Adjournment of Enforcement Pending Foreign Set‑Aside Proceedings: Clarifying Article 36(2) UNCITRAL Model Law in Site Facility APS v Randridge Holdings Ltd [2025] IEHC 668

1. Introduction

This approved ex tempore judgment of Barniville P., President of the High Court, in Site Facility APS v Randridge Holdings Ltd [2025] IEHC 668, is an important addition to Irish arbitration jurisprudence under the Arbitration Act 2010 and the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The decision addresses three core issues in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards:

  • the conditions under which the Irish courts may refuse or adjourn recognition and enforcement under Articles 35–36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law;
  • the threshold for exercising the discretionary power to adjourn enforcement proceedings under Article 36(2) of the Model Law where set‑aside proceedings are said to be pending at the seat; and
  • the proper form of orders under s. 23 of the Arbitration Act 2010, including the necessity of expressly entering judgment in terms of the arbitral award.

Although arising out of a relatively routine application to enforce a foreign arbitral award, the judgment crystallises a clear, pro‑enforcement stance and clarifies that a bare assertion of foreign “appeal” or set‑aside proceedings, unsupported by evidence or details, will not suffice to justify delaying enforcement in Ireland.

1.1 Parties and underlying dispute

The applicant, Site Facility APS, is a Danish company. The respondent, Randridge Holdings Ltd, is an Irish company (the parent of Randridge International Ltd (In Liquidation)) with its registered office in County Wicklow.

The underlying dispute arose under a Parent Company Guarantee (PCG) dated 28 April 2022, under which Randridge Holdings guaranteed certain obligations of the contractor, Randridge International Ltd, to Site Facility APS. The PCG contained a broad arbitration clause providing that:

Any dispute arising out of this Parent Company Guarantee … shall, if not amicably settled, be exclusively and finally settled under the rules of arbitration adopted by the Board of the Danish Institute of Arbitration … The place and seat of the arbitration shall be Copenhagen … The language … shall be English.

Disputes arose concerning unpaid invoices issued by Site Facility to the contractor. These were pursued against Randridge Holdings under the PCG in arbitration seated in Copenhagen, under the rules of the Danish Institute of Arbitration.

1.2 The arbitral proceedings and Final Award

A sole arbitrator, Ms Helen Lehto, was appointed by the Danish Institute of Arbitration. The respondent parent company initially participated with legal representation, but from 14 October 2024 it was no longer legally represented and participated only to a limited degree through its officers, including its chairman, Mr Charlie Quinn.

A hearing was fixed for 19 March 2025. Randridge did not attend that hearing, relying on alleged ongoing settlement negotiations as the reason for seeking postponements and for its non‑attendance. The arbitrator was not satisfied that any settlement had been reached, and the hearing proceeded in the respondent’s absence, albeit on the basis of materials previously submitted by Randridge, including a defence and written submissions.

On 23 June 2025 the arbitrator issued a detailed Final Award. She:

  • upheld Site Facility’s claim in part and rejected it in part;
  • found that some invoices had already been paid and that others were not recoverable for various reasons; and
  • ordered Randridge to pay:
    • €236,525.96 (principal sum under the PCG);
    • €30,000 (legal costs, excluding VAT);
    • €20,800 (arbitration costs reimbursable to Site Facility);
    • interest under the Danish Interest Act at the rate of the official lending rate of the Danish National Bank plus eight percentage points.

Payment was directed within 14 days. Randridge did not pay.

1.3 The Irish enforcement application

Site Facility applied to the Irish High Court under:

  • s. 23 of the Arbitration Act 2010;
  • Articles 35 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (given force of law by s. 6); and
  • Order 56, rule 3 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.

The Notice of Motion (dated 15 October 2025) sought:

  • recognition and enforcement of the Final Award in Ireland; and
  • entry of judgment in the amount due, including interest to 7 October 2025, totalling €359,548.07.

