Security of Tenure for Showpeople’s Yards: Mobile Homes Act 1983 Applies to Council Leases of Ground and Survives Tenant Sequestration

1) Introduction

In Glasgow City Council against James J R Stringfellow and others ([2026] CSOH 19), Lady Drummond in the Outer House of the Court of Session refused Glasgow City Council’s attempt to obtain declarator and removal/ejection of travelling showpeople occupying land at 22 Pearce Street, Govan. The pursuer (a local authority) sought orders declaring the defenders had no right or title and requiring them to leave, in furtherance of the Water Row Development Master Plan (Phase 2).

The central dispute was not merely factual possession but the legal character of the defenders’ occupation: whether the 1995 missive of let covered the whole occupied area; whether statutory security of tenure applied (particularly the Mobile Homes Act 1983 and/or Housing (Scotland) Act 2001); whether bankruptcy (sequestration) ended any tenancy; and (raised in extensive argument, largely obiter) whether eviction would be incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, the Equality Act 2010, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Incorporation)(Scotland) Act 2024.

Although the pursuer framed the action as an “owner recovering land”, the court treated the case as one turning on long-standing occupation, documentary history, and the correct statutory route for termination where mobile homes are stationed on a protected site.

2) Summary of the Judgment

  • Extent of lease: The court found the 1995 lease more probably covered the larger area (red outline plus yellow shaded area on the summons plan), not merely the smaller red area contended for by the Council.
  • Mobile Homes Act 1983 applies: The 1995 lease was an agreement entitling the first defender to station a mobile home on a protected site and occupy it as a main residence; chalets fell within the statutory concept at the relevant time. As a result, eviction required compliance with the 1983 Act (including a court order from the sheriff court on limited grounds and subject to reasonableness).
  • Sequestration did not terminate the lease: Bankruptcy did not automatically end the lease; the Council had an option to treat it as terminated but did not exercise it and, by accepting rent (housing benefit) after the first sequestration, waived reliance on that clause.
  • Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 does not apply (obiter): A lease of ground for siting caravans is not a “tenancy of a house let as a separate dwelling”; the statutory scheme is directed to houses/buildings, not bare land.
  • Compatibility arguments largely obiter: The court nonetheless addressed (i) ECHR proportionality principles for eviction, (ii) UNCRC 2024 Act “relevant function” and best-interests analysis, and (iii) Equality Act 2010 public sector equality duty (PSED), finding (on the assumptions made) no incompatibility and sufficient regard by the Council.

The dispositive result was decree of absolvitor: the pursuer’s craves for declarator and removal were refused.

3) Analysis

A) Precedents Cited

(i) Meaning of “caravan/mobile home” and applicability of the Mobile Homes Act 1983

  • Carter v Secretary of State for the Environment [1994] 1 WLR 1212
    Relied on by the pursuer for a restrictive approach: a structure must be capable of being moved as a “single unit” and not only after dismantling; the court distinguished Carter because it concerned a four-section structure and arose in planning enforcement, not the private-law security-of-tenure context.
  • Bury Metropolitan Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2011] EWHC 2192 (Admin)
    Cited for evidential rigor: the inspector’s conclusion that an assembled structure could be moved by road lacked evidence. Lady Drummond treated it as limited to its facts and not determinative against the defenders.
  • Oades and Oades v Eke [2004] RA 161
    A rating case where chalets were held not to be caravans due to flimsy construction and inability to move without loss of integrity. The court found it unhelpful as a cross-context authority and not matched by evidence on the defenders’ chalets (especially the first defender’s).
  • Howard v Charlton [2003] 1 P & CR 21
    A key influence. Carnwath LJ emphasised that the 1983 Act applies to an agreement under which a person is entitled to station a mobile home, and disputes should ordinarily be approached through the terms/contemplation of the agreement rather than hyper-technical definitional arguments. Lady Drummond adopted this approach: the 1995 lease plainly contemplated siting residential caravans/chalets.
  • Wyre Forest District Council Respondents v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another [1990] 2 AC 357
    Used to confirm that “chalet”-type units can be “caravans” in the statutory sense even if not so in ordinary language.
  • Brightlingsea Haven Limited v Morris [2008] EWHC 1928 (QB)
    Cited (obiter) for the common-sense proposition that later frailty/immobility does not necessarily strip a unit of “caravan” status; supports focusing on capability “when assembled” at the relevant time.
  • West Lothian DC v Morrison 1987 SLT 361
    Important Scottish authority recognising that the 1983 Act protections can apply to travelling showpeople, and acknowledging the possibility of the tenant simultaneously being landlord to sub-occupiers—relevant to the Council’s knowledge of sub-letting and housing benefit payments.

