Judicial Review of University Fitness-to-Practise Decisions: “Regulatory Nexus” Amenability and Finality After De Novo Internal Appeals

Case: Orimolusi v The Provost, Fellows and Scholars Of The University Of Dublin and Ors (Approved)
Citation: [2026] IEHC 385 (High Court, O’Donnell J., 17 June 2026)
Procedure: Judicial review challenging University decisions culminating in a decision of the Visitors upholding withdrawal from an M. Pharm programme.

1) Introduction

This judicial review arose from Trinity College Dublin’s (“the University”) fitness-to-practise (“FTP”) process concerning a postgraduate pharmacy student (“the applicant”) enrolled on an integrated M. Pharm programme. Completion of the programme (and passing the Professional Registration Examination (“PRE”)) is a gateway to registration as a pharmacist with the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (“PSI”). The PSI did not participate in the proceedings; the litigation focused on the University’s decisions.

A central feature of the regulatory landscape was the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (Education and Training) (Integrated Course) Rules 2014 (S.I. 377/2014), including:

  • an eight-year completion requirement (extendable by one year only in exceptional circumstances), and
  • a requirement that no M. Pharm be awarded unless the head of the school confirms overall satisfaction that the student is fit to be a registered pharmacist (reg. 20).

Following repeated concerns (including multiple plagiarism findings and other conduct-related issues), the applicant was referred to the School FTP Committee. The School FTP recommended withdrawal; this was approved by the Dean of Graduate Studies. The applicant appealed to the College FTP Committee (a de novo rehearing), which upheld the withdrawal (majority, with one dissent). A final internal appeal to the University Visitors was dismissed. The applicant then sought judicial review, advancing extensive grounds attacking multiple stages of the process.

The High Court’s decision is notable for two tightly connected public law questions:

  • Amenability: when (if at all) are internal university FTP decisions reviewable in judicial review?
  • Scope/finality: if an applicant uses de novo internal appeals (including an appeal to the Visitors), can they later judicially review earlier internal decisions, or is review confined to the final decision?

2) Summary of the Judgment

The High Court:

  • Held (with hesitation) that, on the particular facts, the University’s FTP decisions were amenable to judicial review because the FTP process had a sufficiently “public” character through its connection to statutory professional regulation (“regulatory nexus”), especially reg. 20 of the 2014 Rules requiring a fitness-to-practise confirmation before an M. Pharm can be awarded.
  • Held that judicial review could only target the decision of the Visitors; challenges to earlier internal decisions were not entertained (both because of time/finality considerations and because de novo internal appeals rendered earlier decisions moot).
  • Rejected the applicant’s challenge to the Visitors’ decision on legality grounds (including complaints about reasons, jurisdiction, plagiarism/discipline interaction, deference, mitigation, and access to Turnitin data).

The proceedings were therefore dismissed, with costs to be addressed subsequently.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Outcome)

The Court treated “amenability” as a fact-sensitive area lacking a single controlling test, and mapped the present case against prior authorities:

  • Flanagan v. UCD [1988] I.R. 724 and Rajah v. Royal College of Surgeons [1994] 1 I.R. 384:
    Frequently cited for the proposition that many disputes between a student and an educational institution may be private/contractual, limiting judicial review.
    Influence here: the respondents relied on this line (and later cases) to characterise the dispute as private.
  • Zhang v. Athlone Institute of Technology [2013] IEHC 390:
    Dunne J. treated amenability as “vexed” and drew on the distinction between powers that are “manifestly private” and those within a public domain, including the relevance of statutory underpinnings where disciplinary functions are exercised.
    Influence here: it supported the applicant’s attempt to locate a public/disciplinary element (plagiarism/disciplined conduct), though the High Court ultimately grounded amenability more narrowly in the professional-regulatory connection.
  • Fassi v. Dublin City University [2015] IEHC 38:
    Noonan J. articulated two key themes: (i) bodies founded on contract/consent are generally not reviewable unless there is a sufficiently public element; and (ii) academic judgment is generally non-reviewable, whereas disciplinary-type issues may engage fair procedures.
    Influence here: the Court treated it as an important modern synthesis and used it as a backdrop for both amenability and the limits of intervention.
  • Galbraith v. Dublin City University [2022] IEHC 520:
    Barrett J. rejected amenability even where the programme aligned with statutory Teaching Council standards, holding the relationship remained private.
    Influence here: this was a close comparator and pushed against amenability; the High Court nonetheless distinguished the present case due to the stronger statutory “fitness confirmation” link (reg. 20).
  • Quinn v. King's Inns [2004] 4 I.R. 344 (and the reasoning linked to Rajah v. Royal College of Surgeons [1994] 1 I.R. 384):
    Emphasised that even if an institution ultimately traces to a charter, the relevant inquiry includes the nature of the power exercised; purely examination/academic decisions may remain private.
    Influence here: it reinforced that “statutory background” alone is insufficient; the Court needed a more concrete public/regulatory function link.
  • O'Donnell v. Tipperary South Riding County Council [2005] 2 I.R. 483 and Beirne v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána (quoted via Zhang):
    The “manifestly private duty” formulation: judicial review is excluded only where the duty is manifestly private and derives solely from contract/consent.
    Influence here: the Court used this language to justify a narrow finding that the function was not “manifestly private” in the particular regulatory setting.
  • Shatter v. Guerin [2021] 2 I.R. 415 (not cited by parties, but raised by the Court):
    Noted as relevant to amenability, including the significance of the source of power.
    Influence here: it signalled the modern Supreme Court focus on the power’s source, even though the Court ultimately treated the University’s internal rules as “private in nature and source” and still found amenability on a narrower basis.

On scope, timeliness, and alternative remedies, the Court relied on a distinct line of authority:

  • Arthropharm (Europe) Limited v. the Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109:
    Murray J. summarised three propositions: (i) adequate alternative remedies are a discretionary bar; (ii) reiterations are not “new decisions” restarting time; (iii) the “collateral attack” rule prevents using a timely challenge to a later decision to invalidate an earlier unchallenged decision.
    Influence here: it structured the High Court’s reasoning that earlier University FTP decisions were not properly reviewable once internal de novo appeals had been pursued.
  • Independent Newspapers plc v. IA [2020] IECA 19 and Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] 2 IR 250 (quoted within Arthropharm):
    Anchored the “collateral attack” rationale in finality and the protection of unchallenged administrative decisions.
    Influence here: reinforced the policy against backward challenges in multi-step contexts.
  • Amariei v. The Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22:
    A comprehensive Supreme Court restatement: applicants must generally exhaust adequate alternative remedies; adequacy is contextual; and judicial review’s role is legality, not merits.
    Influence here: decisive. The High Court treated it as binding and used it to support confining review to the final stage after internal remedies have been pursued.
  • AB v. Chief International Protection Officer [2026] IESC 23:
    Clarified that a “fair appeal can cure” many earlier procedural defects; only exceptional cases involving a “fundamental denial of justice” justify judicial review notwithstanding an adequate appeal. It also warned against isolated reliance on the dictum that “a fair appeal does not cure an unfair hearing.”
    Influence here: supported the High Court’s view that de novo internal appeals (culminating with the Visitors) were capable of curing non-fundamental procedural issues, undermining any attempt to re-litigate earlier stages.
  • Corrigan v. Irish Land Commission [1977] I.R. 317:
    The rule that judicial review generally cannot be grounded on points not raised before the original decision-maker (or at least at the appropriate stage).
    Influence here: reinforced the Court’s limitation to matters argued before the Visitors and its criticism of last-minute jurisdiction points.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Amenability to Judicial Review: A Narrow “Regulatory Nexus” Route

The Court accepted that the immediate source of the impugned powers was the University’s internal statutes and policies (including the “2010 Consolidated Statutes” and FTP policies), and that this normally points away from judicial review. It also accepted the resemblance to Galbraith v. Dublin City University [2022] IEHC 520, where external professional standards did not convert an internal programme decision into a public law decision.

