Fareed v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1063: Guidance on “Relatively Minor” Bad-Character Evidence Admitted to Correct a False Impression

1. Introduction

The appeal in Fareed v R centred on whether the jury’s exposure to two items of “bad-character” material—(i) a photograph of the appellant standing in front of a vehicle displaying the number-plate “EV1L YOB” and (ii) text messages in which he was referred to as the “Godfather of Oldham”—had rendered his conviction for conspiracy to rob unsafe. Although the items were minor in comparison to an extensive circumstantial case, the defence argued they were highly prejudicial, improperly adduced, and inadequately cured by the trial judge’s directions. The Court of Appeal seized the opportunity to clarify:

• When and how “relatively minor” bad-character material may be admitted under s 101(1)(f) Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“CJA 2003”) to correct a false impression;
• Whether the absence of a formal bad-character notice or ruling is fatal; and
• How appellate courts should assess alleged prejudice in the context of broader circumstantial evidence.

The judgment therefore refines the practical application of the bad-character regime and confirms a robust approach to the “safety” test under s 2 Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Lord Justice Holgate (delivering the judgment of the court) dismissed the appellant’s conviction appeal. The Court held:

• The text messages and photograph were admissible under s 101(1)(f) CJA 2003 because the appellant’s own evidence had given a false impression of his meekness and desire for a “quiet life”.
• Although no formal notice or ruling under the 2003 Act had been served, that procedural omission did not, in the circumstances, amount to an unfairness requiring the conviction to be quashed.
• The trial judge’s direction—reminding the jury of the limited relevance of the material and instructing them to focus exclusively on the conspiracy charge—was adequate.
• Even if admitting the material had been wrong, the remaining “ample, freestanding” evidence of guilt rendered any misstep non-determinative of the verdict.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• R v Clinton [1993] 1 WLR 1181 – Authority on appeals alleging inadequate representation. The Court noted that the appellant expressly abandoned any suggestion his trial counsel had been incompetent, thus placing the focus solely on evidential admissibility.
• “McCook procedure” (derived from R v McCook [2014] EWCA Crim 734) – The device for ventilating criticisms of previous lawyers. Its invocation illustrated that most grounds had already been pared away by 2024, leaving only those concerning the photograph and messages.
• Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 101(1)(f) – Provides that evidence of a defendant’s bad character is admissible if it is necessary to correct a false impression given by the defendant. The Court’s reasoning hinges on this limb.

While no further case-law is expressly cited in the judgment, Fareed implicitly draws on a body of CA decisions (e.g. R v Hunter [2015] EWCA Crim 631) that emphasize balancing prejudice against probative value and the curative effect of judicial directions. Fareed adds granularity to the existing jurisprudence by focusing on minor bad-character strands which slip through procedural gaps yet still meet the statutory gateway.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Was a “false impression” created?
   The appellant presented himself as a timid family-centric carer, reluctant to revisit criminality. The Court found that portrayal to be “wider” than the defence acknowledged, warranting rebuttal evidence.
2. Admissibility despite procedural irregularity.
   Ideally, a s 101 notice and formal ruling should have preceded admission, but the Court stressed substance over form:
   • The material was properly admissible on its merits.
   • The defence had advance warning (overnight adjournment).
   • Defence counsel neither objected nor sought exclusion/directions at trial.
3. Balancing prejudice and probative value.
   The text messages showed an ability to threaten; the photograph countered the narrative of meekness. Their probative worth, though modest, outweighed any unfair prejudice, particularly in light of the judge’s limiting direction.
4. Jury direction sufficient.
   By telling jurors that unpleasant aspects of character were “irrelevant to your assessment of the evidence he faces”, the judge neutralised potential prejudice.
5. Safety of the conviction.
   Holgate LJ catalogued 13 strands of independent circumstantial evidence (DNA, cell-site, vehicle links, incriminating texts, concealed mobiles, etc.) illustrating the appellant’s central role in a sophisticated robbery conspiracy. Thus, even if the photograph/messages were excluded, the conviction remained inevitable; s 2(1)(a) Criminal Appeal Act 1968 was not engaged.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Judgment

(a) Trial Practice
Judges and practitioners are reminded that:

• Minor bad-character evidence may still be potent for correcting a false impression, and its admission will be tolerated on appeal if the merits are sound and directions adequate—even where procedural formalities were skipped.
• Late-arising material should be dealt with pragmatically: brief adjournments, an opportunity to object, and clear jury directions will normally suffice.
• The appellate court will consider the overall evidential matrix, not isolated missteps, when assessing “safety”.

(b) Broader Doctrinal Effect
Fareed does not rewrite s 101(1)(f) but clarifies its bandwidth:

• The “false impression” gateway can be triggered by a defendant’s demeanour and broad narrative, not just explicit lies.
• Evidence classed as “relatively minor” can still pass the statutory gateway if it assists the jury’s true evaluation of character.
• Lack of a formal bad-character notice is not, of itself, fatal on appeal if the evidence was otherwise admissible and no defence unfairness ensued.

(c) Future Appeals
Appellants seeking to challenge convictions on the basis of wrongly admitted bad-character evidence must now surmount an additional hurdle: showing not only procedural misstep but that the material was not inherently admissible and that its presence vitiated the overall fairness of the trial, bearing in mind the totality of other evidence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Bad-Character Evidence (CJA 2003 s 101) – Generally, evidence showing misconduct other than the charged offence. It is admissible through seven “gateways”. Gateway (f) allows such evidence if the defendant has left a “false impression” about themselves.
• False Impression – Not confined to explicit statements; it includes an overall persona the defendant cultivates before the jury (e.g. meek family man vs. threatening “Godfather”).
• Safety of the Conviction – Under s 2 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, an appeal court must quash a conviction if it is “unsafe”. The test examines whether, notwithstanding any error, the jury would inevitably have convicted.
• McCook Procedure – An internal CA process whereby criticism of trial lawyers’ conduct is aired by independent counsel so that the original team may respond, enabling the court to decide if any alleged incompetence taints the conviction.

5. Conclusion

Fareed v R underscores the Court of Appeal’s pragmatic stance toward minor procedural lapses in the handling of bad-character evidence. Where material:

• is legitimately admissible under s 101(1)(f) to correct a false impression,
• occupies only a peripheral place in the prosecution’s case, and
• is subject to a clear limiting direction,

an appellate court will be slow to deem a conviction unsafe. The ruling refines the balance between probative value and prejudice, reassuring trial judges that succinct directions usually suffice and reminding defence teams to object contemporaneously if they wish to preserve such points for appeal.

Commentary by: [Your Name], Barrister & Senior Lecturer in Criminal Evidence