Loss of Matrimonial Prospects and Empathetic Assessment of Non‑Pecuniary Damages in Motor Accident Claims:
A Commentary on Jigishaben Maheshbhai Patel v. Sipai Mohammadkhan Rasulkhan & Ors.

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1. Introduction

The judgment of the Gujarat High Court in R/First Appeal No. 1327 of 2022, Jigishaben Maheshbhai Patel v. Sipai Mohammadkhan Rasulkhan & Ors., decided on 26 November 2025 by Honourable Mr. Justice Hasmukh D. Suthar, arises from an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.), Ahmedabad in MACP No. 537/2011.

The case concerns a 19‑year‑old PTC student who suffered amputation of her left leg below the knee when she fell from an AMTS bus due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus driver. The Tribunal had awarded a total compensation of Rs. 11,96,441/‑ with 9% interest per annum, against a claim of Rs. 30,00,000/‑.

The High Court was invited to re‑examine specifically the quantum of compensation, not the findings on negligence or liability, which stood undisputed. The appellant contended that:

• Her income and future prospects had been undervalued;
• Non‑pecuniary damages such as pain and suffering were meagre;
• No amount had been awarded under the head of loss of matrimonial prospects, despite her young age and permanent disability;
• Insufficient provision was made for future medical expenses, particularly the periodic replacement of an artificial limb.

The High Court’s intervention is notable for two principal reasons:

1. It substantially enhances non‑pecuniary damages for a young female amputee, relying on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on “just compensation” and the need for an empathetic approach; and
2. It expressly recognizes “loss of matrimonial prospects” as a distinct head of compensation and quantifies it at Rs. 3,00,000/‑, thereby giving clear doctrinal and practical guidance to Tribunals dealing with similar claims.

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2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Factual Background

On 05.01.2011, the appellant, then a 19‑year‑old female PTC student, was travelling by AMTS bus No. GJ‑01‑BV‑8728 from Lal Darwaja to her home. At Malav Talav, when she was alighting from the front door, the bus driver allegedly moved the bus in a rash and negligent manner. She fell, and the front wheel ran over her left leg.

She sustained serious injuries necessitating amputation of her left leg below the knee. An FIR was lodged at Vejalpur Police Station. She filed a claim petition seeking Rs. 30,00,000/‑ as compensation from the driver, owner, and insurer/operators of the bus.

2.2 Tribunal’s Award

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.), Ahmedabad, by award dated 12.12.2019 in MACP No. 537/2011:

• Held the bus driver solely negligent;
• Found that, as per disability certificate, the appellant suffered 45% partial permanent disability and, for the purpose of compensation, treated this as 50% disability (not amounting to permanent total disablement);
• Noted that the appellant, being a PTC student, had completed her studies thereafter and could still work as a teacher;
• Refused to rely on the oral evidence of a co‑student regarding potential future earnings due to lack of documentary support;
• Adopted a notional income and standard multiplier method, awarding approximately:
  • Rs. 7,56,000/‑ for future loss of income;
  • Rs. 1,90,441/‑ towards medical expenses;
  • Under non‑pecuniary heads:
    • Pain, shock and suffering: Rs. 25,000/‑;
    • Special diet, attendant and transportation: Rs. 10,000/‑;
    • Loss of amenities / enjoyment of life: Rs. 1,00,000/‑;
    • Future medical expenses: Rs. 1,00,000/‑;
    • No amount for loss of matrimonial prospects.

The total compensation worked out to Rs. 11,96,441/‑ with interest at 9% p.a.

