A Locked Console Does Not Defeat the Firearm–Drug-Trafficking Enhancement When Access Is Reasonably Inferred

1. Introduction

In United States v. Tony Johnson, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a firearm stored in a locked vehicle console supported a four-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with drug trafficking. The central question was whether the console’s locked condition severed the required connection between a nearby firearm and drugs intended for distribution.

Tony Johnson, the defendant-appellant, challenged the enhancement imposed at sentencing. The United States defended the district court’s determination that the firearm was connected to Johnson’s drug-trafficking offenses. Writing for a panel that included Judges Stranch and Murphy, Judge Larsen concluded that the district court reasonably inferred Johnson could access the console and properly applied the enhancement.

The opinion’s practical significance is narrow but important: a locked compartment does not necessarily defeat the enhancement when the surrounding evidence supports access and the firearm is close to trafficking drugs. The court did not hold that every firearm found near drugs automatically qualifies, nor did it decide what result would follow if genuine inaccessibility were established.

2. Background and Procedural History

On May 23, 2023, an officer in Berea, Ohio, noticed a vehicle with heavily tinted windows. A license-plate check revealed that its owner, Johnson, had an outstanding felony arrest warrant. The officer stopped the vehicle, which Johnson was driving, and detected a strong marijuana odor.

Johnson surrendered a marijuana blunt after leaving the vehicle. Officers detained him on the warrant and found a small bag of marijuana and suspected ecstasy pills on his person. A subsequent vehicle search uncovered additional drugs in a front storage compartment beneath the radio. Officers also encountered a locked center console, which they pried open, discovering a firearm and ammunition.

A grand jury charged Johnson with being a felon in possession of a firearm and three counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. He pleaded guilty to all four counts without a plea agreement.

The presentence report recommended a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense—drug trafficking. Johnson objected. The district court overruled the objection, calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, and imposed a 70-month prison sentence.

Although the opinion initially describes the appeal as a challenge to the sentence’s reasonableness, Johnson’s sole appellate argument concerned the enhancement. The court did not undertake a separate analysis of an independently asserted substantive-reasonableness challenge or the legality of the vehicle search.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed on three related grounds:

1. The firearm was close to trafficking drugs. Multiple bags containing various controlled substances and a cutting agent were located in a front storage compartment near the center console containing a loaded 9mm Glock, an attached laser sight, and ammunition.
2. The district court reasonably inferred access. Johnson owned the vehicle, and a box matching the firearm’s laser sight was on the floorboard. These facts supported the inference that Johnson had placed the equipped firearm in the console and could access it, notwithstanding the officers’ need to pry the console open.
3. The proposed rebuttable-presumption approach did not warrant reversal. Johnson had not raised that approach below. Moreover, existing Sixth Circuit law already excludes merely coincidental firearm possession, and his asserted rebuttal depended on the factual inaccessibility argument the district court reasonably rejected.

The opinion identifies the enhancement as § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), its designation at Johnson’s 2024 sentencing. It notes that the provision was renumbered as § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) in the 2025 Guidelines Manual.

4. Legal Framework and Standards of Review

The required connection between firearm and felony

The applicable provision increases the offense level by four if the defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” The government must establish that connection by a preponderance of the evidence.

Application Note 14(A) explains that the firearm must have “facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating,” the other offense. Actual use, discharge, or brandishing is therefore unnecessary. Potential assistance can suffice.

For drug trafficking, Application Note 14(B) specifically addresses a firearm found “in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia.” Proximity supports the required connection, but the Sixth Circuit’s cases also recognize that merely coincidental possession is insufficient and that proximity may not be dispositive.

Appellate review

• Factual findings: Reviewed for clear error.
• The determination that possession was connected to another felony: Receives “due deference.”
• Questions of law: Reviewed de novo, meaning independently.

These distinctions mattered because Johnson’s principal objection depended on a factual premise: that the locked console made the firearm inaccessible. The appellate court’s task was not to choose its preferred inference from scratch, but to decide whether the district court’s inference was clearly mistaken.

