1) Introduction
In JL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 498, the Court of Appeal
(Arnold LJ, Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing and Miles LJ) addressed a recurring but previously unresolved issue in refugee cessation cases:
where a person was granted refugee status for one reason (Reason 1) which has ceased to apply, and the person then resists cessation
by advancing a different basis for refugee status (Reason 2), who bears the burden of proof in relation to Reason 2?
JL, a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), had been granted refugee status in 2012 not because of a political profile,
but because, as an unaccompanied minor without support, he was considered at real risk of ill-treatment on return and treated
as falling within a particular social group described as “street children in the DRC”. Years later, following a criminal conviction,
the Secretary of State initiated cessation under paragraph 339A(v) of the Immigration Rules (reflecting Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention).
It was common ground that JL was no longer a vulnerable unaccompanied child (so Reason 1 no longer applied). JL sought to retain refugee status
on a different basis: that he would be perceived by DRC authorities as connected with Rwandan rebels (Reason 2).
3) Analysis
3.1 The legal framework applied
The cessation question was governed by:
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Refugee Convention, Article 1C(5): the Convention ceases to apply where the refugee “can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist”.
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Immigration Rules, paragraph 339A(v): cessation where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the relevant circumstances have ceased,
with attention to whether change is “significant and non-temporary”.
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UNHCR Guidelines (2003) on cessation: emphasising strict interpretation and that conditions must have changed in a “profound and enduring manner”.
3.2 The new/clarified rule on burden of proof in “Reason 2” cases
The Court accepted the orthodox position that, in cessation, the Secretary of State bears the burden of demonstrating that
the circumstances justifying the original grant (Reason 1) have ceased. The novel point was whether that burden extends to a different
reason newly relied upon (Reason 2).
Holding: once Reason 1 has fallen away, the claimant bears the burden of proving Reason 2.
The Court’s rationale was rooted in symmetry with an initial asylum claim: a new basis is “analogous to” (and should be treated like) an initial claim,
save for the recognised practical difficulties of evidencing risk after years abroad.
3.3 Precedents cited and how they shaped the decision
R (Hoxha) v Special Adjudicator [2005] UKHL 19
Hoxha was used for foundational principles: cessation clauses are interpreted “strictly” and a recognised refugee has a legitimate expectation
not to be stripped of status without “demonstrably good and sufficient reason”. The Court treated this as supporting the conceded proposition that
the Secretary of State bears the burden as to the original cessation question, but noted it did not answer the distinct “Reason 2” burden issue.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Quah [2006] HCA 53
Although in an inquisitorial system, Quah reinforced the seriousness of cessation decisions and the need for “rigorous satisfaction”.
The Court again regarded this as focusing on cessation of the original basis rather than allocation of burden for a new ground.
Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08 Abdulla v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECR I-1493
Abdulla was central. While the referred question concerned the standard of proof, the Court of Appeal drew particular support from:
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[83], describing the “other circumstances” inquiry as “an assessment analogous to” examination of an initial application.
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[87], acknowledging that someone long outside their country may have fewer opportunities to assess risk (relevant to what evidence can reasonably be expected).
The Court of Appeal treated Abdulla as aligning the “Reason 2” inquiry with an initial asylum claim—implying that the person advancing the new claim
carries the burden, even if the overall cessation exercise began with the State.
MM (Zimbabwe) confirmed that the Secretary of State bears the onus to show a durable relevant change for cessation (Reason 1). However, the Court relied on
Sales LJ’s observation that it is usually appropriate to expect an individual to identify aspects of their circumstances supporting risk, and adverse inferences may be drawn
if they do not. The Court treated this as operating a fortiori once the claimant advances a new, distinct basis (Reason 2).
MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 994 and MS (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 705
These cases endorsed the “mirror image” approach to cessation: checking whether the circumstances underpinning recognition continue and whether any other basis exists for continued refugee status.
The Court distinguished broad statements (including in MS (Somalia)) that “the burden of proof on all issues will be on the SSHD” as being confined to “all issues” relevant to cessation of the original grant,
not a newly asserted Reason 2 claim.
