“Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department” —
Consolidating Judicial Deference in Interim Relief Applications
Challenging Terrorism Proscription Orders
Introduction
In Ammori, R. (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
([2025] EWCA Civ 848), the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) revisited the circumstances in which
interim relief will be granted to suspend a terrorism proscription order
made under the Terrorism Act 2000.
Huda Ammori, a founder of “Palestine Action”, sought an injunction to
delay the coming into force of an Order that would add the organisation to
Schedule 2 of the Act—an Order already approved by both
Houses of Parliament.
The key issue was whether the High Court had erred in refusing interim
relief, and specifically whether the balance of convenience should tilt
towards protecting the claimant’s
Article 10 and 11 ECHR rights (freedom of expression and assembly) or
towards the public interest in national security as asserted by the
Secretary of State (“SSHD”).
The Court of Appeal dismissed the renewed application for permission to
appeal, thereby letting the Order take effect.
Summary of the Judgment
The appellate court, comprised of three Lords/Lady Justices, held:
- The judge at first instance applied the correct American Cyanamid
tri-partite test for interim injunctions: serious issue, adequacy of
damages, and balance of convenience.
- National security considerations are entitled to “great respect” and
will ordinarily outweigh competing factors absent something “very
compelling”.
- No legal error or irrationality tainted the judge’s evaluation of the
balance of convenience; therefore, appellate intervention was
unwarranted under CPR 52.21.
- The claimant’s grounds—largely centred on ECHR rights, alleged
procedural unfairness, and delay by the SSHD—had insufficient
prospects of success to justify permission to appeal.
Analysis
Precedents Cited
- American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396
The foundational authority on interim injunctions.
It supplies the three-stage test adopted by the judge and endorsed by
the Court of Appeal.
- R (PCS Union) v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 840 (“PCSU”)
Re-affirmed that in public-law cases the court first examines
arguable unlawfulness and then moves to the balance of convenience,
paying heed to the wider public interest.
Ammori imports this framework into the proscription context.
- AG v BBC [2022] EWHC 826 (QB) and
FTDI Holding Ltd v Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster [2025] EWHC 241 (Admin)
These cases articulate the special respect courts must afford to the
executive’s national-security assessments when weighing interim
relief.
- R (Governing Body of X School) v Ofsted
[2020] EWCA Civ 594
Quoted for the notion that a “strong prima facie case” may be
required where injunctive relief would hinder an important public
function.
- Christian Democratic People’s Party v
Moldova (2007) 45 EHRR 13
Relied on by the claimant for the proposition that even short-lived
infringements of political-speech rights can breach the Convention,
but distinguished by the Court as factually remote.
Legal Reasoning
1. Serious Issue to be Tried
The Court accepted that at least one ground (proportionality under
Articles 10 and 11) was arguable; therefore, stage (1) of
American Cyanamid was satisfied. This finding did not, however,
dictate the grant of interim relief.
2. Adequacy of Damages
As is typical in public-law/equality challenges, damages were not an
adequate remedy for either side; the case thus proceeded swiftly to
the decisive stage—balance of convenience.
3. Balance of Convenience
The Court underscored a “hierarchy of interests” in national-security
disputes: (a) protection of the public, (b) Parliamentary approval of
executive action, and only thereafter (c) private or organisational
freedoms that may be curtailed.
Key strands of the reasoning include:
- Suspending the Order would deny the public the protective effect
of proscription, even for a short period, a factor to which the
courts must attach “great weight”.
- Any chilling effect on speech was confined to expressions of
support for Palestine Action as an organisation; individuals
could still criticise Israel or campaign on Palestinian rights
generally.
- Potential criminal liability would arise only if people
“deliberately chose” to break the law after proscription.
Harm flowing from conscious defiance carries little weight in the
equitable balancing exercise.
- Alleged delay by the SSHD (March–July 2025) was given “some weight”
but was eclipsed by the immediate trigger incident of 20 June 2025
(damage to RAF aircraft) and by Parliament’s
swift approval of the Order.
- The availability of the statutory de-proscription route via POAC
was not decisive but underlined that the Order was not
irreversible.
Impact on the Law
The judgment solidifies three important propositions:
- Elevated Deference in National-Security Proscription Cases.
Where Parliament has approved a proscription order, courts will
start from a position of substantial deference, making interim
relief a remote possibility unless the claimant shows powerful
countervailing considerations.
- Limited Weight to “Self-Inflicted” Harm.
Prospective criminality resulting from a conscious decision to
ignore a statutory prohibition is accorded minimal weight in the
balance of convenience.
- Continued Viability of Article 10/11 Challenges.
The Court acknowledged that serious issues may arise on ECHR
grounds, but their mere existence is insufficient to displace the
public-interest calculus favouring national security.
Future claimants seeking to restrain national-security measures—be it
proscription, asset-freezing, or exclusion orders—now face a reinforced
burden at the interim stage. Conversely, the executive gains clearer
guidance that, once Parliament endorses a measure, the courts will not
lightly intervene before the full claim is heard.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Proscription Order: A statutory instrument that adds an
organisation to Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000, rendering
membership or support a criminal offence.
- Interim Relief: Temporary court orders (e.g., injunctions or
declarations) designed to preserve the status quo until the final
determination of a case.
- American Cyanamid Test:
(1) Serious issue to be tried;
(2) Adequacy of damages;
(3) Balance of convenience (including public interest).
- Balance of Convenience: A weighing exercise of potential
harms to each side (and the public) if relief is granted or
refused.
- POAC: The Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission—an
independent tribunal that hears statutory appeals against the
refusal to de-proscribe an organisation.
- Open vs Closed Evidence: In national-security litigation,
some material is disclosed only to the court and “special
advocates”, not to the claimant, to protect sensitive information.
Conclusion
Ammori v SSHD does not blaze an entirely new trail but
crystallises existing jurisprudence into a coherent rule:
where interim relief would
suspend a terrorism proscription order already endorsed by Parliament,
the applicant must demonstrate exceptionally compelling reasons
to override the executive’s national-security assessment.
The Court’s reasoning emphasises (i) respect for democratic
accountability, (ii) the primacy of public protection, and (iii) the
relative paucity of weight given to harms that arise from a
fortiori decision to breach the law.
While substantive challenges to proscription remain possible—and may yet
succeed at the full judicial-review stage or before POAC—the window for
obtaining temporary protection has become decisively narrower.
Legal practitioners should therefore:
- Prepare extensive prima facie evidence on urgency and
disproportionality if interim relief is sought;
- Address national-security justifications head-on, possibly with
expert testimony; and
- Be ready to outline precise, alternative remedies that mitigate
security concerns without wholesale suspension of the order.
In the broader landscape, the decision signals to activist groups,
human-rights NGOs, and government alike that the judiciary will preserve
a strict, high bar before restraining executive measures designed—on the
face of it—to safeguard national security.