The key procedural backdrop is that:

  • the application was served at Randridge’s registered office by registered post on 23 October 2025, with proof of delivery on 24 October 2025;
  • Randridge, through Mr Quinn, responded by letter on 6 November 2025, asserting that “this matter is currently under appeal before the High Court in Denmark” and indicating that a defence would be entered and lawyers would be instructed;
  • no appearance was entered, and no solicitor was in fact instructed until the very morning of the hearing (19 November 2025), after the case had already been called on; and
  • no affidavit or evidence was filed by Randridge, and no material was put before the Court elaborating on the supposed Danish proceedings or any grounds of challenge.

Against this background, the President had to decide (a) whether to adjourn or proceed in Randridge’s absence, and (b) whether any grounds existed under Article 36 of the Model Law to refuse or postpone recognition and enforcement.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court:

  • Refused to adjourn the application despite the respondent’s last‑minute efforts to instruct solicitors and references to an “appeal” pending in Denmark.
  • Found that no grounds under Article 36(1) of the Model Law had been established for refusing recognition or enforcement:
    • no evidence was produced of any defect in the arbitration agreement, the proceedings, or the arbitrator’s jurisdiction;
    • no material was provided to show that the award had been set aside or suspended in Denmark, or that set‑aside proceedings had even properly been commenced on recognised grounds;
    • no public policy concerns were substantiated.
  • Declined to exercise the discretion under Article 36(2) of the Model Law to adjourn enforcement pending the outcome of the alleged Danish proceedings, emphasising that:
    • there was no evidence of a stay or suspension of the award in Denmark;
    • the respondent had not provided any indication of the grounds on which the award was challenged; and
    • the respondent’s conduct suggested a tactical, belated attempt to delay enforcement.
  • Granted recognition and enforcement of the award under s. 23 of the Arbitration Act 2010 and Article 35 of the Model Law in the full amounts claimed:
    • €236,525.96 (principal);
    • €30,000 (legal costs in the arbitration);
    • €20,800 (arbitration costs);
    • €72,222.11 (interest calculated to 7 October 2025);
    • giving a total of €359,548.07, with no further order for compound interest beyond that date.
  • Entered judgment expressly in terms of the award under s. 23(1), following the guidance in Dowling‑Hussey & Dunne’s Arbitration Law, thereby enabling the applicant to pursue execution under Order 42 rule 24 RSC.
  • Ordered the respondent to pay the costs of the enforcement application, to be adjudicated in default of agreement.
  • Granted liberty to apply in the event that a Danish court should later reverse or set aside the Final Award.

The net effect is that the Danish award is now enforceable in Ireland as if it were a judgment of the High Court, notwithstanding the respondent’s assertion of ongoing proceedings at the seat.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Legal framework: Arbitration Act 2010 and UNCITRAL Model Law

Ireland has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as the core legal framework for both domestic and international arbitrations (subject to certain exceptions) through the Arbitration Act 2010.

Two key provisions were central in this case:

  • Section 6 of the 2010 Act gives the Model Law the force of law in the State. Articles 35 and 36 of the Model Law govern recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, including foreign awards.
  • Section 23(1) of the 2010 Act provides:
    An award … made by an arbitral tribunal under an arbitration agreement shall be enforceable in the State either by action or, by leave of the High Court, in the same manner as a judgment or order of that Court with the same effect and where leave is given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award.

Section 23(1) creates a procedural mechanism: an arbitral award is not self‑executing in Ireland; rather, with leave of the High Court, it may be enforced “in the same manner as a judgment”, and the Court may enter judgment in terms of the award to permit execution (e.g. by seizure of assets).

Complementing this domestic mechanism, Article 35 of the Model Law provides in substance that arbitral awards, irrespective of where they are made, shall be recognised as binding and enforced upon application, subject to the limited grounds for refusal set out in Article 36.

