Analysis
Precedents Cited
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. supplied the basic FAA principle: federal law favors arbitration and requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms. The majority used these cases to frame arbitration as contract-based rather than as an independent procedural entitlement.
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson reinforced that arbitration is a matter of contract and that parties may delegate even gateway questions to an arbitrator. This supported the court’s view that the parties’ incorporation of AAA rules mattered decisively.
BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., and John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston were central to the procedural-arbitrability distinction. These cases teach that courts generally decide whether parties agreed to arbitrate, but arbitrators decide procedural conditions and forum-specific issues that arise during arbitration. The majority treated AAA registration under Rule 12 as such a procedural gateway matter.
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. and First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan were cited for the rule that parties may delegate arbitrability questions by clear and unmistakable evidence. The agreement here gave the arbitrator exclusive authority over interpretation, applicability, enforceability, and formation issues, further supporting deference to the arbitral forum.
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela supported the principle that parties may structure arbitration agreements as they wish, including by selecting rules, forums, and procedures.
The controlling Seventh Circuit precedent was Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.. There, Samsung refused to pay AAA administrative fees, the AAA terminated the proceedings, and the Seventh Circuit held that Samsung had not refused to arbitrate because the AAA acted under the rules the parties had adopted. The majority analogized Kohl's refusal to register its agreement to Samsung’s refusal to pay fees.
Hoeg v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. applied Wallrich in similar circumstances involving nonpayment of AAA fees. Although unpublished, it reinforced the majority’s view that court intervention is improper when the arbitral forum has already applied its own rules.
The court also relied on out-of-circuit support. In Frazier v. X Corp., the Second Circuit held that a party’s refusal to comply with an arbitral body’s fee allocation was an intra-arbitration delinquency, not a refusal to arbitrate under § 4. In Hernandez v. MicroBilt Corp., the Third Circuit declined to review the AAA’s administrative decision that an arbitration clause failed due process standards. These cases strengthened the majority’s conclusion that courts should not second-guess arbitral forum administration decisions.
The dissent relied on A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A. for the basic three-part test to compel arbitration: an enforceable agreement, a dispute within its scope, and refusal to arbitrate. It also discussed Dealer Computer Services, Inc. v. Old Colony Motors, Inc., Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Services, Inc., and Frazier v. X Corp. as fee-nonpayment cases that, in the dissent’s view, should not be extended to refusal-to-register cases. Finally, McLellan v. Charly was invoked to warn that the majority’s approach risks converting a bilateral arbitration promise into a unilateral option for the business.
Legal Reasoning
The majority’s reasoning proceeded from the FAA’s contractual foundation. Section 4 allows a court to compel arbitration only when a party has failed, neglected, or refused to arbitrate under a written agreement. But the court emphasized that the FAA does not create a free-standing right to arbitrate in the abstract. It enforces the parties’ chosen arbitration process.
Here, the parties agreed to arbitration conducted by the AAA under its Consumer Arbitration Rules. Rule 12 required Kohl's to register its arbitration clause and pay a registration fee. It also stated that the AAA would decline to administer consumer arbitrations if the business did not comply.
Kohl's refused to register. The AAA then closed the Petitioners’ cases. The majority treated this as the AAA applying a procedural rule within its delegated authority. Because the closure resulted from the contractual framework the parties had selected, the court held that there was nothing left for a federal court to compel under § 4.
The dissent viewed the matter differently. Judge Kolar argued that AAA administration was an essential term of the parties’ agreement and that Kohl's conduct prevented that administration from ever beginning. In his view, compelling Kohl's to register would not disturb AAA discretion; it would enable the AAA to exercise that discretion.
Impact
This decision strengthens the Seventh Circuit’s post-Wallrich rule that courts may not use FAA § 4 to override an arbitral forum’s procedural administration decisions when the parties incorporated that forum’s rules.
The ruling may be especially important in mass consumer arbitration. Businesses that have selected the AAA but fail to comply with AAA registration requirements may avoid being compelled back into AAA arbitration if the AAA closes the cases under its own rules. Consumers, meanwhile, may have to proceed in court or seek other remedies rather than compel arbitration.
Contract drafters should take note. If parties want courts to enforce registration, fee payment, or other pre-administration obligations directly, they may need to state that expressly. Otherwise, incorporation of arbitral forum rules may place those procedural issues beyond judicial correction under § 4.