2.3 High Court’s Core Holdings

The High Court confined itself to the issue of quantum, as negligence and coverage were undisputed. Its main conclusions were:

1. Income assessment and future loss of earnings
   • Following Govind Yadav v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and minimum wage norms, the Tribunal rightly took notional income and applied the Sarla Verma multiplier;
   • Future loss of income of Rs. 7,56,000/‑ was held to be “just and proper” and left undisturbed.
2. Medical expenses
   • Past medical expenses of Rs. 1,90,441/‑, based on bills, were affirmed as correct.
3. Non‑pecuniary heads and future medical expenses – substantial enhancement
   • Pain, shock and suffering: enhanced from Rs. 25,000/‑ to Rs. 2,00,000/‑;
   • Special diet, attendant, transportation: from Rs. 10,000/‑ to Rs. 50,000/‑;
   • Loss of amenities and enjoyment of life: from Rs. 1,00,000/‑ to Rs. 2,00,000/‑;
   • Future medical expenses (for periodic replacement of artificial leg): from Rs. 1,00,000/‑ to Rs. 2,00,000/‑.
4. Loss of matrimonial prospects
   • Recognizing that the 19‑year‑old appellant had lost a significant part of her matrimonial prospects due to the amputation, the Court awarded a distinct amount of Rs. 3,00,000/‑ under this head.
5. Total enhancement
   • The Tribunal’s total under the above non‑pecuniary heads was Rs. 2,35,000/‑;
   • The High Court reassessed these at Rs. 9,50,000/‑;
   • Thus, an additional Rs. 7,15,000/‑ was awarded, with proportionate costs and interest at the same rate as the Tribunal’s award.
6. Directions
   • Opponents were directed to deposit the enhanced amount within four weeks;
   • The Tribunal was instructed to recover the deficit court fee on the enhanced amount, and thereafter disburse the compensation appropriately.

In sum, while the High Court did not disturb the pecuniary heads relating to income and past medical expenses, it significantly recalibrated the non‑pecuniary and future medical components, and importantly, introduced a quantified head for loss of matrimonial prospects.

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3. Analysis

3.1 Issues Before the High Court

The principal legal issues were:

1. Whether the Tribunal had correctly assessed the appellant’s income and future loss of earning capacity, given that she was a student at the time of accident, with no proven actual earnings.
2. Whether the non‑pecuniary heads of compensation (pain and suffering, loss of amenities, etc.) were grossly inadequate in light of the amputation and long‑term consequences.
3. Whether a separate, clearly quantified amount should be granted towards “loss of matrimonial prospects” for a young unmarried woman who has suffered a permanent disability.
4. Whether the provision for future medical expenses (particularly replacement of the prosthetic leg) was sufficient.

The insurer’s principal stance was that, since the appellant had completed her PTC and could still work as a teacher, there was no real functional disability affecting her earning capacity, and therefore no need for enhanced compensation on that score. The High Court substantially rejected this attempt to dilute the consequences of the amputation, particularly in relation to non‑pecuniary harms.

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3.2 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.2.1 Govind Yadav v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2012 (1) TAC 1 (SC)

The High Court relied on Govind Yadav for the proposition that, where there is no direct proof of income, the Tribunal should:

• Use the prevailing minimum wages as a baseline; and
• Make a reasonable assessment rather than leaving the injured uncompensated on a technicality.

In the present case:

• The accident occurred in January 2011;
• The Government‑approved minimum wage at that time was Rs. 4,370/‑ per month;
• The appellant had produced no documentary evidence of income as she was a PTC student;
• Her attempt to establish potential earnings through the testimony of a co‑student was not accepted as a sufficient basis.

Applying Govind Yadav, the Court endorsed the Tribunal’s approach of:

• Adopting minimum wages as a starting point;
• Factoring in future prospects to arrive at a notional income of Rs. 7,000/‑ per month; and
• Using that figure in the multiplier calculation.

This reflects the Supreme Court’s emphasis that an injured person should not be denied fair compensation merely because her present or future income cannot be proved by strict documentary evidence, particularly when she is a student or in informal employment.

3.2.2 Sarla Verma (Smt.) & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121

Sarla Verma is the leading decision standardizing the multiplier method in motor accident compensation. It lays down age‑based multipliers to ensure consistency, fairness, and predictability.

In this case:

• The appellant was 19 years old at the time of the accident;
• The Court approved application of the multiplier of 18, consistent with Sarla Verma for that age bracket.

This confirms the High Court’s adherence to the now‑settled rule that multipliers should be drawn from the Sarla Verma table unless special reasons justify departure.

