Co-accused Youth Discount Does Not Justify Late Sentence Appeal by an Older Adult: R v Buhari [2026] EWCA Crim 929

1) Introduction

In R v Buhari [2026] EWCA Crim 929 the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (Jeremy Baker LJ, Bryan J, and HHJ Hirst sitting) refused an application for a very substantial extension of time (780 days) to seek leave to appeal against the applicant’s minimum term for two murders.

The applicant (an adult in her mid-40s at the time of the offences, of previous good character) was part of a group that pursued a vehicle at high speed after a planned confrontation, culminating in a fatal crash killing two young men (referred to in the judgment by name; this commentary refers to them as “the deceased”).

The key issue was whether the applicant could rely on the later, successful sentence appeal of a co-accused—whose minimum term was reduced principally because of youth and immaturity—to (i) justify the long delay and/or (ii) show arguable merit that the applicant’s own minimum term was manifestly excessive.

2) Summary of the Judgment

  • The court held that the co-accused’s successful appeal (reducing her minimum term due to youth/immaturity) did not assist the applicant, who was a mature adult and had been sentenced on an individualised basis.
  • The sentencing judge had correctly identified the statutory starting point of 30 years for the murder of two persons and then made offender-specific adjustments.
  • The background of blackmail/pressure on the applicant provided, at most, limited mitigation and had been adequately taken into account.
  • Most of the “mitigating factors” advanced were said to go to her comparatively lesser planning role, which the judge had already accepted; post-incident distress was not treated as strong evidence of remorse.
  • The court refused both the extension of time and leave to appeal, concluding that the minimum term properly reflected culpability and mitigation.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment’s principal reference point was the earlier co-accused sentence appeal: Mahek Bukhari: [2025] EWCA Crim 1353. In that case, the Court of Appeal reduced the co-accused’s minimum term because the sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to her youth and immaturity, described by Warby LJ (at [20] of that earlier judgment) as a factor that “ought to have exerted a substantial downward pressure” for an immature 22-year-old adult.

In R v Buhari, the court treated that authority as fact-specific and offender-specific: it explained why the co-accused’s term moved, but it did not generate any corresponding entitlement for an older adult.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps.

(a) The co-accused reduction was based on youth/immaturity—irrelevant to this applicant

The applicant’s argument stressed that her co-accused (her daughter) ended up with a minimum term only about a year longer, despite the sentencing judge finding the applicant’s planning involvement was “significantly less”. The Court of Appeal rejected any inference of unfairness: the co-accused’s reduction was driven by a factor the applicant could not invoke—youth and immaturity. The applicant, by contrast, was expressly characterised by the sentencing judge as “the grown-up adult in this group”.

(b) No “upward pressure” on others from the co-accused sentencing error

The court rejected the suggestion that the sentencing judge’s approach to the co-accused (later corrected on appeal) must have led to an inflated minimum term for the applicant. It emphasised:

  • the correct statutory starting point was identified;
  • the judge then performed an individual assessment of aggravating and mitigating features for each offender.

(c) Mitigation: blackmail context and lesser planning were already sufficiently reflected

The court accepted the sentencing judge was well placed—having presided over the trial—to assess the factual nuance and relative culpability. While the applicant had been subjected to blackmail/pressure, the court endorsed the view that she had “many opportunities” to prevent escalation and that mitigation from the blackmail context was therefore limited.

The remaining points (not a leader; no direct threats; limited involvement in planning; cooperation in providing phone details) largely overlapped with the accepted finding that her planning role was less than others. The court also declined to treat post-crash upset (e.g., head in hands) as strong evidence of remorse.

3.3 Impact

Although the decision is a refusal of extension/leave, it has practical significance in three ways:

  • Co-accused appeals and “parity” arguments: a co-accused’s reduced minimum term does not, without more, create a compelling parity-based argument where the reduction rests on a personal mitigating feature (here, youth and immaturity) absent in the applicant.
  • Extensions of time: where delay is extreme, the court will look closely at whether the proposed appeal is truly arguable; limited merit will commonly defeat “interests of justice” arguments.
  • Contextual pressure/blackmail as mitigation: even serious contextual pressure may carry limited weight in murder minimum term setting where the offender had realistic opportunities to disengage and the escalation to lethal harm was foreseeable within the enterprise.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Minimum term (life sentence): for murder a life sentence is mandatory; the court sets a minimum period to be served before the Parole Board may consider release.
  • Starting point (Schedule 21): courts begin from statutory benchmarks. Here, because two people were murdered, the accepted starting point was 30 years (Sentencing Act 2020, Schedule 21; the judgment references section 321).
  • Aggravating/mitigating factors: features increasing or decreasing seriousness. The court accepted mitigation may exist but found it already reflected and limited in weight.
  • Extension of time: permission to bring an appeal late; the longer the delay, the more compelling the reasons and the stronger the merits usually need to be.
  • Manifestly excessive: a high threshold—more than “arguably harsh”; it connotes a sentence outside the proper range given the offence and offender.

5) Conclusion

R v Buhari confirms that a co-accused’s successful sentence appeal based on youth and immaturity does not provide a free-standing basis for (i) a very late appeal by an older adult or (ii) a claim that the older adult’s minimum term is excessive. The Court of Appeal emphasised individualised culpability assessment, limited weight for contextual pressure where disengagement was possible, and a stringent approach to extraordinary delay where the proposed grounds do not show real merit.