Date: Nov 13, 2025

R v PBN & Ors: Court of Appeal Guidance on Warned Lists and Judicial Responsibility for Listing

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the listing-related component of the judgment in R v PBN & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1442, an anonymised decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) handed down on 12 November 2025.

The part of the judgment provided (paragraphs 45–53) deals not with the substantive offence but with the systemic failures in listing that led to an extraordinary delay—approaching six years—from the incident to the first effective trial listing. The Court uses this case as a vehicle to issue detailed and practically important guidance on:

the judicial nature of listing and where responsibility lies when listing goes wrong;
the dangers of two-week warned lists, especially in the current climate of shortages of criminal advocates;
the need for fixed trial dates after a case has already failed to get on in a warned list;
how to prioritise cases that have already been significantly delayed beyond dates envisaged at the Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing (PTPH); and
the importance of transparency and open justice in exposing these systemic problems, even where reporting restrictions otherwise apply.

The Court explicitly varies a section 71 reporting restriction to permit publication of this part of the judgment alone, underscoring that the public has a legitimate interest in understanding how listing practices and the criminal court backlog can undermine the delivery of justice.

Although the excerpt does not set out the ultimate disposition of the criminal charges, it clearly establishes an important suite of appellate guidance on listing practice that Resident and Presiding Judges are expected to take seriously in future.

2. Summary of the Judgment (Listing Aspects)

The Court’s central conclusions in the excerpted part of the judgment can be summarised as follows:

Responsibility for the failure lay primarily with the listing system, not the CPS.
Although there was some justified criticism of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) – particularly the late notification that one witness was on holiday – the Court held that this was “of no consequence” to the ultimate failure of the trial, because another key witness had been properly warned, subject to a witness summons, and initially indicated her intention to attend before changing her mind. The core problem, in the Court’s view, was protracted delay and multiple failed attempts to list the case, caused by the backlog and local listing practices rather than prosecution fault (para 45).
Listing is a judicial function and the judiciary must own its failures.
Drawing on section 7(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Court emphasises that listing is a judicial responsibility, exercised by the Lady Chief Justice through delegated listing judges. It is therefore not appropriate to blame the CPS for consequences that flow from the listing system chosen and managed by the judiciary (para 47).
The two-week warned list in this case did not work and illustrates systemic risk.
The case appeared in two-week warned lists several times without ever being effectively listed for trial. The first actual trial listing only occurred in August 2025, almost six years after the incident (para 48). This, the Court holds, demonstrates the limitations of two-week warned lists in current conditions.
Two-week warned lists are, in modern practice, often unrealistic and harmful.
The Court endorses previous cautionary guidance (especially from the case of Ng and the Senior Presiding Judge’s 2023 Listing Advice), and concludes that two-week warned lists can be unsustainable where there is a shortage of criminal advocates and where witnesses and counsel must be “on call” for a fortnight with no guarantee their case will be heard (paras 49–53).
Concrete guidance (“PBN guidance”) for Resident and Presiding Judges.
At para 53, the Court sets out six key suggestions:
- (i) A two-week warned list is often unrealistic, especially if used repeatedly in the same case; it imposes excessive demands on witnesses and counsel and risks witness attrition.
- (ii) A one-week warned list, compiled so that all cases in it are realistically expected to start in that week, is preferable. Cases with no realistic prospect of being heard should not be included.
- (iii) Where dates are not fixed at PTPH, the court should operate a system of fixing dates at least two weeks before the trial window identified at PTPH, following a review of which cases genuinely require trial.
- (iv) If a case appears in a warned list and is not reached, it should thereafter be given a fixed date, even if some way into the future.
- (v) Fixed dates for bail cases necessarily involve assumptions about future custody time limit work; some movement may still be required, but this should be managed through effective communication with the parties.
- (vi) The content of warned lists must be carefully controlled and reserved for appropriate cases; those involving seriously traumatised victims should normally be given fixed dates instead.
Although phrased as “suggestions”, coming from the Court of Appeal they carry strong normative force and are likely to shape listing practices across the Crown Court.
Recognition of resource constraints but insistence on systemic reflection.
The Court acknowledges the “heroic efforts” of Resident and Presiding Judges and listing staff grappling with an “intractable” backlog and shortages of advocates and courtrooms (para 46). Nonetheless, this case is used as an “impulse” for those judges to review their listing systems and consider whether adjustments, particularly to warned lists, are required (para 45, 53).
Open justice: varying the reporting restriction to permit publication.
The Court deliberately orders that this part of the judgment be published by varying the section 71 reporting restriction, while scrupulously avoiding any reference that might identify the particular case to potential jurors. This balances fair trial rights with the public interest in transparency and systemic accountability (para 45).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Guidance Relied On

(a) Ng and the Senior Presiding Judge’s Listing Advice (9 January 2023)

At paragraph 52, the Court cites Ng (a previous Court of Appeal decision) and quotes guidance issued by the then Senior Presiding Judge on 9 January 2023. The quoted passage is central:

“I do recommend that courts consider carefully the value of the kind of warned list (particularly a two week warned list) which results in cases being listed across a lengthy period and are called in for trial, if at all, at very short notice. The shortage of criminal advocates means that this is likely to fail in many cases. Courts which continue to use warned lists must carefully monitor their effectiveness in getting all cases listed in the warned list on for trial during the warned period. As a general rule I would suggest that in modern conditions a warned list is likely to be most useful in smaller court centres. Whatever method is used for providing additional work to fill gaps, it is always necessary to consider with care what kind of cases can properly be listed ‘at risk’.”

Several points follow from this:

Continuity of guidance: The Court in PBN locates its comments firmly within an existing trajectory of appellate concern about warned lists and the strain on the criminal bar. This is not a new anxiety, but PBN turns it into more prescriptive, example-based guidance.
Shortage of advocates as a structural constraint: The quoted passage highlights that warned lists increasingly fail because advocacy resources are too thin to permit everyone to be effectively “on standby” for extended periods. PBN adds to this by emphasising witness attrition and the human cost.
Monitoring effectiveness: Ng and the 2023 Advice urge courts to empirically assess whether their warned lists actually result in cases being tried within the warned period. PBN picks this up and demonstrates, by example, the consequences when that monitoring fails or when an ineffective system is persisted with notwithstanding evidence of failure.

PBN therefore does not depart from Ng; rather, it operationalises and strengthens the warnings first articulated there, showing concretely what happens when a case is repeatedly placed in a two-week warned list in a context of backlogs and resource constraints.

(b) Section 7(2) Constitutional Reform Act 2005

Paragraph 47 cites section 7(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which places on the Lord Chief Justice (now styled Lady Chief Justice) the responsibility for:

“the maintenance of appropriate arrangements for the deployment of the judiciary of England and Wales and the allocation of work within courts.”

This is the statutory anchor for the proposition that listing is a judicial function. The Court explains that the Lady Chief Justice performs this responsibility largely by delegation to:

the Senior Presiding Judge;
Presiding Judges of the Circuits; and
Resident Judges at Crown Court centres.

The present constitution of the Court includes a former Senior Presiding Judge, a Presiding Judge and a Resident Judge (para 47), reinforcing the institutional authority of the panel to speak about listing.

The legal consequence is subtle but important:

It underlines that responsibility for listing policy and practice lies within the judiciary itself, insulated from executive or prosecutorial control, reflecting judicial independence.
It follows that, when listing failures cause injustice, the appropriate institutional response is judicial self-scrutiny and reform, not misdirected criticism of parties such as the CPS whose role in the listing decisions is limited.

By grounding its analysis explicitly in section 7(2), the Court transforms what might otherwise sound like administrative commentary into principled judicial guidance derived from statute.

(c) Criminal Practice Direction 5.6

At paragraph 53, the Court notes that Resident and Presiding Judges are currently responsible for listing under Criminal Practice Direction 5.6. While the text of that Direction is not set out in the judgment, the reference shows that the Court’s guidance is directed at, and intended to inform, the exercise of the powers and discretions already recognised in the Practice Direction.

The practical message is that PBN should be read alongside and integrated into local listing policies adopted under CPD 5.6. Future revisions of that Direction may well incorporate or reflect elements of this judgment.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning on Listing

(a) Reframing the blame: from CPS to listing system

Paragraph 45 addresses widespread criticism of the CPS, including from the trial judge. The Court accepts that the CPS seriously erred in failing to notify the court in good time that one key witness was on holiday. However:

That failure was held to be “of no consequence” in practical terms, because the other material witness – subject to a witness summons – had been properly warned, had initially agreed to attend, and later changed her mind.
The trial judge’s approach, namely that the case should be terminated unless both witnesses attended, is implicitly criticised; the Court notes that not all of his reasons for terminating were even related to their absence.