3.2.3 Kajal v. Jagdish Chand & Ors., (2020) 4 SCC 413 and Master Ayush v. Branch Manager, Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., (2022) 7 SCC 738

These two Supreme Court decisions significantly shaped the High Court’s approach to non‑pecuniary damages and the concept of “just compensation” under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

In Kajal:

• The injured was a 12‑year‑old girl who suffered catastrophic brain injury, leaving her mental age equivalent to a 9‑month‑old child;
• The Supreme Court emphasised that:
  • It is “impossible to equate human suffering and personal deprivation with money,” yet the court must make a judicious attempt;
  • Compensation must not be conservative to the point of tokenism, nor a bounty beyond what is just;
  • The degree and nature of deprivation over the victim’s entire life must guide the assessment;
  • In cases of severe disability, particularly mental disability, a liberal view must be adopted because the award is “once and for all” and future enhancement is not usually possible.

Master Ayush reaffirmed Kajal, endorsing the use of Schedule II as a guide for multipliers and reiterating the need for substantial, not merely symbolic, compensation in serious injury cases.

Justice Suthar explicitly quotes and relies on Kajal (via Master Ayush) to underscore that:

• Assessment of damages in personal injury cases necessarily involves “calculated guesswork and conjecture”;
• Compensation should be substantial considering the deprivation suffered throughout life;
• Token damages are impermissible in serious injury cases.

The High Court uses this line of authority to justify substantial enhancement of:

• Pain, shock, and suffering;
• Loss of amenities and enjoyment of life;
• Future medical expenses.

3.2.4 Sidram v. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., (2023) 3 SCC 439 and Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar, (2022) 13 SCC 790

The High Court cites Sidram, which in turn had relied on Pappu Deo Yadav, to highlight a crucial dimension of motor accident adjudication: judicial sensitivity and empathy.

In paragraph 113 of Sidram, quoted by the High Court, the Supreme Court stresses that:

• Severe injury inflicts not only physical limitations but also deep mental and emotional scars;
• The injured is “thrust into the world of the disabled,” experiencing deprivation of autonomy and dignity;
• Dignity is now an intrinsic component of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution;
• If courts “nit‑pick and award niggardly amounts” ignoring these realities, it constitutes an affront to the injured victim.

Justice Suthar uses this authority to articulate that:

• The Tribunal must adopt a “sensitive approach” to the victim’s pain and suffering;
• Compensation must reflect an understanding of the victim’s lifetime of dependence, psychological trauma, and loss of dignity;
• Awarding less than reasonable compensation in such contexts is not merely a technical error; it offends the constitutional value of dignity.

This jurisprudence provides the normative foundation for enhancing non‑pecuniary damages and recognizing heads like loss of matrimonial prospects.

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3.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.3.1 Income Assessment and Future Loss of Earnings

The appellant argued that:

• Her potential as a trained teacher was insufficiently recognized;
• The Tribunal erred in not relying on her co‑student’s evidence regarding likely earnings after completion of PTC.

The High Court, however, upheld the Tribunal’s approach:

• There was no documentary evidence of either present or assured future income;
• As per Govind Yadav, in such situations, it is proper to:
  • Use minimum wages as a starting point; and
  • Adopt a reasonable notional income accounting for some future prospects.
• The Tribunal’s adoption of Rs. 7,000/‑ per month as notional income, with a multiplier of 18 and about 50% disability, was accepted as just and proper.

Though paragraph 7 of the High Court’s judgment momentarily mentions “disability at 40%”, the computation (Rs. 7,56,000/‑) clearly corresponds to 50% disability, consistent with its earlier narration. This appears to be a typographical slip rather than a substantive change in assessment.

The insurer’s argument that the appellant could still pursue teaching and therefore suffered no loss of future prospects was implicitly rejected. The Court accepted the idea that:

• Even if she can work, partial permanent disability does translate into some loss of earning capacity or increased difficulty in maintaining employment;
• Therefore, a 50% disability assessment for compensation purposes was reasonable.

3.3.2 Pecuniary Losses: Medical Expenses

The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 1,90,441/‑ towards medical expenses on the basis of bills (Exhibits 42–79). The High Court found:

• These were properly proven and undisputed;
• The amount was just and correct, and there was no reason to interfere.

