Abusive Litigation and AI Court Deepfakes: Inherent Powers to Protect the Administration of Justice

1. Introduction

This judgment addresses how the High Court may protect the administration of justice when litigation becomes a vehicle for repeated procedural obstruction, intimidation of court personnel and threats against legal representatives. It also considers a developing problem: AI-generated images falsely purporting to depict actual court hearings.

The immediate application was brought by the Courts Service, which sought two forms of protection against the plaintiff: a litigation restriction order requiring advance judicial permission for further proceedings against it or its servants and agents, and a preventive injunction against threatened or attempted arrests and associated interference with those individuals.

The court granted both forms of relief. It also asserted an inherent jurisdiction to address misleading AI-generated depictions of court proceedings and personnel. Importantly, however, it did not make final social-media removal orders, or finally extend the litigation restriction to professional disciplinary complaints. Those matters remained subject to further submissions.

The decision therefore combines an application of established principles governing abusive litigation with a significant statement about the court’s protective jurisdiction over fabricated digital representations of its proceedings.

2. Background and Procedural Context

From a court-fee dispute to repeated procedural conflict

The underlying dispute began when Central Office staff considered that stamp duty was payable on documents the plaintiff wished to issue. The plaintiff disputed that assessment. Following disturbances in October 2024, Gardaí attended the Central Office.

The plaintiff then published a social-media announcement proposing to arrest identified Courts Service staff. The announcement asserted that their handling of his documents constituted criminal wrongdoing and indicated that reasonable force would be used if necessary. Supporters subsequently accompanied him to the Central Office, where access was restricted and Gardaí again intervened.

The proceedings alleged breaches of constitutional rights, denial of access to the courts and unlawful arrest. A related action, McGreal v Concannon & Brown, also formed part of the procedural background.

An important qualification is that the original fee dispute was not simply dismissed as groundless. In the first judgment, [2025] IEHC 425, the court held that stamp duty was not payable in the present proceedings. The later protective orders arose from the plaintiff’s conduct of litigation and associated threats, rather than merely from his challenge to the Central Office’s initial assessment.

Repeated challenges to appearances and representation

The plaintiff repeatedly contested the defendants’ appearances, including the court’s extension of time for their entry. He sought to revisit rulings through further applications, frequently framed as ex parte applications, and challenged the entitlement of the defendants’ solicitors and counsel to act.

The procedural history included appeals that were withdrawn or dismissed, including a dismissal following non-compliance with an unless order, and an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The significance was the sustained attempt to reopen procedural questions, not a finding that every appellate challenge had received an adverse determination on its substantive merits.

The court also recorded disruptive hearings, repeated interruptions preventing counsel and the judge from being heard, extensive correspondence alleging criminal misconduct, and efforts to remove the defendants’ publicly funded representation.

Escalation beyond correspondence

The evidence included an attempted citizen’s arrest of a solicitor during a Court of Appeal hearing in December 2025. The affidavit reported that the plaintiff was subsequently arrested and charged following that incident; the judgment did not determine those criminal charges.

The plaintiff had also attempted a private prosecution concerning the entry of an appearance by a solicitors’ firm. According to the affidavit, the District Court dismissed that matter because the purported summons had been issued by a Peace Commissioner rather than a judge. That procedural outcome should not be confused with a substantive adjudication of every allegation underlying the proposed prosecution.

In the second judgment, delivered on 11 March 2026, the High Court dismissed further applications and struck out both underlying actions as abuses of process. It also indicated that a litigation restriction order would be considered. The present application followed that warning.

3. Summary of the Decision

Cregan J. concluded that the plaintiff’s repeated applications, unfounded allegations and threats justified additional protection beyond the earlier strike-out orders.

1. Permission was required for further proceedings. The plaintiff was restrained from instituting further proceedings against the Courts Service or its servants or agents, including its legal representatives, without leave from the President of the High Court or a High Court judge nominated by the President.
2. Proceedings brought in breach would have no effect. The court expressly directed that proceedings initiated against the Courts Service without the required leave were to be treated as void and of no effect. The Courts Service would not have to enter an appearance or take steps in them.
3. A preventive injunction was granted. The plaintiff was restrained from threatening, attempting or purporting to arrest Courts Service employees, servants or agents, including solicitors and counsel acting for it, and from falsely imprisoning or committing trespass to their persons.
4. The injunction was not confined to court buildings. It protected the relevant individuals throughout the State.
5. Further possible restrictions remained unresolved. Removal of identified social-media material, removal of AI-generated depictions, and restrictions concerning professional disciplinary complaints were reserved for further consideration after submissions.

