Christopher Dineaa Bahtuoh v. State of Minnesota

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A25-1587

Hennepin County Christopher Dineaa Bahtuoh, Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota, Respondent.

Hennesy, J.

Took no part, Aligada, Jr., J. Filed: October 28, 2026 Office of Appellate Courts ________________________ Nico Ratkowski, Ratkowski Law, PLLC, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant. Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

Because the felony-murder jury instruction at appellant's trial required the jury to find that appellant intended to kill another person when he aided and abetted first-degree felony murder, there is no reasonable probability that he is entitled to relief under the Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68. Affirmed.

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O P I N I O N

HENNESY, Justice. Appellant Christopher Dineaa Bahtuoh appeals the district court's summary denial of his preliminary application for relief under a 2023 session law providing certain defendants convicted of first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability a path to challenge their convictions. Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68 (the Act). In 2010, a jury found Bahtuoh guilty of multiple offenses, including first-degree felony murder committed for the benefit of a gang. The State did not allege that Bahtuoh killed the victim himself, but instead that he aided and abetted the shooter who did. The district court instructed the jury that to find Bahtuoh guilty of first-degree felony murder, it must find that Bahtuoh intended his assistance of the shooter to cause the victim's death. We affirmed Bahtuoh's conviction on direct appeal.

In 2025, Bahtuoh filed a preliminary application in the district court asking the court to find there is a reasonable probability he is entitled to relief under the Act, which the district court summarily denied. Bahtuoh appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying his preliminary application because it erred in determining there is no reasonable probability he is entitled to relief under the Act and because the Act does not authorize summary denial under these circumstances. Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying Bahtuoh's preliminary application, we conclude that denial of the application would nonetheless have been appropriate under subdivision 5(h) of the Act

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because there is no reasonable probability that Bahtuoh is entitled to relief. The jury instructions required the jury to find that Bahtuoh acted with intent to cause death when it returned a guilty verdict for felony murder. Because a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bahtuoh acted with the intent to kill, no rational person could believe that Bahtuoh might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence at an evidentiary hearing that he did not act with intent to cause death.

We also reject Bahtuoh's arguments that the amelioration doctrine and rule of lenity require the district court to resolve any uncertainties in the Act in favor of a petitioner, as well as his argument that the district court's denial of his preliminary application abridged his right to testify. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Bahtuoh's preliminary application on other grounds.

FACTS

On April 28, 2009, Kyle Parker was killed in a drive-by shooting in North Minneapolis. On September 25, 2009, a Hennepin County grand jury indicted Bahtuoh on six charges related to the shooting: (1) first-degree premeditated murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1); (2) first-degree premeditated murder committed for the benefit of a gang in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1) and 609.229, subd. 2;¹

(3) first-degree intentional murder during a felony drive-by shooting in violation of Minn.

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Stat. § 609.185(a)(3);²(4) first-degree intentional murder during a felony drive-by shooting committed for the benefit of a gang in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(3) and 609.229, subd. 2; (5) second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1); and (6) second-degree intentional murder committed for the benefit of a gang in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 1(1), and 609.229, subd. 2. The indictment alleged Bahtuoh committed these offenses under both principal and aiding- and-abetting theories of criminal liability.

The Trial

At trial, the State's evidence included the following testimony. Around the time of the offense, Bahtuoh was affiliated with members of the 1-9 gang in North Minneapolis. Bahtuoh knew Parker, who was a member of the rival Taliban gang. On the afternoon of April 28, 2009, Bahtuoh repeatedly drove back and forth between a 1-9 gang house and a residential block in North Minneapolis where Parker sometimes stayed with his mother. Between 6:31 p.m. and 7:58 p.m., Bahtuoh's cell phone placed 13 calls to phone numbers associated with other 1-9 gang members. When Parker exited his mother's house around 8:00 p.m., Bahtuoh and Lamont McGee,³another 1-9 member, were waiting nearby in Bahtuoh's car. Upon spotting Parker, Bahtuoh drove past the house, turned around, and

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pulled up to the curb, orienting the passenger side of the vehicle to face Parker. Bahtuoh rolled down the passenger-side window and called out to Parker. As Parker approached, McGee shot him several times from the passenger seat. Bahtuoh immediately sped away from the scene, running a stop sign. He did not attempt to stop or intervene in the shooting, nor did he attempt to render aid or call 911. At the scene, Parker told his sister that Bahtuoh was responsible for the shooting. Parker died shortly thereafter. In its closing statement, the State did not assert that Bahtuoh was the shooter; instead, the State argued that Bahtuoh knew that a gang-related shooting would occur and that he intended his actions to aid in Parker's killing. The district court instructed the jury that to find Bahtuoh guilty on count four, first-degree felony murder committed for the benefit of a gang, it must find the State proved six elements beyond a reasonable doubt, including that Bahtuoh "acted with the intent to kill Kyle Parker":

First, the death of Kyle Parker must be proven.

