partial judgment must begin with the words "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: . . ," and it must not contain any other wording between those words and the caption. A judgment may include any findings of fact or conclusions of law expressly required by statute, rule, or regulation.
I.R.C.P. 54(a)(1). Rule 54(a)(2) sets forth the requirements for amended judgments, which states:
"If the court orders an amendment to a judgment, the amendment will be effective only after the court enters an amended judgment setting forth all of the terms of the new judgment, including those terms of the prior judgment that remain in effect." I.R.C.P. 54(a)(2). Here, the verdict amount and award of costs were liquidated in two judgments: the Original Judgment and Amended Judgment, respectively. In arguing that the Original Judgment is no longer enforceable, Vertical Raise contends that the Amended Judgment "replaced, supplanted or superseded" the Original Judgment because it "set forth all terms of the [Original] Judgment that remained in effect pursuant to Rule 54(a)" and, therefore, the Amended Judgment "was the only judgment remaining under Rule 54(a) and the only judgment appealable under [Idaho Appellate Rule] 11(a)." For purposes of determining when post-judgment interest accrues, this argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, neither Rule 54(a) nor section 28-22-104(2) indicate that interest accrues only on a judgment that is final and appealable. See Hepworth v. Hepworth, 169 Idaho 745, 751, 503 P.3d 216, 222 (Ct. App. 2021). Rather, "[t]he plain language of Idaho Code [section] 28-22-104(2) indicates that interest on a judgment must accrue at the statutory rate and that the provision applies to all judgments." Roesch, 155 Idaho at 178, 307 P.3d at 195 (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals concluded, section 28-22-104(2) "does not limit 'the judgment' to a single judgment in a proceeding and, thus, the statute allows for the possibility of multiple judgments in a case."
Hepworth, 169 Idaho at 751, 503 P.3d at 222. Second, Vertical Raise does not cite any authority to support its claim that, whenever an amended judgment is entered in a case, the original judgment is effectively nullified. This is not surprising. If such a rule existed, a judgment creditor's priority
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rights would be extinguished whenever a trial court entered an amended judgment, regardless of whether the new judgment incorporated the original judgment's terms. More importantly, this Court has long held that when a debt liquidated in a judgment is not reversed on appeal, interest on that debt runs from the date the original judgment was entered regardless of whether a supplemental judgment is entered on remand. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Flandro (Mitchell II), 96 Idaho 236, 238, 526 P.2d 841, 843 (1974) (judgments for costs not reversed on appeal earn post-judgment interest from the date of the original judgment); Leliefeld v. Panorama Contractors, Inc. (Leliefeld II), 111 Idaho 897, 907-08, 728 P.2d 1306, 1316-17 (1986) (judgments on damages not reversed on appeal earn post-judgment interest from the date of the original judgment); Long v. Hendricks (Long III), 117 Idaho 1051, 1054-55, 793 P.2d 1223, 1226- 27 (1990) (holding that judgment on liquidated medical expenses accrued post-judgment interest from the date of an original judgment rather than a supplemental judgment entered on remand). We also held that, "[w]hen a judgment is modified downward, the new sum draws interest from the date of the original judgment" and that "post-judgment interest may run on the final judgment from the date of the original judgment despite a subsequent modification on appeal." Sanchez v. Galey (Sanchez II), 115 Idaho 1064, 1069, 772 P.2d 702, 707 (1989) (quoting Dursteler v. Dursteler, 112 Idaho 594, 596, 733 P.2d 815, 817 (Ct.App.1987)). In Snap I, we affirmed the district court's award of costs in the Amended Judgment. Thus, under Mitchell II and Leliefeld II, the award of costs earned post-judgment interest from the date the Amended Judgment was entered, as the district court concluded. The remaining question is whether interest accrued on the $800,000 from the date the Original Judgment was entered, notwithstanding this Court's upward modification of the judgment in Snap I. Our decision in Sanchez II is instructive. In that case, a jury returned a verdict awarding Sanchez $1.35 million in damages. 115 Idaho at 1064, 772 P.2d at 702. After the entry of judgment, the district court ordered that Sanchez either accept a $400,000 reduction in damages or a new trial. Id. In the first appeal in that case, Sanchez v. Galey (Sanchez I), 112 Idaho 609, 616, 733 P.2d 1234, 1241 (1986), we reversed a district court's order granting a remittitur or new trial and remanded with instructions that the court enter additional findings of fact. Following the proceedings on remand, the district court once again ordered Sanchez to remit $400,000 or face a new trial. Sanchez II, 115 Idaho at 1065, 772 P.2d at 703. The district court also denied the employee's request for post-judgment interest on the verdict, reasoning that the order granting the
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remittitur or new trial "effectively vacated" the judgments entered on the jury's verdict and, as such, there was no judgment in effect on which interest could run. Id. at 1067, 772 P.2d at 705. Sanchez appealed, and in Sanchez II, we affirmed the trial court's order requiring a remittitur or granting a new trial. Id. at 1070, 772 P.2d at 708. However, we rejected the district court's conclusion that the order granting the remittitur or new trial "effectively vacated" the previous judgment. Id. at 1067-70, 772 P.2d at 705-06. We explained that the judgment would only have been vacated "if Sanchez had properly signified his refusal to consent to a reduction in the judgment on the verdict and the alternative of a new trial became effective." Id. at 1067, 772 P.2d at 705. In that event, "the earlier judgment would have been vacated, and no interest would have accrued until the entry of a new judgment." Id. However, if Sanchez accepted the remittitur, then the original judgment less the remittitur would accrue post-judgment interest from the date the original judgment was entered. Id.
