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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2026
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2025-SC-0327-MR
STEVEN MINTON APPELLANT
V.
ON APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. COLEMAN, JUDGE
NO. 21-CR-00282
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
An Ohio Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant Steven Minton of six counts of first-degree rape of a victim under the age of twelve. The jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. Minton now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). Following a careful review, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
D.B.1lived with her mother and her mother's boyfriend, Appellant Minton, between September 2019 and May 2021. Minton began raping D.B. in September 2019, just after she turned 10 years old. He raped her every other day over the course of the following two years, until she was removed from the
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home. Minton was ultimately indicted on six counts of first-degree rape and one count of being a persistent felony offender.
We need not delve into the lurid details of the six charged rapes. Suffice it to say that the acts described at trial involved Minton having sexual intercourse involving vaginal penetration with D.B. and visible ejaculation, the other specifics of which are not the focus of his appeal. The rapes generally took place in Ohio County, sometimes in the home and sometimes outside the home. However, after trial it was discovered that one of the rapes had taken place in a cemetery by a church that was near the Ohio County line, but actually located in neighboring Grayson County.
In May 2021, D.B. was removed from her mother's custody and went to live with Minton's son Robert and his girlfriend. In a June 2021 interview, D.B. denied that Minton had done anything to her. She later explained she did this because she was scared. However, in a July or August 2021 interview, a social worker mentioned the possibility of D.B. returning to live with her mother and Minton. D.B. then told the social worker about the rapes because she did not want the rapes to begin again.
Before opening statements at trial, Minton moved to introduce testimony by two individuals under Kentucky Rule of Evidence ("KRE") 412, the rape- shield law. The first individual was Wayne Moxley, who had also been charged and convicted of a sexual offense against D.B. Minton sought to admit evidence of Moxley's offense and conviction to establish an alternative source for injuries observed on D.B.'s hymen and as the source of her knowledge
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regarding sex. The Commonwealth argued that Moxley's offense did not involve penetration that could have caused the injuries to D.B.'s hymen, and thus was not admissible under KRE 412.
The second individual Minton sought to call was Emily Rowell. D.B. was placed in Rowell's home as a foster child from October 2021 until April 2022. Minton asserted that Rowell would testify D.B. made a sexual assault allegation against an adult male named Alex who was also living in the home, and that a Cabinet for Health and Family Services ("CHFS") investigation did not substantiate that accusation. Minton thus sought to admit Rowell's testimony to establish that D.B. had previously made false allegations of sexual abuse.
As to both Moxley and Rowell, the Commonwealth argued that Minton had failed to provide proper notice required by KRE 412 for the introduction of such evidence. After hearing argument and testimony from D.B., the trial court found that the lack of notice was not a basis to exclude the evidence. However, the trial court further held that the evidence was nonetheless inadmissible under KRE 412 because it did not establish that Moxley could have been a possible alternative source for D.B.'s injury or that D.B.'s allegation against Alex was demonstrably false.
At trial, D.B. testified regarding the specific details of the six charged rapes. For example, she testified that the first rape occurred in the living room, while the second occurred in Minton's bedroom. The third rape occurred on Halloween in the graveyard of a church, while the fourth rape was right before
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turkey season in a white Ford truck in a tobacco barn. The fifth rape occurred during turkey season in a white 2001 Hyundai in the woods, and the last rape occurred during colder weather in a graveyard beside a farm. D.B. also corroborated her allegations with testimony that Minton had a scar on his testicles and that "he can't have kids."
Dr. Jennifer Liles with the Child Advocacy Center testified that she had examined D.B. and discovered a cut in her hymen that "went the full depth of the hymen" at two specific regions. It was Dr. Liles' opinion that the injury had healed and was consistent with child sexual abuse.
