A Three-Step Batson Remand Permits Previously Undisclosed Strike Explanations, Subject to Credibility Review

Introduction

This decision addresses how a trial court should reconsider a claim of racial discrimination in jury selection after an appellate remand. The central question was whether a remand directing the district court to apply the complete three-step framework of Batson v. Kentucky permitted the government to disclose reasons for a peremptory strike that it had deliberately withheld during the original jury selection.

Thirteen Black male defendants challenged the government’s removal of the only two non-white prospective jurors on the first venire panel: Juror 26, a Black man, and Juror 58, a Hispanic woman. The jury ultimately seated was entirely white. In the defendants’ first appeal, the Seventh Circuit identified procedural errors in the district court’s Batson analysis and remanded for a proper examination. That earlier decision did not establish that intentional discrimination had occurred.

After reconsideration, the district court again rejected the defendants’ objections. A divided Seventh Circuit affirmed. Judge Lee’s majority opinion held that the remand authorized consideration of all three Batson steps, including previously undisclosed explanations, and that the district court’s findings of nondiscrimination were not clearly erroneous. Judge Jackson-Akiwumi dissented, arguing that the government had waived its opportunity to explain Juror 58’s exclusion and that the proceedings remained inadequate to establish whether the explanations were genuine.

Background and Procedural History

The challenged strikes

The prosecution concerned alleged violent crimes and drug trafficking associated with the Bomb Squad. The district court called five panels of prospective jurors. On the first panel, Juror 26 worked for the Peoria Housing Authority and had previously lived near locations connected to the alleged offenses. Juror 58 taught Spanish and English as a Second Language at a Peoria charter school. The government exercised peremptory challenges against both.

The defendants immediately objected under Batson, emphasizing that the strikes removed the panel’s only two non-white members. The district court initially rejected the challenge because it believed the defendants had not proved purposeful discrimination. The government also questioned whether Juror 58’s racial or ethnic identity had been established.

Although it did not change its initial ruling, the court subsequently requested race-neutral explanations. The government supplied four reasons for striking Juror 26 but repeatedly declined to explain Juror 58’s removal, maintaining that its obligation to respond had not arisen because the defendants had failed at the first step.

The first appeal and remand

In United States v. Watkins, 107 F.4th 607 (7th Cir. 2024), the Seventh Circuit found two principal errors. First, the district court had demanded proof of discrimination at a stage requiring only circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination. Second, its statement that the government had offered “race-neutral reasons” did not establish that those reasons were credible rather than pretextual.

The court therefore remanded for the limited purpose of correctly applying the complete three-step Batson process to both challenged jurors, while otherwise affirming the judgment.

Proceedings on remand

The defendants argued that the district court could revisit only the third step and could not receive additional explanations. The district court rejected that interpretation. It found the initial threshold satisfied for Juror 26 but not Juror 58, then nevertheless evaluated the government’s explanations and their credibility for both jurors.

The government requested an evidentiary hearing, while the defendants opposed one based on their understanding of the remand’s scope. The district court resolved the matter on the briefs and again found no purposeful discrimination.

Summary of the Opinion

1. The remand encompassed all three steps. Its express language authorized a complete Batson inquiry, not merely reconsideration of credibility at step three.
2. The disputed first-step ruling was no longer dispositive. Once the government supplied explanations and the district court ruled on intentional discrimination, whether the defendants had initially established a prima facie case became moot.
3. The explanations were facially race-neutral. The government relied on connections to relevant locations, potential witnesses, employment, and criminal history rather than explicitly racial grounds.
4. The credibility findings survived clear-error review. The majority accepted the district court’s assessment that the reasons were genuine, including its explanation for crediting the government despite the delayed disclosure concerning Juror 58.
5. The judgment was affirmed. The defendants obtained neither another remand nor a new trial.

The majority also encouraged district courts to address every Batson step when practicable, even after rejecting the initial showing, so that an adequate appellate record exists.

Analysis: Legal Reasoning

1. The remand’s language controlled its scope

The defendants’ procedural argument failed because the prior mandate expressly directed the district court to “correctly employ[] the three-step process under Batson.” The majority read that language to include precisely what it said: all three steps.

The remand was “limited” in subject matter—it concerned the objections to Jurors 26 and 58—not limited to the final stage of the governing test. That distinction allowed the government to offer explanations for Juror 58 that had not appeared in the original record.

The holding should not be overstated. The opinion does not generally authorize prosecutors to replace discredited explanations with improved ones. It permits consideration of previously undisclosed reasons in the particular setting of an express three-step remand following an erroneous threshold ruling.

2. Step one requires an inference, not proof

At the first step, the challenger must identify circumstances supporting an inference of discriminatory purpose. A demonstrated pattern of discrimination is not indispensable, and a defendant need not share the excluded juror’s race.

The majority acknowledged that the district court might again have imposed an excessively demanding threshold for Juror 58. It did not, however, conclusively resolve that issue. Because the government had supplied explanations and the district court had decided the ultimate discrimination question, the preliminary dispute no longer controlled the appeal.

This distinction matters: the affirmance does not endorse the proposition that striking the only two non-white members of a panel is insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination. The dissent squarely rejected that proposition, while the majority bypassed it under the rule governing completed Batson inquiries.

3. Step two tests facial neutrality, not persuasiveness

The government’s second-step burden is one of production. It must articulate reasons that are not inherently discriminatory. Those reasons need not yet be persuasive or even plausible; whether they deserve belief is principally a third-step question.

For Juror 26, the government identified:

• His former residence near locations of alleged crimes;
• His employment with the housing authority managing a relevant housing complex;
• His acquaintance with potential witness and victim Rachel Parker; and
• His prior arrest for domestic battery.

For Juror 58, the government emphasized her employment at a school near locations connected to the prosecution and the resulting possibility that she knew relevant places or people.

The majority accepted these as facially race-neutral explanations. That conclusion alone did not establish their truthfulness: the defendants retained the opportunity to show that neutral language concealed racial motivation.

4. Step three required contextual credibility findings

The final inquiry was whether the explanations represented the government’s actual reasons or were pretexts for discrimination. The ultimate burden of establishing purposeful discrimination remained with the defendants.

The district court had to consider context, plausibility, consistency, prosecutorial demeanor, and the relationship between the explanations and accepted trial strategy. On appeal, its findings received substantial deference. The majority would reverse only upon a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had occurred.

Juror 26: case-specific connections and comparator evidence

The defendants argued that Peoria’s residential segregation made geographic explanations potential substitutes for race. The majority did not treat that concern as irrelevant. It nevertheless found the prosecution’s rationale more specific than a generalized objection to residents of a predominantly Black neighborhood.

Juror 26 had lived near streets where shootings and other alleged offenses occurred during his residence. His housing-authority employment also connected him to Harrison Homes, a location relevant to the prosecution. The government expressed concern that he might possess information outside the trial record.

Although Juror 26 denied knowledge of the charged crimes and affirmed his impartiality, the majority held that the district court could still credit these concerns. A prospective juror’s assurance of fairness did not conclusively defeat a genuine, race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike.

Comparisons with white jurors also supported the district court’s findings:

• Juror 154: The government struck this white retired teacher partly because she recognized potential witnesses’ surnames. That treatment supported the credibility of its concern about Juror 26’s acquaintance with Parker, even if the acquaintance might arguably have favored the prosecution.
• Juror 54: The government retained this white juror despite a shoplifting conviction. The district court credited the distinction between a nonviolent offense and Juror 26’s arrest for a violent offense, given the violent charges being tried.

The opinion does not equate an arrest with a conviction or establish that either automatically justifies exclusion. Its narrower conclusion is that the district court did not clearly err in accepting the government’s stated distinction.

Juror 58: delayed disclosure and strategic confidentiality

The central controversy concerned whether the government’s original refusal to explain Juror 58’s exclusion undermined its later account.

The majority accepted the district court’s assessment that the government had genuinely possessed a race-neutral reason during jury selection. It also upheld the court’s acceptance of the government’s later explanation that disclosure would have revealed its selection strategy and enabled the defense to conserve peremptory challenges.

Juror 35 illustrated the asserted concern. After questioning about his former employment at Peoria High School, the defense struck him. The majority reasoned that, had the defense known the prosecution’s criteria, it might instead have left him for the government to remove. This was a possible strategic consequence, not a finding that the defense actually would have acted differently.

Crucially, the majority did not recognize a general strategy exception to an operative second-step obligation. It reasoned that, when the government initially withheld its explanation, the district court had already found the defendants’ first-step showing inadequate. Strategic confidentiality was considered later as evidence bearing on credibility, not as an independent exemption from Batson.

The comparison with Juror 154 again supported the government. Although that white teacher had longer experience and had lived in Peoria, both she and Juror 58 taught at schools within the relevant geographic area, and the government struck both.

The majority did not rely on a separate explanation concerning Juror 58’s denial of knowledge of local gang activity because the district court had not made a credibility finding on that rationale. A comparison involving Juror 168 was forfeited on appeal.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The governing constitutional framework

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)

The foundational authority prohibits racially discriminatory peremptory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause and establishes the three-step framework. It supplied the majority’s governing test and the dissent’s insistence that trial courts examine actual motives rather than merely accept neutral wording. It also establishes that a pattern is not a necessary prerequisite to a successful objection.

Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005)

The majority relied on this decision to explain the inferential character of the first-step showing. The dissent invoked its discussion of prosecutorial nonresponse: declining to explain a strike can strengthen the inference of discrimination. Thus, the same authority supported both a low initial threshold and the dissent’s proposed consequences for refusing to participate.

