“Present-Obligation, Not Past-Residence” – Indiana Supreme Court Refines Cross-State Sex-Offender Registration Rules
(Gage Peters v. Dennis J. Quakenbush II & Lloyd Arnold, Ind. Sup. Ct. No. 25S-PL-152, 19 June 2025)

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Indiana’s decision in Peters v. Quakenbush addresses a recurring puzzle under the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA): when must a person who has ever gained an out-of-state sex-offender label continue registering after moving to Indiana? The Court faced two intertwined questions:

1. Does Indiana Code § 11-8-8-19(f) (“the Jurisdiction Statute”) compel registration whenever another jurisdiction has ever imposed an obligation, irrespective of the source of that obligation?
2. If yes, does that compulsion persist even when the person no longer has a current reporting duty in the sister state?

Plaintiff Gage Peters—convicted in Illinois, briefly vacationing in Florida, and now residing in Indiana—became the test case after Hamilton County authorities insisted his week-long stay in Florida converted his ten-year Indiana obligation into lifetime registration. The Court ultimately rejected that view and clarified the trigger for imported obligations under SORA.

Summary of the Judgment

• Statutory Holding #1 – Source-Neutrality: The phrase “a person who is required to register … in any jurisdiction” means that Indiana will honor an out-of-state registration obligation even if the triggering crime was committed elsewhere. The Court expressly disavowed the Court of Appeals reasoning in Marroquin v. Reagle.
• Statutory Holding #2 – Present-Tense Requirement: The imported obligation exists only when the offender is presently required to register in the other jurisdiction. Because Florida imposes no current in-person reporting duty on former, non-resident offenders, Peters is not “required to register” in Florida; consequently, Indiana cannot extend Florida’s lifetime term to him.
• Disposition: Trial court summary judgment for the State reversed; summary judgment ordered for Peters. Concurring opinions urge legislative clarification and raise Art. I, § 23 (Privileges & Immunities) concerns.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Wallace v. State (2009) – historical overview of SORA; backdrop for statutory purpose.
• Tyson v. State (2016) – emphasised Indiana’s goal of avoiding “safe havens.”
• State v. Zerbe (2016) – clarified that the foreign registry requirement, not the foreign conviction, triggers Indiana duties.
• Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104 (2016) – U.S. Supreme Court reading of federal SORNA’s present-tense wording; heavily relied on for “present obligation” rationale.
• Lindsey v. Swearingen, 582 F. Supp. 3d 1127 (N.D.Fla. 2022) & McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2020) – confirmed that Florida keeps data online but does not impose ongoing reporting on non-residents.
• Marroquin v. Reagle, 228 N.E.3d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) – rejected; Court insists the statutory text is broader than Marroquin allowed.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textualism First. Justice Goff anchors the analysis in the words “any jurisdiction” and the present-tense verb “is required.” Together, these dictate that (i) the original locale of the offense is irrelevant, but (ii) the out-of-state requirement must still be ongoing.
2. Definition of “Register.” Indiana Code § 11-8-8-4 obliges “in-person” reporting to local law enforcement and delivery of the detailed information listed in § 11-8-8-8. If the other state imposes no such current, in-person duty, the Indiana analogue is not triggered.
3. Florida Statutory Survey. The Court walks through Fla. Stat. § 943.0435, concluding that once a person leaves Florida and ceases to “establish or maintain a residence,” the reregistration obligation vanishes. Publication of historical data on Florida’s website does not equal a current “registration” duty.
4. Avoiding Absurd Results. The majority rejects the Court of Appeals’ dissent’s “absurd” label yet implicitly acknowledges fairness concerns by harmonising the statute with common-sense limits: a week-long vacation should not precipitate a lifetime obligation.

3. Impact of the Judgment

• Immediate Practical Effect. Indiana agencies must confirm that an offender is under an active out-of-state reporting duty before importing the registration term.
• Law-Enforcement Protocols. Sheriffs and the Department of Correction will likely create checklists: (a) obtain written proof of current duty in the sister state, (b) verify whether in-person reporting is required, (c) document the term length.
• Litigation Forecast. Expect challenges where the foreign state requires electronic, but not in-person, updates; or where duties are triggered intermittently (e.g., upon re-entry). Peters establishes that in-person is central in Indiana.
• Legislative Pressure. All three separate opinions invite the General Assembly to clarify (i) timing, (ii) the definition of “register” for foreign jurisdictions, and (iii) equality concerns under Art. I, § 23. A statutory amendment may follow.
• Constitutional Undercurrents. Justice Molter flags potential Privileges & Immunities claims if two Hoosiers with identical Indiana convictions face divergent duties solely due to travel; Peters avoids, but does not resolve, that issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• SORA (Sex Offender Registration Act): Indiana’s framework compelling certain offenders to keep authorities apprised of residence, employment, etc.
• Jurisdiction Statute (I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f)): Says: “If you must register somewhere else, you must register here for at least that long.”
• “Any Jurisdiction” vs. “Another Jurisdiction”: The Court stresses that the statute does not demand that the offense occurred elsewhere—only that a foreign registry duty exists.
• “Present-tense” interpretation: Statutory duties triggered only when the obligation is current now, not merely historical.
• In-person Reporting: Under Indiana law, to “register” means physically appearing at the sheriff’s office, not emailing or online updates. Many states, including Florida for non-residents, eschew that requirement.
• Absurdity Doctrine: Judicial tool allowing courts to deviate from literal statutory text to avoid results the legislature could not have intended. The majority finds no need to invoke it thanks to textual resolution.

Conclusion

Peters establishes a two-step filter for importing foreign sex-offender obligations into Indiana:

1. Step 1 – Source-Neutral Trigger: Any current out-of-state registry duty—no matter how or where it arose—can follow a person into Indiana.
2. Step 2 – Present-Obligation Check: If, upon entering Indiana, the person is not currently required to register under the foreign jurisdiction’s rules (as measured against Indiana’s in-person model), Indiana cannot extend that state’s registration period.

By disavowing Marroquin yet siding with Peters, the Court harmonises public-safety objectives with due-process fairness, ensuring Indiana is no haven but also no trap. Whether the legislature will refine the statutory language—especially the definition of “register”—remains to be seen, but practitioners should treat Peters as the controlling roadmap for cross-jurisdiction registration disputes going forward.