Minton called his son Robert to testify. Robert stated he had never observed any sexual or inappropriate contact between Minton and D.B. He did acknowledge that Minton tried to send text messages to D.B. and visit her at Robert's home when he was not permitted to do so. Minton also called D.B.'s mother, who testified that D.B. "fibs a lot and sometimes tells stories." She also testified that Minton disciplined D.B., who disliked the discipline and often became defiant. She further denied seeing anything inappropriate between Minton and D.B., though she also acknowledged that Minton and D.B. were alone together many times both in the home and outside of it. Minton also testified on his own behalf. He denied raping D.B. or touching her sexually. He admitted that he had a vasectomy which left a scar on his testicles.
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The jury found Minton guilty on all counts and recommended a sentence of life in prison. The trial court sentenced Minton in accordance with the jury's recommendation. Minton now appeals as a matter of right.
ANALYSIS
Minton raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Wayne Moxley's conviction for sexually abusing D.B.; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding Emily Rowell's testimony that a CHFS investigation did not substantiate sexual abuse allegations D.B. made against an individual in her foster home named Alex; and (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss one of the rape counts for lack of jurisdiction given that the rape occurred in another county. We review each issue in turn, providing additional facts as necessary.
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Excluding Evidence Of Moxley's Crime Against D.B.
Minton first argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Wayne Moxley was convicted of sexually abusing D.B. and thus may have been an alternative source of the injury to her hymen. Defense counsel argued to the trial court that this evidence should be admitted and advised the court of the substance of the evidence. His argument is thus preserved. KRE 103(a)(2). We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, thus inquiring whether the decision was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Manery v. Commonwealth, 492 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).
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As noted above, Minton sought to admit evidence of Moxley's offense and conviction to establish that Moxley could have been the source of the injury to D.B.'s hymen. Moxley's conviction was for conduct that occurred sometime between March and May of 2020, within the same timeframe as Minton's charged conduct. The Commonwealth noted, however, that Moxley's abuse of D.B. consisted of "poking" her in the back and buttocks while she was fully clothed and touching of the breasts, but not penetration of the vagina. D.B. also testified outside the presence of the jury that there was no penetration by Moxley, and that Minton was the only person who did that. The Commonwealth therefore argued that because Moxley's conduct did not involve vaginal penetration, it could not have been the source of the injury to D.B.'s hymen. The trial court agreed and thus excluded evidence of Moxley's offense and conviction from trial.
We likewise agree. KRE 412, the rape-shield law, provides that in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct, evidence offered to prove either "that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior" or "any alleged victim's sexual predisposition" is inadmissible. However, the Rule also sets forth three exceptions in which such evidence is admissible in a criminal proceeding:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the
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sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(C) any other evidence directly pertaining to the offense charged.
KRE 412(b)(1).
Here, Minton sought to admit evidence of Moxley's offense and conviction as proof that Moxley could have been the source of the injury to D.B.'s hymen. However, Minton offered no evidence that Moxley's abuse of D.B. involved vaginal penetration as would have been necessary to cause that injury. Indeed, all of the evidence was to the contrary. First, D.B. expressly testified during the evidentiary hearing that Moxley's abuse did not involve penetration. Second, we have also reviewed the notes taken by Dr. Liles regarding D.B.'s report of abuse by Moxley, which were tendered by Minton as avowal evidence. Those notes likewise contain no indication of penetration by Moxley. Rather, D.B. reported to Dr. Liles that Moxley's conduct consisted of him lying on top of her and moving "back and forth" while she was fully clothed and lying face down. Notably, however, these same notes do include a reference to penetration by Minton. Third, the Judgment and Formal Sentencing Order for Moxley, which Minton also tendered by avowal, also includes no indication that Moxley's crime involved penetration.
Finally, Minton's summary by avowal to the trial court of Moxley's expected testimony is likewise devoid of any suggestion of penetration by Moxley that might have caused the injury to D.B.'s hymen. Rather, beyond what is already discussed above, Minton offered only that Moxley would have
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"testified to the charges and gone into detail about his relationship with the victim" and this "evidence would have provided the jury with an alternative suspect of these injuries." This statement, being wholly cursory and lacking in any substantive detail whatsoever, was likewise insufficient to demonstrate that Moxley's testimony might have established that he could have been an alternative source of D.B.'s injury. Thus, because Minton failed to submit any substantive proof that Moxley's conduct may have involved penetration that could have resulted in D.B.'s injury, the trial court correctly excluded evidence of Moxley's offense and conviction for the purpose of proving an alternative source of injury.