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991)

This decision establishes that defendants may challenge discriminatory exclusion even when they and the excluded juror are of different races. It supported concern about the treatment of Juror 58 and reinforced that Batson protects prospective jurors as well as defendants.

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)

This authority performed three functions: it rendered the initial prima facie dispute moot after explanations and an ultimate discrimination ruling; supplied the facial-neutrality standard at step two; and supported deference to trial-level credibility findings. The dissent also relied on its emphasis on attorney demeanor when questioning a paper-only assessment.

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995)

The majority used this case to separate production from persuasion. A second-step explanation need not be persuasive or plausible. That low threshold does not dispense with the third-step obligation to assess whether the explanation is genuine.

Credibility, appellate deference, and development of the record

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008)

This case supplied clear-error review and identified purposeful discrimination as the ultimate issue. The majority’s disposition depended substantially on that deferential standard rather than on an independent appellate determination of the prosecutors’ motives.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)

The majority drew on its credibility factors: demeanor, reasonableness, probability, and consistency with accepted trial strategy. The dissent emphasized its related warnings about the importance of observing the prosecutor and the risks of distortion when explanations emerge after time has passed.

Morgan v. City of Chicago, 822 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2016)

This decision reinforced that the fact-intensive credibility inquiry belongs particularly to the trial judge and ordinarily receives substantial appellate deference.

United States v. Lovies, 16 F.4th 493 (7th Cir. 2021)

The majority invoked its clear-error formulation and explanation that trial judges are better situated than transcript-reviewing appellate courts to assess credibility. The dissent relied on its procedural guidance that district courts may hear all three stages before ruling, arguing that a prosecutor should not be able to prevent that fuller inquiry.

United States v. Cecil, 615 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2010)

Quoted through United States v. Lovies, this case supported explicitly delineating the three steps while reserving judgment until the inquiry is complete. Its role was procedural guidance rather than a direct answer to the waiver dispute.

Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019)

This precedent explains why merely labeling reasons “race-neutral” is not a sufficient credibility finding. It supported the first remand. The dissent maintained that the post-remand paper record still left the reviewing court unable to determine whether the prosecutors were credible.

Lamon v. Boatwright, 467 F.3d 1097 (7th Cir. 2006)

Cited through the dissent’s discussion of United States v. Taylor, this decision supported the proposition that step three tests the honesty of the prosecutor’s explanation, not merely its facial acceptability.

Delayed explanations, waiver, and comparative analysis

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005)

The dissent relied on this decision’s insistence that prosecutors stand or fall on their stated reasons and its concern about explanations that appear to be afterthoughts. Its institutional emphasis on public confidence also supported the dissent’s broader criticism of the proceedings.

United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2011)

The dissent cited this decision for limiting consideration to the reasons initially supplied rather than additional reasons developed afterward. It treated the prosecution’s deliberate nonresponse as a choice that should similarly constrain the later inquiry. The majority instead relied on the express scope of the remand.

United States v. Taylor, 277 F. App’x 610 (7th Cir. 2008)

This separate decision supported the dissent’s position that an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to question the prosecutor and adequately develop the record. It did not establish, in this opinion, a categorical hearing requirement for every Batson remand.

United States v. Brasher, 962 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 2020)

The dissent invoked its refusal to consider a strike justification first presented on appeal. The analogy was that contemporaneous explanations constrain later rationalization. The procedural distinction is that the explanations here were presented to the district court during an expressly authorized remand, rather than first to the appellate court.

Pitchford v. Cain, 608 U.S. 391 (2026)

As described by the dissent, this decision rejected waiver where defense counsel lacked a sufficient opportunity to contest the prosecution’s explanations at step three. The dissent extrapolated an opportunity-based principle: because the government here repeatedly received an opportunity to explain its strike, its deliberate refusal should constitute waiver. That extrapolation was not adopted by the majority.

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016)

The dissent used this decision both to reinforce that one discriminatory strike violates the Constitution and to argue that shifting explanations may indicate pretext. It viewed the government’s later strategic-confidentiality account as materially different from its original reliance on the absence of an established racial identity or sufficient first-step showing.

Collective assessment and the earlier proceedings

Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019)

This decision anchored the dissent’s broader account of Batson: courts must determine actual reasons, one discriminatory strike is enough, and trial judges bear primary responsibility for enforcement. It also supported the importance of jury service and public confidence in nondiscriminatory adjudication.

United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2005)

The dissent relied on this decision to argue that excluding people of color collectively is no less suspicious because the excluded jurors belong to different racial or ethnic groups. It therefore criticized examining Jurors 26 and 58 in isolation at step one.

United States v. Stephens, 514 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2008)

The district court viewed this later decision as implicitly permitting a paper-based remand inquiry. The dissent disputed that inference: the appellate court’s failure to criticize the procedure did not establish that a hearing was unnecessary under the materially different circumstances here.

