“Any Person” Includes the Law Society: Competence of Self-Referred Conduct Complaints to the SLCC and Mandatory Censure for AML Reporting Failures

1. Introduction

Petitioner: Nicola Simone Cannon, a Scottish solicitor and the money laundering reporting officer (“MLRO”) of Cannons Law Practice LLP.
Respondent: The Council of the Law Society of Scotland (“the Society”).
Court: Inner House, Second Division, Court of Session.
Citation: [2026] CSIH 14.

The petition arose from Ms Cannon’s admitted failure to submit her firm’s annual money laundering certificate (a supervisory compliance document) by the relevant deadline under the Society’s Practice Rule B9.5, implementing the Society’s supervisory responsibilities under the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (“the 2017 Regulations”). The deadline of 30 April 2022 was extended to 13 June 2022; the certificate was not delivered until December 2022.

The Society lodged a conduct complaint with the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission (“SLCC”), which was then remitted back to the Society for investigation and determination. The Society’s Professional Conduct Sub-Committee found unsatisfactory professional conduct, imposed a censure and a £800 fine. The Scottish Solicitors’ Discipline Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) refused Ms Cannon’s appeal.

Before the Inner House, Ms Cannon argued principally that:

  • the Society had no power to make a complaint to the SLCC in these circumstances (competency/natural justice/ECHR concerns);
  • the sanctions were disproportionate and breached Convention rights (including arguments directed at the mandatory nature of censure); and
  • the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Inner House refused the petition and upheld the Tribunal’s decision. In doing so, it held (in substance) that:

  • The Society’s lodging of a conduct complaint with the SLCC was competent and lawful: the phrase “any person” in the relevant statutory scheme is not to be read as excluding the Society.
  • The process was not contrary to natural justice nor in breach of article 6 ECHR; the Society was not “judge in its own cause” in a disqualifying sense, and there existed a meaningful right of appeal to an independent tribunal and onward petition.
  • A censure was mandatory once unsatisfactory professional conduct was established (under section 42ZA(3)(a) of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980), and the court would not entertain an ECHR-compatibility challenge to the statutory requirement absent proper intimation to the Lord Advocate and Advocate General.
  • The £800 fine was within range and not harsh; personal responsibility as MLRO could not be displaced by reference to staffing pressures or delegation.
  • Applying the supervisory standard in Hood v Council of the Law Society of Scotland 2017 SC 386, [2017] CSIH 21, the Tribunal’s decision disclosed no error of law, no irrationality, and no fundamental flaw of approach.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Cannon v Scottish Legal Complaints Commission [2020] CSOH 23

Ms Cannon relied on Cannon v Scottish Legal Complaints Commission [2020] CSOH 23 to argue that, just as the SLCC could not initiate a complaint to itself, the Society could not (in effect) “complain to itself” by lodging a complaint and then determining it after remission.

The Inner House treated Cannon as “of little assistance” because it addressed a materially different question: whether the SLCC itself could raise a complaint for its own determination. In Cannon, the court inferred (from the 2007 Act’s structure) that “any person” did not include the SLCC. Here, however, the relevant point was whether “any person” includes the Society—an entity with longstanding statutory disciplinary and regulatory functions.

The Court’s treatment of Cannon is significant: it confirms that reasoning which excludes a decision-maker from the class of potential complainers does not automatically exclude a regulator from complaining about its members, especially where the regulator is separately charged with supervision and enforcement.

(b) Hood v Council of the Law Society of Scotland 2017 SC 386, [2017] CSIH 21

Hood supplied the Inner House’s statement of the court’s limited supervisory role over the Tribunal. The Inner House quoted the Hood test (paragraph 17) for intervention:

  • error of law;
  • a finding unsupported by evidence;
  • a fundamental error in approach; or
  • a decision which no reasonable tribunal could reach.

The Court applied this as a disciplined restraint framework: even where mitigation exists, evaluative judgments about professional standards and sanction are primarily for specialist bodies unless one of these threshold errors is demonstrated.

(c) Robson v Council of the Law Society of Scotland 2005 1 SC 125

In rejecting the article 6/natural justice challenge, the Inner House relied on the availability of appeal and onward court review as curing or neutralising any residual structural concern. Robson v Council of the Law Society of Scotland 2005 1 SC 125 was cited as authority supporting the proposition that a professional discipline system can satisfy fairness requirements when there is access to an independent tribunal and subsequent court oversight.

The use of Robson underscores a recurring theme in professional regulation: first-instance decision-making by a regulator is not automatically incompatible with article 6, provided the overall scheme includes sufficient independent review.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Competency: the Society as “any person”

Central to the case was statutory interpretation of the complaint gateway in the Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007. The Court held that a conduct complaint may be forwarded to the SLCC by “any person” and that there is “no good reason” to construe this as excluding the Society. The Court noted that, under Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978, “person” includes an unincorporated body—supporting inclusion of the Society.

The Court also reasoned from the structure of the 2007 Act: the Act expressly permits the Society to lodge certain services complaints (sections 2(2)(b)(viii) and 46(1)). It would be “absurd” if the Society could make a services complaint but not a (more serious) conduct complaint. This structural/logic argument is an important part of the ratio: where Parliament has expressly recognised a regulator’s standing to complain in one category, it is unlikely (absent clear language) to have silently excluded it from the broader “any person” class in a parallel and more serious category.

The Court also placed weight on the Society’s overarching statutory objects and incidental powers under section 1 of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980, as identified by the Tribunal: the Society’s regulatory and disciplinary role is integral to protecting both the profession’s reputation and the public interest.

(b) Natural justice and article 6 ECHR

Ms Cannon’s “judge in its own cause” contention was rejected. The Inner House drew a distinction between:

  • a body with a personal/pecuniary stake in the outcome; and
  • a regulator performing a public statutory function without such a stake.

The Court emphasised that the Society’s role is to maintain professional standards “in the interests of both the profession and the common good”. It considered that allowing Ms Cannon’s argument would make it practically impossible for the Society to discharge core regulatory functions (including in areas such as client money protection), because it would depend on third parties being persuaded to raise complaints.

In addition, the Court found no actual unfairness on the facts: the failure to submit the certificate was undisputed, procedures were properly followed, adequate reasons were given, and the relevant issues were considered. Any arguable appearance-based concern was further answered by the right of appeal to the Tribunal and petition to the Court under section 54(1) of the 1980 Act, in line with Robson v Council of the Law Society of Scotland 2005 1 SC 125.

(c) The 2017 Regulations and the MLRO’s personal duty

The Court’s approach reflects the policy intensity of anti-money laundering supervision. It noted that the Society is subject to duties to monitor and enforce compliance under the 2017 Regulations, and cited Regulation 49(1)(d) as imposing a duty to discipline defaulting members. This reinforced the conclusion that it would be perverse to interpret the 2007 Act so as to obstruct the Society’s ability to initiate and progress regulatory discipline arising from AML supervision.

On sanction, the Court treated the MLRO role as involving personal, non-trivial regulatory responsibility. Arguments based on the firm’s size, income, administrative pressures, or delegation to an assistant did not materially reduce the MLRO’s accountability for meeting a known annual requirement.

(d) Mandatory censure and the limits of the petition without constitutional intimation

Once unsatisfactory professional conduct was established, section 42ZA(3)(a) of the 1980 Act “mandated a censure”. Ms Cannon attempted to characterise the mandatory and enduring nature of censure as arbitrary/disproportionate (the Court refers to an article 8 rights submission in this context). The Inner House refused to entertain an incompatibility argument because the petition had not been properly intimated to the Lord Advocate and the Advocate General, depriving them of the opportunity to participate and make submissions on ECHR compatibility.

This is an important procedural reminder: where the relief sought depends upon a finding that primary legislation is incompatible with Convention rights, parties must comply with the required notification/intimation steps; otherwise the court may treat the argument as not properly before it.

(e) Unreasonableness: application of the Hood standard

Applying Hood v Council of the Law Society of Scotland 2017 SC 386, [2017] CSIH 21, the Inner House found no basis to interfere. Mitigation (accident, surgery, convalescence) had already been given effect by classifying the conduct as unsatisfactory professional conduct rather than professional misconduct. The lengthy delay (certificate delivered months after the extended deadline) supported the evaluative view that the approach was overly casual for an AML supervisory requirement. The £800 fine was characterised as “at the lower end” and not harsh.

3.3 Impact

  • Regulatory standing clarified: The decision strengthens the practical ability of the Society to initiate conduct complaints to the SLCC in furtherance of its statutory duties. Reading “any person” to include the Society reduces the risk of technical challenges designed to disable regulator-led enforcement.
  • AML compliance discipline reinforced: The Court’s reasoning places significant weight on the 2017 Regulations and the importance of annual AML certification as a supervisory tool. Future respondents may find it difficult to characterise failures to complete AML supervisory obligations as trivial “single rule” breaches.
  • Fairness challenges channelled into structural safeguards: The judgment aligns with a broader regulatory-law approach: concerns about first-instance regulator decision-making are often addressed by independence at the appeal stage and court review, rather than by disabling the regulator from initiating proceedings.
  • Procedural discipline for ECHR incompatibility arguments: Parties seeking to attack the compatibility of mandatory sanctions in primary legislation must ensure proper intimation to constitutional law officers, or risk the argument being rejected as not properly before the court.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Money laundering certificate (annual AML certificate)
A periodic compliance return required by the professional regulator to evidence a firm’s adherence to AML obligations. It enables risk assessment and targeted supervision by the regulator.
MLRO (Money Laundering Reporting Officer)
The individual within a firm responsible for overseeing AML reporting and internal compliance processes. The role carries personal professional responsibility, even in small practices.
Unsatisfactory professional conduct vs professional misconduct
Both are disciplinary categories. Professional misconduct is the more serious, often involving a serious and reprehensible departure from standards. Unsatisfactory professional conduct is a lower-level but still sanctionable failure to meet professional standards.
“Judge in its own cause” (natural justice)
A rule against decision-making where the decision-maker has an improper interest or bias. In regulatory discipline, the rule is often satisfied where the regulator acts in the public interest and there is independent appellate oversight.
Article 6 ECHR
The right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. In professional discipline, the overall scheme can comply if independent review is available, even if the initial decision is by a regulator.
Statutory interpretation of “any person”
Courts interpret broad words in context. Here, “any person” was read as including the Society, supported by the Interpretation Act and by the structure and purpose of the regulatory scheme.

5. Conclusion

[2026] CSIH 14 confirms that the Law Society of Scotland may competently lodge a conduct complaint with the SLCC as “any person” under the 2007 statutory scheme, and that doing so does not, without more, offend natural justice or article 6 ECHR given the Society’s public regulatory function and the availability of independent appeal and court oversight. The judgment also underscores the seriousness with which the court views AML supervisory obligations and affirms that, once unsatisfactory professional conduct is established, censure is mandatory under section 42ZA(3)(a) of the 1980 Act—while attempts to challenge that statutory mandate on ECHR grounds must be properly intimated to the constitutional law officers.