Bunting & Anor v Blaney & Anor (No. 2): The “Four Cs” Standard for Grounds of Appeal and Respondents’ Notices

1. Introduction

In Bunting & Anor v Blaney & Anor (No. 2: Best Practice) [2025] NICA 67, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland (McCloskey LJ, McBride J and Huddleston J) delivered a procedural “best practice” judgment arising out of inter-related appeals governed by RCJ Order 59. The underlying litigation comprised four consolidated Commercial Court cases involving (i) claims by Excel–A–Rate Business Services Limited (“Excel”) against Eamon Blaney (“EB”) and Carmel Blaney (“CB”) on guarantees and security, and (ii) possession proceedings under RCJ Order 88 in respect of a dwelling house at 35 Ardenlee Avenue, Belfast (the “premises”), including a separate Order 88 claim by Robert Bunting against EB (with CB added as second defendant).

The immediate trigger for this judgment was not the substantive merits of the commercial dispute, but the Court’s case management experience of defective appellate pleadings: a single notice of appeal by CB and a respondent’s notice by Excel that required repeated judicial intervention, multiple adjournments, and successive re-drafts. The Court used this occasion to issue system-wide guidance on how grounds of appeal and respondent’s notices should be formulated in Northern Ireland.

Key issues addressed

  • The chronic problem of vague, unparticularised, repetitive, and argumentative grounds of appeal/respondent’s notices.
  • The Court of Appeal’s power to strike out defective appellate pleadings, including of its own motion.
  • The minimum standard required for drafting grounds: the “four ‘c’s’”—clear, coherent, comprehensible, concise.
  • Professional duties to the court in appellate case management, including compliance with directions and proper handling of draft judgments.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that poorly drafted grounds of appeal and respondent’s notices are a recurring “mischief” consuming disproportionate court resources. It emphasised that:

  • Defective notices may be struck out, and this power can be exercised without an application by any party.
  • Although the Court has often been generous in allowing parties to amend, the “alarming frequency” of defective notices means this magnanimity may need reconsideration, with reference to stricter practice elsewhere and potential legal aid implications.
  • The Court formulated general guidance applicable to all appeals of every species at every tier in Northern Ireland, not merely appeals under RCJ Order 59.
  • The “golden rule” for pleadings of every kind is good communication.

In a postscript, the Court criticised the conduct of Excel’s legal representatives after the draft judgment was circulated as being inconsistent with the Court’s directions and with the UK Supreme Court’s strictures in R (Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22 (paras [66] and [73] cited).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

R (Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22

The only external authority expressly cited is R (Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22, referenced in the postscript as setting “strictures” relevant to how parties and legal representatives should respond to a judgment circulated in draft. While this judgment does not set out the content of paragraphs [66] and [73], the Court’s reliance on Edwards serves two functions within the decision:

  • Disciplinary/professional signal: appellate practice is not merely technical; it is underpinned by duties of compliance and restraint, particularly when engaging with a draft judgment.
  • Institutional protection: draft-judgment circulation is not an invitation to re-argue the case or to disregard directions; it is part of orderly hand-down practice. The Court positions Edwards as an authoritative benchmark for that process.

Accordingly, Edwards is deployed not to decide a point of substantive private law, but to reinforce the Court’s insistence on disciplined appellate procedure and adherence to directions—an important theme throughout this “Best Practice” judgment.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds from practical realities and the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over its own appellate process:

  1. Problem identification grounded in experience: The Court records that “much of the business” of the Court of Appeal involves “unsatisfactorily formulated grounds of appeal,” generating wasteful consumption of judicial and administrative resources.
  2. Case study illustrating systemic risk: Excel’s respondent’s notice exemplified “obfuscation, repetition, evasiveness, verbiage” and inadequate cross-referencing to bundles/transcripts. The Court details multiple case management orders, vacated hearing dates, and a “wholly disproportionate” investment of court time.
  3. Legal basis for control: While noting the lack of prescriptive statutory or rule-based drafting requirements in Part III (particularly section 35) of the Judicature (NI) Act 1978 and RCJ Order 59, the Court confirms it has the power to strike out defective notices and may do so of its own motion.
  4. Normative guidance as a solution: The Court sets out practical drafting rules aimed at preventing the recurring failures it observes. Central to this is rejecting empty formulae (“erred”, “was in error”, “erred in fact and law”) and demanding precision: what finding/conclusion is challenged, why, and where it appears in the judgment.
  5. Boundary between grounds and argument: The Court insists that grounds are not a place for evidence recitation or legal submissions; argument belongs in skeleton arguments and oral submissions. Grounds must communicate issues, not litigate them.

The “Four Cs” standard

The Court crystallises its overall requirement: grounds must be clear, coherent, comprehensible, and concise. This becomes the practical test for acceptable appellate pleading and a benchmark against which case management and strike-out decisions may be taken in future.

Substantive content embedded in the guidance

The guidance (paras [19]–[21]) contains several doctrinally significant distinctions that shape appellate review:

  • Findings of fact vs conclusions: the Court warns that “conclusions” may be scattered throughout a judgment and are not always confined to its end.
  • Evaluative judgments are not findings of fact: this signals that not every contested assessment can be attacked as a factual error; the category of complaint matters.
  • Error of law affecting a finding of fact: the Court accepts in principle that a factual finding can be “vitiated by error of law,” but stresses careful crafting—implicitly cautioning against formulaic “fact and law” pleading.

3.3 Impact

The likely effects of [2025] NICA 67 are procedural, cultural, and (potentially) financial:

  • Tighter admissibility discipline: the Court signals that its prior generosity in allowing amendments may reduce; defective grounds may be more readily struck out, including on the Court’s own initiative.
  • Re-shaping drafting norms: the judgment supplies a checklist-style template for acceptable grounds. Practitioners who continue using “erred in fact and law” or “was in error” risk immediate procedural sanctions.
  • Case management consequences: the decision links defective drafting to adjournments, vacated hearings, and reserved costs—foreshadowing more frequent adverse costs consequences for non-compliance.
  • Professional responsibility emphasis: the Court frames the problem as a failure to “engage with the overriding duties of lawyers to the court,” and flags the gravity of situations with “possible strike out and contempt of court implications.”
  • Legal aid implications: while not elaborated, the Court’s reference implies that poor drafting and the inefficiencies it causes may affect funding decisions or recovery.

More broadly, the judgment functions as an institutional statement: appellate procedure is not merely administrative; it is integral to fair and efficient justice, and the Court will actively police it.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Notice of appeal / respondent’s notice: the appellant’s document states why the lower court decision should be changed. A respondent’s notice (RCJ Order 59, Rule 6) is how the respondent argues the decision should be varied, affirmed on different grounds, or challenged by cross-appeal.
  • Grounds of appeal: short statements identifying exactly what is said to be wrong in the decision below. They are not evidence summaries or full legal argument.
  • Findings of fact vs evaluative judgments: a “finding of fact” is what the judge decided happened (e.g., who signed what, who paid what). An “evaluative judgment” is an assessment or weighing exercise (e.g., reasonableness, proportionality, fairness) and cannot always be attacked as if it were a simple factual mistake.
  • Strike out (own motion): the court can remove (strike out) defective grounds/notices even if the other side does not apply—because the court must control its process.
  • “Erred in fact and law” / “was in error”: the Court holds these stock phrases are meaningless unless they specify the precise mistake and where it appears in the judgment.
  • Ex turpi causa non oritur action: a Latin maxim meaning a claimant should not profit from their own wrongdoing. In this judgment it appears only as relief sought in CB’s notice of appeal; the Court does not determine its applicability here.

5. Conclusion

Bunting & Anor v Blaney & Anor (No. 2) establishes a clear procedural precedent in Northern Ireland appellate practice: grounds of appeal and respondent’s notices must be drafted to the “four ‘c’s’” standard—clear, coherent, comprehensible, concise—and must avoid empty “error” formulae, evidence recitation, and argumentative pleading. The Court underscores its willingness to deploy strike-out powers (including of its own motion), to impose robust case management, and to revisit its traditionally generous approach to defective notices. The judgment’s wider significance lies in its insistence that effective appellate justice depends on disciplined communication and strict adherence to professional duties to the court, reinforced (in the postscript) by reference to R (Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22.