United States v. Watkins, 107 F.4th 607 (7th Cir. 2024)

The prior appellate decision supplied both the corrected first-step standard and the controlling remand instructions. Its express reference to the entire three-step process was the majority’s principal answer to the defendants’ procedural objections.

United States v. Watkins, No. 18-cr-10036-JES, 2024 WL 4132698 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2024)

This was the district court’s post-remand ruling under review, not an independent controlling precedent. The dissent quoted it to examine the treatment of Juror 58, the acceptance of the strategy explanation, and the decision to proceed without an evidentiary hearing.

The Dissent’s Central Objections

Judge Jackson-Akiwumi agreed that the remand covered all three steps but disagreed about what evidence the district court could properly consider and whether its process was adequate.

• Collective circumstances were overlooked. The defendants challenged the removal of both non-white panel members. Assessing the strikes separately obscured the asserted pattern and improperly discounted Juror 58.
• The government deliberately relinquished its opportunity to explain. Repeated invitations to provide reasons distinguished this case from one in which a prosecutor never had an opportunity to respond.
• Strategy could not excuse nonparticipation. Protecting selection tactics does not override the obligation to explain a challenged strike once the court undertakes the second-step inquiry.
• The paper record was insufficient. The newly supplied explanation came through briefing after the original prosecutor had left the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The dissent considered a hearing necessary to examine whether the explanation reflected the original decision.

The dissent also stressed that the district court had an independent responsibility to determine whether a hearing was needed, regardless of the defendants’ opposition. It would have ordered a new trial because the accumulated errors undermined confidence in the jury-selection process.

Potential Impact

Greater importance of precise remand language

Future litigants should distinguish between a remand limited to a particular issue and one limited to a particular analytical step. An express direction to conduct the entire Batson process can permit development of a record that was incomplete during the original proceedings.

A narrow path for previously withheld explanations

The decision permits delayed disclosure in the circumstances presented, but it does not make late explanations immune from scrutiny. Their timing, consistency, supporting evidence, and relationship to the original decision remain relevant to pretext.

Continued scrutiny of geographic and employment rationales

The opinion accepts case-specific geographic connections while leaving intact the concern that residence and employment can function as racial proxies. Future disputes will likely turn on specificity, consistency across jurors, and the quality of comparative evidence—not simply whether the prosecutor invokes geography.

Incentives to complete the record during jury selection

The majority agreed that the government should, as a matter of practice, have supplied its reasons when asked. Its recommendation to address all three steps encourages contemporaneous explanations and express credibility findings, reducing the need for reconstruction years later.

Limits on the hearing holding

The affirmance leaves this paper-based assessment intact, but does not announce that evidentiary hearings are generally unnecessary. The dissent identifies circumstances—delayed explanations, unavailable original prosecutors, and disputed motives—that may support stronger demands for live examination in future cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Peremptory challenge

A limited opportunity to remove a prospective juror without proving that the juror must be disqualified. It cannot lawfully be used for racial discrimination.

Prima facie showing

An initial showing sufficient to require an answer. Under Batson, it raises an inference of discrimination; it does not establish the entire claim.

Burden of production

The obligation to supply an explanation. At step two, the prosecutor must state a facially race-neutral reason, while the ultimate burden of proving discrimination remains with the challenger.

Pretext

A stated reason that conceals the real motive. A neutral-sounding explanation can still be pretextual.

Comparator evidence

Evidence comparing the treatment of jurors with relevant similarities. Retaining a white juror while striking a minority juror for the same characteristic may suggest discrimination; consistently striking both may support neutrality.

Clear-error review

A deferential form of appellate review. The appellate court does not simply substitute its preferred factual assessment; it reverses when firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake.

Waiver and forfeiture

Waiver ordinarily involves intentional relinquishment of a position; forfeiture involves failure to preserve or pursue it. The dissent treated the government’s repeated refusal as waiver. The majority separately noted forfeiture of the defendants’ Juror 168 comparison.

An all-white jury

The jury’s composition can be relevant evidence, but does not alone establish a Batson violation. The constitutional question is whether race improperly influenced the selection process, not whether the final jury matched the defendants’ racial identity.

Conclusion

United States v. Kentrevion Watkins establishes that an express remand for the complete Batson process permits reconsideration of every step and, in these circumstances, consideration of previously undisclosed strike explanations. The majority upheld the district court’s credibility findings under clear-error review.

The decision’s broader significance lies in the tension between reconstructing an incomplete record and ensuring that later explanations reflect actual, contemporaneous motives. Both opinions underscore the practical importance of a complete inquiry during jury selection: prompt explanations, meaningful examination of pretext, and explicit credibility findings remain the strongest safeguards against discriminatory strikes.