The court emphasised that the litigation restriction was a filter, not an absolute prohibition: a genuine future claim could still proceed with judicial permission.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

M v. M [2026] IESC 2

This Supreme Court authority supplied the principal contemporary framework. Cregan J. relied on Collins J.’s explanation that litigation restriction orders protect public interests in finality and the proper use of limited judicial resources. Those interests explain why a court may act on its own initiative, rather than only at an opposing party’s request.

The judgment also relied on Dunne J.’s warning that the factors identified in earlier authorities are not a rigid checklist. The central inquiry is whether a restriction is necessary and proportionate in exceptional circumstances. Such an order ordinarily operates as a screening mechanism, with appellate safeguards, rather than extinguishing access to justice.

This authority allowed the court to assess the overall pattern of conduct without treating each previously identified factor as an indispensable precondition.

Houston v Doyle [2020] IECA 289

This decision appeared through Collins J.’s discussion in M v. M. It supported the proposition that the jurisdiction serves the public interest and may be exercised by the court of its own motion. Its significance was jurisdictional: protection against abusive litigation is not merely a private remedy for an inconvenienced defendant.

McMahon v. VW Law & Co LLP [2007] IEHC 51

Cregan J. reproduced MacMenamin J.’s account of features supporting a litigation restriction order. These include persistent groundless proceedings, reopening issues already determined, oppressive multiplication of actions, carrying disputes into new proceedings against lawyers, and relevant failures to discharge costs.

The court stated that all the identified criteria were fulfilled. The detailed narrative particularly demonstrated repeated attempts to reopen decided issues, attacks on legal representatives and the use of litigation-related processes for improper purposes. Although costs formed part of the cited framework, the judgment’s reproduced factual account concentrated more extensively on those other features than on particular unpaid costs liabilities.

Riordan v. Ireland (No. 5) [2001] 4 I.R. 463

This authority was the source, acknowledged within McMahon v. VW Law & Co LLP, of the familiar indicators of vexatious litigation. Its influence was therefore mediated through that later decision. Together, the authorities demonstrate that courts examine patterns and purposes, rather than simply counting unsuccessful cases.

Kearney v. Bank of Scotland [2020] IECA 92

The court set out Whelan J.’s principles at length. They require particular caution because access to courts is constitutionally protected and engages Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Relevant considerations include litigation history, outrageous allegations, the likelihood of further proceedings, costs conduct, proportionality and fairness to unrepresented litigants.

Especially important was the preference for ordinary dismissal or strike-out where that is sufficient. A further restriction requires a clear and compelling justification. Here, the underlying proceedings had already been struck out, but the court found a continuing risk that fresh proceedings and related intimidation would follow.

Kearney v. Bank of Scotland also explains that the order should protect other litigants’ access to scarce judicial resources, not merely protect a persistent litigant from their own appetite for litigation.

Towey v. The Government of Ireland [2022] IEHC 559

Cregan J. relied on Dignam J.’s analysis of attacks on lawyers. Independent legal representation is a cornerstone of the rule of law; obstacles to effective advocacy harm both individual rights and the administration of justice.

This reasoning directly supported treating the plaintiff’s allegations against solicitors and counsel as more than ordinary contentious correspondence. Attempts to intimidate representatives, disqualify them without foundation or expose them to oppressive proceedings threatened the defendants’ ability to participate effectively in litigation.

Szabo v. Esat Digifone Ltd. [1998] 2 ILRM. 102

Both parties accepted this authority as providing the test for the perpetual quia timet injunction: a “proven substantial risk of danger”.

The persistent arrest threats, combined with conduct acting on them, established that the danger was concrete rather than speculative. This precedent supplied the distinct legal basis for preventive personal protection, separate from the litigation restriction jurisdiction.

McGreal v Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration & ors [2025] IEHC 597

The plaintiff relied on this earlier refusal to open an Article 40.4.2 habeas corpus inquiry concerning an unidentified category of persons. He argued, in substance, that an injunction protecting a large class of Courts Service personnel was insufficiently certain.

Cregan J. distinguished the contexts. An application to investigate the detention of unidentified persons did not determine whether an injunction could protect an ascertainable employment or agency class. For enforcement purposes, the judgment referred to a person whom the plaintiff knew, ought to know, or could ascertain through reasonable inquiry was within that protected class.

Earlier judgments in the present dispute

The first judgment, [2025] IEHC 425, and the second judgment of 11 March 2026 supplied the factual and procedural foundation. They documented earlier applications, disruption and warnings. Their significance was cumulative: the third judgment was not an isolated response to one disagreement, but a protective response after ordinary procedural rulings and strike-out had proved insufficient.

