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1
DANNEHY, J., with whom BRIGHT, J., joins as to part II only, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. The majority concludes that the state violated Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70, 79 S. Ct. 1173,
3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959), by failing to correct purport- edly false or substantially misleading testimony given by Kingsley Minto and Attorney Richard Cohen at the crimi- nal trial of the petitioner, Carlton Bryan. In reaching that conclusion, the majority determines that the habeas court clearly erred in finding that the testimony of Minto and Cohen was neither false nor substantially misleading and, further, that the habeas court clearly erred in finding that, even if portions of Minto's testimony were false or substantially misleading, any resulting misimpres- sion was corrected by Cohen's testimony explaining the nature and extent of Minto's understanding concerning his arrangement with the state. In my view, the majority reaches these conclusions only by failing to afford the deference required by our clearly erroneous standard of review. Because the habeas court's factual findings are supported by evidence in the record and, therefore, are not clearly erroneous, I cannot agree that the petitioner established any Napue violation.
I conclude, however, that the petitioner's conviction must nonetheless be reversed because he has established that the state failed to satisfy its obligations under Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). Spe- cifically, the state was required, but failed, to disclose two interviews of Minto conducted by the Manchester Police Department, as well as certain benefits conferred on Minto, namely, the pretrial decision of the prosecutor, Senior Assistant State's Attorney Donna Mambrino, not to sign arrest warrants supported by probable cause for Minto's alleged involvement in armed robberies in West Hartford and Windsor. Because the state withheld impeachment evidence and that evidence was material, it violated its obligations under Brady and Giglio, and
2
reversal is required. I therefore respectfully concur in the judgment and dissent in part.
I
In Napue, the United States Supreme Court held that a conviction knowingly "obtained through use of false evi- dence" violates the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Napue v. Illinois, supra, 360 U.S. 269. Testimony that is substantially misleading, even if "technically cor- rect," is considered false under Napue. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 684, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985); see id., 683-84; State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173, 186, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010). "To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed it 'to go uncorrected when it appear[ed].' " Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 246, 145 S. Ct. 612, 221 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2025), quoting Napue v. Illinois, supra, 269.
"[The] essence of [a] Napue/Giglio violation is [the] lack of disclosure of [the] truth to [the] jury . . . ." Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, 336 Conn. 168, 182, 243 A.3d 1163 (2020). "Whether a prosecutor knowingly presented false or misleading testimony . . . presents a mixed question of law and fact, with the habeas court's factual findings subject to review for clear error and the legal conclusions that the court drew from those facts subject to de novo review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 175. Thus, whether testimony was false or substantially misleading and whether Mambrino cor- rected any misimpression are factual determinations entrusted in the first instance to the habeas court. See id. Our role is not to determine whether we would have interpreted the testimony differently but only whether the habeas court's findings are unsupported by the evi- dence or otherwise leave this court with "the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle v. Kulesza,
197 Conn. 101, 105, 495 A.2d 1074 (1985). I conclude that the habeas court reasonably found that Minto's testimony, considered in context and as a whole,
3
was not false or substantially misleading concerning his arrangement with the state. The majority reaches the opposite conclusion by focusing almost exclusively on Minto's repeated denials that he had received a "deal,"
while discounting the testimony that immediately accom- panied those denials. On direct examination, after Minto denied that he had been promised "any deals," Mambrino immediately asked whether he had been told that, if he testified, the state would advise the sentencing judge of his cooperation. Although Minto again responded that "[n]o deal was made," Mambrino clarified the ques- tion, asking, "[n]o specific deal was made, but was that told to you?" Minto answered, "[y]es." Thus, the jury was expressly informed that Minto had been told that Mambrino would make his cooperation known to the sentencing judge. Read fairly and in context, Minto's repeated statements that there was "[n]o deal" reasonably referred to the absence of a negotiated plea agreement, sentencing recommendation, or promised disposition of his pending criminal charges—not to the absence of communications between the parties regarding his coop- eration. See Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 1, 17, 190 A.3d 851 (2018) (witness' statement
"cannot be divorced from the context surrounding it"), cert. denied sub nom. Greene v. Semple, 586 U.S. 1167,
139 S. Ct. 1219, 203 L. Ed. 2d 238 (2019).1The habeas court reasonably interpreted the testimony in precisely that manner.