This reflects the general practice that, where documentary evidence is available and unchallenged, courts should grant the full reasonable cost of treatment actually incurred.

3.3.3 Non‑Pecuniary Damages: Pain, Suffering, and Loss of Amenities

The High Court considered several factors:

• The appellant’s age (19 years) at the time of accident;
• The permanence and seriousness of the injury (amputation below the knee);
• The lifetime impact on her mobility, social life, and mental well‑being;
• The guiding principles in Kajal, Master Ayush, and Sidram on “just compensation” and avoiding token damages.

The Tribunal had awarded:

• Pain, shock and suffering: Rs. 25,000/‑;
• Loss of amenities and enjoyment of life: Rs. 1,00,000/‑.

The High Court found these figures too low for such a life‑altering injury, stating that:

• Compensation must reflect the fact that the appellant will carry this disability throughout her life;
• The physical and emotional trauma she endures is far beyond what such modest sums represent.

Accordingly, the Court:

• Increased pain, shock and suffering to Rs. 2,00,000/‑;
• Enhanced loss of amenities and enjoyment of life to Rs. 2,00,000/‑.

These enhancements align with the Supreme Court’s insistence that serious injuries should not attract merely symbolic or routine awards under non‑pecuniary heads.

3.3.4 Special Diet, Attendant, and Transportation

The Tribunal had awarded only Rs. 10,000/‑ under this composite head. The High Court considered this to be:

• “Meagre” and not commensurate with the actual demands of:
  • Hospital visits;
  • Special nutritional needs during recovery;
  • Costs of attendants or caregivers.

It accordingly increased the amount to Rs. 50,000/‑, recognizing that:

• These expenses, though sometimes difficult to document, are real and inevitable in serious injury cases;
• Courts must account for them under “just compensation” rather than ignoring or trivialising them.

3.3.5 Future Medical Expenses and Prosthetic Replacement

The evidence of the Orthopaedic Surgeon (Exh. 35 and Disability Certificate at Exh. 36) established that:

• The appellant requires an artificial leg (prosthesis);
• Such an artificial leg needs replacement every 3 to 5 years.

The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 1,00,000/‑ for future medical expenses. The High Court held this to be inadequate, considering:

• The appellant’s remaining lifespan as a young adult;
• The recurring nature of expenses for maintenance or periodic replacement of the prosthesis;
• Inflation and the likely escalation in medical costs.

Accordingly, the Court enhanced this head to Rs. 2,00,000/‑. This resonates with the Kajal principle that courts must look forward and account for the full future burden of the disability, given that the claimant cannot normally return for additional compensation later.

3.3.6 Loss of Matrimonial Prospects: A Distinct Head of Compensation

One of the most important aspects of the judgment is the explicit recognition and quantification of “loss of matrimonial prospects”.

The Court observes:

• The appellant was a young unmarried lady aged about 19 years at the time of accident;
• She suffered a permanent amputation of her left leg below the knee;
• The Tribunal had not awarded any compensation under this head.

Justice Suthar holds that, in these circumstances, the claimant is entitled to Rs. 3,00,000/‑ towards loss of matrimonial prospects. The underlying legal and social rationale includes:

• Permanent disability of this nature can significantly affect an unmarried young woman’s marriage opportunities in the social context;
• This loss is an independent aspect of loss of happiness, autonomy, and life opportunities which cannot be fully subsumed under general heads like “pain and suffering” or “loss of amenities”;
• Recognising it as a distinct head ensures that the court explicitly addresses and quantifies this particular dimension of harm.

While Supreme Court decisions have occasionally referred to concepts like loss of marriage prospects, this High Court judgment is significant in that:

• It expressly labels “loss of matrimonial prospects” as a head of compensation;
• It assigns a discrete and substantial figure (Rs. 3,00,000/‑) in the context of partial permanent disability affecting a young woman.

This sets a clear precedent within the jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court and provides practical guidance to Motor Accident Claims Tribunals in similar cases.