KN (DRC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1665 and PS (Zimbabwe) v Secrtary of State for the Home Department (Cessation principles) [2021] UKUT 283 (IAC)
The Court addressed reliance on formulations in KN (DRC) (and repeated in PS (Zimbabwe)) that the Secretary of State must show there are “no other circumstances” giving rise to persecution risk.
The Court treated those passages as concerned with defining what cessation entails in a “Reason 1” case, rather than shifting onto the State the burden of disproving any conceivable alternative fear advanced by a claimant.
JS (Uganda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1670
Not materially determinative: it followed earlier cessation authorities but did not answer the “Reason 2 burden” question.
3.4 The Court’s legal reasoning on Ground 1 (burden)
The Court’s reasoning can be distilled into three linked propositions:
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State’s burden for cessation of the original basis: It remains for the Secretary of State to establish that the “circumstances in connection with which” the person was recognised (Reason 1) have ceased in a significant and non-temporary way.
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New basis is not “cessation” but a new claim: Once Reason 1 is accepted to have ceased, the claimant’s reliance on Reason 2 is, in substance, a renewed/alternative protection claim.
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Burden follows the nature of the claim: As with an initial asylum claim, the person asserting a fear on Reason 2 bears the burden to establish a real risk, though the standard remains the “lower” risk-based assessment and decision-makers must apply anxious scrutiny.
The Court also rejected an attempt to avoid the practical consequence by arguing that burden “didn’t matter”: it held the UT had applied the burden against JL, but that was not an error because the burden lay with him.
3.5 Ground 2: risk categories, country guidance, and materiality
JL relied on risk categories in AB and DM v Secretary Of State For The Home Department (Risk categories reviewed - Tutsis added DRC CG) [2005] UKIAT 118,
particularly category (i): persons with actual or perceived nationality of a state hostile to the DRC, including those presumed to have “Rwandan connections”.
He argued the UT wrongly treated him as needing to show a political opposition profile (category (iii)), making reliance on post-2018 political change (as reflected in
PO (DRC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (DRC - Post 2018 elections CG) [2023] UKUT 117 (IAC)) irrelevant.
The Court accepted that JL did raise a category (i) argument orally, and that the UT may have elided categories. However, it held any error was immaterial because,
even accepting the core factual account of forced captivity by the FDLR as credible, there was “simply no reason” to think DRC authorities would perceive JL as having Rwandan connections on return—particularly returning to Kinshasa.
3.6 Standard of proof and credibility: MAH (Egypt)
The Court reiterated that the relevant standard is not best understood as a conventional “lower standard” but as a risk assessment, citing
MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216. It underlined the need for “most anxious scrutiny”.
Importantly, the Court was prepared to treat JL’s historical account as credible, but still found the Reason 2 risk not established due to lack of any plausible mechanism
for state perception or adverse interest.
3.7 Home Office policy guidance
The Court considered (but did not treat as determinative) a passage from the Secretary of State’s guidance Revocation of protection status (version 2.0, 24 January 2025),
which notes that the burden rests on the Home Office when making a revocation decision, while also recognising that an individual may raise “other protection-based grounds”.
The Court read this as consistent with the legal structure: the State must justify cessation of the original basis, but the claimant may advance further grounds requiring assessment.
3.8 Impact
The decision supplies a clear allocation rule for a common procedural posture in cessation cases:
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For claimants/refugees: if the original grant basis has fallen away, they should treat any alternative theory of risk as a claim they must prove—meaning careful evidence on identification, state interest, and return route/receiving authorities becomes critical.
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For the Secretary of State and tribunals: decision-making should separate (a) whether the original recognition circumstances have ceased (State’s burden) from (b) whether the person nonetheless currently qualifies on a different basis (claimant’s burden), while keeping the risk-based standard and anxious scrutiny.
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For country guidance usage: the case illustrates that even where risk categories exist (e.g., “Rwandan connections”), a claimant must still show why they would be perceived within that category on the evidence.