(ii) Sequestration (bankruptcy) and leases

  • Anderson v Hamilton and Co (1875) 2 R 355
    Cited for the principle that a trustee may adopt or not adopt contracts; used by the pursuer to argue non-adoption terminates interests. The court accepted vesting but rejected automatic termination on the facts.
  • Fraser v Robertson 1881 8 R 347
    Cited (with text commentary) for the proposition that bankruptcy does not itself automatically terminate a lease, though it may entitle the landlord to irritate. This supported Lady Drummond’s finding that termination required an exercised right/step, not mere sequestration.
  • Rankine, The Law of Leases in Scotland (3rdedition, 1916) and Rennie (ed), Leases (2015)
    Used for orthodox lease principles on sequestration, vesting, and landlord remedies; the court’s analysis followed that structure (vesting vs termination vs waiver/acceptance of rent).

(iii) Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 interpretation and “house”

  • Nisela v Glasgow CC 2006 Hous LR 66
    Cited by the defenders for conversion of pre-2002 local authority residential tenancies; the court distinguished it and held the 1995 ground lease did not convert and was not within the 2002 Order mechanism.
  • Gordon v Kirkcaldy DC 1990 SC 107 and R v Rent Officer of the Nottingham Registration Area ex p Allen (1986) 52 P & CR 41
    Raised to support a broader, functional meaning of “house/dwelling” in other statutory contexts; the court held these did not control the 2001 Act’s scheme, which presupposes a building/house, not bare land.
  • R(O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department) [2023] AC 255
    Cited for the modern approach to statutory meaning-in-context; supported the court’s text-and-purpose reading that the 2001 Act is directed to houses/buildings and landlord repairing/fitness obligations.

(iv) Human rights, proportionality, discrimination, and interpretative duties

  • Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700
    Provided the structured proportionality framework; later contrasted with the more “housing possession” tailored approach in Pinnock.
  • Kay v United Kingdom [2012] 54 EHRR 30 and Buckley v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 101
    Cited for the principle that those at risk of losing their home should be able to have proportionality assessed by an independent tribunal.
  • Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2011] 2 AC 104 and Hounslow London Borough Council v Powell [2011] 2 AC 186
    Central to the court’s (obiter) discussion of Article 8 in eviction: where domestic law gives an unqualified right to possession, Article 8 proportionality may provide a defence; yet normally strong weight is given to the authority’s entitlement and public housing/regeneration aims.
  • Aster Communities Ltd v Akerman-Livingstone [2015] UKSC 15, [2015] AC 1399
    Confirmed Pinnock; distinguished structured proportionality where discrimination is alleged—relevant to how the court analysed Article 14 arguments.
  • Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983
    Quoted for judicial restraint in second-guessing housing allocation/management decisions.
  • Carson v United Kingdom (2010) 51 EHRR 13, R (RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2009] 1 AC 311, and R (SC and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and others [2022] AC 223
    Used for Article 14 principles (analogous situations, justification) and the broad margin of appreciation in social-economic policy.
  • S v L 2013 UKSC 30 and Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557
    Cited for the limits of “reading down” under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“go with the grain”; not inconsistent with fundamental features). This underpinned the rejection of re-engineering the 2001 Act to cover bare land.
  • ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, [2011] 2 AC 166
    Cited for the principle that children’s best interests are a primary consideration in decisions impacting them—relevant to the UNCRC “prism” point.