The remainder of Minto's testimony at the petitioner's criminal trial similarly does not compel the majority's conclusion. Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined
4
Minto concerning his expectations arising from his tes- timony. Although Minto denied that anything had been promised to him, the jury also heard his acknowledgment at the conclusion of his testimony that he did have "con- siderations," the details of which would be addressed later. Whether those answers were perfectly precise is not the question before us. The relevant question is whether the habeas court's findings are unsupported by the evi- dence. On this record, I cannot conclude that they are. The habeas court also reasonably determined that, even if portions of Minto's testimony could be viewed as incom- plete or potentially misleading, Mambrino corrected any possibly misleading testimony by calling Cohen, the attorney who represented Minto in connection with the Manchester robbery, immediately after Minto testified. See State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 208, 283 A.3d 477 (2022) (witness' misleading testimony was cured by call- ing of another witness). Cohen explained what was meant by Minto's statement that there was "[n]o deal" when Cohen testified that there was no written plea agreement, no agreement for any specific sentence, and no promise of any particular sentencing recommendation. He further testified, however, that Mambrino had informed him that, if Minto testified truthfully, she would advise the sentencing court of Minto's cooperation and that Cohen hoped this would result in a more favorable disposition. Thus, the jury learned precisely the nature of Minto's informal arrangement with the state.
The majority faults Cohen for describing this arrange- ment as an " 'expectation' " or " 'hope' " rather than as an "agreement . . . ." (Emphasis omitted.) Part II of the majority opinion. In doing so, however, it substitutes its own characterization of the evidence for that of the habeas court. The constitutional question is not whether every witness used identical terminology to describe the parties' understanding. Rather, it is whether the jury was apprised of the facts bearing on the witness' potential bias. See Napue v. Illinois, supra, 360 U.S. 269; Gomez
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 336 Conn. 189-90.
5
The habeas court reasonably concluded that Cohen's testimony accomplished exactly that by informing the jury that Minto expected favorable consideration because Mambrino had agreed to advise the sentencing judge of Minto's cooperation. Indeed, Mambrino's decision to call Cohen immediately after Minto underscores the absence of any effort to mislead the jury. Rather than allowing defense counsel to speculate about the nature of the par- ties' understanding, Mambrino elicited testimony from Cohen, the attorney who had reached the understanding, and placed its essential terms before the jury. The habeas court therefore reasonably concluded that any potential ambiguity in Minto's testimony had been clarified. Because the record reasonably supports the habeas court's determination that Minto's testimony was not false or substantially misleading and, alternatively, that any potentially misleading testimony was corrected through Cohen's testimony, I cannot conclude that those factual findings are clearly erroneous. The majority reaches a different result only by reweighing the evi- dence and drawing its own factual inferences from the trial record. Our standard of review does not permit that approach. See, e.g., State v. Michael J., 274 Conn. 321, 347, 875 A.2d 510 (2005) ("our function is not to decide factual issues de novo" (internal quotation marks omitted)).2
Accordingly, I disagree with the majority that the state violated Napue and that the petitioner's conviction should be reversed on that basis.
II
The petitioner claims, however, that his convic- tion must nonetheless be reversed because the state
6
suppressed material impeachment evidence concerning Minto, a key state witness, in violation of Brady and Giglio. Specifically, the petitioner argues that the state failed to disclose (1) two recorded interviews conducted by the Manchester Police Department in which Minto repeatedly sought to trade information about the murder of Shamari Jenkins (victim) for favorable treatment in his own robbery case, and (2) Mambrino's decision not to sign arrest warrants supported by probable cause for Minto's alleged involvement in armed robberies in West Hartford and Windsor because it was not in the state's interest to do so based on Minto's anticipated testimony at the petitioner's murder trial. The habeas court concluded that the recorded interviews were not material and that the state had no obligation to disclose the decisions not to prosecute Minto for those robberies. I respectfully disagree with the habeas court and, for the reasons set forth herein, agree with the petitioner that his conviction must be reversed.