The Court therefore concludes that:

The CPS was not the real cause of the failure of the trial; and
The “real problem was the very long delay and the multiple failed attempts to list the case”, attributable to the backlog and the listing system adopted, not to the CPS (para 45).

This reallocation of responsibility has two legal implications:

It cautions trial judges against misdirected criticism of the CPS where the underlying issue is systemic listing failure. Unjustified criticism can found appeals, undermine professional relationships and obscure the structural causes of delay.
It ensures that where a remedy is sought (for example, a stay for abuse of process or a terminating ruling), courts assess who is institutionally responsible for the delay and whether that responsibility properly attracts a particular legal consequence.

(b) Acknowledging resource constraints without absolving systemic design

In paragraph 46, the Court strikes a careful balance:

It recognises that the Resident Judge, other judges and listing staff at the relevant Crown Court have worked under “great pressure” for a long time in managing a very large and increasing backlog.
It records that they have tried a number of different approaches but face fundamental structural constraints: too much work, too few courts, and shortages of key personnel, including advocates.

The Court describes the efforts of judges and staff as “heroic” and emphasises that its critical review of “the depressing history of this single case” must be read in that context. This is important for two reasons:

It avoids personalised blame or any suggestion of bad faith; the problem is framed as systemic rather than individual.
It underscores that judicial responsibility for listing does not equate to fault where the underlying cause is structural under-resourcing. The Court calls, implicitly, for both better listing design and improved resourcing.

(c) Explaining why listing is a judicial function and why that matters

Paragraph 47 is doctrinally central. The Court reminds readers that:

Listing is expressly “a judicial function” under section 7(2) CRA 2005.
The Lady Chief Justice discharges this function by delegating to senior and local judicial officers (Senior Presiding Judge, Presiding Judges, Resident Judges).

Why does this matter in the context of PBN?

It legitimises the Court’s intervention: the panel includes judicial leaders with direct experience of high-level listing responsibilities, and so is particularly well-placed to comment on systemic listing practices.
It clarifies that the failure “in this case” is institutional and judicial rather than prosecutorial, reinforcing the Court’s earlier reallocation of blame.

The Court expressly states that it wishes to explain why “it is the listing system rather than the CPS which has failed in this case” (para 47). In doing so, it anchors systemic criticism in a statutory framework of judicial responsibility.

(d) The mechanics and risks of warned lists

Paragraphs 48–50 provide a concise but important explanation of how warned lists operate and why they can go wrong in the present environment.

Key features of warned lists as described in the judgment:

When a case appears in a two-week warned list, the parties are told the case is liable to be called for trial at any point during that period (para 49).
The actual start date may not be set until the day before; witnesses and counsel must therefore preserve availability over the whole period.
Over-listing is deliberate: it is designed to ensure courts remain fully utilised. If a single trial collapses (because of pleas or adjournments) and nothing else is available, a court can stand empty for days (para 50).

However, warned lists are inherently based on estimates—about which cases will plead, which will go short, and how long trials will last. When those assumptions are wrong:

Cases can reach the end of the warned period without being listed at all (para 49).
Alternatively, they might be given dates that conflict with witness availability or when no suitable counsel is free.
The same case may then reappear in subsequent warned lists, with the same risks repeating, leading to .

The Court is realistic: some form of over-listing is “inescapable” to avoid empty courts (para 50). But PBN stresses that when warned lists are used, they must be:

appropriately sized,
realistic in terms of available judicial and advocacy resources, and
subject to careful monitoring and adjustment.

The case before the Court illustrates what happens when these disciplines are not applied: a short and simple case took nearly six years to reach a proper trial listing, during which time witness cooperation eroded.

(e) Prioritisation: when long-delayed cases must move up the queue

Paragraph 51 deals with one of the Resident Judge’s hardest tasks: setting priorities between competing cases. The Court recognises that:

Cases involving defendants on remand (custody time limits), very serious offences, or severely traumatised victims often legitimately require prioritisation.
Prioritising such cases inevitably means that other, less urgent cases are delayed to create courtroom capacity.