3.2 Grounds for refusing enforcement under Article 36(1)

Barniville P. reproduced in full the text of Article 36(1), which mirrors Article V of the New York Convention. The grounds fall into two main categories:

  1. Party‑invoked grounds (Article 36(1)(a)): the party resisting enforcement must furnish proof of:
    • incapacity or invalidity of the arbitration agreement;
    • lack of proper notice or inability to present its case;
    • excess of jurisdiction (award dealing with matters beyond the submission);
    • improper composition of the tribunal or procedure; or
    • the award not being binding, or having been set aside or suspended at the seat.
  2. Ex officio grounds (Article 36(1)(b)), which the Court may consider on its own initiative:
    • the subject matter is not arbitrable under Irish law; or
    • enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of the State.

Two features of Article 36(1) are important and are implicitly applied in the judgment:

  • The list of grounds is closed and exhaustive. Recognition or enforcement “may be refused only” on these grounds.
  • The burden of proof rests squarely on the party resisting enforcement (here, Randridge) to establish one or more of these grounds.

In this case, the respondent did not engage with these grounds at all in any formal way:

  • no affidavit was sworn explaining any alleged defect in the arbitration;
  • no suggestion was made that the arbitration agreement in the PCG was invalid;
  • no reason was advanced why notice or the ability to present its case was impaired (indeed, the arbitrator’s Final Award shows that Randridge was given ample opportunity and actively participated before withdrawing legal representation and choosing not to attend the hearing); and
  • no evidence was produced that the award had been set aside or suspended in Denmark.

The Court therefore held that no Article 36(1) ground had been established, and none appeared to apply on the facts available.

3.3 The alleged “appeal” in Denmark and Article 36(1)(a)(v)

The only material suggesting any attempt to challenge the award at the seat came from two sources:

  • Mr Quinn’s letter of 6 November 2025, describing the matter as “currently under appeal before the High Court in Denmark”; and
  • the applicant’s affidavit (Mr Heskjaer), which confirmed that Randridge had commenced proceedings in Denmark seeking a declaration that the award was invalid.

Importantly, the President notes that the term “appeal” is something of a misnomer in the arbitration context. Under:

  • the UNCITRAL Model Law, and
  • s. 37 of the Danish Arbitration Act 2005 (which restricts recourse against an award),

an award is generally final and binding and cannot be appealed on the merits. Instead, a party can only seek to have the award set aside on specific, limited grounds similar to those found in Article 34 of the Model Law (serious procedural irregularity, lack of jurisdiction, etc.).

Crucially:

  • the Court was given no information as to the grounds on which Randridge’s Danish proceedings were brought;
  • no evidence was provided that the award had been set aside or suspended by the Danish courts (which is the only outcome relevant to Article 36(1)(a)(v));
  • there was no suggestion of any stay or order restraining enforcement at the seat; and
  • the applicant’s Danish lawyers had advised that the Danish proceedings did not operate as a stay, and the award remained fully enforceable.

Article 36(1)(a)(v) focuses on the status of the award in the courts of the country of origin: has it been set aside or suspended? In the absence of evidence that such a decision has been taken by the Danish court, or at least that set‑aside proceedings had been instituted on arguable grounds, there was no basis for enlivening Article 36(1)(a)(v) as a ground of refusal.

3.4 Discretion to adjourn under Article 36(2): the key clarification

The most significant part of the judgment concerns the Court’s handling of Article 36(2). That provision states:

If an application for setting aside or suspension of an award has been made to a court referred to in paragraph (1)(a)(v) of this article, the court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the award, order the other party to provide appropriate security.

Several points emerge from the President’s reasoning:

  1. Evidence of seat proceedings is required.
    It is not enough simply to assert that an “appeal” or challenge is pending:
    • The respondent provided no documentary proof of any Danish proceedings.
    • No details of the grounds of challenge were furnished.
    • No evidence of any application to “set aside or suspend” the award in the sense contemplated by Article 36(1)(a)(v) was given.
    The Court held that in these circumstances it could not be satisfied that the case fell within Article 36(2) at all.
  2. The power to adjourn is discretionary and must be exercised only where it is “proper” to do so.
    Even if an application at the seat exists, the Court:
    • must evaluate whether, in all the circumstances, it is “proper” to adjourn recognition and enforcement; and
    • may require security from the award debtor as a condition of adjournment.
    The President emphasised that:
    • Randridge had almost four weeks’ notice of the Irish enforcement hearing and still failed to put forward any substantive material;
    • its failure to cooperate and its last‑minute approach to instructing solicitors suggested a tactical delay rather than a bona fide challenge;
    • there was nothing before the Court indicating even a stateable case in Denmark.
    In such circumstances, it would not be “proper” to adjourn the enforcement decision.
  3. Security is not an automatic or appropriate substitute for enforcement.
    Article 36(2) contemplates that, in some cases, a court might adjourn and require the award debtor to provide “appropriate security” in the meantime. Here, the President refused to embark on that route:
    • there was no evidence of Randridge’s financial position or capacity to provide security;
    • the Court had no basis for calculating or assessing a realistic level of security; and
    • given the absence of any real information about the Danish proceedings, even security was not a justified middle course.

The key clarification is therefore this:

A bare, unsupported assertion that set‑aside proceedings have been initiated at the seat (or that an “appeal” is pending) is insufficient to justify adjournment of recognition and enforcement under Article 36(2). The party resisting enforcement must produce concrete, timely evidence of those proceedings and of some arguable basis for them; failing that, the Irish courts will proceed to enforce.

In practical terms, the judgment signals a firm pro‑enforcement approach, resisting attempts to use vague references to foreign challenges as a tactic to delay execution.

3.5 Service, delay, and the Court’s decision to proceed in the respondent’s absence

Before addressing the substantive enforcement issues, the Court dealt with whether it was appropriate to proceed with the application at all, given that Randridge had not entered an appearance and had no representation in court.

The President carefully traced the chronology:

  • service of the motion and grounding affidavit by registered post on 23 October 2025, with proof of delivery on 24 October 2025;
  • a detailed solicitor’s letter explaining the nature of the application and urging Randridge to seek legal advice;
  • a follow‑up letter of 5 November 2025 seeking confirmation of safe receipt and indicating the intention to proceed on 19 November 2025;
  • Mr Quinn’s letter of 6 November 2025 acknowledging receipt, asserting an appeal in Denmark, and stating that a defence would be entered and that lawyers would be instructed; and
  • the absence of any actual legal representation until 10:00am on the morning of the hearing, and the inability of the newly‑contacted solicitor to attend.

In light of this, the President characterised the respondent’s conduct as:

a very belated attempt … to seek to delay this recognition and enforcement application.

The Court stressed that:

  • the respondent had nearly four weeks’ notice of the hearing date;
  • the applicant was enforcing an award already final and binding for several months;
  • no reasonable basis for an adjournment had been put forward.

Consequently, the Court was “not disposed to putting the matter back” and proceeded to hear the application in Randridge’s absence.

This part of the reasoning underscores that enforcement proceedings under the Model Law are summary in nature and not an opportunity for an award debtor to litigate afresh or to delay. Procedural fairness requires proper service and reasonable opportunity to respond; once those are satisfied, and in the absence of good reason, the Court will not lightly adjourn.

3.6 Interest, compound interest, and possible public policy concerns

The Final Award granted interest under the Danish Interest Act at the official lending rate of the Danish National Bank plus eight percentage points, from specified dates. The applicant calculated interest to 7 October 2025 as €72,222.11, bringing the total due to €359,548.07.

Initially, the applicant also appeared to seek additional interest beyond that date. During the hearing, following discussion with the Court, counsel confirmed that no claim would be made for any further compound interest (i.e. interest on interest), given:

  • uncertainty on the material before the Court about entitlement to such compound interest; and
  • the potential—only tentatively mentioned—public policy implications in Ireland.

The President expressly declined to express a concluded view on whether compound interest could give rise to a public policy objection to enforcement under Article 36(1)(b)(ii). However, he observed that it “could potentially and arguably give rise to public policy issues” in this jurisdiction.