Minton also sought to admit evidence of Moxley's conviction as a potential source for D.B.'s sexual knowledge, in particular her knowledge of ejaculation. However, this theory suffers the same flaw as that regarding Moxley as an alternative source of injury—neither the trial court nor we have been provided with any evidence Moxley's conduct involved ejaculation. D.B. did not testify that Moxley ejaculated in the course of that abuse. Dr. Liles' notes contain no indication that Moxley ejaculated. Indeed, they indicate to the contrary that Moxley stopped his conduct when he heard D.B.'s mother coming down the hall. Moxley's Judgment and Formal Sentencing Order likewise include no references to ejaculation. And Minton's summary by avowal of Moxley's anticipated testimony also contains no substantive assertion that Moxley would testify he ejaculated. As such, Moxley's offense and
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conviction could not establish that he may have been the source of D.B.'s knowledge regarding ejaculation.
In sum, Minton did not offer any evidence that Moxley's conduct involved vaginal penetration such that he could have caused the injury to D.B.'s hymen, or that his abuse involved ejaculation. Absent such proof, Moxley's offense and conviction were not only inadmissible under KRE 412, but indeed were wholly irrelevant because they could not establish any fact of consequence to the determination of Minton's guilt for the six charged rapes. The evidence was thus also inadmissible under KRE 402, which provides that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible." See also KRE 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."). As such, the trial court did not err in excluding that evidence.
Finally, we also disagree with Minton's contention that KRE 412 was applied in an arbitrary and disproportionate manner that violated his constitutional right to present a meaningful defense. Evidentiary rules may not be applied in such a manner as to infringe on the defendant's right to present a defense in an arbitrary or disproportionate manner. Dennis v. Commonwealth,
306 S.W.3d 466, 473 (Ky. 2010). The application of an evidentiary rule is unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only if it results in the exclusion of evidence important to the defense. Id. (noting that arbitrary rules are those that "exclude[ ] important defense evidence but that d[o] not serve
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any legitimate interests.") (citation omitted); id. at 474 (noting that in determining if a rule is disproportionate, we weigh the importance of the evidence to the defense and the scope of the exclusion against the prejudicial effects the rule is designed to prevent).
Here, the evidence regarding Moxley's offense and conviction was not only unimportant to the defense; it was indeed wholly irrelevant because it could not establish that Moxley may have been a source of either D.B.'s injury or her knowledge of sexual matters. Thus, because the evidence excluded was not important for Minton's defense, the application of KRE 412 under the circumstances was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. Quite simply, while a defendant unquestionably has a right to present a defense, that right does not extend so far as to permit the defendant to mislead the jury with irrelevant evidence. See Commonwealth v. Bell, 400 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Ky. 2013) ("[T]he right to present a defense is not unlimited. Like the Commonwealth, 'the accused . . . must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.'") (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). As such, the trial court's exclusion of Moxley's offense and conviction was appropriate and did not violate Minton's constitutional right to present a defense.2
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II. The Exclusion Of D.B.'s Unsubstantiated Allegation Against Alex Was Not Reversible Error.
Minton next argues the trial court also erroneously excluded testimony by D.B.'s former foster mother, Emily Rowell, that D.B. made an unsubstantiated sexual abuse allegation against another male in the home named Alex. As with Moxley, Minton offered the substance of that proposed testimony to the trial court and argued it should be admitted. As such, his argument is preserved, and we review the trial court's exclusion of the evidence for an abuse of discretion. KRE 103(a)(2); Manery, 492 S.W.3d at 147. Minton sought to offer Rowell's testimony to establish that D.B. had made a sexual abuse allegation against Alex, that a subsequent CHFS investigation did not sustain that allegation, and that D.B. thereafter was no longer welcome in Rowell's home. In short, Minton sought to admit the evidence to establish that D.B. had previously made a false allegation of sexual abuse.