(v) UNCRC incorporation and “relevant function” under the 2024 Act

  • Re United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Incorporation)(Scotland) Bill 2022 SC (UKSC) 1
    Provided the constitutional background: the Scottish Parliament cannot make the effect of Acts of the UK Parliament conditional upon Scottish legislation; this explains why the enacted 2024 Act uses the “relevant function” limitation.
  • Lord Advocate's Reference [2025] HCJC 2, 2025 SLT 101
    Decisive in Lady Drummond’s interpretation: “relevant function” should not be read narrowly by dissecting enabling sources in a way that would drain the 2024 Act of content. The court adopted a practical approach: the pursuer, acting as a housing authority/regeneration body, was acting in connection with a relevant function; likewise the court.

(vi) Equality Act 2010: protected characteristic (ethnic group) and PSED compliance

  • Mandla v Dowell-Lee [1983] 2 AC 548
    The foundational “ethnic group” test: long shared history and distinct cultural tradition as essential conditions. Lady Drummond applied Mandla to extensive evidence and held travelling showpeople constituted a distinct community with ethnic origins for Equality Act purposes.
  • CRE v Dutton [1989] 2 WLR 17 and Moore v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 44 (Admin)
    Cited as comparators where other travelling groups have been recognised as ethnic groups; supportive background for recognising showpeople.
  • R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345, Hotak v Southwark London Borough Council [2015] UKSC 30, and London And Quadrant Housing Trust v Patrick [2019] EWHC 1263
    Used to frame what “due regard” requires in PSED performance, including that it is a continuing duty and not a tick-box exercise.

B) Legal Reasoning

(i) The leased subjects: resolving an evidential gap

A striking feature was the poor quality of the Council’s core lease evidence: only a copy missive existed; the attached monochrome plan was unsigned and did not clearly show “boundaries coloured red” as the lease wording suggested. Against that, the defenders produced coherent oral evidence (accepted as “straightforward” and consistent) supported by pre-1995 documentation—planning material, estates correspondence, and a sketch plan indicating the broader yard bounded by Water Row and the Johnston yard. The court treated the documentary planning trail (including references to a site licence in 1989 and a month-to-month lease) as revealing continuity rather than a sudden unexplained reduction in 1995.

The site licence point was used as an inferential anchor: the measured smaller red area was below the statutory threshold, while the larger red+yellow area exceeded it; the existence of a licence in 1989 therefore supported occupation of the larger area. The conclusion: the 1995 lease covered the larger footprint.

(ii) Mobile Homes Act 1983: agreement-focused applicability and the “chalet” question

The Council attempted to defeat the 1983 Act by characterising chalets as non-mobile, relying on planning/rating authorities and the “single unit” concept. The court, adopting Howard v Charlton [2003] 1 P & CR 21, reframed the question: not whether the structure is a “caravan” in ordinary language, but whether the agreement entitled the occupier to station a mobile home.

On the facts, the lease’s purpose was the parking of showpeople’s residential caravans; the chalets were present and known at the time. The court held it was unrealistic to allow the landlord, decades later, to deny the statutory protection that corresponds with what both parties contemplated. In addition, on the statutory definition itself, evidence supported that the first defender’s chalet was transported in two parts and bolted together, aligning with section 13 of the 1968 Act (twin-unit caravans).

Consequence: the 1983 Act implied terms applied; the agreement continued month-to-month until terminated under the Act; and eviction required the proper forum and statutory grounds (then sheriff court; with future transfer noted to the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland).