Second, the defendant, acting alone or intentionally aiding and abetting another, caused the death of Kyle Parker.

Third, the defendant, acting alone or intentionally aiding and abetting another, acted with the intent to kill Kyle Parker. To find the defendant had an intent to kill, you must find that the defendant acted with the purpose of causing death or believed that the act would have that result.…

Fourth, at the time of the act causing the death of Kyle Parker, the defendant, acting alone or intentionally aiding and abetting another, was engaged in the act of committing or attempting to commit the crime of drive-by shooting…. Fifth, the defendant committed this act for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, or motivated by involvement with a criminal gang. Sixth, the defendant acted with the intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.

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(Emphasis added.) Neither party objected to the jury instructions. The jury acquitted Bahtuoh of counts one and two—the first-degree premeditated murder counts—but found him guilty on all other charges. The district court entered a judgment of conviction on count four, first-degree felony murder committed for the benefit of a gang, and sentenced Bahtuoh to life in prison with the possibility of release after 31 years.

The First Consolidated Appeal

Bahtuoh appealed his conviction to our court. We stayed the appeal to allow Bahtuoh to petition for postconviction relief. State v. Bahtuoh, No. A10-1584, Order at 1 (Minn. filed Nov. 16, 2010). The district court denied the petition, and Bahtuoh appealed that decision to us as well.⁴We consolidated Bahtuoh's appeals and affirmed his conviction. State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 808, 809 (Minn. 2013). In that appeal, Bahtuoh raised two issues relevant here. First, Bahtuoh challenged the sufficiency of the State's evidence that he intentionally aided McGee in committing a drive-by shooting— the predicate crime underlying the first-degree felony-murder charges. Id. at 809. We reviewed the circumstances proved at trial and concluded the State presented sufficient

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evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bahtuoh "knew of a planned shooting and intended to further the shooting."⁵Id. at 811.

Second, Bahtuoh argued that the district court plainly erred by giving the jury a general instruction suggesting that a defendant's intentional presence at a crime scene was sufficient to establish that the defendant knew the principal would commit a crime and intended their actions to further the commission of that crime.⁶Id. at 812; cf. Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2008) (defining the mental state elements of aiding-and-abetting

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liability). We observed, however, that any error in giving this instruction was

"counterbalanced" by the district court's charging instruction for the first-degree felony murder charged in count four, which required the jury to find that Bahtuoh had the specific intent to kill the victim. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d at 813. We concluded that the jury instructions, read as a whole, imposed a higher mental state requirement than the aiding- and-abetting statute—which, at the time, only required the State to prove that the defendant intentionally aided in the commission of the crime underlying the first-degree felony-murder charge⁷—because the instructions required the jury to find that Bahtuoh

"acted with the intent to kill Kyle Parker" before returning a guilty verdict on count four. Id. at 814-15. We therefore concluded that any instructional error did not affect Bahtuoh's substantial rights because "the district court instructed the jury that Bahtuoh had to possess the intent to kill Parker, rather than the lesser state of mind of knowledge that McGee would commit a crime." Id. at 815 n.1.

The Act

At the time of Bahtuoh's indictment, trial, and appeal, the accomplice liability statute did not require the State to prove that a defendant had the intent to kill another

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person in order to establish liability for first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and- abetting theory. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05 (2008); supra at 8 n.7 (explaining the effect of the expansive liability provision). But about ten years after we decided Bahtuoh's consolidated appeal, the Legislature amended the expansive liability provision in the Act such that a person can be convicted of first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and- abetting theory of liability only if that person "intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured the other with the intent to cause the death of a human being." Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 3, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 850 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2a(a) (2024)). The Legislature also established procedures by which defendants convicted of felony murder prior to this amendment could petition for relief. See the Act.