The Court then makes an important suggestion:

Where a case is not reached at or about the time fixed at PTPH and must be put back for a substantial period, it should thereafter attract a higher level of priority.

In practical terms, the Court suggests that this is usually best addressed by giving the case a fixed date at that point, even if it was previously listed “at risk” (para 51). The reasoning is that:

Once a case has already suffered a significant listing failure, fairness to the parties—both defendants and witnesses—requires that it not be left in the same uncertain queue.
A fixed date signals institutional recognition that the case’s delay now itself justifies priority.

(f) From Ng to PBN: sharpening the caution on warned lists

Having referred to Ng and the 2023 Listing Advice, the Court declares that this case “demonstrates that the cautionary note sounded there is well-founded” (para 53). It identifies the relevant Crown Court as a smaller centre (where, in theory, warned lists were thought to work better) but concludes that the two-week warned list system did not work well here.

The Court then crystallises six lessons (para 53(i)–(vi)), which amount to a practical code for future listing. These can be grouped into three themes:

Realistic time windows:
A two-week warned list, especially when repeatedly applied to the same case, is unrealistic. Requiring witnesses and counsel to be “on call” for a fortnight with no guarantee the case will be heard is likely, over time, to lead to witness disengagement. A one-week warned list, carefully planned so that all its cases are expected to start, is considered more viable (para 53(i)–(ii)).
Timely fixing of dates and escalation after failure:
Courts that do not fix dates at PTPH should adopt a mechanism—through a review hearing or effective communication—to fix dates at least two weeks before the PTPH window, once it is clearer which cases actually need trial (para 53(iii)). Crucially, if a case has already appeared in a warned list and not been reached, it should be given a fixed date (para 53(iv)). The Court even offers a counterfactual: had this happened in January 2022 for PBN, the case “would probably have been dealt with long ago”.
Careful control of which cases are listed “at risk”:
The Court accepts that bail cases of a certain seriousness may appropriately be listed “at risk” in warned lists—especially at first instance. But it insists that cases involving allegations of major trauma to victims should be listed with as much certainty as possible, typically by way of fixed dates (para 53(vi)). Warned lists should be reserved for cases suitable for that level of uncertainty.

Although expressed as “suggestions”, the language and context strongly indicate that the Court expects Resident and Presiding Judges to review and, where appropriate, revise their listing practices in light of this guidance. In future appeals dealing with excessive delay or repeated warned-list failures, these paragraphs are likely to be cited as authoritative benchmarks against which local practice is assessed.

(g) Human cost and respect for the justice system

One striking feature of PBN is the Court’s emphasis on the “human cost” of poor listing (para 53(i)). It highlights:

Witnesses who become “weary of the demands the listing of the case has made on [them]”, potentially to the point of requiring arrest under a witness summons.
The effect on defendants, victims and witnesses of repeatedly disrupted expectations and prolonged uncertainty.

The Court explicitly notes that this damages “the respect that people have for the way the justice system operates”. This resonates with broader jurisprudence on:

the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Article 6 ECHR); and
public confidence as an ingredient of the rule of law and the legitimacy of criminal justice.

By foregrounding these issues, PBN positions listing not as a mere administrative detail but as a core determinant of justice and public trust.

(h) Transparency and the variation of the section 71 reporting restriction

At paragraph 45, the Court explains that this part of the judgment is placed separately so that it can be published now, through an order varying the section 71 reporting restriction “to this extent”. It emphasises that it will not say anything that might identify the case to potential jurors.

This is significant for at least three reasons:

It reflects a careful balancing of fair trial rights (avoiding pre-trial publicity about the particular case) with open justice and the public’s right to scrutinise systemic issues in criminal justice.
It demonstrates that appellate courts may deliberately use partial or anonymised publication to address system-wide concerns in real time, rather than waiting until ongoing proceedings are fully concluded.
It underlines a strong judicial commitment to transparency in the face of serious backlog and listing problems: “There is also an important public interest in these events and they should not be clouded in secrecy. Transparency is important in the criminal justice system.”

Future courts or parties challenging reporting restrictions—especially where they seek to draw attention to systemic issues rather than case-specific details—are likely to rely on this reasoning as persuasive authority.