(iii) Sub-occupiers and knowledge of sub-letting

Although only the first defender held the lease with the Council, the court held it was implicit that the first defender permitted others to station and occupy their units; and, critically, the Council knew of sub-letting (housing benefit payments were made in respect of other occupiers). The lease’s non-subletting clause did not defeat the practical reality accepted by the landlord.

(iv) Sequestration: vesting is not termination; waiver by conduct

The court separated (a) vesting of the tenant’s estate in the trustee from (b) termination of the lease. Sequestration did not automatically end the lease; the landlord could irritate (and here had a contractual option under clause 16) but did not prove it exercised that option. Post-2009, the Council accepted rent (via housing benefit) until July 2016, which the court treated as confirming continuation and waiving reliance on clause 16. Even after rent ceased, the Council did not terminate; it only served notice years later. Thus the lease persisted.

The 1983 Act’s protection was also not contingent on rent payment; non-payment might be a ground under the statutory regime, but termination must still follow the Act’s pathway.

(v) Housing (Scotland) Act 2001: why bare land is outwith the scheme (obiter)

The defenders sought Scottish secure tenancy status, arguing “house” should be read broadly to include caravans/chalets and their siting arrangements. The court rejected this as inconsistent with the statutory structure: section 11 speaks of “tenancy of a house let as a separate dwelling” and section 111 defines “house” in terms of parts of a building. Repairing/fitness obligations (wind and watertight) presuppose a physical structure provided by the landlord, not a plot of land. Conversion provisions and the 2002 Order did not capture the defenders’ pre-2002 position.

(vi) Reading down / incompatibility (obiter): no breach triggering section 3 HRA or section 24 UNCRC Act

The interpretative duty under section 3 HRA arises only if the ordinary reading produces a Convention breach. The court held it did not: the differential position arises from the type of agreement (house tenancy vs mobile-home pitch agreement), not from showpeople status. Parliament legislated against the background of the mobile homes statutory regime; the 1983 Act already provides security of tenure with a reasonableness safeguard. Thus there was no need to read down, and no basis for a declaration of incompatibility or strike-down declarator.

(vii) UNCRC 2024 Act “relevant function” (obiter): a practical, purposive construction

A significant constitutional and interpretative point was the meaning of “relevant function”. The Council argued a narrow approach based on the UK Parliament source of certain powers (e.g., section 189 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973; section 47A of the Court of Session Act 1988). The court rejected a complex dissection and followed Lord Advocate's Reference [2025] HCJC 2, 2025 SLT 101: “relevant function” was introduced to ensure competence, not to hollow out the Act. On that approach, both the local authority (acting in housing/regeneration) and the court were acting in connection with relevant functions.

(viii) Best interests and eviction (obiter): compatibility assessment on the facts

Having accepted that UNCRC duties could apply, the court assessed the child’s best interests using evidence including a psychologist report and the Council’s impact assessments. While relocation would be disruptive, the court considered mitigation (alternative sites, maintaining schooling, keeping extended family together) could preserve stability and cultural identity, concluding that (on the assumed premise of no existing right/title) removal would not be incompatible with the cited UNCRC requirements.

(ix) Equality Act 2010 (obiter): showpeople as an ethnic group; PSED satisfied

The court held travelling showpeople met the Mandla v Dowell-Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 criteria, based on extensive evidence of long shared history, distinctive cultural tradition, language (“Polari/Parlyaree”), and social customs. Nonetheless, the court found no made-out case of direct discrimination. On PSED, the Council had completed equality impact assessments, identified negative impacts, and pursued alternative sites; on the evidence, this sufficed as “due regard” in context.

C) Impact

(i) Practical precedent for showpeople yards and pitch agreements

The core effect is to strengthen the position of long-standing showpeople communities occupying council land under “ground leases” that contemplate residential caravans/chalets. Where the arrangement is, in substance, a pitch agreement on a protected site, the Mobile Homes Act 1983 may govern termination—even if the units are chalet-like and long-installed. The decision discourages late-stage definitional manoeuvres (“not a caravan”) where the original agreement contemplated siting residential units.