Nonetheless, the Court found amenability “with some considerable hesitation” on a narrow, fact-specific basis. The persuasive features were:

  • the pharmacy student code of conduct was mandated to be modelled on the PSI code (2014 Rules);
  • the inquiry concerned fitness to practise in a regulated profession;
  • there was an operative link between the University FTP process and the head of school’s duty under reg. 20 to confirm overall satisfaction of fitness to be a registered pharmacist; and
  • plagiarism—while not processed as discipline in this instance—retained a disciplinary “backdrop”.

Critically, the Court highlighted the third factor as the strongest: the statutory requirement that the M. Pharm award (for recognition under the 2014 Rules) cannot be made without a fitness confirmation by the head of school. Even if, conceptually, FTP and certification could be separate processes, the evidence (including correspondence) showed that University decision-makers and the Visitors understood them as linked.

Key doctrinal point: The judgment does not establish a general rule that university decisions are reviewable; rather, it recognises reviewability where internal FTP processes are functionally connected to a statutory professional regulatory condition (here, reg. 20 certification).

(B) What Can Be Reviewed: Finality After De Novo Internal Appeals

Having accepted amenability, the Court substantially narrowed the case by holding that only the Visitors’ decision could be judicially reviewed. Earlier decisions (School FTP, Dean approval, College FTP, Council/Board approvals) were not reviewed except as context.

The Court’s reasoning combined practical finality and binding Supreme Court authority on alternative remedies:

  • The University’s appeal structure involved de novo reconsideration (notably the College FTP rehearing). That meant earlier decisions were not simply “steps” whose legality necessarily determined the legality of later steps.
  • Once the applicant elected to appeal, the earlier decision was rendered moot in practical terms: the new decision became the operative act affecting rights/interests.
  • Allowing judicial review of earlier decisions after exhausting internal appeals would undermine the policy requiring exhaustion of alternative remedies and would risk an impermissible “collateral attack” dynamic.
  • Amariei v. The Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 and AB v. Chief International Protection Officer [2026] IESC 23 reinforced that a properly constituted appeal can typically cure many procedural issues, and that judicial review should not supplant adequate internal/statutory remedial structures absent exceptional, fundamental defects.

Practical consequence: In internal university structures featuring rehearing and a final Visitors’ appeal, an applicant should expect judicial review (if available at all) to be confined to the final Visitors’ decision and to issues properly raised there.

(C) Judicial Review Focus: Legality (Not Merits) and Deference to the Visitors

The Court emphasised orthodox judicial review limits: it was not an appeal on proportionality in the merits sense, but a supervision of legality. This was sharpened by the Visitors’ statutory-like role under the University’s internal statutes: they are designated as final authority on interpretation and possess wide remedial powers.

The Court therefore approached the Visitors’ decision with “considerable deference”, noting:

  • the Visitors’ wide discretion under the 2010 Statutes, including interpretive authority;
  • the professional and mixed composition of the School FTP and College FTP committees; and
  • the accepted factual basis: the applicant did not dispute the underlying events, but argued primarily disproportionality and, late, a jurisdictional “fork in the road” theory.

(D) The “Fork in the Road” / Double Jeopardy Argument Rejected

A core legality challenge was the claim that once plagiarism had been referred to (and dealt with by) the Junior Dean under discipline procedures, it could not then be used in an FTP process; or that the rules imposed a binary choice between discipline and FTP.

The Court accepted the Visitors’ rejection of that framing. The Court’s analysis is important for regulated-profession programmes:

  • University policies did not create a bright-line rule excluding disciplinary-type facts from FTP.
  • While plagiarism is ordinarily dealt with through discipline, the policies contemplated exceptions and did not prevent FTP committees from considering patterns of behaviour.
  • Here, the issue was not punishment for a discrete offence but an “agglomeration” of concerns culminating in repeated plagiarism in the final year, going to honesty and trustworthiness—attributes central to fitness to practise in pharmacy.

(E) Reasons, Timing, and Fair Procedures

The applicant argued reasons were not timely because the Visitors gave an oral decision first and written reasons later. The Court rejected this:

  • the parties agreed to that approach given time pressures;
  • the applicant could commence judicial review and later amend when written reasons issued; and
  • written reasons were delivered within a reasonable time and met the standard explained in Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 I.R. 752.

The Court also reiterated that decision-makers need not answer every point seriatim; reasons must allow the parties (and a reviewing court) to understand why the decision was made.

