Juror Internet Research: Fresh Evidence May Be Received Yet Convictions Remain Safe Absent Demonstrable Prejudice

1. Introduction

Hicks & Ors v R [2026] EWCA Crim 706 is a judgment of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) concerning five appellants convicted (by an 11–1 majority) of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance contrary to s.1(1) Criminal Law Act 1977, arising from an attempted protest action connected with Heathrow Airport.

The appeal raised multiple complaints about fairness, but the central issue (Ground 1) concerned alleged juror misconduct: a juror (“Juror 5”) was said to have conducted internet research and shared it during deliberations. The appellants sought to rely on fresh evidence from another juror (“Juror 4”) and police enquiries.

The court also made a postponement of reporting order under s.4(2) Contempt of Court Act 1981 covering substantial parts of its reasoning (paragraphs [32]–[89] and an annexed table), due to an anticipated CPS charging decision relating to Juror 5.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6: leave to appeal refused; the court held the complaints were not properly arguable and that the trial judge’s handling and directions were “impeccable”.
  • Ground 1 (Juror 5 internet research): the court received the fresh evidence and granted leave, because it “may” afford a ground of appeal; but after undertaking the (redacted) evaluative exercise, it held the evidence did not afford a ground for allowing the appeal and dismissed Ground 1.
  • Outcome: all applications/appeals were dismissed; convictions stood.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

No previous cases are cited in the published (non-redacted) portion of the judgment. Any reliance on authority in relation to juror misconduct, admissibility of juror evidence, or the “safety” test cannot be assessed from the material presently available.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6: case management, police incidents, speeches, and “agreed facts”

The court treated the non-juror grounds as incapable of undermining safety:

  • Ground 2 (short notice of trial listing; Article 6 ECHR): the court upheld the Resident Judge’s case management decision to start the trial one week later than originally planned. Financial loss and disruption were “regrettable” but not shown to have made the eventual convictions unsafe, particularly where the trial judge managed the trial to ensure the self-represented defendants could present their cases.
  • Ground 3 (police conduct; arrests): one arrest occurred away from the jury’s knowledge and was irrelevant. A separate arrest at court (of a supporter) was criticised by the trial judge as unnecessary, but she investigated potential juror impact, decided it was not prejudicial, and directed the jury that the incident was unconnected with the appellants. The Court of Appeal held this was within the range of reasonable responses and, in any event, occurred weeks before verdict.
  • Ground 5 (media coverage; alleged misleading prosecution speech; judicial direction about counsel’s honesty): the court treated the trial judge’s direction as properly distinguishing comments in closing from evidence: the jury could accept or reject counsel’s submissions, but should not evaluate them through accusations of professional dishonesty. Importantly, the direction did not require the jury to accept the prosecution’s characterisation of publicity; it only addressed the impropriety of treating advocacy as dishonest where counsel is professionally bound.
  • Ground 6 (climate emergency; “opinion” vs “fact”): the court held the trial judge did not direct the jury to ignore agreed facts. Rather, she correctly directed that jurors’ own views on climate change were not for decision and were irrelevant to guilt. The agreed facts were treated as having limited relevance to assessing the sincerity/credibility of the defendants’ asserted beliefs, not as matters the jury was required to resolve.

(b) Ground 1: juror internet research, fresh evidence, and the safety of convictions

Although the reasoning is largely redacted, the published outcome is significant in three respects:

  1. Fresh evidence gateway: the court accepted that evidence of alleged juror research may “afford a ground for allowing an appeal” and therefore received it and granted leave.
  2. Evaluative exercise on “safety”: the court stated it conducted the relevant assessment (described in the redacted section), and ultimately concluded the fresh evidence did not justify allowing the appeal.
  3. Open justice balanced against fair trial in related proceedings: the s.4(2) order demonstrates a concrete mechanism by which appellate courts may temporarily restrict reporting of juror-misconduct material to avoid prejudicing anticipated proceedings against a juror, while still publishing an immediate, usable version of the decision and setting a clear timetable for any extension applications.

Note: paragraph [90] refers to “section 23 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1968”, whereas the application earlier is described as under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. On the face of the judgment, this appears to be a slip; the statutory provision for reception of fresh evidence on appeal is in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

3.3 Impact

  • Juror misconduct allegations: the decision illustrates that even serious allegations (internet research, sharing material in deliberations) do not automatically render a conviction unsafe; the Court of Appeal may admit fresh evidence and still uphold the verdict after a structured safety assessment.
  • Trial fairness complaints in protest cases: the court reaffirms a robust approach to separating political motivation and broader “cause” narratives from the legal elements of the offence, while still permitting agreed background material to be used for limited credibility purposes.
  • Courtroom incidents involving police: the judgment supports the view that prompt judicial enquiry and clear directions can cure potential prejudice short of discharging a jury, especially where temporal distance reduces any residual effect.
  • Advocacy and judicial correction: it underscores the judicial role in preventing self-represented parties from reframing forensic dispute as professional dishonesty, while preserving the jury’s freedom to reject counsel’s submissions as unpersuasive.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Conspiracy to cause a public nuisance
An agreement between two or more people to pursue a course of conduct which will involve causing a public nuisance. The appeal judgment emphasises that the jury’s task is to decide the elements of the offence, not the moral or political merits of the underlying protest.
Fresh evidence on appeal (s.23 Criminal Appeal Act 1968)
Evidence not used at trial that the appellate court may consider if it could matter to the safety of the conviction. Here, the court admitted the material concerning Juror 5 because it may provide a ground of appeal, but concluded it ultimately did not.
“Unsafe” conviction
The Court of Appeal does not simply ask whether something went wrong; it asks whether the conviction can safely stand in light of the whole case. The court’s dismissal of Ground 1 (despite admitting fresh evidence) reflects this distinction.
s.4(2) Contempt of Court Act 1981 postponement of reporting
A temporary restriction on reporting parts of proceedings, used to prevent a substantial risk of prejudice to other legal proceedings (here, potential criminal proceedings against Juror 5).
Closing speeches vs evidence
What lawyers (or defendants) say in speeches is not itself evidence; it is argument about what the evidence shows. The jury may accept or reject it.

5. Conclusion

[2026] EWCA Crim 706 leaves the convictions intact and is notable for its handling of alleged juror internet research: the court treated the allegation as sufficiently serious to justify admitting fresh evidence and granting leave, yet still dismissed the appeal after concluding—on the redacted reasoning—that the convictions remained safe. In the published parts, the court also delivers a clear message that (i) disruptive listing changes, (ii) ill-judged police conduct around the trial, (iii) disputes about advocacy characterisations, and (iv) broader controversy about climate change, will not render convictions unsafe where the trial judge’s directions and management keep the jury focused on the legal issues they must decide.