We have previously held that "the credibility of the complaining witness in a sex crime case may be attacked by cross-examination concerning a prior false accusation." Dennis, 306 S.W.3d at 472. "To insure that the rape shield rule is not circumvented, however, the proponent of such evidence is required to make a preliminary showing that the prosecuting witness made a prior accusation and that the accusation was in fact false," meaning "demonstrably false." Id. at 472, 475 (emphasis added). To satisfy this standard, "the proponent must show that there is a distinct and substantial probability that the prior accusation was false." Id. at 475. However, this standard "does not
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require absolute proof of falsity." Perry v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Ky. 2012).
Some circumstances in which a victim's prior allegation of sexual abuse by another may be deemed "demonstrably false" and thus admissible include where the victim recants the allegation, where an investigation establishes
"pertinent facts wholly inconsistent with the allegation," or where circumstances strongly suggest "that the victim had a motive to fabricate the prior and current allegations." Dennis, 306 S.W.3d at 475. Also relevant is whether "the alleged victim told different stories to different people or at different times." Perry, 390 S.W.3d at 132. These examples "are not exclusive, and one can imagine other types of proof that would also meet the demonstrably false standard depending on the particular facts of the case." Id. However, we have also held that an investigation that merely fails to substantiate the prior allegations is not sufficient to establish that the prior allegation was demonstrably false. Dennis, 306 S.W.3d at 475. ("[I]nvestigations that do not exonerate but merely fail to substantiate are not sufficiently probative of falsity to justify breaching the alleged victim's shield."). Here, Minton contended that CHFS had "cleared" Alex, that afterward D.B. was no longer welcome in the home, and that the evidence was thus relevant to show that D.B. had previously made false sexual assault allegations. The trial court ruled that because the CHFS investigation only failed to substantiate D.B.'s allegation but did not affirmatively find that the allegation was false, the evidence was inadmissible. We agree.
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As an initial matter, we question whether an adequate foundation could even have been laid to demonstrate that Rowell was competent to testify to the actual conclusions of a CHFS investigation.3Even setting that concern aside, however, Minton's counsel explicitly acknowledged before the trial court that the CHFS investigation simply failed to sustain D.B.'s allegations. This is precisely the type of evidence we have found to be insufficient to establish that a victim's prior accusation against another was demonstrably false. Id. In his avowal, Minton mentioned no other evidence that Rowell might offer other than that D.B. was no longer welcome in her home after she made an accusation against Alex. However, neither the failure of CHFS to substantiate D.B.'s allegation nor the mere fact that D.B. may have been unwelcome in Rowell's home satisfies the required showing that her allegation against Alex was
"demonstrably false." Thus, because Minton failed to provide evidence that could support a finding that D.B.'s allegation against Alex was "demonstrably false," the trial court did not err in excluding Rowell's testimony. Finally, Minton also contends the trial court erred in failing to allow him to question D.B. during the pre-trial hearing about her allegations against Alex. The trial court ruled that Minton could not question D.B. about those allegations because Alex's alleged conduct would have occurred after her physical examination. The trial court apparently mistook Minton's questioning to be an effort to establish that Alex could have been the source of D.B.'s
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injury. However, Minton contends the questioning was to establish that D.B.'s allegation against Alex was false.
However, when the trial court announced its ruling, defense counsel simply moved on to another line of questioning rather than correcting the trial court's misunderstanding. In doing so, Minton deprived the trial court of an opportunity to make a ruling based upon the actual purpose for which Minton sought to admit the evidence—to establish the falsity of D.B.'s allegation against Alex. Thus, because the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule on that issue, we need not consider it further. Smith v. Commonwealth, 567 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Ky. 1978) ("[T]he trial court was not afforded an opportunity to correct the errors, if any; consequently, this court cannot consider them."). Moreover, we also would find the error harmless in any event given that the jury heard testimony that D.B. had a reputation for being untruthful, and Minton offered the trial court no basis to believe D.B. would recant her allegation against Alex while on the stand. Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding D.B.'s prior allegation against Alex warrants a new trial.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Refusing To Dismiss The Charge For Conduct Occurring In A Neighboring County.
