Section 35 LSRA Injunctions: Mandatory PII Compliance for Irish Barristers and Limits of EU Free-Movement Arguments

Case: The Legal Services Regulatory Authority v Sallabi (Approved) [2026] IEHC 427
Court: High Court of Ireland (President of the High Court, Mr Justice David Barniville)
Date: 3 July 2026
Procedural significance: First High Court judgment on an LSRA application under s. 35 Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.

1. Introduction

This judgment concerns an application by the Legal Services Regulatory Authority (“LSRA”) for statutory injunctive relief under s. 35 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 to prohibit an Irish barrister (the “respondent barrister”) from:

• providing legal services in the State without compliant professional indemnity insurance (“PII”);
• holding himself out as entitled to practise as a barrister in the State without such PII; and
• failing to produce proof of compliant PII to the LSRA before providing such services.

The respondent barrister had previously held Irish-market PII (the “Zurich policy”) but, after moving (or claiming to move) his base of operations to Belgium, sought to rely instead on a Belgian collective policy associated with the Brussels Bar (the “Brussels Bar policy”). The LSRA disputed both (i) the policy’s territorial scope (whether it covered Irish barrister work performed in Ireland) and (ii) its compliance with the LSRA’s 2024 Regulations (S.I. No. 490 of 2024).

The respondent barrister also raised extensive EU law arguments, contending that the LSRA’s insistence on Irish-compliant PII unlawfully restricted Treaty freedoms (establishment and services) and that Irish rules should be “disapplied”.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court granted the LSRA the permanent orders sought under s. 35, prohibiting the respondent barrister from practising or holding out as entitled to practise in Ireland unless and until he has an approved, compliant PII policy and produces proof to the LSRA.

Key holdings included:

• Section 35 is a civil, statutory injunction mechanism, distinct from criminal prosecution (s. 36) and from the misconduct/disciplinary regime (Part 6).
• The respondent barrister is a “practising barrister” under the 2015 Act and must comply with s. 46(1) and the 2024 Regulations when providing legal services in Ireland.
• The respondent’s EU free-movement arguments were misconceived: he was not exercising Treaty establishment/services rights by providing legal services in Ireland under the Irish professional title he acquired in Ireland.
• On interpretation, the Brussels Bar policy did not cover the respondent’s Irish barrister work performed in Ireland (notably in light of Article 9), and it also failed compliance with key regulatory requirements (including Regulation 12(1) and several parts of Regulation 14).
• The “Zurich policy” was found to be compliant with the 2024 Regulations, defeating any claim that compliance was impossible.

3. Analysis

3.1 The new precedent: how s. 35 operates (threshold, procedure, and relationship with discipline)

The judgment provides the first detailed roadmap for s. 35 applications:

• Nature of relief: s. 35 is a civil remedy (“statutory form of injunction”), not a disciplinary finding and not a criminal conviction.
• Standard of proof: for final orders, entitlement must be shown on the balance of probabilities (not the interlocutory injunction test).
• Procedure: applications are brought by originating notice of motion under Order 53D and Order 84B RSC, with evidence typically on affidavit (Order 84B, r. 7). The Court accepted that the issues were suitable for this procedure and did not require plenary proceedings.
• Co-existence with misconduct complaints: the Court rejected the argument that a pending Part 6 misconduct complaint deprives the Court of jurisdiction. The Court emphasised the distinct purposes and standards of the Part 6 regime (including the criminal standard for findings of misconduct) versus s. 35 relief.

Practical effect: The LSRA can move quickly to protect consumers by restraining ongoing or imminent non-compliant practice, without waiting for the slower Part 6 disciplinary pathway or for criminal enforcement.

3.2 Precedents cited and how they influenced the decision

(a) Contract/insurance interpretation: “text in context”

Because the Court had no expert evidence on Belgian law governing the Brussels Bar policy, it interpreted the policy applying Irish interpretive principles. The Court relied on:

• Brushfield Limited T/A the Clarence Hotel v Arachas Corporate Brokers Limited and AXA Insurance DAC [2021] IEHC 263
• Law Society of Ireland v Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland [2023] 1 IR 479
• Charwin Limited T/A Charlie's Bar v Zavarovalnica Sava Insurance Company DD [2021] IEHC 489

These authorities supported a reasonable-person, text-in-context approach, enabling the Court to construe Article 9’s territorial limitation as a real restriction tied to activities carried out from an office/legal practice based in Belgium—undermining the respondent’s contention of EU-wide cover for Irish work.

(b) EU free movement: services vs establishment and permissible professional rules

The respondent relied on numerous CJEU authorities to argue that Irish PII requirements unlawfully restricted Treaty freedoms. The Court’s reasoning drew on the structure of the Treaty and the specific lawyer Directives, and considered (among others):

• C-427/85, Commission v Germany, ECLI: EU:C:1988:98
• Case C-294/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-3591
• Case C-739/19, V.K. v An Bord Pleanála, ECLI: EU:C:2021:185
• Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165
• Case C-168/98 Luxembourg v European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-9131
• Case C-341/05 Laval
• Case C-540/22 SN & Others ECLI:EU:C:2024:530

The Court used these cases principally to:

• confirm that professional rules in a host state can apply where justified by overriding public interest (notably consumer protection and proper administration of justice);
• reject the respondent’s “discrimination” framing: he was being treated like any other Irish barrister practising in Ireland; and
• emphasise that the respondent’s reliance on selected passages did not bridge the central factual/legal gap: he was practising in his home Member State using his home professional title.

(c) Disapplication and EU supremacy cases (rejected as irrelevant on the facts)

The respondent invoked classic EU supremacy/disapplication authorities:

• Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125
• Case 106-77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629
• Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Limited [1990] ECR 1-2433
• Danqua v Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2017] IECA 20

The Court rejected disapplication because the respondent failed to show any EU law incompatibility in the first place.

(d) “Impossibility” (lex non cogit ad impossibilia) cases (distinguished)

The respondent argued that compliance was impossible due to the unavailability of a qualifying policy. The Court distinguished:

• Protect East Meath Limited v Meath County Council [2026] IESC 1
• Aranbel Limited v Darcy and Others [2010] IEHC 272
• Adoption Authority of Ireland v AB [2021] IEHC 829

These did not assist because (i) a compliant policy existed (Zurich), (ii) at least one other insurer was available, and (iii) the respondent had obtained a live Zurich quotation.

3.3 Legal reasoning: why the Brussels Bar policy failed (cover and regulatory compliance)

(a) Cover: territorial scope (Article 9)

The Court preferred the LSRA’s interpretation of Article 9: although consequences of acts may occur “anywhere in the world”, the key condition was that the activity causing the damage must be carried out from a law office/legal practice based in Belgium.

A decisive practical point was evidential: despite repeated requests, neither the Brussels Bar nor the broker/insurers gave the respondent explicit confirmation that the policy covered Irish barrister practice conducted in Ireland under the Irish professional title.

(b) Regulation 12(1): insurer “licensed and authorised to transact business in the State”

The Brussels Bar policy was co-insured: 80% by MSIG (authorised to provide services in Ireland) and 20% by KBC. The Court accepted that KBC’s name did not appear on the relevant Central Bank of Ireland registers and there was no evidence it had exercised passporting rights into Ireland. As co-insurance was not joint and several (Article 24), the KBC deficit mattered: the policy failed Regulation 12(1).

(c) Regulation 14: claims-made, retroactivity, innocent non-disclosure, and run-off

The Court held (or was at least satisfied) that the Brussels Bar policy did not comply with key parts of Regulation 14:

• Regulation 14(d) run-off: broker correspondence confirmed no offer of “annually renewable run-off cover at a fixed premium” on required terms.
• Regulation 14(c) innocent/unintentional non-disclosure: the Court accepted that Belgian statutory rules referenced by the parties could allow reduction/termination in scenarios inconsistent with the Irish regulatory requirement.
• Regulation 14(b) full retroactivity: the Court accepted the LSRA’s concern that retroactivity provisions were qualified and did not clearly meet the Irish requirement.

(d) The Zurich policy

The Court found the respondent’s “Zurich is non-compliant” argument untenable, given:

• the LSRA’s approval and assessment of the Zurich scheme;
• the policy structure (“any one claim plus costs and expenses”) satisfying minimum indemnity per claim; and
• policy provisions addressing innocent misrepresentation and run-off arrangements (supported by broker materials).

3.4 Impact

• Regulatory enforcement: This decision operationalises s. 35 as a rapid consumer-protection tool, clarifying that the High Court can grant final restraining orders on affidavit evidence where appropriate.
• Cross-border practice reality-check: Irish barristers cannot avoid Irish PII rules for Irish practice by pointing to registration or insurance arrangements linked to another Member State, particularly where (i) cover is territorially limited and/or (ii) insurers have not passported into Ireland as required by Irish regulations.
• Insurance market compliance: The judgment highlights practical due diligence requirements: policy wordings, insurer regulatory status (including co-insurers), and mandatory run-off/claims-made protections under the 2024 Regulations.
• EU law framing: The Court’s “home Member State/host Member State” analysis serves as a warning against misapplying the Lawyers’ Establishment and Services frameworks to a practitioner practising under a home title in the home state.

4. Complex concepts simplified

• Section 35 (2015 Act): a civil court order (like an injunction) stopping a legal practitioner from breaching the Act/regulations, even if the breach could also be a criminal offence.
• “Practising barrister” / “qualified barrister”: statutory categories; if you hold the Irish barrister qualification and provide or hold out as providing legal services as a barrister, you must comply with the regulatory conditions (including PII).
• Claims-made policy: insurance responds to claims first made/notified during the policy period, regardless of when the work was done (subject to standard exclusions for pre-notified matters).
• Run-off cover: insurance that continues after a practitioner stops practising, covering later-arising claims about earlier work (the Irish rules require six years and certain terms).
• EU “establishment” vs “services” for lawyers: establishment is permanent practice in another Member State under the home professional title; services are temporary cross-border activity. Neither concept converts home-state practice into an EU cross-border scenario simply because the practitioner also registers abroad.
• Solvency II “passporting”: an insurer authorised in one EU state may operate in another, but it must take formal steps (notifications/registrations). A customer cannot assume passporting exists without evidence the insurer has activated it for the host state.

5. Conclusion

The Legal Services Regulatory Authority v Sallabi (Approved) [2026] IEHC 427 establishes the first full High Court treatment of s. 35 as an effective statutory injunction for LSRA enforcement. The Court confirmed that Irish barristers providing legal services in Ireland must have PII compliant with the 2024 Regulations; that foreign Bar insurance arrangements do not suffice where cover and regulatory criteria are not met; and that EU free-movement arguments cannot be used to sidestep core consumer-protection rules governing legal practice in the home state.