Two points can be drawn from this obiter remark:

  1. The Irish courts are generally willing to enforce foreign interest regimes, including relatively high default or penalty interest rates, as long as they are part of the parties’ agreed legal framework and do not amount to a clear violation of public policy.
  2. Nonetheless, there may be a threshold—particularly with compound interest over long periods, or interest that is penal or oppressive—beyond which enforcement could be refused or truncated on public policy grounds.

Practically, this part of the judgment is a caution to practitioners:

  • when seeking enforcement of foreign awards in Ireland, interest claims should be clearly explained and justified, especially if they involve compounding; and
  • where doubt exists, it may be preferable to limit the enforcement request to interest clearly unproblematic under Irish law, rather than risk drawing a public policy challenge.

In this case, because the applicant limited its claim to simple interest to a defined date, no public policy issue ultimately arose and the Court enforced the interest component in full.

3.7 Form of orders under s. 23: leave to enforce and entry of judgment

A particularly practical aspect of the judgment is the President’s express reliance on the guidance in Arran Dowling‑Hussey & Derek Dunne, Arbitration Law (3rd ed.), at p. 501, para. 8‑129. The Court endorsed the authors’ advice that:

The court can only give leave to enforce the award in terms of the award itself. When bringing an application … care should be taken to ensure that the Notice of Motion … also claims an order … entering judgment in terms of the arbitral award. At the hearing … care should also be taken to ensure to request the court to expressly order that judgment shall be entered in terms of the arbitral award. If the order … does not also include an order entering judgment … it will not be possible to obtain leave to issue execution … under Ord. 42 r. 24 …

Acting in line with that guidance, the President:

  • first, made an order recognising and enforcing the Final Award in the specific sums awarded (principal, costs, and interest to 7 October 2025); and
  • second, made a separate but related order under s. 23(1) “entering judgment in the terms of the Final Award” in the total sum of €359,548.07.

This dual structure is more than a mere formality:

  • recognition and enforcement “in the same manner as a judgment” conceptually places the award on the same footing as a court judgment;
  • but to use the Court’s enforcement machinery (e.g. execution under Order 42 rule 24 RSC), a formal judgment must be entered in the Central Office reflecting the amount due.

The judgment therefore serves as a procedural precedent or template for practitioners seeking to enforce arbitral awards in Ireland: motions should explicitly seek both:

  1. leave to enforce under s. 23(1); and
  2. entry of judgment in terms of the award.

3.8 Liberty to apply if the award is subsequently set aside

Finally, the President granted liberty to apply in the event that a Danish court were subsequently to reverse or set aside the Final Award. This ensures that:

  • if the legal status of the award at the seat changes materially, the parties may return to the Irish court to seek variation or discharge of the enforcement order; and
  • the risk of inconsistent outcomes is mitigated, while still allowing prompt enforcement in the meantime.

This reflects a flexible, pragmatic approach: the Court will not wait indefinitely for foreign proceedings of unknown scope or merit, but equally recognises that subsequent annulment at the seat may, in appropriate circumstances, justify revisiting enforcement.

4. Authorities and “precedents” considered

4.1 Statutory and international instruments

The decision is built on a straightforward application of the statutory and international framework:

  • Arbitration Act 2010:
    • s. 6 – giving the UNCITRAL Model Law force of law; and
    • s. 23 – enforcement of arbitral awards by leave of the High Court.
  • UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration:
    • Article 35 – recognition and enforcement of awards; and
    • Article 36 – exclusive grounds for refusing recognition/enforcement, and discretionary adjournment pending set‑aside proceedings.
  • Danish Arbitration Act 2005, s. 37 – referred to in passing to explain the limited recourse against awards and the mischaracterisation of Danish proceedings as an “appeal”.

No prior Irish case law is cited by name in the judgment. Instead, the Court applies the statutory text directly. However, the approach is wholly consistent with the internationally recognised interpretation of the Model Law and New York Convention:

  • narrow interpretation of refusal grounds;
  • strong pro‑enforcement bias; and
  • a high threshold for adjournment or refusal on the basis of foreign challenges.

