Late Criminal Appeals and Modified Good Character Directions Where Bad Character Evidence of Sexual Misconduct Is Admitted

Case: Adams, R. v
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Neutral citation: [2026] EWCA Crim 1047
Date: 21 July 2026
Constitution: Lady Justice Andrews, Sir Robin Spencer, Her Honour Judge Karu

1. Introduction

The Court of Appeal determined (i) a renewed, substantially out-of-time application for leave to appeal conviction arising from a 2022 trial for sexual offences against two complainants (C5 and C6), and (ii) an appeal against a further seven-year sentence imposed in 2026 following conviction for sexual offences against four additional complainants (C1–C4). The appellant had been sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in 2022 and, after the 2026 convictions, received a further total sentence of seven years.

The overarching factual theme advanced by the prosecution across the proceedings was that, over decades, the appellant groomed and sexually exploited teenage boys for whom he occupied a position of trust (teacher/mentor in drama and music contexts).

Key issues

• Extension of time: whether an extension of 1,040 days should be granted to enable an appeal against conviction.
• Trial fairness / directions: whether admission of “bad character” evidence (C7; and agreed evidence from C8) undermined the appellant’s entitlement to a full good character direction, and whether the delay direction was inadequate.
• Sentence: whether the 2026 further total sentence of seven years was manifestly excessive, including categorisation under modern guideline equivalents and the treatment of totality where offences could have been sentenced together.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Leave to appeal conviction (out of time): refused. The Court held there was no substance in the proposed grounds; the convictions were safe; and, in any event, the magnitude of delay lacked a compelling explanation and did not satisfy the “interests of justice” threshold.
• Appeal against sentence: dismissed. The Court upheld the judge’s categorisation, consecutive structure across multiple victims/occasions, and a seven-year further term as not manifestly excessive.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents cited

R v Hunter (Nigel) [2015] EWCA Crim 631

Hunter supplied the controlling framework for directions where a defendant has no prior convictions/cautions but the Crown adduced other misconduct as bad character evidence. The Court in [2026] EWCA Crim 1047 relied on Hunter (quoting at [83]) to underscore:

• Once other misconduct evidence is admitted and relied on, a bad character direction is required.
• A modified good character direction may be woven in as a matter of fairness, but not invariably.
• There will be occasions where giving a good character direction would offend Lord Steyn’s “absurdity principle” (i.e., it would be illogical to invite the jury to treat the defendant as of good character while simultaneously being asked to accept serious proven/accepted misconduct).
• Trial judges have a broad discretion as to how to craft (or withhold) such directions, and appellate courts should show proper regard to that discretionary evaluative judgment.

Applying Hunter, the Court held that once C7’s evidence was properly admitted (and C8’s evidence was in any event before the jury), the appellant’s “only shield” of good character could not remain “full and unmodified”. The trial judge’s integrated approach—modifying the good character direction while carefully instructing that the jury could only rely on bad character matters if sure they were true—was endorsed as fair and “neater” than separating directions in a way that risked confusion.

3.2 Legal reasoning

(A) Extension of time: “real prospect of success” plus “interests of justice”

The Court emphasised that extreme delay in seeking leave to appeal conviction engages a demanding two-stage inquiry: not only must the proposed grounds have a real prospect of success, but it must also be in the overarching interests of justice to permit the appeal out of time. In assessing the latter, the Court flagged factors including:

• absence of a good reason why the grounds could not have been raised within time;
• the sheer length of delay;
• practicalities and fairness of any retrial after long passage of time;
• potential impact of retrial on multiple sexual complainants.

The explanation advanced (difficulty obtaining transcripts affecting instructions) was treated as weak, particularly where an in-time sentence appeal had been lodged and trial counsel had given negative advice on conviction.

(B) Bad character admission and the modified good character direction

The central attack on trial fairness was recast by counsel as a complaint that admission of C7 (a prior complaint investigated but not charged) so eroded good character that the jury did not receive the benefit of the appellant’s unblemished record.

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three steps:

• Admissibility: C7’s evidence was plainly admissible under section 101(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as relevant to an important matter in issue—propensity to engage in similar sexual behaviour with teenage boys in a trust/mentor context—and as bearing on credibility. No sustainable legal challenge was articulated to the ruling itself.
• Exclusionary discretion and fairness: the trial judge had considered “satellite litigation”, prejudice, and passage of time and concluded a fair trial remained possible; the Court found no basis to disturb that evaluative judgment.
• Directions once admitted: relying on R v Hunter (Nigel) [2015] EWCA Crim 631, the Court held modification was inevitable. Further, the judge’s approach—treating C7’s allegations “as if” counts on the indictment for evaluative purposes and warning that bad character could only be used if the jury were sure—met the fairness requirement.

(C) The “cynical ploy” argument rejected

The appellant criticised the prosecution for not charging C7 and instead adducing his account as bad character. The Court rejected the allegation of improper motive as inappropriate. It also treated the point as immaterial: whether introduced as a charge (with cross-admissibility) or as bad character, the practical consequence for the jury’s assessment—and the necessary modification to good character—would not have improved in the way suggested.

(D) Delay direction to the jury

The Court upheld the trial judge’s succinct direction warning that passage of time may disadvantage a defendant by loss of memory, documents, or witnesses. The appellant did not identify concrete prejudice of the kind that would require a more tailored warning (e.g., a lost alibi). The Court also attached weight to the fact that directions had been agreed with trial counsel, and that the appellant had been able to provide relatively detailed accounts in defence statements.

(E) Sentence: categorisation, harm/culpability, and totality across separate proceedings

On the 2026 sentence appeal, the Court endorsed a structured approach:

• Categorisation: the only challenge was to count 1 (C1). The Court clarified that within the modern guideline equivalent, “category 2 harm” turned on the nature of the sexual touching/exposure, not on downstream psychological impact. Even if vulnerability was debated, other culpability features (planning, abuse of trust, age disparity) independently justified the category and the uplift.
• Totality “as if together”: the sentencing judge correctly asked what the global sentence would have been had all matters been sentenced together (stating 17 years as a just and proportionate total), then applied totality to arrive at an overall 14-year position, imposing a further seven years for the later case to reflect what remained just and proportionate.
• Consecutive terms: consecutive sentences were justified to reflect different victims, different occasions, and the long temporal span of offending.
• Delay in listing the second trial: the Court rejected the contention that the appellant was penalised for electing trial. The “as if together” totality analysis substantially neutralised the complaint that timing caused unfair additional punishment.

3.3 Impact

• Reinforced high threshold for very late conviction appeals: the decision illustrates that, where delay is extreme, the Court will scrutinise not only merits but the systemic and personal consequences of reopening historic sexual trials, including the realism of retrial and the impact on complainants.
• Practical confirmation of Hunter in sexual cases: where bad character evidence of sexual misconduct is admitted (even without prior convictions), the defendant’s good character “shield” may be significantly diluted; appellate courts will be slow to interfere with a trial judge’s decision to give a modified direction rather than a full one.
• Sentencing across sequential prosecutions: the endorsement of an “as if sentenced together” framing demonstrates an orthodox, transparent way to apply totality when further historic complainants emerge after publicity from an earlier trial.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Bad character” evidence (CJA 2003, s.101(1)(d)): evidence of misconduct not charged in the current indictment may be admitted if it is important to an issue such as whether the defendant has a relevant propensity. It is not admitted simply to show the defendant is a “bad person”.
• Good character direction: where a defendant has no previous convictions, juries are commonly directed that good character may support credibility and reduce likelihood of offending. If other misconduct is before the jury, the direction may be reduced or withheld.
• Lord Steyn’s “absurdity principle”: a shorthand for the idea that it may be illogical to give a “full” good character direction if the jury is being asked to accept serious misconduct evidence; in some cases it would be “absurd” to describe the defendant as of good character.
• “Satellite litigation”: a side-trial within the trial—extensive dispute about collateral issues (e.g., whether C7’s allegation amounts to an offence), risking distraction and unfairness.
• Totality: sentencing principle requiring the overall sentence to be just and proportionate to all offending; often applied by considering a notional single sentencing exercise, then adjusting concurrency/consecutivity accordingly.

5. Conclusion

[2026] EWCA Crim 1047 is a firm application of two orthodox but practically significant principles. First, very late applications for leave to appeal conviction require more than arguable grounds: the Court must be satisfied it is in the interests of justice to reopen matters, particularly in historic sexual cases with multiple complainants. Second, where sexual misconduct bad character evidence is admitted, a defendant’s good character direction will almost inevitably be modified in line with R v Hunter (Nigel) [2015] EWCA Crim 631, and appellate courts will generally uphold a trial judge’s discretionary calibration of fairness. On sentence, the case endorses a transparent totality methodology for sequential prosecutions arising from later-emerging historic complainants and confirms that properly structured consecutive sentences across victims and decades will not be disturbed absent manifest excess.