Bahtuoh's Petition

On August 1, 2025, Bahtuoh filed a preliminary application for relief under the Act. Bahtuoh's application alleges that he did not know McGee had a gun on the night of the murder and did not aid McGee with intent to cause Parker's death.⁸The district court denied Bahtuoh's preliminary application in an order titled "Order Summarily Denying Preliminary Application for Relief." The district court concluded that there was no reasonable probability Bahtuoh was entitled to relief. In denying Bahtuoh's application,

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the district court relied on this court's conclusion in Bahtuoh's consolidated appeal that there was sufficient evidence that Bahtuoh intended to further the shooting. The district court reasoned that the same facts upon which we relied in that appeal to conclude Bahtuoh intended to further Parker's shooting established that he intended to cause Parker's death.

Bahtuoh now appeals.

ANALYSIS

Before turning to the parties' arguments, we briefly describe the postconviction procedures and requirements set forth in the Act, as clarified by our case law. We then discuss whether Bahtuoh's preliminary application establishes a reasonable probability that he is entitled to relief under the Act. We conclude by addressing Bahtuoh's arguments regarding our amelioration doctrine, the rule of lenity, and his right to testify.

A.

As relevant here, the Act creates a pathway to relief for individuals convicted of first-degree felony murder, under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3), before the State was required to prove a defendant intended to cause another person's death to secure a conviction under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability. The Act requires a district court to vacate an applicant's conviction and sentence if the applicant can establish that they "neither caused the death of a human being nor intentionally aided … another with the intent to cause such a death." State v. Griffin (Griffin V), 24 N.W.3d 247, 249 (Minn. 2025).

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This pathway to relief has two steps, only the first of which is relevant here. An applicant seeking relief under the Act must first file a preliminary application in district court containing information about the applicant and the offense of conviction, as well as a "brief statement … explaining why the applicant is entitled to relief." The Act, subd. 4(a)(6). The Act permits the district court three possible responses to a preliminary application. See generally State v. Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d 847, 854 (Minn. 2026) (describing the preliminary application procedures the Act prescribes). First, the district court "may summarily deny" a preliminary application for any one of the reasons enumerated in subdivision 5(e) of the Act, including if "the issues raised in the application … have previously been decided by the court of appeals or the supreme court in the same case."⁹The Act, subd. 5(e)(4). Second, the district court may deny a preliminary application under subdivision 5(h) of the Act if it determines "there is not a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief." Id., subd. 5(h); Zielinski,

32 N.W.3d at 854. We have clarified that there is no reasonable probability an applicant is entitled to relief if the application, materials, and relevant records "would cause no rational person to believe that [] at an evidentiary hearing, the applicant might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they neither caused nor intentionally aided … another with the intent to cause the death of a human being." Zielinski,

32 N.W.3d at 858-59. Third, and finally, if the district court determines that there is a

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reasonable probability an applicant is entitled to relief, it may advance their application to the petition stage. Id. at 854. Denial of a preliminary application is an appealable order, which we review for abuse of discretion. Griffin V, 24 N.W.3d at 254. Recently, in State v. Zielinski, we clarified the difference between a summary denial under subdivision 5(e) and a denial for lack of reasonable probability under subdivision 5(h). We held that a district court "may not summarily deny a first-time preliminary application for a reason other than those enumerated in subdivision 5(e)."¹⁰ Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d at 856-57. Because failure to establish a reasonable probability of entitlement to relief is not among those reasons, a district court abuses its discretion when it summarily denies a preliminary application on that basis—notwithstanding that subdivision 5(h) permits the district court to (non-summarily) deny a preliminary application for lack of reasonable probability upon notice to the applicant. Id.

B.

Bahtuoh argues the district court erred when it determined that there is no reasonable probability he is entitled to relief. He asserts the district court conflated intent to aid in or abet the drive-by shooting—the intent required for the felony underlying the felony-murder charge in count four—with intent to cause death as the amended aiding- and-abetting statute requires to sustain a felony murder conviction. Bahtuoh also relatedly

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claims the district court erred by concluding he acted with the intent to cause death based on the circumstantial evidence we identified as supporting Bahtuoh's felony-murder conviction on direct appeal. Bahtuoh additionally argues that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying his preliminary application based on a finding that there was no reasonable probability he was entitled to relief—a reason not among those enumerated in subdivision 5(e).¹¹

Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying Bahtuoh's preliminary application,¹²we conclude that denial of the application would nonetheless have been appropriate under subdivision 5(h) of the Act because there is no reasonable probability that Bahtuoh is entitled to relief. See Zielinski,

32 N.W.3d at 859 (reaching the issue of reasonable probability in the "interest of judicial economy" because "the district court made a determination as to reasonable probability, the parties briefed and argued the issue, and we [could] resolve it on the record presented" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the application, materials, and relevant records establish that the jury determined Bahtuoh intended to cause death when he aided and abetted felony murder, Bahtuoh cannot establish a reasonable probability that he is entitled to relief under the Act.

