rather than whether it is the only appropriate sentence.
Downward variance
A sentence below the advisory Guidelines range based on the statutory sentencing factors. It is distinct from reducing the offense level under a specific Guidelines provision.
Intended loss and actual loss
Intended loss concerns the financial harm sought; actual loss concerns the financial harm that occurred. The difference can matter when assessing an appropriate sentence.
Concurrent and consecutive sentences
Concurrent terms overlap; consecutive terms are served one after another. The 168-month fraud sentence here followed the separate 200-month sentence.
Unpublished opinion
An opinion that does not carry binding precedential force in the Eleventh Circuit, although its reasoning may be considered persuasive.

8. Conclusion

The opinion illustrates two established sentencing principles: acceptance of responsibility depends on the defendant’s overall conduct, and appellate courts defer substantially to reasonable sentencing judgments.

Leszczynski’s renewed guilty plea and rehabilitation did not require the district court to disregard serious earlier obstruction. Likewise, the court’s express recognition of trauma, mental health concerns, and intended-loss inflation did not oblige it to grant the larger reduction he requested. The decision’s significance is therefore practical rather than doctrinally novel: later improvement matters, but it does not automatically outweigh the complete sentencing record.