3.3.7 Once‑and‑For‑All Compensation and Judicial Empathy

Reiterating Kajal and Sidram, the Court underscores that:

• Motor accident compensation is generally awarded once and for all;
• The claimant cannot ordinarily return to the court later seeking increased compensation based on unforeseen future expenses;
• Therefore, Tribunals must adopt a liberal and sensitive approach in serious disability cases.

Justice Suthar emphasizes that:

• The Tribunal must have empathy and understand the psychological and social trauma of the victim;
• It is vital not to cause “subsequent trauma” by appearing indifferent or overly technical;
• Under‑compensation in such cases undermines the victim’s dignity, which is now a recognized element of the right to life under Article 21.

This normative framework justifies the substantial enhancement of non‑pecuniary heads and the inclusion of loss of matrimonial prospects.

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3.4 Impact and Significance

3.4.1 For Motor Accident Claims Tribunals in Gujarat

The judgment will likely influence MACT practice in Gujarat in several ways:

• Recognition of loss of matrimonial prospects as a distinct, quantifiable head, especially in cases involving:
  • Young unmarried women;
  • Serious permanent disability (amputation, disfigurement, etc.).
  Tribunals are now more clearly guided to:
  • Explicitly discuss matrimonial prospects in appropriate cases;
  • Avoid merging this loss entirely into generic non‑pecuniary heads.
• Enhanced benchmarks for non‑pecuniary damages:
  • The earlier figure of Rs. 25,000/‑ for pain and suffering in an amputation case is now decisively rejected as inadequate;
  • The revised figures (Rs. 2,00,000/‑ each for pain and suffering and loss of amenities, and Rs. 50,000/‑ for diet/attendant/transport) set a more realistic bar.
• Future medical expenses and prosthetics:
  • Tribunals are reminded to consider recurring costs of prosthetic devices and future treatment needs;
  • Expert medical evidence about replacement intervals should directly inform the quantum awarded.
• Emphasis on empathetic adjudication:
  • MACTs are encouraged to move beyond formulaic calculations;
  • They must consciously factor the human impact of injuries and avoid “niggardly” awards.

3.4.2 For Students and Non‑Earning Claimants

The case reinforces the principle that:

• Students or persons without provable income are still entitled to robust compensation for future loss of earnings;
• Minimum wages provide a fair baseline for notional income, which may be enhanced for future prospects, especially when the claimant is pursuing vocational or professional education.

This promotes substantive fairness by ensuring that non‑earning youth—often with substantial future potential—are not disadvantaged in compensation solely due to the absence of present income.

3.4.3 Gender, Disability, and Social Realities

By recognizing loss of matrimonial prospects for a young female amputee, the judgment:

• Acknowledges the social reality that disability can materially affect marriage prospects in the prevailing societal context;
• Ensures that this specific harm is not left unaddressed in compensation calculations.

At the same time, it is important—especially for future courts—to ensure that such recognition:

• Does not reinforce negative stereotypes or suggest that disabled persons are inherently less “marriageable”;
• Is treated as a pragmatic response to actual social prejudice, not as an endorsement of that prejudice.

When carefully applied, this head helps approximate full and fair compensation by recognizing the loss of life opportunities without devaluing the lives of disabled persons.

3.4.4 Alignment with National Jurisprudence

This judgment brings Gujarat High Court practice into closer alignment with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, by:

• Applying Govind Yadav, Sarla Verma, Kajal, Master Ayush, Sidram, and Pappu Deo Yadav in a coherent manner;
• Reaffirming the centrality of “just compensation” and the constitutional value of dignity in personal injury claims;
• Encouraging liberal awards in serious disability cases, while still remaining within rational bounds.

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4. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

4.1 Pecuniary vs Non‑Pecuniary Damages

• Pecuniary damages are financial losses that can be calculated in money terms, such as:
  • Medical expenses;
  • Loss of earnings (past and future);
  • Costs of attendant, transport, and special diet (when given a money value).
• Non‑pecuniary damages compensate for intangible harms, including:
  • Pain, shock, and suffering;
  • Loss of amenities or enjoyment of life;
  • Loss of matrimonial prospects;
  • Loss of expectation of life, disfigurement, etc.