We further explained that in the event Sanchez elected to accept the remittitur, the defendants could have prevented post-judgment interest from accruing on the modified verdict by tendering payment:
At the instigation of the defendants the district court had made its own computation of damages, and had arrived at its damage assessment of $950,000. That would be the amount of the judgment on the verdict if Sanchez consented to such reduction. No lesser amount was involved. . . .
. . . .
The defendants . . . clearly decided to make no tender whatever, and have retained the use of the money represented by the district court's lower figure of $950,000 since the judgment was entered on the verdict on October 31, 1984. . . . The defendants then on their cross-appeal in Sanchez I sought to persuade this court of reversible error at the trial, but again failed, and were so advised October 17, 1986. . . . And again no tender of any kind was made to stop the accruing interest. The decision of the Court of Appeals in Dursteler v. Dursteler, 112 Idaho 594, 733 P.2d 815 (Ct.App.1987), which is almost side-by-side with Sanchez I, also served to advise the defendants that "When a judgment is modified downward, the new sum draws interest from the date of the original judgment . . . post-judgment interest may run on the final judgment from the date of the original judgment despite a subsequent modification on appeal." 112 Idaho at 596, 733 P.2d at 817. We perceive no difference between a modification made at the trial court level, or by an appellate court.
Id. at 1069, 772 P.2d at 707 (last alteration in original).
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In this case, the $800,000 damages calculated by the district court began accruing interest when the Original Judgment was entered on October 15, 2021. Thereafter, the district court granted Snap's motion for an additur or the new trial. Like the employee in Sanchez II, Vertical Raise did not consent to the additur or opt for a new trial. Instead, it appealed the district court's order and
"request[ed] this Court to reinstate the jury's original verdict, or alternatively, allow [it] to elect to have a new trial." Snap I, 173 Idaho at 514, 544 P.3d at 729. Even so, Vertical Raise was clearly aware of the $800,000 judgment entered by the district court on October 15, 2021. Yet, like the defendants in Sanchez II, it elected to make no tender to stop the accruing interest. And while the jury's verdict was modified upwards by $200,000 in Snap I and not downward as in Sanchez II and Dursteler, this distinction is immaterial because the district court did not permit the $200,000 to accrue post-judgment interest.
Vertical Raise argues that Mitchell II, Leliefeld II, and Sanchez II are all distinguishable because this Court "operatively reversed" the Amended Judgment when it reversed the district court's oral order granting the new trial or additur in Snap I because the additur was included in the Amended Judgment. We disagree. As set forth above, we only reversed the trial court's order granting an additur or new trial. 173 Idaho at 514-29, 544 P.3d at 729-44. We did not reverse any of the judgments in Snap I. At most, our decision had the effect of partially reversing the Amended Judgment to the extent that it awarded Snap the additur. However, as set forth in Mitchell II and Leliefeld II, this did not stop interest accruing on the remaining judgments. Next, Vertical Raise contends that Mitchell II, Leliefeld II, and Sanchez II are no longer controlling precedent due to the 2010 amendment to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a). "The rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." Thompson v. Burley Inn, Inc., 173 Idaho 637, 646, 546 P.3d 649, 658 (2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Gomez v. Crookham Co., 166 Idaho 249, 259, 457 P.3d 901, 911 (2020) superseded by statute, I.C. § 72- 209(3), as stated in, Fulfer v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., 171 Idaho 296, 298 n.1, 520 P.3d 708, 710 n.1 (2022)). "'Principles of stare decisis, like judicial restraint, compel [appellate courts] to not lightly reject precedent merely because there has been a change in the makeup of the Court or because the precedent was not unanimous,' or if the current Court would decide a precedent-setting case differently." Id. (quoting Gomez, 166 Idaho at 259, 457 P.3d at 911).
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This Court's 2010 order amending Rule 54(a) provides in pertinent part:
1. That Rule 54(a) be, and the same is hereby, repealed and the following adopted to read as follows:
Rule 54(a). Judgments - Definition - Form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies means a separate document entitled "Judgment" or "Decree". A judgment shall state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action. Such relief can include dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings, the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment is final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to subsection (b)(1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action.
