WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Summary Judgment entered on May 19, 2024 [sic] is hereby set aside. Creditors filed an original action in the Court of Appeals seeking a writ of prohibition, and the Court issued a first-class writ concluding the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order.
Huffman appealed as a matter of right and argues Creditors effectively waived any objection to the circuit court's jurisdiction by ignoring motions, hearings, and orders despite having notice. He argues the Court of Appeals improperly assumed the circuit court lacked jurisdiction without a full record
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of the December 16 hearing because Creditors did not include it when filing the original action. Huffman relies on the missing hearing to argue the Court of Appeals improperly concluded the oral motion did not cite CR 60.02 or CR 60.03, which can permit post‑finality reconsideration.2Huffman also argues Creditors had an adequate remedy by appeal under Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Moberly, 241 S.W.3d 329 (Ky. 2007), so that the writ should not have been granted.
Creditors argue that the circuit court's jurisdiction ended when the order granting summary judgment was not appealed, leading to satisfaction of the judgment, and that Huffman did not invoke CR 60 or other statutory authority to revive jurisdiction. Creditors distinguish Asset Acceptance based on the type of post-judgment motion filed. Finally, Creditors argue that waiver cannot restore jurisdiction the court no longer possesses.
We reverse the Court of Appeals because it abused its discretion in issuing a first-class writ, which is appropriate only when a court acts outside of its subject-matter jurisdiction. Circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over civil actions to collect credit card debt. We decline to issue a writ of prohibition because Creditors failed to plead they were entitled to a second-class writ and establish irreparable injury and great harm would result if the writ were not issued.
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II. ANALYSIS
For a court to issue a writ, the petition must establish either:
(1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted.
Schulkers v. Lape, 730 S.W.3d 903, 913 (Ky. 2026) (quoting Hoskins v. Maricle,
150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004)). We review the Court of Appeals' ruling on whether to issue a writ for abuse of discretion and will affirm it absent a finding that the determination was arbitrary, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 630 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Ky. 2021). The Court of Appeals concluded the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it entered post-finality orders. It reasoned that the court's authority to act in the case ended ten days after entry of the summary judgment order and that none of Huffman's subsequent filings invoked any rule or statute capable of "invoking anew" the court's jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals concluded the circuit court's orders compelling discovery, imposing sanctions, setting aside the summary judgment, and directing return of garnished funds were issued without subject-matter jurisdiction and therefore void ab initio. We conclude the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in ruling the circuit court acted outside its subject-matter jurisdiction. We decline to issue a writ because Creditors failed to properly plead their case. Their original action in the Court of Appeals did not invoke Kentucky
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Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 60, nor did it cite or address the Hoskins standard governing the issuance of writs. They also failed to plead that great injustice and irreparable injury would result if their petition was not granted in their briefing before this Court.
A. The Circuit Court Acted Within Its Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, So the First Class of Writs Does Not Apply.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the key factor in distinguishing between the two classes of writ. The phrase "outside its jurisdiction" means subject-matter jurisdiction. Harilson v. Shepherd, 585 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Ky. 2019). "The first class of writs refers to subject-matter jurisdiction; that is, the lower court's core authority to hear the case at all." S.I.A. Ltd., Inc. v. Wingate,
677 S.W.3d 487, 496 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Commonwealth, 504 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2016)).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the court's power to hear and rule on a particular type of controversy. Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Ky. 2007). Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined at the beginning of a case based on the type of case presented on the face of the complaint, and a court
"will retain jurisdiction over such a case so long as jurisdiction was proper in the first place." Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Ky. 2013) (internal quotation omitted).
Our precedent further illustrates this distinction. In Harilson, the Lexington Herald-Leader sought judicial review after the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission (LRC) denied its open-records request. The LRC sought a writ of prohibition, asserting the circuit court lacked subject-matter
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jurisdiction. We held that KRS 7.119 incorporates the Open Records Act, including its authorization of judicial review, and we affirmed the Court of Appeals' denial of the writ. Harilson, 585 S.W.3d at 755-56. Likewise, In Louisville Historical League, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't, 709 S.W.3d 213 (Ky. 2025), a local ordinance authorized an aggrieved party to seek review in Jefferson Circuit Court of a decision by the Louisville Metro Council. After the circuit court granted summary judgment for a local preservation organization, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the organization's failure to plead a specific injury deprived the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction. We reversed, holding that any deficiency in pleading injury concerns only particular-case jurisdiction, not subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 221-23.