A
The majority opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history, as recounted by the Appellate Court in the petitioner's direct appeal. Accordingly, I do not repeat them in full. Instead, I highlight only those facts that are pertinent to the petitioner's claim. In 2013, the petitioner and Matthew Allen Hall-Davis, a close friend of his, conspired to kill the victim, who was pregnant with the petitioner's child and chose not to have an abortion. In April of that year, Hall-Davis approached a vehicle in which the victim and the petitioner were seated and fired a single shot from a Ruger Super Blackhawk .44 Magnum revolver (.44 Ruger) through the rear windshield, fatally striking the victim.
Several days after the murder, Hall-Davis met with Minto, a mutual friend of both Hall-Davis and the petitioner, at Minto's residence. During that meeting, Hall-Davis confessed that he had killed the victim at the remarks, standing alone, were so egregious as to deprive the petitioner of due process is not before us.
7
petitioner's behest in order to terminate her pregnancy. Hall-Davis then asked Minto for money to flee the area, but Minto told him that he had none to give him. On May 11, 2013, Minto and Hall-Davis robbed a jew- elry store in Manchester. During the robbery, Hall-Davis brandished a .44 Ruger. After the petitioner viewed surveillance footage of the robbery on the Internet, he became upset because the footage revealed that Hall- Davis still possessed the same .44 Ruger used to kill the victim, even though he previously told the petitioner that he had disposed of it. The petitioner then contacted Detective Reginald Early of the Hartford Police Depart- ment and reported that Hall-Davis and Minto had com- mitted the Manchester robbery. Based largely on that information, the Manchester Police Department obtained arrest warrants for both men, and Minto surrendered to the police on May 25, 2013. Shortly thereafter, Man- chester police detectives conducted two interviews of Minto. Both interviews were video recorded. During the second interview, Minto, in response to questioning, essentially admitted to participating in two additional robberies in West Hartford and Windsor. Mambrino did not authorize warrants charging Minto with those robberies, expressing that it was not in the state's inter- est to bring additional charges against him based on his anticipated testimony at the petitioner's criminal trial. At the petitioner's criminal trial, the state relied heavily on Minto's testimony to establish both the peti- tioner's motive and his participation in the conspiracy with Hall-Davis. Minto testified that Hall-Davis had told him that the petitioner "wanted to get rid of the baby . . . before [the victim] hit seven months" of pregnancy. Minto further testified that Hall-Davis confessed that he had killed the victim for the petitioner because the petitioner "kept pleading with [him] to do it . . . ." Minto also linked Hall-Davis to the murder weapon, testified that the same firearm had been used in both the homicide and the Manchester robbery, stated that Hall-Davis and the petitioner had repaired a malfunction in the firearm
8
before the murder, and testified that he had observed Hall-Davis dispose of the shell casing from the fatal shot. Because no one other than Hall-Davis and the petitioner witnessed the shooting, Minto's testimony assumed particular significance.
Following his conviction, the petitioner submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Man- chester Police Department seeking records relating to Minto's cooperation with law enforcement. Through that request, he learned for the first time that the Manchester police had conducted two recorded interviews of Minto that had never been disclosed to the defense. Although the Manchester Police Department had destroyed the recordings pursuant to a court order, the petitioner ultimately obtained copies from the Windsor Police Department.
The first interview reveals that, after initially deny- ing any involvement in the Manchester robbery, Minto quickly shifted to attempting to bargain with the detec- tives once they confronted him with incriminating evi- dence. He stated: "All right. All right. . . . Let's get it done. . . . What is it going to take for me to get out of here? I got some information." When the detectives asked what information he possessed, Minto responded:
"Murder. . . . Shamari, the East Hartford girl [who] was shot on Mather Street." Throughout the interview, Minto repeatedly sought leniency in exchange for his cooperation, making statements such as: "Drop all this, I tell you everything," and "I want to make a deal. If you could help me, I'll say whatever you want me to say."
The interview further demonstrates that Minto's will- ingness to cooperate fluctuated depending on whether the detectives suggested that his cooperation might benefit him. After Minto implicated both the petitioner and Hall- Davis in the victim's murder, the detectives indicated that they already knew much of the information he was providing, at which point Minto resumed denying his involvement in the Manchester robbery and declined to provide additional information. Later, however, after
9
the detective suggested that helping the police recover the firearm could benefit Minto, he immediately resumed negotiating, asking the detectives to "lessen up some of them charges" and repeatedly inquiring, "what are you going to do for me?"
During the second interview, conducted later that same day, Minto identified the .44 Ruger as the murder weapon and sought a reduction in his bond in exchange for assisting the police in recovering it. He began the interview by stating: "You get the bond. I'm going to get you the weapon." The detective responded that recover- ing the firearm would be "a huge thing" for Minto and assured him that the prosecutor would be informed of his cooperation, while cautioning that he could make no promises because of the seriousness of the charges. The second interview also revealed Minto's involvement in additional robberies in West Hartford and Windsor. The detective informed Minto that those jurisdictions possessed sufficient evidence to arrest him and advised him not to deny his involvement because "the whole deal falls through" if he was not truthful about the addi- tional robberies. The detective further explained that Manchester, West Hartford, and Windsor had formed a joint task force to investigate those crimes. Following that discussion, Minto effectively admitted his participa- tion by confirming details of both robberies in response to the detective's questions.
The petitioner subsequently submitted additional FOIA requests to the West Hartford and Windsor Police Departments. The records produced in response estab- lished that both departments had prepared arrest war- rants to charge Minto in connection with separate armed robberies and that Mambrino, the prosecutor who was also assigned to the petitioner's murder, declined to authorize those warrants.
The petitioner thereafter filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his operative amended peti- tion, he alleged, among other claims, that the prosecuting
10
authority violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence relating to Minto. At the habeas trial, the petitioner introduced the Manchester interview videos and evidence that Mambrino had declined to issue arrest warrants for the West Hartford and Windsor armed robberies. Mam- brino testified that her declination of the West Hartford warrant had nothing to do with Minto's cooperation. She explained that both the West Hartford and Windsor war- rants had been denied in the interest of judicial economy and not because Minto had agreed to cooperate with the state. Following the trial, the habeas court denied the petitioner's petition.
With respect to the Manchester interview videos, the habeas court concluded that they were not material evi- dence. The court stated that "[t]he fact that Minto had pending cases in Manchester was known to the defense and he was questioned about his motivation for testify- ing. [Although] it certainly would have been better for [the petitioner's trial counsel] to confront Minto about his requests for consideration during that interview, the court cannot conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that those questions would have altered the jury's ver- dict." The habeas court likewise rejected the petitioner's claim concerning the state's failure to disclose its decision not to prosecute the West Hartford and Windsor robber- ies, explaining that "[t]here is no evidence that Minto was aware that those charges were not being prosecuted in exchange for his testimony, or even that [Mambrino] did it for that purpose. The evidence establishe[d] that [Mambrino] unilaterally decided not to prosecute those charges because she believed there were already enough charges to prosecute Minto on." Following the denial of the petition, the habeas court granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court.
After filing his principal brief in the Appellate Court, the petitioner sought permission from the Appellate Court to file a motion for augmentation and rectification
11
of the record with the habeas court. In support of that motion, he represented that, during the pendency of the appeal, he had discovered, through an additional FOIA request, an email exchange between Mambrino and a West Hartford police detective. According to the petitioner, the email exchange established, contrary to Mambrino's sworn testimony at the habeas trial, that she had declined to authorize arrest warrants charging Minto with multiple armed robberies because it was
"not in [the state's] best interest" to prosecute him in light of his anticipated testimony at the petitioner's criminal trial. The Appellate Court granted that motion and directed the appellate clerk "to forward the motion for rectification and response to the habeas court for consideration."3
The habeas court held a hearing on the motion, at which the parties agreed that the newly discovered evi- dence—specifically, the email from Mambrino to the police detective—would be admitted as a full exhibit and made a part of the record. Following the hearing, the habeas court concluded that "the existence of the email sent by [Mambrino] does not alter [the court's] application of the prevailing case law." In explaining that conclusion, the court observed: "What the email proves is that [Mambrino] declined to sign warrants charging Minto with additional crimes because he was going to testify against [the petitioner], and therefore it was not in the state's best interest to arrest him. There is a fair argument to be made that this information constitutes information favorable to the defense that must be dis- closed." The habeas court nevertheless concluded that the newly discovered evidence did not affect its resolu- tion of the petitioner's claim because, in the operative habeas petition, he did not allege "that the state [had] failed to disclose exculpatory or impeachment infor- mation in the general sense . . . ." Rather, the court
12
explained, the petitioner alleged the narrower claim that the state "failed to disclose that Minto [had] received favorable [treatment] in exchange for his cooperation
. . . ." (Emphasis omitted.) Accordingly, because there remained "simply no evidence of an agreement between the state and Minto or that he was aware that the state had chosen to decline warrants for his involvement in other offenses," the court determined that the newly discovered email did not alter its analysis. The petitioner thereafter filed in the Appellate Court a motion seeking a remand to the habeas court for recon- sideration of its ruling on the motion for rectification. On the same day, the petitioner filed what he characterized as an "alternative motion," renewing his request for rec- tification and seeking a remand to permit him to amend his habeas petition. The Appellate Court denied both motions but ordered the petitioner to file a supplemental brief addressing the issues raised in the two motions. After briefing in the Appellate Court concluded, but before oral argument was scheduled, the petitioner filed a motion pursuant to Practice Book § 65-2 requesting that this court transfer the appeal to itself. We granted that motion.
B
As a threshold matter, the petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion during the rectifica- tion proceedings by declining to consider whether the state's suppression of the newly discovered evidence— namely, the email exchange between Mambrino and a West Hartford detective—deprived him of a fair trial. The petitioner contends that the habeas court improperly construed his operative petition as alleging only that the state had failed to disclose an agreement between the state and Minto, pursuant to which Minto received favorable treatment in exchange for his cooperation, rather than as a broader claim that the state had violated its obligations under Brady by suppressing material
13
impeachment evidence generally. I agree with the peti- tioner.
"[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carpenter v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 834, 842, 878 A.2d 1088 (2005). In interpreting pleadings, Connecticut courts construe them "broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliphant v. Com- missioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569, 877 A.2d 761 (2005). "[W]e long have eschewed the notion that pleadings should be read in a hypertechnical manner."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, 312 Conn. 286, 299, 94 A.3d 553 (2014). "Although essential allegations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication . . . [a habeas petition] must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory [on] which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties. . . . As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the [habeas petition] is insuf- ficient to allow recovery." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carpenter v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 842.
In count two of the operative habeas petition, the peti- tioner alleged a constitutional due process violation based on "the prosecuting authority's failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence." The petitioner specifi- cally alleged that "[t]he prosecuting authority failed to disclose in a timely manner the following evidence to the petitioner or his counsel prior to the petitioner's criminal trial . . . (B) [that Minto] received favorable disposi- tions in [State v. Minto, Superior Court, judicial dis- trict of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CR-13-0243805-T]; Manchester Police Department Case No. M201304348; Windsor Police Department Case No. 2013-21679; and West Hartford Police Department Case No. 1300023062,
14
Incident No. 083, in exchange for his cooperation with the police and/or prosecuting authority in [State v. Bryan, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CR-13-0667185-T] . . . ." In his habeas petition, the petitioner further described each of these items as "excul- patory or otherwise favorable evidence that should have been disclosed to the petitioner or his counsel prior to his criminal trial" and alleged that "there is a reasonable probability that, had [they] been disclosed in adequate time to be used by the defense during the petitioner's criminal trial, the result of the petitioner's criminal trial would have been different and more favorable to the petitioner."
I conclude that the habeas court construed the opera- tive habeas petition too narrowly. In it, the petitioner alleged a general claim under Brady and then specified that the prosecuting authority failed to disclose that Minto had "received favorable dispositions" in multiple criminal matters "in exchange for his cooperation with the police and/or the prosecuting authority . . . ." Prop- erly understood, that allegation is not limited to the existence of a formal or informal agreement between the state and Minto. Rather, read broadly and realistically, as our pleading jurisprudence requires, the petitioner alleged that the state had failed to disclose favorable impeachment evidence bearing on Minto's motive to cooperate with law enforcement and to testify against the petitioner. Such an allegation falls squarely within the general principles announced in Brady, and it pro- vided the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, with fair notice that the petitioner claimed, in general terms, a violation of the state's disclosure obligations under Brady. Having concluded that the petitioner's claim was sufficiently pleaded and that the record is adequate for review, I turn to the merits of his Brady claim, namely, whether the state's suppression of (1) its pretrial decision not to authorize arrest warrants, despite having probable cause, for Minto's alleged armed robberies in Windsor and West Hartford, and (2) video
15
recordings of Minto's interviews with the Manchester Police Department constituted violations of Brady.4
C
Under Brady, the government bears a constitutional duty to disclose favorable evidence to the accused when such evidence "is material either to guilt or to punish- ment . . . ." Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 87. Favorable evidence includes not only evidence that tends to exculpate the accused, but also evidence that is use- ful to impeach the credibility of a government witness. See Giglio v. United States, supra, 405 U.S. 153-54; see also Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
330 Conn. 15. The rules established in Brady and its progeny derive from the due process clauses of the United States consti- tution, and their core aim is to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial by ensuring the reliability of any criminal verdict against him. See United States v. Bagley, supra,
473 U.S. 675. In order to prove a Brady violation, "a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching, (2) the evidence was suppressed by the state either wilfully or inadvertently, and (3) the evidence was material to the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vega v. Commissioner of Correction, 354 Conn. 437, 445, 354 A.3d 151 (2026); see also Strickler
16
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999). Evidence is material "only if there would be a reasonable probability of a different result if the evidence had been disclosed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 354, 370,
102 A.3d 1 (2014); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995). The petitioner first claims that "the habeas court erred in finding that the state did not have an obligation to disclose its decision not to prosecute [Minto]" in con- nection with the Windsor and West Hartford robberies. He argues that the authorities on which it relied were inapposite and that it incorrectly determined that the arrest warrant information did not have to be disclosed on the basis that there was no evidence Minto was aware that the charges were not being prosecuted in exchange for his testimony. In the petitioner's view, the habeas court's "constrained application of Brady," which would
"prohibit a finding that this information was favorable
. . . unless it establishe[d] an incentive promised to the witness, is wholly inconsistent with Brady's require- ment that the prosecutor disclose all favorable exculpa- tory impeachment information." (Emphasis omitted.) The respondent counters that the habeas court did not err because the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the warrants were denied pursuant to "an agree- ment or understanding, whether formal or informal, in exchange for Minto's testimony at the petitioner's criminal trial." I agree with the petitioner that, because Mambrino declined the warrants based on Minto's antici- pated cooperation, the state conferred a benefit on Minto that it was obligated to disclose to the defense. The habeas court's reasoning—and the respondent's argument on appeal—rests on the premise that favor- able treatment or benefits afforded to a cooperating witness do not qualify as impeachment evidence unless a defendant first establishes the existence of an express or implied agreement between the witness and the pros- ecution. That premise misconstrues the nature of the
17
state's disclosure obligations under Brady and Giglio. The state's duty to disclose impeachment evidence is not limited to circumstances in which there is proof of an informal or formal agreement. Rather, impeachment evidence is "broadly defined" as "evidence having the potential to alter the jury's assessment of the credibility of a significant prosecution witness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adams v. Commissioner of Correction,
309 Conn. 359, 369-70, 71 A.3d 512 (2013). Here, the evidence demonstrates that Mambrino declined to authorize warrants supported by probable cause for the arrest of Minto for two armed robberies because pursuing those charges was not in the state's interest in light of his anticipated testimony against the petitioner. By withholding authorization for the warrants, and by failing to disclose that decision and the basis for it, the state deprived the petitioner of favor- able impeachment evidence. This evidence would have tended to impeach Minto's credibility by demonstrating a motive to testify favorably for the state by implicating the petitioner in the victim's murder.5See, e.g., Benn
v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1057 (9th Cir.) (explaining that disclosure of benefits conferred on informant "could have allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that [the informant] had a motive other than altruism for testify- ing on behalf of the [s]tate" (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942, 123 S. Ct. 341, 154 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2002); United States v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 669, 682-83 (7th Cir.) (expressing concern over govern- ment's failure to disclose, under Brady and Giglio, that it had requested state prosecutor to delay filing robbery charges against witness until after she testified), cert.
18
denied, 513 U.S. 940, 115 S. Ct. 344, 130 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1994). Although the respondent contends that the evidence lacked impeachment value because the habeas court found no evidence that Minto knew that Mambrino had declined to pursue those charges in exchange for his testimony, evidence of the witness' awareness of the benefit is not a prerequisite for the evidence to possess impeachment value. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, supra,
314 Conn. 370 (explaining that impeachment evidence is
"broadly defined" (internal quotation marks omitted)). A benefit conferred on a cooperating witness, regardless of specific evidence that he knew of that benefit, can bear on his credibility because it is objective evidence of the relationship between the witness and the state, evidence the jury is entitled to weigh in assessing whether his testimony was the product of an ordinary civic obliga- tion or something else.6
Turning to the Manchester interview videos, I simi- larly conclude that they were favorable evidence that should have been disclosed to the defense. During those
19
interviews, Minto repeatedly attempted to negotiate with law enforcement for favorable treatment in exchange for providing information concerning the victim's death. Indeed, at one point, Minto stated: "I want to make a deal. If you could help me, I'll say whatever you want me to say." That statement alone was powerful impeachment evidence because it demonstrated Minto's willingness to tailor his account if doing so would secure a benefit from the state. A reasonable juror could have viewed the statement as reflecting not merely a generalized desire for leniency but a willingness to subordinate the truth to his own self-interest.
Additionally, during the interviews, law enforcement informed Minto that he was a suspect in two additional armed robberies and that the investigating agencies possessed sufficient evidence to obtain arrest warrants against him. Thus, at the very time Minto was attempt- ing to negotiate with investigators, he knew that he faced the realistic prospect of prosecution for multiple, additional serious felonies. That circumstance provided a concrete and compelling reason for him to seek favor- able treatment from the state and, in turn, to provide information that would be perceived as valuable to the prosecution. The videos of the interviews would have permitted the defense to argue that Minto was motivated by his own substantial criminal exposure and was actively attempting to leverage testimony against the petitioner into favorable treatment for himself. Accordingly, I conclude that the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense.
The remaining question is whether the suppressed impeachment evidence was material. Evidence is mate- rial "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. 433-34. Put differently, "[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in
20
its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression under- mines confidence in the outcome of the trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adams v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 309 Conn. 370-71, quoting Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 434.
In the present case, there can be little dispute that Minto occupied a central role in the state's case. First, through his testimony, the state introduced Hall-Davis' admissions, which directly implicated the petitioner in the victim's death. Minto testified that Hall-Davis had confessed to him that he killed the victim and did so at the petitioner's behest. Minto's testimony painted the petitioner as the architect of the murder, one who requested Hall-Davis to carry it out.
Second, Minto linked the petitioner to the murder weapon. Minto testified that, some time before the vic- tim's murder, he saw the petitioner and Hall-Davis with a .44 Ruger and that the two went into another room of the apartment they were in to repair it by installing a spring. Minto testified that the .44 Ruger was the same firearm Hall-Davis had used during their Manchester robbery and to kill the victim. He indicated that, after the robbery, Hall-Davis discarded a shell casing and told him it was from the bullet that killed the victim. Minto further testified that he then drove to Henry Park in Vernon, where he dropped off Hall-Davis so that Hall- Davis could hide the gun. Minto testified that, after the robbery, he, Hall-Davis, and the petitioner met at a restaurant, where the petitioner was upset with Hall- Davis because he had not discarded the firearm and said that he wanted the gun back. Notably, without Minto, law enforcement would not have recovered the firearm. After his arrest by the police for the Manchester robbery, Minto led the police to the area of Henry Park where he had dropped off Hall-Davis to hide the gun.
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Third, Minto was instrumental in advancing the state's theory of motive. Minto testified that, in January 2013, the petitioner told him the victim was pregnant with his child and that he was trying to convince her to have an abortion. Minto later testified that, when Hall-Davis admitted killing the victim, Hall-Davis said the petitioner wanted her dead in order to terminate the pregnancy before she reached seven months. Consequently, Minto's credibility was of particular importance to the jury's assessment of the state's case.
To the extent there was any ambiguity as to Minto's importance to the state's case, the degree to which Mam- brino relied on Minto's testimony in closing argument clears it up. In closing, Mambrino identified the elements the state needed to prove and directed the jury to Minto's testimony as evidence supporting each element. As to the murder count, Mambrino argued, "[i]n count one, the state has to prove two elements: the [petitioner] intended to cause the death of another person, and the [petitioner] caused the death of such person. Evidence to support element one: Look at [Minto's] testimony. He told you that [the petitioner] was upset with [the victim] when she told him that she was going to have the baby. He did not want to have a baby with her." As to causation, Mambrino argued, "Hall-Davis also told [Minto] that he's the one [who] shot and killed [the victim] because [the petitioner] pressured him to do it." Mambrino again emphasized Minto's testimony in arguing that the peti- tioner was guilty as an accessory to murder, stating, the petitioner "is charged as an accessory in this case. And the judge is going to tell you that, in order for the state [to] prove that someone is an accessory . . . he either solicited or requested or commanded or importuned or intention- ally aided [Hall-Davis] to kill [the victim]. [Hall-Davis] told [Minto] that the [petitioner] begged him to do it. . . . [The petitioner] then aided [Hall-Davis] by providing him with his gun . . . and . . . when [Reginald Lewis, one
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of the petitioner's former coworkers] couldn't fix that gun, both Hall-Davis and [the petitioner] fixed that gun."
The respondent contends that the interview recordings and the pretrial decision not to authorize arrest war- rants for Minto's alleged armed robberies in Windsor and West Hartford were not material evidence. With respect to the decision not to authorize the arrest war- rants, the respondent maintains that such evidence has no impeachment value. As to the interview recordings, the respondent contends that the jury already knew that Minto had cooperated with law enforcement in the Manchester robbery investigation, understood that he expected to receive some benefit in exchange for that cooperation, and heard extensive cross-examination on those subjects. In essence, the respondent's position is that the withheld evidence was immaterial because it was merely cumulative impeachment evidence or because defense counsel had already impeached Minto's cred- ibility through other means.
Although Minto was subjected to cross-examination and the jury was aware that Cohen had offered Minto's cooperation to the state in exchange for making Minto's cooperation known to the sentencing judge, the sup- pressed evidence was qualitatively different from the impeachment evidence presented at the petitioner's criminal trial. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 327, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 198 L. Ed. 2d 443 (2017) (explaining that impeachment evidence is not immaterial merely because witness may have already been impeached with other evidence). As previously discussed, during the recorded interviews, Minto repeatedly sought leniency in exchange for his cooperation. Perhaps most damning was when he said to detectives: "I want to make a deal. If you could help me, I'll say whatever you want me to say."
(Emphasis added.) This statement was direct evidence, in Minto's own words, that he was willing to tailor his account to secure a benefit from the state. Such evidence strikes at the heart of a witness' credibility in a manner fundamentally different from generalized evidence of bias or cooperation.
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The withheld evidence also would have revealed that Minto faced substantially greater criminal exposure than the jury was led to believe. That information, together with the fact that law enforcement had made the tactical decision not to authorize warrants because of Minto's cooperation in the petitioner's case, would have furnished defense counsel with further ammunition to argue that Minto's testimony was motivated by self-interest rather than truthfulness.
The respondent nonetheless argues that there is not a reasonable probability that a different result would have occurred because the state's case against the petitioner was strong. The materiality inquiry under Brady, how- ever, "is not a sufficiency of [the] evidence test." Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. 434. The relevant question is not whether the remaining evidence, viewed in isolation, would have been sufficient to sustain the conviction but whether the suppressed evidence, considered collectively,
"could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict."
Id., 435. On the facts of this case, and given Minto's central role in the prosecution, I conclude that it could. The withheld evidence would have provided the defense with a substantially stronger basis on which to challenge the credibility of Minto, the state's principal witness, whose testimony was central to the state's theory that the petitioner had orchestrated the murder. In sum, I am persuaded that the cumulative effect of the suppressed impeachment evidence sufficiently undermines confi- dence in the verdict.
Because I would reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand the case with direction to grant the habeas petition, to vacate the petitioner's underlying conviction, and to order a new trial on the basis of the foregoing Brady violations, I concur in the judgment.
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