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To establish a reasonable probability of entitlement to relief, a preliminary application must "allege facts that would cause a rational person to believe that at an evidentiary hearing, the applicant might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they neither caused nor intentionally aided … another with the intent to cause the death of a human being." Id. at 858. Although at the time of Bahtuoh's trial aiding and abetting felony murder did not require proof of an intent to kill another person, the district court nevertheless instructed the jury that it was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Bahtuoh "acted with the intent to kill Kyle Parker" to return a guilty verdict on the first-degree felony-murder charge at issue here. The relevant instruction further specified: "To find the defendant had an intent to kill, you must find that the defendant acted with the purpose of causing death or believed that the act would have that result." We assume that the jury properly followed the district court's instructions. State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 578 (Minn. 2009).

This assumption is bolstered by the State's closing argument, in which it argued at length that Bahtuoh himself—not just the shooter—acted with intent to cause death. Bahtuoh offers no reason to depart from that assumption here.¹³And it is immaterial that

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the aiding-and-abetting statute in effect at the time of the offense did not make intent to cause death an element of first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The State took on a higher burden because the jury was instructed that it had to find Bahtuoh intended to cause death in order to find him guilty of first-degree felony murder—the same burden the statute now requires. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2a(a). The jury concluded the State met that burden beyond a reasonable doubt. For those reasons, the application and records of relevant proceedings would not cause a rational person to believe that at an evidentiary hearing Bahtuoh might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not intentionally aid another with the intent to cause Parker's death. See Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d at 858-59. Thus, the application presents no reasonable probability that Bahtuoh is entitled to relief.

C.

Bahtuoh also argues that the amelioration doctrine and rule of lenity require us to construe the Act in favor of applicants and resolve "any uncertainty about whether [Bahtuoh's] conduct meets the [Act's] heightened intent requirement … in his favor." But we recently rejected nearly identical arguments in State v. Green, 35 N.W.3d 1, 16-17 (Minn. 2026). There, we explained that the amelioration doctrine applies to cases that are not yet final when a statute is amended to mitigate criminal punishment. Id. at 16. "[T]he doctrine is about which law applies—the old law or the amended one—to criminal cases that are pending when the law changes." Id. at 17. Here, because the Legislature expressly made its amendments to Minn. Stat. § 609.05 retroactive by creating a process for individuals convicted under the prior version of the statute to petition for relief, it is

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"unnecessary" to apply the amelioration doctrine. Green, 35 N.W.3d at 17. In any event, Bahtuoh—like Green—would not meet our requirements for applying the doctrine because the district court entered final judgment in his case well before the Act took effect. Id.

The rule of lenity is equally inapplicable here. Our cases are clear that the rule is a statutory construction "canon of last resort" that applies only when other canons fail to resolve ambiguities in a criminal statute. E.g., State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 440 (Minn. 2017). Here, however, Bahtuoh makes no argument that the Act is ambiguous in any manner that affects his eligibility for relief.

Finally, in his briefing before us, Bahtuoh argued that in summarily denying his preliminary application the district court effectively rejected Bahtuoh's "testimony"—in the form of his allegations in the application—as "self-serving." He asserted that the district court's decision implicates the constitutional principle that a defendant may not be disqualified from testifying because of bias and contends that this was structural constitutional error requiring automatic reversal. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991). Bahtuoh conceded at oral argument, however, that the constitutional right to testify does not apply to postconviction proceedings. Bahtuoh now acknowledges that any right to testify in postconviction proceedings must be found, if at all, in our postconviction statutes, Minn. Stat. § 590.01 et seq. But a postconviction court need not even schedule a hearing on a petition—at which a petitioner could testify—if "the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief." Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1. Because that is likewise the case

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here, the district court's denial of Bahtuoh's preliminary application did not abridge any right to testify.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court. Affirmed.

ALIGADA, Jr., J., not having been a member of the court at the time of submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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