The Jefferson Circuit Court clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction with original jurisdiction over all justiciable causes not exclusively vested in some other court. Ky. Const. § 112; KRS 23A.010(1). District courts have exclusive jurisdiction where the amount in controversy does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000). KRS 24A.120. Creditors filed a civil action against Huffman seeking to collect over $15,000 in credit card debt. Applying Harilson, Louisville Historical League, and Steadman, the circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction remained constant throughout the litigation, including after summary judgment was entered. The Court of Appeals erred by treating the ten-day limitation on a court's authority to alter its own judgment as a limitation on subject-matter
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jurisdiction, thereby blurring the distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and particular-case jurisdiction.3That limitation does not restrict the circuit court's jurisdiction over civil debt-collection actions. It merely governs what the court may do procedurally in this particular case. The amount in controversy exceeded $5,000, and thus subject-matter jurisdiction remained intact. "Subject-matter jurisdiction is binary—a court either has it or it doesn't, and it cannot be given by a party's waiver, consent, or estoppel." Id. at 221 (cleaned up).
Creditors argue that entry of the satisfaction of judgment terminated the circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction. As this Court has consistently explained, subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's constitutional and statutory authority to hear a class of cases. Satisfaction of a judgment does not erase a circuit court's underlying authority to adjudicate civil debt‑collection actions. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals' issuance of a first-class writ.
B. Creditors Did Not Plead or Establish Irreparable Injury as Required for a Second-Class Writ.
The Court of Appeals limited its analysis to the first class of writs based on the petition filed by Creditors. In the Statement of Relief Sought in the petition filed in the Court of Appeals, they requested Issuance of a writ of prohibition against the Honorable Susan Schultz Gibson, Jefferson Circuit Court Judge who has acted and continues to act without jurisdiction in Jefferson Circuit Court No.
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22-CI-004116 including prohibiting enforcement of orders entered on October 29, 2024 and December 19, 2024 and prohibiting further proceedings in that case.
But their petition did not cite RAP 60 or acknowledge the Hoskins standard governing writs. Creditors limited their argument to an alleged lack of jurisdiction and the absence of an adequate remedy on appeal, contending the exception of Asset Acceptance did not apply. They did not assert that great injustice and irreparable injury would result if the petition was not granted, nor did they address the harm requirement in their briefing before this Court.4 The requirement of great injustice and irreparable injury is a demanding standard. It asks for more than ordinary prejudice necessary for appellate reversal and more than the common burdens of litigation such as delay, expense, or inconvenience. S.I.A. Ltd., 677 S.W.3d at 501. The injury must inflict "incalculable damage to the applicant ... either to the liberty of his person, or to his property rights, or other far‑reaching and conjectural consequences." Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 19 (Ky. 2004) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Litteral v. Woods, 223 Ky. 582, 4 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (1928)). It must be "something of a ruinous nature." Henderson Cnty. Health Care Corp. v. Wilson, 612 S.W.3d 811, 817 (Ky. 2020) (quoting Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961)).
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Consistent with that standard, we have held that a delay and the costs of an appeal do not constitute irreparable injury. Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 19 (citing Farmers Nat'l Bank of Danville v. Speckman, 312 Ky. 106, 226 S.W.2d 315, 317 (1949)). Nor will we issue a second-class writ for reasons of judicial economy. Gilbert v. McDonald-Burkman, 320 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Ky. 2010). A writ may not serve "as a substitute for appeal or to circumvent normal appellate procedure." Lawson v. Woeste, 603 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Ky. 2020). Creditors have not pled, nor do we discern, an injury approaching incalculable damages or a ruinous outcome. Their conduct reinforces that conclusion. The circuit court vacated summary judgment and ordered the funds returned on December 19, 2024. Creditors did not file their petition until May 15, 2025. Waiting nearly six months to seek extraordinary relief does not indicate an exceptional circumstance demanding urgent intervention to prevent irreparable harm.
"It is an unvarying rule that a question not raised or adjudicated in the court below cannot be considered when raised for the first time in this court."
Steadman, 411 S.W.3d at 724 (quoting Combs v. Knott County Fiscal Court, 283 Ky. 456, 141 S.W.2d 859, 860 (1940)). We have reversed the Court of Appeals when it sua sponte resolved an issue neither raised in briefing on appeal nor presented to the circuit court because the proper role of an appellate court is to review for error. Norton Healthcare, Inc. v. Deng, 487 S.W.3d 846, 852-53 (Ky. 2016). We likewise decline to address a legal question not presented— particularly one requiring a showing of irreparable injury.
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III. CONCLUSION
We hold the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in concluding the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in this case and reverse its decision to issue a first-class writ. Because Creditors did not request a second-class writ and failed to plead irreparable injury, we remand this case to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
James Hays Lawson Lawson at Law, PLLC Nick Curtis Thompson The Law Office of Nick Thompson COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST/APPELLEE:
Edna Jenelle Coulter
Javitch Block LLC
Boyd W. Gentry
Law Office of Boyd W. Gentry, LLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Susan Schultz Gibson, Judge Pro se
Hon. Tracy E. Davis, Judge Pro se