Order at 1, In Re: Amendments of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.) 54(a) and 58(a) (Idaho Mar. 29, 2010) (effective Jul. 1, 2010).
In its reply brief, Vertical Raise argues that the 2010 amendment to Rule 54(a) amounted to "a substantive change" in the law because "Rule 54(a) no longer includes orders or other mandates that do not fit within its definition of a 'judgment'" and because this Court exclusively resolved the issue whether a document qualified as a judgment within the meaning of section 28- 22-104(2) by exclusively referencing Rule 54(a) in Roesch.
There are two problems with Vertical Raise's argument. First, as Snap notes, "Vertical Raise fail[ed] to identify what wording of the amendment would have altered or nullified" Mitchell II, Leliefeld II, and Sanchez II in its opening brief. "[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that appellants are 'required to identify legal issues and provide authorities supporting the arguments in the opening brief.'" State v. Ingraham, 172 Idaho 30, 36, 528 P.3d 966, 972 (2023) (citations omitted). "Raising a new issue at a 'late stage of the briefing does not allow for full consideration of the issue,' nor does it give a respondent a fair opportunity to respond to the issue." Id. (citation omitted). "Thus, such late arguments . . . are generally not considered by the Court." Id.
Second, it is unclear how the amendments to Rule 54(a) undermine our holdings in Mitchell II, Leliefeld II, or Sanchez II. The purpose of the amendment was "[t]o address the continuing confusion over what constitutes a final appealable judgment . . . ." Civil Rules Advisory Committee Minutes (Mar. 2, 2010). However, as set forth above, neither Rule 54(a) nor section 28-22-104(2) indicate that post-judgment interest only accrues on a judgment that is final and appealable. In
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short, Vertical Raise has not established that Mitchell II, Leliefeld II, and Sanchez II are manifestly wrong.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err when it determined the dates that post-judgment interest accrued on awards of damages and costs. Therefore, we affirm the district court's Third Amended Judgment.
B. We decline to address whether Vertical Raise's tendering of payment to Snap stopped post-judgment interest from accruing.
In their briefing, a dispute arose between Snap and Vertical Raise regarding the proper method of calculating post-judgment interest and whether Vertical Raise's payment of the judgment amount and cost award stopped interest from accruing where such payment only covered the principal amount owed, but not any interest. In its respondent's brief, Snap asserted that it was entitled to $223,113.22 in post-judgment interest as of July 21, 2025, because Vertical Raise failed to tender payment on interest owed and "interest on interest has continued to accrue . . . ." Vertical Raise disputed Snap's calculation in its reply brief, noting that Snap erroneously included interest on interest or applied an incorrect interest rate. While acknowledging during oral argument that the calculation of interest was not raised as an issue on appeal, Snap's counsel requested that this Court provide guidance to the parties on this issue. We decline to address this issue because it was not properly presented to this Court.
"It is axiomatic that this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal[,]"
Siercke v. Siercke, 167 Idaho 709, 715, 476 P.3d 376, 382 (2020), or issues that "lack . . . citations of applicable authority," Dickenson v. Benewah Cnty. Sheriff, 172 Idaho 144, 150, 530 P.3d 691, 697 (2023) (citation modified). Moreover, an appellate court may provide guidance on remand when it "reverses or vacates a judgment upon an issue properly raised, and remands for further proceedings . . . ." Hood v. Poorman, 171 Idaho 176, 191, 519 P.3d 769, 784 (2022) (quoting N. Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Hayden, 164 Idaho 530, 540, 432 P.3d 976, 986 (2018)). Snap seeks guidance on an issue raised for the first time its respondent's brief, and neither party presented cogent argument or citations to any authority to support their positions. Furthermore, we have not reversed or vacated any judgment or remanded for further proceedings and, therefore, we may not address this issue under the guise of "guidance." Accordingly, we decline to address this issue.
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C. Attorney Fees
Snap requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121, which permits courts to "award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.C. § 12-121. "These conditions exist when an appellant has only asked the appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has failed to show that the district court incorrectly applied well-established law." Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, 53,
408 P.3d 45, 51 (2017) (citation modified). Snap is the prevailing party in this appeal, and we find that Vertical Raise pursued this appeal unreasonably and without foundation because Vertical Raise failed to show that the district court incorrectly applied Mitchell II and Leliefeld II, or to explain how the amendments to Rule 54(a) undermine our holdings in Mitchell II or Leliefeld II. Accordingly, we award Snap its reasonable attorney fees on appeal under section 12-121.
V. C ONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the Third Amended Judgment of the district court. Snap is awarded attorney fees under section 12-121 and costs on appeal as a matter of course pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a).
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BRODY, MOELLER, and MILLER, J. Pro Tem,
CONCUR.