This case mainly alters and enhances the non‑pecuniary component of the award.

4.2 “Just Compensation” (Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act)

Courts must grant compensation that is:

• Neither niggardly nor excessive—it should reflect the actual harm suffered;
• Substantial in serious injury cases, not merely token sums;
• Based on a realistic assessment of both present and future consequences of the injury.

“Just compensation” requires a degree of conjecture and estimation because not all losses can be precisely measured in money. This judgment illustrates that principle in action.

4.3 Multiplier Method

For loss of future income, courts use the multiplier method:

1. Determine the monthly income of the victim (actual or notional);
2. Deduct appropriate amounts (if necessary, e.g., for personal expenses in death cases; not usually in injury cases);
3. Apply the percentage of functional disability to that income;
4. Multiply the resulting annual loss by an age‑based multiplier (from Sarla Verma).

In this case:

• Notional income: Rs. 7,000/‑ per month;
• Disability: effectively 50% for compensation purposes;
• Age: 19 years – multiplier 18;
• This yielded a future loss of income figure of Rs. 7,56,000/‑.

4.4 Functional vs Permanent Disability

• Permanent physical disability refers to anatomical loss, like amputation, expressed as a percentage (e.g., 45% permanent partial disability).
• Functional disability refers to how that physical disability affects the person’s actual ability to work and earn in their specific vocation.

The Tribunal and High Court determined that, while the appellant’s leg was amputated below the knee, she:

• Could still potentially work as a teacher;
• Was therefore not “100% functionally disabled” but did suffer substantial loss of earning capacity.

Hence, a 50% disability was used for computing loss of earnings, striking a balance between full and minimal impairment.

4.5 Loss of Matrimonial Prospects

This head compensates for:

• The diminished likelihood of marriage or of obtaining a suitable match;
• The social and emotional loss linked to that reduction in prospects.

It is particularly relevant in cases of:

• Young unmarried persons;
• Serious and visible permanent disabilities (limb loss, disfigurement, etc.).

In this case, the Court recognized that the appellant’s amputation at 19 years adversely affects her matrimonial opportunities and accordingly fixed a compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/‑ under this head.

4.6 Once‑and‑For‑All Principle

In motor accident claims:

• The claimant generally receives a single lump sum award covering all present and future losses;
• There is typically no provision for periodic revision of the award if future expenses turn out to be higher;
• Therefore, courts must be forward‑looking and liberal, particularly in:
  • Children’s cases;
  • Cases of severe or permanent disability;
  • Where ongoing medical treatment or prosthetic replacement is needed.

The High Court founded its enhanced award partly on this principle, citing Kajal and related authorities.

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5. Conclusion

The decision in Jigishaben Maheshbhai Patel v. Sipai Mohammadkhan Rasulkhan & Ors. is a significant contribution to motor accident jurisprudence in Gujarat and beyond. It:

• Affirms the use of minimum wages and standardized multipliers for students and non‑earning claimants;
• Retains the Tribunal’s pecuniary findings on income loss and medical expenses, ensuring stability in methods of quantification;
• Substantially enhances non‑pecuniary damages (pain, suffering, loss of amenities, attendant and diet costs, future medical expenses) in line with recent Supreme Court guidance on “just compensation”;
• Recognizes and quantifies “loss of matrimonial prospects” as a distinct head of compensation, awarding Rs. 3,00,000/‑ to a young unmarried amputee;
• Reinforces the duty of Tribunals to decide claims with empathy and sensitivity, conscious of the constitutional value of dignity and the severe life‑long consequences of serious injuries.

In practical terms, this judgment provides clear benchmarks and doctrinal clarity to Motor Accident Claims Tribunals and appellate courts. It underscores that in cases of serious and permanent disability—especially for young claimants— non‑pecuniary losses must be addressed fully and explicitly, including the impact on matrimonial prospects, lifestyle, autonomy, and dignity.

Approved for reporting, the decision is likely to serve as a guiding authority in future cases involving young amputees and other seriously injured claimants, ensuring that compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act moves closer to the ideal of being truly “just, fair, and reasonable.”