5. Analysis of the Legal Reasoning

A. Litigation restrictions protect access to justice as well as limiting it

The central balancing exercise was between the plaintiff’s right to bring genuine claims and the rights of others to conduct litigation without oppression, intimidation or repeated reopening of decided questions.

The evidence reportedly identified 30 High Court proceedings instituted by the plaintiff, including six against the Courts Service or its employees. The judgment should not be read as declaring every one of those proceedings abusive. Their relevance lay in the broader history and the assessment of future risk, considered alongside the specific misconduct established in these proceedings.

The order was targeted by defendant class: it concerned the Courts Service and its servants and agents, including legal representatives. It was not a general prohibition against the plaintiff bringing any proceedings against anyone. The permission mechanism preserved a route for legitimate claims while preventing immediate exposure to further unfiltered litigation.

B. Why the Courts Service’s public role mattered

The Courts Service cannot avoid future contact with a persistent litigant in the way that some private parties might. Its statutory responsibilities require it to receive and administer proceedings and interact with court users.

That unavoidable exposure strengthened the case for prospective protection. The same administrative interaction could otherwise become the starting point for successive proceedings against the organisation or individual staff.

The court also upheld the Courts Service’s joinder as a notice party and its entitlement to seek relief. It accepted its position as employer and its responsibility for relevant staff conduct through vicarious liability. Separately, the court held that the organisation had a sufficient right and interest to seek protection for its employees and agents against threatened personal interference; individual applications from every potentially affected person were unnecessary.

C. The practical importance of the “void and of no effect” direction

The order did more than require permission. It addressed the burden that unauthorised proceedings could otherwise impose by declaring that the Courts Service need not appear or take steps in proceedings brought against it in breach.

This is a significant operational protection. Requiring a public body to defend or formally dispose of each prohibited action could reproduce the very expense and disruption the restriction was intended to prevent. The direction should nevertheless be understood as an express term of this judgment, not assumed to arise automatically under every litigation restriction order.

D. Civil procedural disagreement did not justify citizen’s arrest

The plaintiff relied on section 4 of the Criminal Law Act 1997. The court held that its requirements had no application to the facts of these civil proceedings. Entering an appearance, permitting its filing or acting as a legal representative did not provide reasonable grounds for the criminal allegations advanced.

The decision does not abolish statutory citizen’s arrest powers or hold that court personnel are immune from criminal law. Rather, it rejects their misuse as a means of contesting procedural decisions or intimidating those performing lawful functions. A genuine concern about criminal conduct could be reported to Gardaí for investigation.

E. Why preventive relief was necessary

The injunction addressed an escalating pattern: threats were followed by an attempted arrest. Under Szabo v. Esat Digifone Ltd., the court did not have to wait for another physical confrontation once a substantial risk had been proved.

The plaintiff argued that existing civil and criminal protections already prohibited the relevant wrongdoing. The court’s answer was practical: those protections had not prevented the threats or attempted interference. Their existence did not make a tailored injunction redundant.

Similarly, limiting protection to court premises would have left the same individuals exposed elsewhere. The nationwide scope reflected the persons protected and the demonstrated conduct, rather than a restriction tied to one building.

F. Certainty and undertakings

The plaintiff objected that he could not identify every Courts Service employee. The court rejected that objection and placed responsibility on him to establish whether a proposed target fell within the protected class. Its later explanation referred to actual knowledge, what he ought to know and what reasonable inquiry could establish.

That explanation matters because breach may lead to attachment and committal. The judgment itself emphasised the need for clarity where personal liberty could ultimately be affected by enforcement.

The plaintiff offered qualified undertakings not to arrest certain persons. The court considered them insufficiently clear and comprehensive, preferring an enforceable order. The reasoning was case-specific: undertakings were rejected because of their restrictions and qualifications, not because undertakings can never provide adequate protection.

6. AI-Generated Court Images: A Developing Protective Jurisdiction

The asserted principle

The most novel discussion concerns AI-generated images and videos posted online that purported to reproduce actual hearings. Cregan J. regarded these as deliberately false representations capable of damaging the integrity of proceedings and public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court asserted that its inherent jurisdiction could address such material even if existing recording rules and practice directions did not directly cover it. The underlying principle was that fabricating an apparent visual record of proceedings may threaten the same institutional interests protected by restrictions on unauthorised courtroom recording.

