“A Reasonable Period of Time”: The Supreme Court of Ohio’s Clarification of Response Deadlines under R.C. 149.43 in State ex rel. Castellon v. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office (2025-Ohio-2787)

Introduction

In State ex rel. Castellon v. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office, the Supreme Court of Ohio was asked to decide whether the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office complied with Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, when it took fifty-two days to furnish 38 pages of records (with redactions) requested by inmate-relator Estephen Castellon. Castellon sought medical, forensic, and grand-jury related documents from his 2016 rape and kidnapping case. When the prosecutor initially withheld several items, Castellon filed an original action in mandamus, also requesting statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.

The eventual outcome—denial of all relief—appears straightforward. Yet the Court’s opinion (joined by six justices, with Chief Justice Kennedy concurring in part and dissenting in part) establishes or confirms several important points:

Records provided after litigation render the mandamus claim moot unless the relator proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that additional responsive records exist.
Fifty-two days can be a “reasonable period of time” under R.C. 149.43(B)(1) for a public office to review, redact, and disclose a modest set of sensitive records.
Statutory damages will be denied where the requester cannot establish any breach of R.C. 149.43(B), even if the response time feels excessive.
Only the records described in the original written request are litigable in the ensuing mandamus action, absent an amended complaint.
The prosecutor, not being the “keeper” of grand-jury transcripts, has no duty to provide minutes that it does not maintain.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court issued a per curiam opinion denying all of Castellon’s demands:

Mandamus: Moot as to four categories of records (medical, SANE report, DNA report, chain-of-custody) because they were produced; not warranted for grand-jury minutes because the prosecutor does not keep such a transcript and Castellon abandoned that portion of the claim.
Statutory damages: Denied—Castellon failed to prove the prosecutor violated any obligation under R.C. 149.43(B).
Court costs & attorney fees: Denied—relator was indigent and pro se, incurring no compensable costs or fees.

“The prosecutor’s response time was reasonable, given the need to examine the requested records and to make any necessary redactions before providing copies to Castellon.”

Chief Justice Kennedy concurred in the denial of mandamus and costs but dissented on damages, arguing that 52 days is not reasonable for a public-records custodian to produce 38 pages of records with redactions and would have awarded the statutory maximum of $1,000.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

State ex rel. Brinkman v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-5063 — once requested records are provided, mandamus is generally moot.
State ex rel. Frank v. Clermont Cty. Prosecutor, 2021-Ohio-623 — affidavits from the custodian shift the burden to the requester to rebut with clear and convincing evidence.
State ex rel. Morgan v. Strickland, 2009-Ohio-1901 — “reasonable period of time” is fact-dependent.
State ex rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson, 1994-Ohio-5 — agencies have a legitimate interval to review and redact records.
State ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., 2018-Ohio-5108 — emphasizes orderly examination and redaction.
State ex rel. Woods v. Lawrence Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2023-Ohio-1241 — damages may survive even when writ is moot on production.
Additional modern public-records cases—Griffin, Cordell, Grim, and Horton—were referenced to delineate burdens and damages metrics.

Collectively, these authorities furnished the analytical scaffolding: production → mootness; affidavit → burden-shifting; timing → contextual; damages → strict statutory prerequisites.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

Mootness Doctrine Applied.
Once Perk’s affidavit established that every responsive record in the prosecutor’s possession had been surrendered, the writ was presumptively moot. Castellon produced no evidence— documents, metadata, or credible testimony—suggesting additional records existed. The Court therefore dismissed the mandamus claim.
Scope of the Litigation Fixed by the Original Request.
Requesters cannot, mid-litigation, pivot to new or refined demands unless they amend their pleadings. Castellon’s switch from “grand-jury minutes” to “evidentiary documents shown to the grand jury” was irrelevant because it never became part of the pleadings.
“Reasonable Period of Time.”
Despite only 38 pages being involved, the Court accepted that (i) medical, SANE, and DNA records contain highly sensitive information; (ii) each page required individualized review and redaction; (iii) work did not begin until February 12, after internal assignment; and (iv) mediation efforts overlapped with production. On that record, 52 calendar days (about 38 business days) was “reasonable.”
Statutory Damages Rejected.
Damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) demand proof of (a) a valid written request and (b) a breach of R.C. 149.43(B). Because the Court found no untimely response, improper denial, or unlawful request for identity/intended use, the statutory prerequisites were unmet.
No Court Costs or Fees.
An indigent, pro se relator incurs neither taxable costs nor attorney fees, making those claims legally impossible.

Impact on Future Litigation and Public Records Practice

Tangible benchmark for “reasonable time.” Agencies will cite Castellon whenever 6–8 week delays are challenged, especially for sensitive or heavily redacted records.
Affidavit practice reaffirmed. Custodians should submit detailed affidavits early to shift the evidentiary burden.
Importance of precise requests. Requesters who wish to expand or modify their demands must do so in writing and, if litigation is pending, through an amended pleading.
Grand-jury materials. The decision reiterates that prosecutors are not the statutory custodians of grand-jury transcripts; defendants must use Crim.R. 6(E) or post-conviction mechanisms, not the Public Records Act.
Dissent as a cautionary flag. Chief Justice Kennedy’s opinion signals that future courts may view prolonged response times skeptically when the record volume is low, ensuring agencies remain vigilant.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandamus: A lawsuit asking a court to order a government official to perform a clear legal duty.
Public Records Act (R.C. 149.43): Ohio law requiring government bodies to provide public records promptly and at cost.
Reasonable Period of Time: No fixed deadline; depends on volume, sensitivity, need for redactions, and logistical hurdles.
Mootness: A doctrine that courts will not decide a dispute after the controversy has been resolved—here, after records are delivered.
Statutory Damages: Flat monetary penalties (up to $1,000) payable when an agency violates the Public Records Act; awarded per business day of non-compliance.
SANE Report: Medical documentation prepared by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner; often contains protected health information and victim details.
Grand-Jury Minutes: The transcript of secret grand-jury proceedings; generally not a public record and safeguarded by Crim.R. 6(E).

Conclusion

State ex rel. Castellon crystallizes several facets of Ohio public-records jurisprudence. The majority opinion affirms that:

The act of ultimately producing records, combined with a detailed custodian affidavit, will usually moot mandamus.
A multi-week delay—stretching to nearly two months—can satisfy the “reasonable period” requirement where sensitive redactions are necessary.
Statutory damages remain a strict-liability remedy, but only when a clear violation of R.C. 149.43(B) is proven.

Conversely, the Chief Justice’s dissent warns agencies against treating this timeframe as a safe harbor, emphasizing the statute’s mandate for promptness. Together, the opinions supply both a shield and a sword: public offices gain a precedent for deliberative, careful disclosure, but requesters gain a roadmap for challenging undue delay. Future litigants and record custodians alike will find Castellon an essential citation in any debate over how fast is “fast enough.”