3.3 Likely Impact on Future Practice and Law

(a) Practical impact on listing policies

The immediate audience for PBN is Presiding Judges and Resident Judges across England and Wales, especially in smaller Crown Court centres that rely heavily on warned lists. In practice, the judgment is likely to drive:

Reassessment of two-week warned lists: Courts will be under strong pressure to justify continuing use of two-week warned lists, and many may move to one-week lists or more fixed-date scheduling, particularly where advocate shortages are acute.
Implementation of the “fail-once then fix” principle: The idea that a case which has already been through a warned list without being reached should thereafter receive a fixed date is a concrete, easy-to-apply rule of thumb. It is likely to become embedded in local listing protocols.
Greater differentiation of cases: Courts may increasingly distinguish between:
- cases suitable to be listed “at risk” (e.g. lower seriousness, all on bail); and
- cases requiring fixed dates (e.g. serious trauma alleged, vulnerable witnesses).

Over time, if this guidance is followed, one can expect:

fewer cases experiencing multiple, fruitless appearances in warned lists; and
more predictable trial dates for witnesses and advocates, reducing attrition and last-minute crises.

(b) Influence on appeals concerning delay and terminating rulings

The judgment’s implicit message is that systemic listing failures cannot simply justify terminating proceedings without careful analysis of responsibility and alternatives. In future:

Appeals against stays for abuse of process or other terminating rulings grounded primarily on listing delays and witness problems may invoke PBN to:
- distinguish between CPS fault and judicial listing fault; and
- argue that the proper remedy is better listing (e.g., fixed dates) rather than termination.
Defence appeals may also rely on PBN where repeated listing failures have caused actual unfairness (e.g., lost evidence, faded memories), arguing that a court’s failure to follow the PBN guidance on warned lists and fixed dates is a relevant factor in determining whether a stay is appropriate.

While PBN does not itself create a rigid legal rule, it supplies structured criteria by which the reasonableness of listing decisions and the proportionality of remedies can be assessed.

(c) Relationship to Article 6 ECHR (reasonably prompt trial)

Although the judgment excerpt does not expressly cite Article 6, the underlying themes align with its requirements:

The near six-year gap between incident and first effective trial listing sits uneasily with the requirement that criminal charges be determined within a “reasonable time”.
Systematic reliance on unrealistic warned lists, leading to repeated postponements, is precisely the sort of structural defect that can underpin an Article 6 complaint.

PBN can therefore be seen as part of a broader judicial effort to avert systemic breaches of Article 6 by tightening up listing practices from within the domestic procedural framework.

(d) Reinforcing open justice and systemic accountability

By varying the section 71 reporting restriction to publish anonymised commentary on listing, the Court sets a precedent in favour of selective transparency where:

the subject-matter is of significant public interest (here, the criminal backlog); and
publication can be arranged without prejudicing future jurors or undermining a fair trial.

In future, parties seeking publication of judgments or extracts that highlight systemic failings—whether in listing, disclosure, or case management—may rely on PBN as support for:

varying reporting restrictions to permit anonymised or thematic publication; and
framing such publication as a contribution to public debate and democratic accountability rather than as case-specific comment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

To make the judgment more accessible, this section briefly explains key procedural terms and concepts used in the excerpt.

4.1 Listing

Listing is the process by which courts decide:

which cases will be heard;
in which courtroom;
on what date; and
before which judge.

It is a core judicial function. Good listing balances:

efficient use of scarce court time and resources;
the rights of defendants, victims and witnesses to timely and fair hearings; and
the availability of judges, advocates and courtrooms.

4.2 Warned lists

A warned list is a list of cases told that their trial may be called on at any time within a specified period (often one or two weeks). Parties must be ready to start within that window, but:

they may not know the actual start date until very shortly before; and
some cases in the warned list may not start at all if time and resources run out.

Warned lists are a form of over-listing intended to ensure courts never sit idle if other trials collapse. However, they can create serious problems if:

too many cases are listed relative to capacity;
witnesses and advocates cannot realistically be “on call” for the entire period; or
cases are repeatedly placed in warned lists without ever being reached.

4.3 “Floating trials” and “at risk” listings

A floating trial is one that is not allocated a specific courtroom or judge in advance but is expected to be taken by any suitable court that becomes free. Similarly, a case listed “at risk” is one that may not be reached in the scheduled period because higher-priority work might intercede.