4.2 Scholarly authority: Dowling‑Hussey & Dunne

The only non‑statutory authority cited is the leading Irish arbitration treatise Arbitration Law (3rd ed.) by Arran Dowling‑Hussey and Derek Dunne. The President expressly adopted their practical guidance on:

  • the need to seek an order both granting leave to enforce and entering judgment in terms of the award; and
  • the consequence that without such a judgment order, execution under Order 42 rule 24 RSC may not be available.

This is a notable example of the High Court treating leading commentary as a persuasive source on procedural practice in arbitration matters.

4.3 Relationship with existing Irish and international jurisprudence

Although not expressly cited, the judgment aligns with the broader trend in Irish case law post‑2010 Act in favour of:

  • minimal curial intervention in arbitral proceedings;
  • strict limitation of grounds to resist enforcement to those enumerated in the Model Law; and
  • active support for Ireland’s reputation as a pro‑arbitration and enforcement‑friendly jurisdiction.

Internationally, many courts applying Article VI of the New York Convention or Article 36(2) of the Model Law adopt a balancing approach when foreign set‑aside proceedings are pending, considering factors such as:

  • the strength and bona fides of the foreign challenge;
  • whether a stay has been granted at the seat;
  • the conduct of the award debtor; and
  • whether security can mitigate prejudice.

Site Facility sits squarely within this international mainstream. Where no evidence of genuine seat‑court proceedings is provided, and the debtor’s conduct appears dilatory, the case for adjournment collapses.

5. Simplifying Key Concepts

5.1 Recognition vs enforcement

  • Recognition means the Irish court accepts the arbitral award as legally binding between the parties, for example, so it can be relied on as res judicata in other proceedings.
  • Enforcement means the court allows the award to be executed like a court judgment (e.g., seizing assets, garnishee orders, etc.).

In practice, under Article 35 and s. 23, recognition and enforcement are usually dealt with together, as in this case.

5.2 Set‑aside vs appeal

  • An appeal ordinarily involves a higher court re‑examining the merits of a decision, potentially substituting its own findings of fact or law.
  • In Model Law arbitration, there is generally no appeal on the merits. Instead, a party may bring a set‑aside (annulment) application on limited procedural or jurisdictional grounds (e.g., invalid agreement, lack of notice, excess of jurisdiction).

The reference to an “appeal” in Denmark in this case was therefore somewhat misleading; in reality, Randridge appears to have commenced some form of set‑aside or annulment proceedings, albeit without evidence or particulars.

5.3 Parent company guarantee (PCG)

A parent company guarantee is a contractual undertaking by a parent company to answer for the obligations of its subsidiary or affiliate. Here:

  • Randridge Holdings guaranteed the obligations of Randridge International Ltd to Site Facility;
  • when Randridge International went into liquidation and failed to pay invoices, Site Facility relied on the PCG and pursued the parent in arbitration.

The enforcement proceedings in Ireland concerned the parent’s liability, not the insolvent contractor’s.

5.4 “Final and binding” award

A “final and binding” award means:

  • the arbitral tribunal has rendered its last award on the substantive issues;
  • the tribunal is functus officio (its mandate has ended, save for limited correction/interpretation powers); and
  • the award is binding on the parties subject only to recourse mechanisms such as set‑aside or refusal of enforcement on limited grounds.

The Court treated the Danish Final Award as final and binding, particularly in the absence of evidence of any effective suspension or annulment in Denmark.

5.5 Public policy in enforcement of awards

Public policy under Article 36(1)(b)(ii) is a narrow and exceptional ground for refusing enforcement. It covers situations where:

  • enforcing the award would be fundamentally offensive to the State’s most basic notions of justice and morality; or
  • enforcement would disrupt the core legal order (e.g., enforcing a contract for corruption, serious illegality, or gross procedural unfairness).

