¶23 IT IS ORDERED that the GCA's Petition for Declaratory Judgment on Original Jurisdiction is GRANTED in part as follows:
1. The GCA's petition presents a justiciable question, and she has standing to seek a declaratory ruling as to whether Montana counties may lawfully disseminate CCJI to ICE without a court order.
2. The AG does not have supervisory authority over a county attorney when the county attorney acts as legal advisor to the county and its subdivisions. The AG exceeded his authority in this instance by attempting to direct the GCA's legal advice to county offices and employees. Accordingly, the AG's order asserting supervisory control over the Gallatin County Attorney's Office is unenforceable.
3. On or before December 7, 2026, the parties shall submit simultaneous briefs addressing the following issues:
(1) Whether ICE is a "criminal justice agency" as defined by §§ 44-5-103(2), and -103(7)(b), MCA, and whether that determination can be made as a matter of law or requires a factual determination.
(2) Whether a "criminal justice agency" as defined by §§ 44-5-103(2), and -103(7)(b), MCA, is entitled to confidential criminal justice information solely by virtue of its status as a "criminal justice agency." The Clerk is directed to provide notice of this Order to all counsel of record.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2026. /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
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We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE
Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson, concurring. ¶24 I concur in the Court's Opinion and Order. I write separately to address the Court's incomplete treatment of Fletcher, as it applies to the Attorney General's supervisory control over a county attorney, and in consideration of the political question doctrine. ¶25 The Court correctly describes the county attorney role as a dual state and local government officer, and this dispute involves Cromwell's role as a county officer advising her local government client on areas of civil law. This is not a dispute confined entirely within the functioning of the legal arm of the executive branch, as the Attorney General argues. If that were the case, I would agree it is a political question and the Court should not interfere between the Attorney General and a county attorney with regard to legal representation of state legal interests.
¶26 While the Court's treatment of Fletcher is correct, it addresses a slightly different question. Fletcher stands for the proposition that the Attorney General can entirely direct a county attorney's prosecution decisions when enforcing state criminal law, even to the point of requiring the county attorney to dismiss a case. Fletcher, 260 Mont. at 416,
859 P.2d at 996. But, crucially for analysis of the political question doctrine, Fletcher did
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not come to us from a county attorney complaining about the Attorney General's oversight. It came to us because the Attorney General directed the Lincoln County Attorney to refrain from using certain tainted investigative evidence in the prosecution of twenty-four criminal cases, and then directed the Lincoln County Attorney to dismiss those cases due to lack of remaining untainted evidence. The district court declined to grant the motions to dismiss, and the erstwhile criminal defendants filed a petition for a writ of supervisory control. Fletcher, 260 Mont. at 412-14, 859 P.2d 993-94. The criminal defendants had standing to challenge the district court's refusal to grant the Lincoln County Attorney's motions (as directed by the Attorney General) to dismiss.
¶27 Fletcher holds not only that the Attorney General has authority to direct a county attorney in the manner she prosecutes a criminal case, but also that the district court violated the separation of powers by declining to grant the Attorney General-directed motions to dismiss. Fletcher, 260 Mont. at 416, 418, 859 P.2d at 996-97. Nowhere in Fletcher did we hold a county attorney's petition challenging the Attorney General's supervision of a county attorney's criminal prosecution duties is subject to judicial review and not amenable to the political question doctrine. The Court's treatment is incomplete when it observes, "Obviously, the Attorney General's assertion of supervisory control was subject to judicial review because we reviewed it and determined that, in that particular instance, he did not exceed the supervisory authority conferred by § 2-15-501, MCA."
Opinion, ¶ 10. We reviewed it because the truly aggrieved parties—the criminal defendants—petitioned for our review when the District Court questioned the Attorney General's direction of the County Attorney and the merits of the Attorney General-directed
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motions to dismiss. That does not necessarily mean a county attorney may petition us to review the Attorney General's direction to her in her role as an attorney representing the state in a legal matter.
¶28 That history, however, illustrates why this case is different. This is not a dispute about a county attorney's role enforcing state law under the direction of the Attorney General. It is a dispute about the Attorney General's assertion of state authority over the County Attorney's exercise of her legal duties to her local government client. Such assertion of authority is susceptible to judicial review for the reasons articulated by the Court.
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON