Extending Buckhannon: The First Circuit Clarifies “Prevailing-Party” Status Under Clayton Act §16 in Garavanian v. JetBlue Airways Corp.

1. Introduction

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in its 21 August 2025 opinion Garavanian v. JetBlue Airways Corporation, confronted a recurring question in modern antitrust litigation: when a private plaintiff’s parallel action becomes moot because the Department of Justice (DOJ) obtains the ultimate injunctive relief, can that private plaintiff still recover attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing party” under §16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26?

The appeal came from Gabriel Garavanian and Timothy Niebor—two Spirit Airlines customers who, with twenty-three other consumers, sued to enjoin the proposed JetBlue–Spirit merger under Clayton Act §7. After the district court found only Garavanian and Niebor had standing, the DOJ (joined by several states) tried its own case first and won a permanent injunction. The consumer suit was then dismissed as moot. Claiming victory by proxy, Garavanian and Niebor sought fees. The district court denied the request, and the First Circuit has now affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Issue Decided: Whether Garavanian and Niebor “substantially prevailed” within the meaning of Clayton Act §16 such that they could recover fees and costs, despite their action ending in a mootness dismissal.
Holding: They did not; a party cannot be deemed prevailing without a judicially sanctioned alteration of the parties’ legal relationship. The Buckhannon two-part test applies to §16, and the consumer-plaintiffs failed the “judicial imprimatur” prong.
Disposition: District court’s denial of attorneys’ fees affirmed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)
Set the prevailing-party test: (a) material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship and (b) judicial imprimatur. The First Circuit treats this as the default rule for all fee-shifting statutes using the phrase “prevailing party.” The panel rejected the appellants’ request for a Clayton-Act-specific standard, reiterating that Buckhannon is presumed to apply “across the board.”
Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989)
Source of the “material alteration” concept adopted in Buckhannon. The court cites it to trace the development of prevailing-party doctrine.
First Circuit Line of Cases—Smith; Hutchinson; Aronov; Diffenderfer; J.S.; Suárez-Torres
These decisions confirmed the Circuit’s commitment to apply Buckhannon uniformly. By canvassing them, the panel foreclosed any argument that §16 should be treated differently.
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992)
Quoted for the proposition that a plaintiff “prevails” only upon receiving actual relief that modifies the defendant’s behavior in the plaintiff’s own case.
District Court Merger Decision—United States v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 712 F. Supp. 3d 109 (D. Mass. 2024)
Provided the factual backdrop. The consumer-plaintiffs relied on the court’s rhetorical nod—“to those dedicated customers of Spirit, this one’s for you”— to claim intended-beneficiary status; the panel found the statement legally insignificant.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel conducted a de novo review of prevailing-party status. Its reasoning unfolded in four logical steps:

Uniform Meaning of “Prevailing Party.” Because §16 uses the familiar term, Buckhannon applies absent clear statutory text to the contrary. Congress could have created a different standard but did not.
No Judicial Imprimatur. The pivotal requirement was the absence of a judgment “on the merits” in the consumers’ own docket. A mootness dismissal, by definition, signifies the court’s inability to grant relief and lacks merits adjudication.
Third-Party Injunction Doesn’t Travel. While the DOJ obtained a merits judgment, that injunction ran solely in favor of the DOJ and the plaintiff states. Being pleased with someone else’s victory does not confer prevailing status. The stray “dedicated customers of Spirit” sentence lacked operative effect.
Catalyst Theory Rejected. Appellants alternatively invoked the notion that their lawsuit “catalyzed” the DOJ result. The Supreme Court repudiated the catalyst theory in Buckhannon; the panel therefore declined to revive it under §16.

3.3 Anticipated Impact on Future Litigation

Parallel Actions: Private antitrust plaintiffs who file alongside government enforcers face a higher hurdle to fee recovery. Unless they obtain their own consent decree or judgment, they cannot rely on the government’s win.
Forum-Management Strategy: Corporations defending mergers may now confidently resist fee petitions from private plaintiffs if the private case becomes moot.
Uniformity Across Circuits: While a few district courts had already applied Buckhannon to §16, this is the first published circuit-level endorsement, likely influencing other circuits facing similar fee-shifting questions.
Legislative Prompt: If Congress wishes to incentivize private antitrust enforcement differently, it may need to amend §16 to provide a bespoke fee standard—as it has done in the Clayton Act’s treble-damage §4 context.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Clayton Act §7 (15 U.S.C. § 18): The federal statute prohibiting mergers whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition.” Plaintiffs often seek injunctions before a merger closes.
Clayton Act §16 (15 U.S.C. § 26): Allows “private attorney-general” suits for injunctive relief and mandates fee-shifting when the plaintiff “substantially prevails.”
Prevailing Party: A legal term of art meaning a party that receives a court-ordered, merits-based alteration in its favor—either through judgment or a consent decree.
Judicial Imprimatur: Formal approval by a court (e.g., judgment, injunction, consent decree). Mere voluntary change by the defendant, or relief obtained in someone else’s lawsuit, lacks this hallmark.
Mootness: A case becomes moot when events occur that make it “impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief.” Courts then dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, without reaching merits.
Catalyst Theory: A pre-Buckhannon idea that a plaintiff can recover fees by triggering voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct, even absent a court order. The Supreme Court rejected this theory in 2001.

5. Conclusion

Garavanian v. JetBlue cements a straightforward but far-reaching rule: Buckhannon governs §16 of the Clayton Act just as it governs civil-rights and copyright fee-shifting provisions. A private antitrust plaintiff must obtain its own court-sanctioned relief to be a “prevailing party.” Success by others—even when it moots the private action and vindicates the same competitive concerns—does not suffice.

The opinion reinforces doctrinal uniformity, safeguards defendants from opportunistic fee claims, and subtly encourages coordination (or at least sequencing) between private and governmental antitrust suits. Unless Congress intervenes, practitioners should assume that in the First Circuit—and likely beyond—the road to fee recovery under §16 runs only through a judgment or consent decree in the plaintiff’s own name.