Per Curiam
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Petitioner is a Justice of the Canandaigua Town Court in Ontario County. He challenges the determination of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct ("Commission") sustaining two charges of misconduct against him and determining that he should be removed from office (see NY Const, art VI, § 22; Judiciary Law § 44). We conclude that petitioner committed misconduct and the sanction of removal is warranted.
I.
Petitioner was first elected to serve on the Canandaigua Town Court in 1999; his current term expires on December 31, 2027. In April 2025, petitioner was served by the Commission with notice of a formal written complaint, which included two charges.
Charge I alleged that on or about May 10, 2024, petitioner used a racial slur, "the n-word," at least three times during a conversation with a court staff member and an Assistant Public Defender in the parking lot outside the Ontario County Jail following court proceedings.
In testifying before the Commission's referee, petitioner stated that he used the word in recounting a story about his father, which he claimed was in furtherance of the lesson that "the differences among us could be bridged if we were all devoted to tolerance and dignity and respect and friendship." As to the racial slur in question, petitioner described it as
"derogatory" and "horribly inappropriate," but repeatedly denied using the word himself, instead maintaining that he was simply "quoting [his] father." He stated that [*2]doing so added "authenticity" and "[c]ontext and color" to the story, and that if he had used a euphemism instead, "nobody would have understood what [he] was talking about." He denied that using the word in that context could create the appearance of racial bias or prejudice. The referee found that petitioner's testimony lacked credibility in several respects: first, in asserting that he had used the slur only once; second, in claiming he had prefaced the story with a disclaimer that he would use the "vernacular . .
. [of] the time"; and third, in asserting that he would have told the story the same way had a Black person been present. The referee also found unpersuasive petitioner's explanation for why he felt it was necessary to use the word. Charge II alleged that on or about May 15, 2024, petitioner made racially insensitive comments after the arraignment of a Black woman, whom the Commission referred to as Ms. D. Ms. D appeared in court with visible injuries to her face and said that she needed to return to the hospital for treatment. When petitioner denied her request for pre-trial release without bail, she became upset, stating that she was in "a racist-ass county," that she was "the wrong color to be [t]here," and that petitioner was "holding [her] because [she's] African American." After Ms. D left the courtroom, petitioner stated from the bench, "Naturally she played the race card." He then said to the Assistant Public Defender who had represented Ms. D during the arraignment, "She was pretty well restrained so she couldn't attack you, but she probably would have if she hadn't been handcuffed."
Petitioner's testimony as to whether the "race card" statement was appropriate or could create the appearance of bias was inconsistent. The referee found petitioner's testimony that he was not aware of the extent of Ms. D's injuries not credible.
The referee sustained both charges and concluded that petitioner's conduct violated 22 NYCRR §§ 100.1 (requiring judges to "preserve[ ]" "the integrity and independence of the judiciary"), 100.2 (A) (requiring judges to "act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary"), 100.3 (B) (4) (requiring
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judges to conduct their judicial duties in a manner that does "not, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice . . . based upon . . . race"), and 100.4 (A) (1)-(2) (requiring judges to conduct all "extra-judicial activities so that they do not:
(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge; [or] (2) detract from the dignity of judicial office").
The Commission concluded that the evidence sustained the charges and that the appropriate sanction was removal. The Commission found unpersuasive petitioner's reason for making the "race card" comment â namely, that he "felt badly"
for Ms. D â and determined that his statements "taken together showed indicia of racial animus and insensitivity." It noted petitioner's apparent lack of awareness of the impact and impropriety of his statements and his attempts to minimize his behavior, and it concluded that petitioner had engaged in misconduct. Regarding the sanction, the Commission concluded that petitioner had "irreparably damaged confidence that he can be and appear to be fair and impartial," and that he should be removed from office. That conclusion rested in part on various "aggravating factor[s],"
including petitioner's minimization of his conduct and his failure to accept responsibility for and understand the impact of his statements, as well as his lack of credibility and his prior receipt of two Letters of Dismissal and Caution.FN1
II.
A.
We have "plenary power to review the law and the facts" underlying the Commission's judicial misconduct determination (Matter of Greenfield, 76 NY2d 293, 295 [1990]). Upon our independent review of the record, we conclude that the evidence supports the Commission's determination that petitioner committed misconduct. The Commission's factual findings are supported by the record. We accord the adverse credibility findings made by the Commission and the referee "due deference" (Matter of Collazo [State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 91 NY2d 251, 253 [1998]). Those findings, coupled with petitioner's admissions, the testimony of other witnesses, and corroborating evidence, are fully sufficient to support the finding that petitioner's conduct demonstrated "at least the appearance of racial bias," which could undermine public confidence in the judiciary.
