The Arkins Principle: Primacy of Statutory Appeals over Judicial Review & Cost Neutrality Where Leave Is Refused Inter Partes

Introduction

Arkins v Labour Court ([2025] IEHC 416) concerns a production worker, Mr Thomas John Arkins, who sought judicial review of two Labour Court decisions that had dismissed his unfair-dismissal and minimum-notice claims against Element Pictures Limited (“EPL”). Simons J, sitting in the High Court, refused leave to bring judicial review and subsequently issued this written ruling to clarify the very narrow basis of that refusal for the benefit of the self-represented applicant.

The judgment is significant for two interconnected reasons:

1. It restates—sharply and emphatically—the principle that where a statutory right of appeal on a point of law exists, judicial review will be unavailable save in exceptional circumstances. This restatement will hereafter be referred to as “the Arkins Principle.”
2. It forges a practical cost rule: where the Court itself directs that a leave application be heard inter partes (rather than the usual ex parte) and then refuses leave, no order for costs should ordinarily be made against the unsuccessful applicant. This cost-neutrality nuance has the potential to guide future case-management decisions at the leave stage.

Summary of the Judgment

Simons J refused leave on two independent bases:

1. Adequate Alternative Remedy: Sections 10A of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 and 46 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 provide an explicit appeal to the High Court on a point of law. Following the Court of Appeal in Chubb European Group SE v Health Insurance Authority and the Supreme Court in EMI Records, such an appeal must, absent exceptional features, be pursued before judicial review can be invoked.
2. No Arguable Case: The Labour Court’s central finding—that Mr Arkins was never engaged by EPL in any capacity—was a pure question of primary fact, rationally grounded in oral and documentary evidence. It therefore fell well short of the high irrationality threshold in O’Keeffe and Meadows.

On costs, although “costs follow the event” is the statutory default (Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, s 169), the judge ordered no costs against Mr Arkins. The Court itself had converted a normally ex-parte leave application into an inter-partes hearing; it would have been unfair to penalise the lay applicant for that procedural decision.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Chubb European Group SE v Health Insurance Authority [2020] IECA 91, [2022] 2 IR 686
  Held that a statutory appeal generally “supplants and enlarges” judicial review. Simons J leaned on this formulation to conclude that the Oireachtas intended the labour-law appeals to be the primary pathway.
• EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd v Data Protection Commissioner [2013] IESC 34
  The Supreme Court anchored the “adequate alternative remedy” rule. The judgment imported this doctrine wholesale.
• Erdogan v Workplace Relations Commission [2021] IEHC 348 and Burke v An Adjudication Officer [2021] IEHC 667
  Both employment-law cases reinforced the requirement to exhaust statutory appeals. Simons J cited them as employment-specific proof.
• O’Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 IR 39 and Meadows v Minister for Justice [2010] IESC 3
  Set the “irrationality” threshold for interfering with findings of fact. The judgment applied these to dismiss any suggestion of factual error review.
• Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31
  Defined what constitutes an adequate statement of reasons. Simons J found the Labour Court to be compliant.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Architecture: The Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 and Workplace Relations Act 2015 set out a complete code culminating in an appeal to the High Court—indicative of legislative intent to foreclose collateral review.
2. Judicial Restraint: Findings on who the employer is are quintessentially factual. Because the Labour Court had heard witnesses, such findings could only be revisited if no evidence existed to support them, an argument unsupported on the papers.
3. Separation of Issues: The questions of “bogus self-employment” in the film industry were not reached by the Labour Court and thus not amenable to High Court review. Judicial review examines the process and legality of what was decided, not collateral questions.
4. Costs Discretion: Simons J carved out an equitable exception to s 169 LSRA 2015, emphasising that a court-instigated deviation from ex-parte practice should not financially prejudice a self-represented litigant.

3. Impact of the Judgment

• Procedural Clarity in Employment Litigation The ruling will likely accelerate the use of statutory appeals from the Labour Court and curtail premature judicial-review filings. Lawyers will need to consider Arkins before advising clients to invoke judicial review.
• Judicial Economy By routing challenges through the statutory appeal pathway, the High Court can better allocate judicial-review resources to cases lacking an appeal alternative.
• Costs Guidance The cost-neutrality dictum may influence future leave-stage directions, especially in cases where self-represented applicants are involved. Courts may either (a) stay with ex-parte hearings to avoid cost exposure or (b) signal that no order for costs is a likely outcome if they themselves mandate an inter-partes format.
• Substantive Employment-Status Debates Deferred Although the wider “bogus self-employment” controversy remains unresolved, Arkins confirms that such substantive questions must be litigated before the Labour Court (and on appeal) before the High Court can be engaged.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Judicial Review vs Statutory Appeal: Judicial review is a supervisory remedy focusing on the legality of the decision-making process. A statutory appeal (here “on a point of law”) directly invites the Higher Court to decide whether the decision-maker got the law wrong. If legislation grants an appeal, courts usually insist litigants take that route first.
• Leave Stage: To bring judicial review in Ireland, an applicant must obtain “leave” (permission). This is typically a quick, ex-parte screening. However, the Court can order an inter-partes hearing—meaning all sides attend—where the issues appear borderline or legally complex.
• Irrationality / O’Keeffe Standard: Courts will quash findings of fact only if literally no evidence exists to support them, making the decision perverse or plainly unreasonable.
• Costs Follow the Event: Under s 169 LSRA 2015, the losing party normally pays the winner’s legal costs. The court may, however, depart from that rule where special circumstances warrant.

Conclusion

Arkins v Labour Court crystallises two practical teachings for Irish public-law and employment practitioners. First, where a statutory right of appeal exists, judicial review will only exceptionally be entertained. Attempting to leapfrog that route risks summary dismissal at the leave stage—a reaffirmed doctrine we have labelled the “Arkins Principle.” Second, the judgment provides a humane cost precedent for self-represented litigants: if a court itself orders an inter-partes leave hearing and subsequently refuses leave, no automatic cost penalty should ensue.

Beyond its procedural import, the judgment underscores the judicial system’s limited remit: structural employment-status issues in the film industry must be ventilated before, and determined by, the specialist Labour Court and thereafter through the bespoke statutory appeal mechanism. High-profile policy debates, however compelling, cannot bootstrap an otherwise unstateable judicial-review claim.

— Commentary prepared by an independent legal analyst, 2025