The existing rules and directions

• Order 123 of the Rules of the Superior Courts regulates recording of court proceedings.
• Practice Direction HC80 concerns cameras and electronic devices in court. The judge acknowledged that an AI image generated after a hearing might not fall directly within it.
• Practice Direction HC142, on responsible use of generative AI in court documents, emphasises authenticity, responsible use and protection of the integrity of court processes.

HC142 expressly identifies fabricated and deepfake material as a risk and prohibits presenting such material to the court as authentic evidence. The conduct discussed here, however, concerned publication on social media. The judgment therefore did not establish that those posts necessarily breached a provision specifically governing evidential material filed in court. Instead, it relied on the broader protective rationale and inherent jurisdiction.

The limits of what was decided

The court’s jurisdictional statement was firm, but the remedy remained provisional. It proposed hearing the plaintiff before making final removal orders.

Accordingly, the decision is not authority for a concluded prohibition on every AI-assisted courtroom illustration, artistic reconstruction or clearly identified fictional depiction. Its reasoning focused on false images purporting to show actual proceedings or personnel and their capacity to mislead.

Future cases may require closer examination of authenticity claims, labelling, context, freedom of expression and the proportionality of particular removal orders. Those questions were not fully resolved here.

7. Social-Media Posts and Disciplinary Complaints: Reserved Issues

The judgment expressed strong concerns about posts accusing court staff and legal representatives of wrongdoing, including the risk that readers might act against those identified. It described particular posts as defamatory and one as amounting to scandalising the court.

Those observations must be distinguished from the operative orders. The judgment did not award defamation damages, impose a contempt sanction or finally order removal of the posts. The court invited identification of the material concerned and preserved an opportunity for the plaintiff to respond.

Likewise, the proposed extension to complaints before the Legal Services Regulatory Authority, Law Society, Bar Council or other professional bodies was not finally determined. The concern was that plainly unfounded complaints could perpetuate the same campaign through another forum. Any eventual restriction would require its own consideration; the judgment does not establish a general bar on complaints to professional regulators.

8. Potential Impact

Protection against escalating litigation abuse

The decision illustrates how courts may combine two distinct remedies: a permission filter against further abusive proceedings and an injunction against threatened personal interference. One addresses misuse of legal process; the other addresses a proved danger to individuals.

Institutional protection for unavoidable public-facing functions

The Courts Service’s inability to disengage from court users may be significant in future applications by public bodies performing compulsory administrative functions. It is a contextual factor supporting necessity, not an exemption from the usual proportionality requirements.

Protection of independent representation

The reasoning reinforces that threats and baseless proceedings against lawyers can obstruct the represented party’s access to justice. Legal representation is protected as part of the administration of justice, not merely as a professional convenience.

A foundation for addressing fabricated digital records

The AI discussion provides a possible foundation for future intervention against deceptive synthetic accounts of hearings. Its practical reach will depend on later decisions defining when material is misleading, what harm justifies intervention and how narrowly relief should be framed.

Procedural fairness remains essential

The court’s reservation of additional restrictions is important. Even serious established misconduct did not eliminate the need to identify proposed further relief and hear the affected litigant before deciding it.

9. Complex Concepts Simplified

Inherent jurisdiction

The court’s power to control its own process and protect the administration of justice, exercised within legal and constitutional limits.

Litigation restriction or Isaac Wunder order

An order requiring judicial permission before specified proceedings may be brought. It screens claims rather than necessarily banning them.

Abuse of process

Using court procedures improperly, such as repeatedly reopening decided issues or employing proceedings to oppress or intimidate.

Quia timet injunction

A preventive order made because sufficiently serious future harm has been proved to be a substantial risk.

Appearance

A formal procedural step indicating that a defendant intends to participate in and defend proceedings.

Ex parte application

An application initially made without the other side being heard. It is not a means of excluding opponents from issues they are entitled to contest.

Vicarious liability

An employer’s legal responsibility for relevant conduct of employees occurring in connection with their employment.

Attachment and committal

Enforcement procedures that may ultimately result in imprisonment for disobeying a court order, subject to applicable safeguards.

Deepfake

Synthetic or manipulated material that creates a misleading appearance of an authentic event, person or recording.

10. Conclusion

The judgment confirms that access to justice does not include an entitlement to repeat decided disputes, intimidate legal representatives or misuse citizen’s arrest powers against court personnel. Targeted litigation restrictions and preventive injunctions may be necessary where ordinary procedural remedies have proved insufficient.

Its emerging contribution is the assertion of inherent jurisdiction over deceptive AI-generated depictions of court proceedings. That principle must be distinguished from the final relief: the litigation restriction and protective injunction were granted, while social-media removal orders and restrictions on disciplinary complaints remained for further hearing.