5. Analysis of the Precedents Cited

United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2011)

United States v. Taylor supplied the governing standards of review: clear-error review for factual findings, due deference to the firearm–felony connection determination, and de novo review of legal questions. Its influence was particularly important in the console-access dispute. Because the district court drew a supported factual inference, the appellate panel would not reverse merely because Johnson proposed a competing interpretation.

United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2009)

United States v. Angel established that the government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a nexus between the firearm and an independent felony. It also supplied an important qualification: proximity is “indicative of a connection between the guns and the drugs,” but “may not be dispositive.”

This precedent supported both the enhancement’s application and the limits on that application. It permitted the court to rely on proximity without converting proximity into an irrebuttable rule. It also helped explain why Johnson’s proposed Third Circuit approach might differ little in substance from existing Sixth Circuit law.

United States v. Ennenga, 263 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2001)

United States v. Ennenga supplied the rule that firearm possession “merely coincidental” to another felony cannot support the enhancement. The panel invoked that principle both when stating the governing framework and when answering Johnson’s request for a rebuttable presumption.

The case therefore functions as a limiting principle: the enhancement requires a meaningful connection, not simply the simultaneous occurrence of firearm possession and a felony.

United States v. Moore, 580 F. App’x 452 (6th Cir. 2014)

United States v. Moore provided the closest factual analogy. It upheld the enhancement where drugs were found on the driver and a loaded firearm was located in a floorboard compartment behind the driver’s seat.

The comparison supported treating drugs and a firearm located in different parts of a vehicle as sufficiently close. It did not resolve the locked-console issue by itself; that issue required the separate factual finding that Johnson had access.

United States v. Johnston, 595 F.3d 292 (6th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2008)

The court cited United States v. Johnston, quoting United States v. Jeross, for the familiar clear-error formulation: reversal requires a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” These authorities defined the appellate threshold rather than supplying a separate rule about firearms or trafficking.

Applying that threshold, the panel found no sufficient basis to disturb the district court’s access finding.

United States v. Perez, 5 F.4th 390 (3d Cir. 2021)

Johnson relied on United States v. Perez, which reads Application Note 14(B) as creating a rebuttable presumption when firearms and drugs are found in close proximity. Under that approach, a defendant may present evidence that the firearm had no relationship to drug-related activity.

The Sixth Circuit did not adopt or categorically reject that formulation. It observed that Johnson had forfeited the argument by failing to raise it in the district court, questioned how much substantive difference existed between the two circuits’ approaches, and concluded that Johnson’s claimed rebuttal failed on the facts. The opinion therefore should not be characterized as establishing a definitive circuit conflict over rebuttable presumptions.

United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019), and United States v. Hilton, 2026 WL 2583134 (6th Cir. 2026)

These cases appear in a footnote addressing Guidelines commentary. The court cited United States v. Havis in explaining that Johnson did not dispute that Application Note 14(B) was an interpretation to which the court could defer under appropriate circumstances. It also noted that United States v. Havis had been superseded on other grounds, as recognized in United States v. Hilton.

Their role was limited. Johnson conceded that Note 14(B) should apply and disputed its interpretation, not its validity. Consequently, the panel did not decide a broader challenge to the authority of Guidelines commentary.

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The underlying felony was trafficking, not merely personal possession

The court first identified evidence supporting drug trafficking: multiple plastic bags, different controlled substances, varying quantities, and a cutting agent. The substances included methamphetamine, fentanyl, cocaine, mixtures, and other drugs. Johnson’s guilty pleas to three possession-with-intent-to-distribute counts further confirmed the trafficking character of the conduct.

This distinction mattered because Application Note 14(B)’s specific proximity instruction concerns drug trafficking. The opinion does not establish that the same reasoning automatically governs every case involving drugs possessed solely for personal use.

B. The vehicle’s layout supported a firearm–trafficking nexus

The drugs were beneath the radio in a front storage compartment, while the loaded firearm and ammunition were in the nearby center console. The court treated that arrangement as close proximity of the kind contemplated by the commentary and supported by United States v. Moore.

