Totality in Domestic Abuse: Lead Sentence Must Reflect Distinct Offending Against Children and Partners

1) Introduction

In R v Jennings [2026] EWCA Crim 644, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) considered an Attorney General’s Reference under section 36 Criminal Justice Act 1988, arguing that a suspended sentence imposed for a cluster of domestic abuse offences was unduly lenient.

The offender pleaded guilty to: (i) controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship (Serious Crime Act 2015, s.76), (ii) intentional strangulation (Serious Crime Act 2015, s.75A), and (iii) two assaults by beating (Criminal Justice Act 1988, s.39), involving his spouse and two of their children. The key issue was whether the sentencing judge had properly applied the principle of totality so that the overall sentence was “just and proportionate” for the entirety of the criminality.

2) Summary of the Judgment

• Leave to refer was granted; the sentence was held unduly lenient.
• The Court found the sentencing judge erred by failing to ensure the overall sentence reflected the total criminality, particularly the distinct serious offending against two children in addition to prolonged abuse of the spouse.
• The Court identified the least just and proportionate term on the lead count (controlling/coercive behaviour) as 3 years 6 months, then applied a 2-month reduction to reflect compliance with a stringent electronically monitored curfew already served.
• All sentences were quashed and re-imposed concurrently as immediate custody, producing a total of 3 years 4 months imprisonment.
• Restraining orders remained in force “until further order”.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court applied the established test for “unduly lenient” sentences from Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1989] 11 Cr App R (S) 521: a sentence is unduly lenient if it falls outside the range of sentences which the judge, applying his mind to all relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate. This authority framed the appellate threshold: the Court was not deciding whether it would have sentenced differently, but whether the imposed sentence was outside the permissible range.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court accepted (and no party disputed) the guideline categorisations adopted at first instance:

• Controlling or coercive behaviour: category A1, starting point 2½ years custody.
• Intentional strangulation: category B1, starting point 2½ years custody.
• Assault by beating (two counts): within community-to-custody ranges depending on harm/culpability.

The sentencing judge’s stated rationale was pragmatic: the offender had already served substantial remand time, and a suspended sentence with intensive probation interventions was said to better manage rehabilitation and reduce reoffending than release on licence. The Court did not treat that objective as illegitimate; however, it held that it could not override the need for a sentence that properly reflected the seriousness and breadth of the offending.

The decisive error was the failure to address totality. Even where concurrent sentences are used, the court must “stand back” and test whether the overall outcome is just and proportionate for the offending as a whole. Here, the lead term on the controlling/coercive behaviour count was not increased (nor were sentences structured consecutively) to capture:

• the prolonged and insidious pattern of domestic abuse against the spouse, and
• the separate, distinct and serious violence against two children (including strangulation of an adult child and an assault on a daughter),
• with significant psychological harm evidenced in victim personal statements, and
• risk assessed by probation as high to the victims and future partners, alongside continued minimisation/dispute of details.

The Court noted it might have been preferable to impose consecutive terms for some counts (specifically identifying counts 1 and 3), but treated the central question as whether the sentence on the lead count (count 4) was sufficiently uplifted to represent totality. It was not. The resulting suspended sentence fell outside the reasonable range and was therefore unduly lenient.

Having decided to intervene, the Court considered whether to exercise discretion not to increase sentence, including: updated materials (further references and a counsellor’s note), and the first judge’s view that probation-supervised rehabilitation was beneficial. The Court held the updated material did not materially improve the offender’s position. Given the seriousness, immediate custody was required.

Importantly, the Court gave a concrete example of credit for punitive restriction already served: it reduced the otherwise appropriate term by 2 months to reflect approximately 4 months compliance with an electronically monitored curfew. That adjustment recognised real-world penal impact while still delivering proportionate custody.

3.3 Impact

The decision reinforces several practical sentencing lessons in domestic abuse prosecutions involving multiple counts:

• Totality must be explicit and outcome-focused: where multiple offences capture different facets of harm (partner abuse plus child-directed violence), concurrency without uplift can understate overall criminality.
• Rehabilitation cannot displace proportionality: pragmatic concerns about supervision and treatment may inform disposal, but cannot justify a sentence that fails the totality “stand back” test.
• Distinct child victims matter in totality: violence directed at children within the family is not simply part of the same course of conduct; it can require an additional sentencing response (uplift and/or consecutive structure).
• Curfew compliance can be credited when resentencing, but only as a calibrated adjustment, not a substitute for proportionate custody.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Attorney General’s Reference (unduly lenient sentence)

A mechanism allowing the prosecution (via the Law Officers) to ask the Court of Appeal to increase a sentence if it is not just “lenient”, but outside the reasonable range a judge could impose.

Totality

A sentencing principle for multiple offences: the overall sentence must fairly reflect the total wrongdoing. Judges may use consecutive terms, or concurrent terms with an uplift on the lead offence, but must “stand back” and check the final total is proportionate.

Concurrent vs consecutive sentences

Concurrent sentences are served at the same time (the longest term effectively governs). Consecutive sentences are served one after another (terms add up). Totality governs which structure—or what uplift—is needed.

Suspended sentence

A custodial term that is not immediately served unless the offender breaches conditions or reoffends during the operational period. If the immediate term required is too long to be suspended, custody must be immediate.

5) Conclusion

R v Jennings [2026] EWCA Crim 644 is a clear totality-based correction: where prolonged coercive control is accompanied by separate violent offences against children, the sentencing court must ensure the lead sentence (or the structure of consecutive terms) properly reflects the combined criminality. A rehabilitative rationale and the availability of probation interventions cannot justify an overall sentence that is not just and proportionate; where it falls outside the reasonable range, the Court of Appeal will intervene and impose immediate custody, while still giving measured credit for substantial restrictions already served (such as electronically monitored curfew).