(ii) Forum and remedy discipline

A local authority cannot sidestep the 1983 Act by bringing possession proceedings in the Court of Session as if against a mere squatter. If the 1983 Act applies, the statutory route (and statutory grounds plus reasonableness) must be used in the appropriate forum. This is especially significant for regeneration-driven displacement, where the temptation is to pursue a simpler proprietorial remedy.

(iii) Insolvency does not silently clear the site

The sequestration analysis emphasises that vesting and termination are distinct. Landlords who wish to rely on insolvency-related termination options must clearly exercise them and evidence that exercise; continued acceptance of rent can amount to waiver. This has broader relevance to public landlords managing legacy arrangements.

(iv) UNCRC 2024 Act: early guidance on “relevant function” and litigation posture

Although largely obiter, the court’s embrace of a practical reading of “relevant function” (following Lord Advocate's Reference [2025] HCJC 2, 2025 SLT 101) signals that defenders may be able to invoke UNCRC rights in civil proceedings against Scottish public authorities without the analysis collapsing into technical source-tracing. The decision also illustrates the evidential burden: best-interests assessments, professional evidence, and mitigation measures will be scrutinised.

(v) Equality: recognition of showpeople as an ethnic group

The finding that travelling showpeople can constitute an ethnic group for Equality Act purposes is potentially influential in future disputes about site provision, relocation, consultation, and public authority decision-making, even though the PSED challenge failed on the facts here.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Declarator and removal (ejection)
A declarator is a court declaration of legal rights (here, that defenders had no right/title). “Removal” is the order requiring departure, with warrant for ejection if not complied with.
Protected site (Mobile Homes Act 1983)
A site that meets licensing/planning conditions such that statutory security of tenure for mobile homes can apply. The parties ultimately agreed the site was a protected site.
Mobile home/caravan (statutory meaning)
Not the everyday meaning. A “caravan” can include a twin-unit structure brought in sections and assembled on site. The key is capability of being moved (in the relevant statutory sense), and—under the 1983 Act—often whether the agreement entitles siting one.
Implied terms and security of tenure
The 1983 Act automatically inserts mandatory terms into pitch agreements, limiting eviction to certain grounds and requiring a court order and reasonableness assessment.
Sequestration (bankruptcy) and leases
Bankruptcy can transfer (vest) the tenant’s interest to a trustee, but it does not automatically end the lease. Termination generally requires landlord action (e.g., irritancy) or statutory steps.
Reading down (Human Rights Act 1998, section 3)
Courts must interpret legislation compatibly with ECHR rights “so far as possible”, but cannot rewrite it against its fundamental structure (“go with the grain”).
Public Sector Equality Duty (Equality Act 2010, section 149)
A duty to have “due regard” to equality aims when making decisions. It is about the quality of decision-making (consideration, assessment, mitigation), not guaranteeing any particular outcome.
UNCRC 2024 Act “relevant function”
The Act binds public authorities only when acting in connection with certain functions (broadly, devolved or devolvable functions). The court favoured a practical approach so the Act remains effective rather than being defeated by technical analysis of legislative sources.

5) Conclusion

The judgment’s principal legal significance lies in its firm holding that a local authority “ground lease” permitting siting of residential caravans/chalets on a protected site can fall within the Mobile Homes Act 1983, conferring statutory security of tenure that must be terminated through the Act’s procedures and forum. The court also reinforced that sequestration does not automatically terminate such a lease, particularly where the landlord does not exercise termination options and continues to accept rent.

While much of the human-rights, UNCRC, and equality discussion was not necessary to dispose of the case, it offers important signposts: a purposive understanding of “relevant function” under the UNCRC 2024 Act; careful, evidence-driven best-interests analysis; and recognition that travelling showpeople may constitute an ethnic group under the Equality Act—matters likely to recur where regeneration proposals intersect with long-established travelling communities.