The analysis concerned potential facilitation. The court did not identify evidence that Johnson fired or brandished the firearm during a drug transaction, and the governing standard did not require such evidence.

C. A locked console did not establish inaccessibility

Johnson’s strongest factual argument was that officers could reach the gun only by prying open the console. But difficulty of police access did not compel the conclusion that Johnson himself lacked access.

Two circumstances supported the district court’s contrary inference: Johnson owned the vehicle, and the floorboard contained a laser-sight box matching the sight mounted on the firearm. Together, those facts supported an inference that Johnson had handled the equipment and placed the firearm inside the console.

The opinion did not identify a recovered key or establish precisely how quickly Johnson could retrieve the gun. Its conclusion was instead that the district court’s access inference was not clearly erroneous. That is narrower than a rule that ownership always proves access or that locks are irrelevant.

D. The rebuttable-presumption argument failed procedurally and factually

The panel gave several reasons why Johnson’s reliance on United States v. Perez did not justify reversal. First, he had not presented the theory below. Second, Sixth Circuit law already permits recognition that proximity may be coincidental rather than facilitative. Most importantly, Johnson’s proposed rebuttal rested entirely on the asserted inaccessibility of the firearm.

Once the district court’s contrary factual finding survived clear-error review, the proposed presumption framework did not change the outcome. The court thus avoided resolving a broader interpretive question unnecessary to the appeal.

7. Potential Impact and Limits

Locked storage is a factual consideration, not an automatic exception

The opinion offers persuasive support for applying the enhancement despite a locked compartment when other evidence reasonably establishes access. Conversely, it leaves open cases involving persuasive evidence that the defendant could not access the firearm or that its presence was unrelated to trafficking.

Circumstantial evidence can establish the connection

Vehicle ownership, the firearm’s location, matching accessory packaging, the firearm’s loaded condition, and the organization of the drugs collectively supported the ruling. Future courts may find the case useful where no single item conclusively proves the relationship but the evidence as a whole supports it.

Developing the record and preserving legal arguments remain essential

For defendants, the decision illustrates the difficulty of overturning supported factual findings on appeal. Evidence bearing on actual access or an unrelated reason for the firearm’s presence should be developed at sentencing. Distinct interpretive arguments, such as a proposed rebuttable-presumption framework, should likewise be presented to the district court.

The decision’s reach should not be overstated

As an unpublished disposition applying existing authority, the opinion’s principal contribution is a fact-specific illustration. It does not establish an irrebuttable proximity rule, resolve the validity of Application Note 14(B), or comprehensively define how inaccessible a firearm must be before the required nexus fails.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Four-level enhancement

An increase of four offense levels in the Guidelines calculation—not an automatic addition of four years to the sentence.

Nexus

A meaningful connection between the firearm and another felony. Here, the issue was whether the firearm could assist drug trafficking.

Preponderance of the evidence

The government must show that the required connection is more likely than not, a lower threshold than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Potential facilitation

The firearm could help the other offense, even if it was never actually used.

Clear error

A demanding standard for overturning factual findings. An appellate court must firmly conclude that the lower court made a mistake.

Rebuttable presumption

A starting inference that can be overcome by contrary evidence. Johnson sought to treat proximity as such an inference.

Forfeiture

Failure to raise an argument at the appropriate time. Here, Johnson did not present his proposed presumption framework in the district court.

Guidelines commentary

Explanatory material accompanying the sentencing provisions. The commentary’s application was conceded in this appeal; its broader legal authority was not decided.

9. Conclusion

United States v. Tony Johnson confirms that a locked vehicle console does not, by itself, defeat a firearm–drug-trafficking enhancement. Nearby trafficking drugs, vehicle ownership, and matching firearm-accessory packaging supported the district court’s inference that Johnson could access the loaded firearm.

The broader lesson is one of evidence and appellate restraint: proximity strongly supports a connection, but merely coincidental possession remains insufficient. The Sixth Circuit affirmed because the record supported the district court’s findings, not because it adopted a categorical rule about every locked firearm or every firearm found near drugs.