Finally, Minton argues the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss one of the rape charges when it was discovered after trial that the offense occurred in a car in Grayson County rather than Ohio County, very close to the line between the two counties. After trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion stating that D.B. and her guardian had advised the prosecution after trial that the
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incident underlying Count Five of the indictment occurred in Grayson County. Minton moved for dismissal of that charge. The Commonwealth contended that the issue was one of venue, and that Minton had waived any venue argument he might have. The defense responded that it did not waive the issue because it had no way of knowing the offense did not occur in Ohio County. The defense further asserted the jury was required to find that the offense occurred in Ohio County, which it could not find given that the offense occurred in Grayson County. The trial court concluded the issue was one of venue that did not deprive the court of jurisdiction and therefore denied the motion.
Minton now argues that prosecution in Ohio County was improper because 1) the offense occurring in Ohio County was a necessary element of the crime that could not be proven because it occurred in Grayson County, and
2) Ohio County law enforcement lacked jurisdiction to pursue prosecution of an offense that occurred in Grayson County. We disagree. First, that the offense occurred in Ohio County was not an element of the charged crime of rape. Indeed, it is generally not an element of any crime that the offense occurred in the county where trial is held. Turner v. Commonwealth, 345 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Ky. 2011) ("[T]he location of the crime is not an element, and its lack of proof, therefore, does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt."). Thus, Minton is incorrect in asserting the Commonwealth could not obtain a conviction for lack of a proven element simply because the offense occurred in a different county.
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We also pause to note that the Ohio Circuit Court had authority to hear the charge even though the offense occurred in Grayson County. A circuit court has jurisdiction to hear a case involving the prosecution of an offense that occurs anywhere in the Commonwealth. Derry v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Ky. 2008) ("The circuit courts of this state are never without 'jurisdiction' to preside over the prosecution of offenses committed in Kentucky.") (citation omitted). And while KRS 452.510 sets the venue of a criminal prosecution as "the county or city in which the offense was committed," KRS 452.650 provides that "[t]he venue of the prosecution may be waived by the defendant and the failure to make a timely motion to transfer the prosecution to the proper county shall be deemed a waiver of the venue of the prosecution." We have previously held that a motion to transfer venue of a criminal prosecution is timely only if it is made before trial. Derry, 274 S.W.3d at 444. Thus, the issue of venue in a criminal prosecution is waived where the defendant fails to raise it before trial. Id.
Here, Minton did not raise any issue regarding venue until after trial. We further note that while Minton alleges he had no way of knowing the offense occurred in Grayson County rather than Ohio County, he could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars seeking the exact location of the offense in order to determine before trial whether venue was proper in Ohio County. See Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.22; Leslie W. Abramson, Kentucky Criminal Practice and Procedure § 21:23 (6th ed. 2025) ("The motion for the date, time and place
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of offense is normally within the scope of a bill of particulars."). Thus, Minton waived any venue objection he had to the trial being held in Ohio County. Finally, we also disagree that Ohio County officials could not pursue prosecution for the charged offense. A Commonwealth's Attorney has "the duty to prosecute all violations . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the criminal and penal laws which are to be tried in the Circuit Court in his judicial circuit." KRS 15.725(1). As noted above, the Commonwealth's circuit courts all have jurisdiction to hear a case involving a criminal offense that has occurred anywhere in Kentucky. Derry, 274 S.W.3d at 443. Thus, because the offense here occurred in Kentucky, the prosecution was "subject to the jurisdiction" of the Ohio Circuit Court. KRS 15.725(1). Moreover, the case was triable in Ohio Circuit Court because Minton waived any venue objection he had based on the location of the offense. Thus, the case was also properly
"tried" in the Circuit Court of the Ohio County Commonwealth's Attorney. Thus, because the Ohio Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, Minton waived any venue objection he may have had, and the Commonwealth's Attorney therefore acted within the scope of the statutory powers of that office in prosecuting the case when it was heard in Ohio Circuit Court, the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the Ohio Circuit Court.
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All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Goodwine, Keller, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Thompson, J., dissents.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Jennifer Wade
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General