The Commission's legal determination that petitioner's actions constituted misconduct is also sound. The racial slur used by petitioner was unquestionably offensive and was followed just days later by petitioner's racially biased, on-the- record comments regarding a Black defendant who had appeared before him. Petitioner's inability to recognize the impact that his statements could have on the public's confidence [*3]in the judiciary's impartiality and integrity demonstrates his lack of understanding of the need for judges "to both be and appear to be impartial" (Matter of Ayres [New York State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 30 NY3d 59, 66 [2017]; see also Matter of Putorti [New York State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 40 NY3d 359, 367 [2023] ["Judges must 'act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary' " and "perform their judicial duties" without " 'by words or conduct, manifest(ing) bias or prejudice' based upon race"], quoting §§ 100.2 [A] and 100.3 [B] [4]). Petitioner's arguments for rejecting the Commission's legal findings lack merit. Petitioner asks us to modify what he describes as a "strict liability rule" from Matter of Agresta (64 NY2d 327 [1985]). Agresta does not establish such a rule. Petitioner further asserts that there is no consensus as to the propriety of his language and that it was improper for the Commission to hold him to a higher standard than the general public (see Matter of Senzer, 35 NY3d 216, 219 [2020], quoting Matter of Tamsen, 100 NY2d 19, 21 [2003]). Any purported lack of consensus would not obviate the finding that petitioner's conduct underlying the charges here reflect racial bias (see Putorti, 40 NY3d at 366, 368 [noting that petitioner's "repeated( ) and gratuitous( )" references to a litigant's race "exhibit(ed) bias or, at least, implicit bias"], quoting Matter of Spector v State Commn. on Jud. Conduct, 47 NY2d 462, 466 [1979]; see also Matter of Pennington, 2006 Ann Rep of NY Commn on Jud Conduct at 224, 226 ["Regardless of whether (petitioner's) remarks were knowingly racist or simply ill-considered, the use of such language by a judicial officer serves to undermine public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary"]).
B.
Removal is an "extreme sanction" that "is warranted only in the event of 'truly egregious circumstances' " (Putorti, 40 NY3d at 367, quoting Matter of Restaino [State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 10 NY3d 577, 589 [2008]). Here, the multiple grounds for the Commission's determination â petitioner's offensive statements, combined with the adverse credibility findings, his failure to take responsibility for or appreciate the impact of his conduct,FN2 and his receipt of two prior letters of caution â warrant that result. The Commission's determination accords with prior cases in which we have accepted a sanction of removal (see Ayres, 30 NY3d at 64 ["The inability to recognize the seriousness of one's misconduct and the failure to heed a prior warning are significant aggravating factors, and can be grounds for removal"]; Putorti, 40 NY3d at 368 [emphasizing petitioner's failure to "show remorse," his "denial . . . of facts to which he previously stipulated," and the existence of ongoing investigations into his prior conduct]; Matter of Mason [State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 100 NY2d 56, 60 [2003] [highlighting petitioner's "lack of candor as evidenced by the inconsistent and evasive explanations he offered at different points in the proceeding"]; Matter of Aldrich v State Commn. on Jud. Conduct, 58 NY2d 279, 283 [1983] [noting that petitioner "fails to recognize the inappropriateness of his actions"]; Matter of Going, 97 NY2d 121, 126 [2001] [noting the petitioner's "lack of contrition" and the prior admonishments he had received]; cf. Matter of Watson, 100 NY2d 290, 303-304 [2003] [modifying sanction from removal to censure where the "petitioner expressed remorse," "acknowledged before the Commission that he exercised extremely poor judgment," and acknowledged his misconduct]). We reject petitioner's assertion that his sanction is too severe because the petitioner in Agresta, who used the same slur on the bench, was censured rather than removed (see
64 NY2d at 329-330). In the more than four decades since Agresta, the Unified Court System has provided extensive training and issued repeated guidance about explicit and implicit bias and inappropriate or insensitive languageânot limited to race, but including a broad set of other classifications as well. Our ethical rules also make clear that judicial
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officers are held to a higher standard of conduct than is the general public. Petitioner's conduct must be viewed in that context.
III.
Petitioner also raises several as-applied constitutional challenges for the first time before this Court. Those challenges lack a supporting factual record (see Judiciary Law § 44 [9]).FN3
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission's determination of misconduct is supported by the record, and the sanction of removal is warranted. Accordingly, the determined sanction should be accepted, without costs, and Hon. Walter W. Jones removed from the office of Justice of the Canandaigua Town Court, Ontario County. Determined sanction accepted, without costs, and Hon. Walter W. Jones removed from the office of Justice of the Canandaigua Town Court, Ontario County. Opinion Per Curiam. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Garcia, Singas, Cannataro, Troutman and Halligan concur. Judge Rivera took no part.
Decided October 27, 2026
Footnotes
Footnote 1 The first letter, issued in August 2021, concerned petitioner's alleged ex parte communications with a complaining witness and his alleged failure to comply with COVID-19 safety protocols. The second, issued in March 2024, concerned petitioner's alleged neglect of administrative responsibilities, which led to "an unexplained surplus" of "fines and fees"
in his court accounts. Both contained warnings that petitioner should adhere to several of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct that form the basis for the charges here.
Footnote 2
To the extent petitioner suggests that the Commission improperly penalizes judges "for not apologizing or showing remorse,"" the Commission may properly consider the risk of recurrent conduct.
Footnote 3
We see no basis for concluding that our approach "operates to the particular disadvantage" of federal claims (Walker v Martin, 562 US 307, 321 [2011]).
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