These devices are used to maximise efficiency but, as PBN shows, must be used with care to avoid unfairness and excessive uncertainty.

4.4 Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing (PTPH)

The PTPH is the first substantial hearing in most Crown Court cases. At this hearing, the court:

takes a plea from the defendant (guilty or not guilty);
sets timetables for case preparation (disclosure, witness availability, etc.); and
identifies a likely trial window or provisional date if a not guilty plea is entered.

The Court in PBN suggests that where a case is not reached around the time envisaged at PTPH and must be substantially delayed, it should then be given priority, typically by way of a fixed date (para 51).

4.5 Custody time limits

Custody time limits are statutory maximum periods for which a defendant can be held in custody awaiting trial. If a trial does not start within the relevant time limit (and no extension is granted), the defendant must usually be released on bail.

Cases involving defendants in custody are therefore often given priority in listing, which in turn can delay cases where all defendants are on bail, as in PBN (para 51, 53(v)).

4.6 Resident Judges and Presiding Judges

A Resident Judge is the senior circuit judge responsible for the day-to-day running of a Crown Court centre, including local listing decisions.
A Presiding Judge is a senior judge responsible for overseeing a larger geographical area (a Circuit), providing leadership and support to Resident Judges, and implementing national policy.

Both are key actors in operationalising the listing guidance given in PBN.

4.7 Section 71 reporting restriction

The judgment refers to a “section 71 reporting restriction”. While the excerpt does not specify the statute, such an order typically prohibits media reporting of certain aspects of a case—often to protect the fairness of a future trial or to protect identities of vulnerable parties.

In PBN, the Court:

varies the restriction to allow publication of its comments on listing;
ensures that nothing is published that might identify the case to potential jurors; and
justifies this on the basis of the public interest in transparency about systemic issues.

5. Conclusion

The listing-focused portion of R v PBN & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1442 delivers a significant and timely set of judicial guidelines on criminal listing practice in England and Wales.

From the material provided, the judgment establishes the following key points:

Listing is a judicial responsibility.
Under section 7(2) CRA 2005, the judiciary—led by the Lady Chief Justice— owns the listing function. When listing goes wrong, especially in a way that causes extreme delay and undermines trials, that responsibility cannot be shifted onto the CPS or other parties.
Two-week warned lists are, in current conditions, often unworkable and damaging.
Particularly where there is a shortage of criminal advocates, expecting witnesses and counsel to be “on call” for a fortnight, sometimes repeatedly, is unrealistic and likely to lead to witness attrition and loss of faith in the justice system.
Cases that fail to be reached in warned lists should move to fixed dates.
The Court’s practical “fail-once then fix” principle—that if a case appears in a warned list and is not reached, it should thereafter be given a fixed date— is a concrete, widely applicable rule of thumb likely to shape future listing policies.
Long-delayed cases must be prioritised.
When a case has not been reached at around the time anticipated at PTPH and must be put back for a substantial period, fairness demands that it move up the priority list, generally by way of a fixed trial date.
Warned lists should be carefully curated.
Only cases suitable to be listed “at risk” should go into warned lists. Cases involving allegations of major trauma or particularly vulnerable victims should normally receive fixed dates and a higher degree of certainty.
Transparency about systemic failings is itself a public good.
By varying a reporting restriction to publish its comments on listing, the Court affirms that the public has a legitimate interest in understanding structural problems—like the criminal backlog—and how they can erode effective justice.

Taken together, these elements amount to what might be termed the PBN guidance on warned lists and fixed dates. While not legislation, it is authoritative guidance from the Court of Appeal on how listing should be approached in the contemporary, resource-strained criminal justice system. Resident and Presiding Judges will be expected to consider and, where appropriate, implement this guidance in their local listing practices.

In the broader legal landscape, PBN contributes to:

the development of fair and efficient criminal procedure;
the protection of Article 6 rights through better case management; and
the reinforcement of public confidence in a criminal justice system that acknowledges its own systemic shortcomings and seeks to address them openly.

Even as it recognises the heroic efforts of judges and court staff facing intractable backlogs, PBN is a clear call for more realistic, humane and transparent listing practices, with warned lists approached cautiously and fixed dates used more strategically to prevent the sort of prolonged and damaging delay seen in this case.