Engellant v. Crowley Fleck

Judicial District Court's judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Crowley Fleck, PLLP, and Daniel McLean. Appellees respond in opposition.

M. R. App. P. 20 provides that the Court will consider a petition for rehearing only in limited circumstances when: (1) the Court "overlooked ^somefactmaterial^tothe decision"; (2) the Court "overlooked some question presented by counsel that would have proven decisive to the case"; or (3) "its decision

conflicts^withastatute^orcontrolling decision not addressed by the supreme court."

Kevin Engellant asserts that rehearing is warranted

because^theCourt overlooked the controlling inquiry—not when Kevin knew the malpractice

action existed^butwhen Kevin "knew or should have known of his interest in

the case requiring intervention."

Kevin asserts that he had no reason to intervene until

the trial revealed that "the validity of the 2012 Will was transformed into an issue for the

malpractice jury." Crowley Fleck responds that, as this Court observed, the validity ^ofthe2012Will,^andCrowley Fleck's assertion that it negated causation, were part of the case as soon as Crowley Fleck filed its Answer to the Complaint in August 2020. Crowley Fleck argues further that, as only the Personal Representative had standing to file a professional

negligence action, Kevin^had no legally cognizable interest in the litigation and

could^nothavesuffered prejudice^bythe denial of intervention. Crowley Fleck points out this Court's express determination that the jury's verdict has no bearing on the probate court's

orders^andasserts^thatittherefore cannot prejudice Kevin's interest in the probate action. In any event, as the District Court found, any interests Kevin had were adequately represented by Daren in the litigation. Finally, by the time Kevin filed his motion to intervene and associated request for new trial, the case had been pending for more than four years and had just completed an eight-day trial. Crowley Fleck asserts that granting

Kevin intervention^atthatbelated stage would have seriously prejudiced the Defendants. Crowley

Fleck concludes^byarguing^that Kevin's petition reargues issues he already raised ^orcould^haveraised^andwhich^thisCourt already rejected. Appellee Shana Diekhans joins Crowley

Fleck's argumentsⁱⁿfull. Daren Engellant contends that all three criteria of ^{M.R.App.P.20aremet.He} asserts first that, by characterizing his argument as essentially one of collateral estoppel.

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the Court overlooked the question presented by the Estate—^that § 72-3-317, MCA, expressly makes a formal testacy order "final as to all persons" concerning issues relevant to whether the decedent left a valid will. Second, Daren argues that, in concluding that the Estate suffered no prejudice from the trial court's removal from its jury instructions of the agreed fact regarding Greg's 1978 Will having been probated, the Court overlooked the material effect of Instruction 33, which directed the jury to "disregard all evidence and comments of counsel regarding any ruling that the probate

court^hasorhasnotmade."

Third, Daren asserts that this Court's conclusion that ^{ifthe2012Willwas}valid^theEstate suffered no injury from Gregory's September 2012 transfer ^ofhisERCstock overlooks^the distinct question presented by the Estate's malpractice

claim: whether Defendants' negligence caused Gregory to relinquish his property during his lifetime. Daren urges the Court to find that his arguments do not simply rehash issues he raised and briefed on appeal because they "concern a statutory finality rule the Opinion did not address, material facts affecting the Court's harmlessness determination, and

a separate lifetime-injury question the jury never reached."

Crowley Fleck responds that Daren's petition essentially presents two core objections—the same objections he presented, couched under multiple theories, throughout this litigation and that this Court already rejected. Crowley Fleck points out that Daren's petition continues to claim—as he did in his appellate briefing—(1) that the trial court should have found the formal probate proceeding ^tohaveresolved^the"identical

•i.e., the validity of the 2012 will—for purposes of

assessing causation^and damages in the malpractice action and (2) that the court was wrong to conclude that finding a valid 2012 Will necessarily meant the Estate suffered

no injury from the separate September 2012 stock transfer. Crowley Fleck asserts that all of Daren's arguments boil down to his claim that the admission of Gregory Engellant's 1978 Will to probate in the probate proceeding conclusively established that will ^asGreg's valid^lastwilland testament when he died and estopped Crowley Fleck from arguing otherwise in defense of the Estate's negligence claim. These arguments, Crowley

Fleck contends,^weremade issue

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repeatedly throughout the litigation, raised and briefed on appeal, and considered and finally resolved by this Court's Opinion.

Regarding the omission of Agreed Fact No. 20, Crowley Fleck points out that this Court already addressed and rejected Daren's arguments and argues that the Court need not address them again. Instruction 33 cannot have prejudiced Daren because, as this Court has already concluded, "Instruction 33's directive

that the probate court had yet to reach a final judgment is accurate and consistent with the

record.

Crowley Fleck argues that although Daren has reframed the arguments in his rehearing petition, they still seek only to urge this Court to reconsider—on the same basis Daren

already argued—its holding that the probate presents a separate and distinct issue ^fromthedetermination^ofcausation^and damages in this negligence case.

Finally, addressing Daren's argument that this Court overlooked an alleged

"separate injury to Gregory and his Estate," Crowley Fleck points out that Daren did not challenge, at any point in this appeal or in his petition for rehearing, the District Court's Order granting Crowley Fleck's motion for judgment ^asamatter^oflawonhisclaims^for all damages other than the value of the stock. Thus, as the Concurring Opinion stated clearly, Daren did not preserve a distinct claim for damages arising from Gregory's loss of ownership, control, or use of the stock during his

lifetime. Having fully considered the Engellants' petitions and the Appellees' responses, the Court concludes that rehearing is not warranted under M. R. App. P. 20.

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Justices

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