The President’s brief mention of compound interest as “potentially and arguably” raising public policy concerns illustrates that not every divergence from domestic law will trigger the public policy exception. It is a high bar.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 For award creditors

The decision is encouraging for parties seeking to enforce foreign arbitral awards in Ireland:

  • It confirms that the High Court will adopt a robust, pro‑enforcement stance, particularly when the award debtor’s resistance is poorly substantiated.
  • It shows that last‑minute attempts to delay enforcement—especially where the debtor has had ample notice and fails to file evidence—will not be entertained.
  • It offers clear procedural guidance on framing s. 23 applications to include both leave to enforce and entry of judgment, enabling efficient execution.

6.2 For award debtors

The case is a cautionary tale for parties resisting enforcement:

  • Bare assertions of foreign “appeals” or challenges are insufficient. Concrete evidence and clear particulars of any set‑aside application must be provided if Article 36(2) adjournment is to be invoked.
  • Delay, non‑appearance, and minimal engagement will be viewed negatively and may be characterised as tactical attempts to frustrate enforcement.
  • If a genuine set‑aside application is on foot at the seat, it must be raised properly and in good time, ideally supported by:
    • a copy of the foreign pleadings;
    • evidence of any stay orders; and
    • a concise explanation of the grounds and prospects.

6.3 For Irish arbitration law and practice

Substantively, the judgment reinforces Ireland’s image as:

  • a New York Convention‑compliant, Model Law jurisdiction with strong support for arbitration; and
  • a jurisdiction where foreign awards will be enforced swiftly, absent cogent and timely objection.

Procedurally, it:

  • clarifies the evidence‑based threshold for invoking Article 36(2) adjournment; and
  • endorses best practice in drafting enforcement motions under s. 23.

Given that the judgment is by the President of the High Court, in his specialised arbitration list, it will likely carry significant persuasive authority in future enforcement cases.

6.4 Interaction with proceedings at the seat

The decision also contributes to the broader international debate on how enforcement courts should respond to seat‑court challenges:

  • It supports the view that seat‑court proceedings do not automatically halt enforcement elsewhere. They are a factor, not a veto.
  • Without evidence of suspension or set‑aside, enforcement should normally proceed.
  • At the same time, by granting liberty to apply if the Danish court ultimately annuls the award, the judgment maintains a degree of comity and flexibility.

This balanced approach aligns Ireland with other pro‑enforcement jurisdictions that seek to prevent abuse of set‑aside mechanisms while still respecting the primary supervisory role of the courts at the seat.

7. Conclusion

Site Facility APS v Randridge Holdings Ltd [2025] IEHC 668 is more than a routine enforcement order. It sets out, with welcome clarity, the standards that will govern:

  • when the Irish courts will refuse or postpone enforcement of a foreign award under Article 36 of the Model Law; and
  • how practitioners should frame and seek orders under s. 23 of the Arbitration Act 2010.

The key takeaways are:

  1. The grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement are strictly limited to those in Article 36(1), and the burden of proof lies on the award debtor.
  2. A party seeking an adjournment under Article 36(2) must produce cogent evidence of seat‑court set‑aside or suspension proceedings and of some arguable basis for them. A bare assertion of a foreign “appeal” is not enough.
  3. The Irish courts will not indulge tactical, last‑minute attempts to delay enforcement. Once service is properly effected and time has been allowed, enforcement applications may proceed in the debtor’s absence.
  4. On interest, while foreign statutory interest regimes will generally be enforced, compound interest may, in some circumstances, raise public policy concerns, though this case stops short of making any definitive ruling.
  5. Procedurally, orders under s. 23(1) should both grant leave to enforce and expressly enter judgment in terms of the award, to permit execution under the Rules of the Superior Courts.

In sum, the judgment reinforces Ireland’s position as a jurisdiction committed to the efficient and reliable enforcement of arbitral awards, while setting an evidence‑based threshold for any attempt to rely on foreign set‑aside proceedings to delay or derail that enforcement.