Wallkill Val. Land Trust, Inc. v. Richards

rail trail â​​ to the Wallkill Valley Railway Company to allow for the construction of a railbed and the laying of tracks for passage over the property. This conveyance was subject to the condition that the Railway erect and maintain a "good and sufficient fence" along the rail trail. However, to access and cultivate the portion of the property adjoining the river, defendant and Bartel's predecessor in title constructed and maintained a passage across the rail trail. Relevantly, a 1917 map identifies a "[f]arm [c]rossing" bisecting the rail trail. When the railbed was constructed, embankments were created on either side â​​ the parcels â​​ as well as drainage ditches. In 1977, the Railway ceased operations and did not continue to maintain the areas adjacent to the rail trail. The owners of 56 Sand Hill Road at that time assumed control of the maintenance of the parcels to, among other things, maintain the farm crossing. At some point prior to 1991, the Railway conveyed the rail trail to the Consolidated Rail Corporation which, in 1991, transferred the rail trail to plaintiff. In 1996, defendant's father purchased the property at 56 Sand Hill Road, and he and defendant allegedly used and maintained the parcels and the farm crossing to access the river. Defendant asserts that he continued this maintenance throughout the following years. In 2007, plaintiff sold the rail trail to the Town which, in turn, conveyed a conservation easement to plaintiff. In March and April 2023, defendant contended that he was performing his "usual and necessary" maintenance on the parcels, which ultimately led to plaintiff commencing this action. We turn first to that portion of plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the third-party complaint because the Town, as the fee owner of the rail trail, is a necessary party to the third-party complaint.^FN3 RPAPL 1511 (2) provides that, in an action brought under RPAPL article 15, "[w]here it appears to the court that a person not a party to the action may have an estate or interest in the real property which may in any manner be affected by the judgment, the court, upon application of such person, or of any party to the action, or on its own motion, may direct that such person be made a party." Necessary parties are "[p]ersons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons [*3]who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action" (CPLR 1001 [a]).

Defendant and Bartels, in the third-party complaint, seek a judgment of adverse possession declaring Bartels the owner of the parcels, a judgment that defendant and Bartels have a permanent and unrestricted easement over the parcels as well as a judgment that they have a right of reentry. As conceded by defendant in both his reply affirmation in support of his motion to dismiss and an affirmation filed in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, defendant's affirmative defenses are based upon the same theories as the third-party complaint. Plaintiff correctly identifies an essential problem with each of these claims and affirmative defenses â​​ namely, that all are premised upon defendant and/or Bartels having some form of superior right to the parcels, or the rail trail more generally, than plaintiff. However, it is undisputed that plaintiff does not own the rail trail but merely holds a conservation easement. Thus, if defendant and Bartels were to prevail on any of their claims in the third-party complaint the Town would necessarily be affected because that would result in an additional property interest â​​ whether fee ownership, an easement or right of reentry â​​ encumbering the Town's fee ownership of the rail trail. It is clear that this result would prejudice the Town by impairing its title. Accordingly, the Town, as the current owner, is a necessary party to the third-party complaint and must be joined (see RPAPL 1511 [2]; CPLR 1001 [a]; Dunkin Donuts of N.Y., Inc. v Mid-Valley Oil Co., Inc., 14 AD3d 590, 592 [2d Dept 2005]; Hitchcock v Boyack, 277 AD2d 557, 558 [3d Dept 2000]; see generally Sorbello v Birchez Assoc., LLC, 61 AD3d 1225, 1226 [3d Dept 2009]).^FN4 However, by entering into the stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice with the Town, defendant and Bartels released a necessary party, requiring dismissal of the third-party complaint due to the nonjoinder of a necessary party (see Katz v Village of Southampton, 244 AD2d 461, 462 [2d Dept 1997], lv denied 95 NY2d 753 [2000]; compare Sorbello v Birchez Assoc., LLC, 61 AD3d at 1226). We turn now to that portion of plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of defendant's affirmative defenses in the original action. Specifically, plaintiff contends that defendant is precluded by res judicata from asserting his affirmative defenses due to the stipulation of discontinuance in the third-party action.^FN5 Res judicata "bars successive litigation based upon the same transaction or series of connected transactions if: (i) there is a judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (ii) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party to the previous action [or proceeding], or in privity with a party who was" (Matter of People v Applied Card Sys., Inc., 11 NY3d 105, 122 [2008] [internal quotation marks and [*4]citations omitted], cert denied 555 US 1136 [2009]; accord Whitney Lane Holdings, LLC v Don Realty, LLC, 130 AD3d 1218, 1220 [3d Dept 2015]). Initially, there can be no dispute that the affirmative defenses are based upon the same transaction â​​ defendant conceded this in affirmations filed in Supreme Court. Specifically, "the remaining claims [after discontinuing against the Town] in the third-party complaint only serve to support [defendant's] affirmative defenses set forth in his answer to [plaintiff's] complaint." Next, the "stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice has the same preclusive effect as a judgment on the merits" (Busher v Barry, 223 AD3d 778, 780 [2d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Kirby v David Fabricators of N.Y., Inc., 236 AD3d 436, 437 [1st Dept 2025]). Finally, defendant, as a party to the third-party action and to the stipulation, had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" his property claims against the Town (Whitney Lane Holdings, LLC v Don Realty, LLC, 130 AD3d at 1220 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Gropper v 200 Fifth Owner LLC, 151 AD3d 635, 635 [1st Dept 2017]). While there are references in both Supreme Court's decision and defendant's appellate brief alluding to conversations regarding the impact of the discontinuance on plaintiff's claims, the record before us is devoid of same and, thus, they cannot be considered by this Court (see Matter of D.B.S. Realty v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 201 AD2d 168, 173 [3d Dept 1994]). Clark, J.P., Ceresia, Mackey and Corcoran, JJ., concur.