(F) Late-Raised Issues and the Limits of the Record

The Court approved the Visitors’ criticism of raising significant jurisdiction points on the eve of the hearing and noted that judicial review would, in any event, be limited to issues argued before the Visitors. The Court also treated some allegations (e.g., bias/composition concerns at earlier stages) as not properly before the Visitors and therefore not a basis to quash their decision.

(G) Turnitin Data Complaint

The applicant’s complaint about lack of access to detailed Turnitin match data was treated as misconceived because:

  • it was raised very late; and
  • the applicant accepted plagiarism and the policies treat plagiarism as serious regardless of intention, undermining materiality/causation.

3.3 Impact

The judgment’s likely significance lies less in its outcome (judicial review refused) than in its structured approach to three recurring disputes in higher education and regulated professions.

  • “Regulatory nexus” amenability: Programmes embedded in statutory professional qualification frameworks (especially those requiring a formal fitness confirmation as a condition of award/recognition) may, in specific circumstances, render internal FTP determinations amenable to judicial review—even where most university decisions remain private/contractual.
  • Finality after de novo internal appeals: Where internal appeals involve rehearing and the applicant pursues them to conclusion, judicial review will ordinarily be confined to the final decision (here, the Visitors), and earlier stages cannot be revived as stand-alone targets.
  • FTP can lawfully consider disciplinary-type facts as part of a pattern: Even where plagiarism is “generally” a disciplinary matter, repeated plagiarism and associated conduct issues may be considered by FTP bodies as part of assessing fitness, particularly for professions requiring high trust and integrity.
  • Operational lesson for institutions: The University succeeded notwithstanding acknowledged administrative imperfections (e.g., the recording omission regarding earlier plagiarism). However, the judgment also demonstrates the litigation risk created by documentation gaps in “log of concerns” systems and the importance of clear articulation of the FTP/discipline interface.
  • Procedural discipline for appellants: The case underlines the danger of last-minute legal reframing. Parties should raise jurisdiction and procedural fairness issues at the earliest appropriate stage and before the final appellate body, or risk being shut out.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Amenability to judicial review: Not every decision can be challenged by judicial review. Courts ask whether a decision is sufficiently “public” in nature (even if made by a non-state body). Here, the key “public” feature was the statutory professional-regulatory requirement (reg. 20 of the 2014 Rules) linking the University’s FTP evaluation to eligibility for a recognised professional qualification.
  • Alternative remedies / exhaustion: If there is an adequate appeal route (internal or statutory), courts usually expect it to be used instead of judicial review. After exhausting such routes, judicial review typically focuses only on the final decision, not every earlier step.
  • De novo appeal: An appeal that reheard the matter afresh (not limited to reviewing errors). Because a de novo decision becomes the operative decision, earlier decisions often lose independent legal significance for judicial review purposes.
  • Collateral attack: An attempt to invalidate an earlier decision indirectly by challenging a later one after the time to challenge the earlier decision has passed.
  • Fitness to practise vs discipline: Discipline typically imposes penalties for past misconduct. FTP focuses on whether a person is suitable to enter (or remain in) a profession, often looking at patterns and risks rather than punishment.
  • Curial deference: Courts often give weight to specialist decision-makers on matters calling for professional judgment (especially where the decision-maker has appropriate expertise and has followed fair procedures).

5) Conclusion

[2026] IEHC 385 recognises that a university FTP decision may be amenable to judicial review where it is closely connected to a statutory professional regulatory scheme—particularly where the institution must certify fitness as a condition of awarding a recognised qualification. However, the Court simultaneously confined judicial review to the final internal appellate decision (the Visitors) after the applicant pursued de novo internal appeals, reflecting the Supreme Court’s strong contemporary emphasis on exhausting adequate alternative remedies and preserving finality.

On the merits-in-law, the applicant’s challenge failed because the Visitors provided adequate reasons within a reasonable time, permissibly rejected the “fork in the road” discipline/FTP dichotomy, were entitled to consider the overall pattern of conduct (including repeated plagiarism), and acted within their broad discretionary and interpretive remit under the University’s statutes.