PER CURIAM:
Travis Rollins appeals his convictions and restitution order for wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2; money laun- dering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1957(a); and
1
2 Opinion of the Court 23-12037 aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). After careful review, we affirm Rollins's convictions and dismiss as moot his appeal of the restitution order.
The facts are known to the parties, and we will not recite them except as necessary to decide the issues presented.
I
We begin with Rollins's argument that the district court erred by allowing Jay Beskin, an attorney for All Items Moved, to testify.1We agree with the district court that Beskin was acting as an attorney for the company, not Rollins, and that Rollins therefore cannot assert attorney-client privilege.
The attorney-client privilege protects the disclosures made by a client to his attorney, in confidence, "for the purpose of secur- ing legal advice or assistance." In re Renco Grp. Inc., 164 F.4th 1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 2026). The attorney-client privilege "belongs solely to the client," who may waive it either expressly or by implication. Id. (citation modified). The party invoking attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that the relationship existed and the par- ticular protected communications were confidential. United States
v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554, 1562 (11th Cir. 1991).
2
23-12037 Opinion of the Court 3 Here, we conclude that Rollins has failed to show that Be- skin was his attorney. Although Rollins initially hired Beskin, the lawyer was retained to assist in incorporating All Items Moved, and nothing in the record indicates that Beskin was hired to assist Rol- lins personally. Moreover, both Beskin and Peter Rodriguez, who owned All Items Moved, testified that Beskin worked on behalf of the company. And Rollins hasn't offered evidence that the com- munications discussed in Beskin's testimony were for the purpose of securing legal advice for Rollins rather than for All Items Moved. Accordingly, Rollins has failed to show that he retained Beskin as his personal attorney.
When a corporation—in this case, All Items Moved—holds attorney-client privilege, the power to waive that protection "rests with the corporation's management and is normally exercised by its officers and directors." Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985). "Displaced managers"—here, Rollins—"may not assert the privilege over the wishes of current managers"—here, Rodriguez— "even as to statements that the for- mer might have made to counsel concerning matters within the scope of their corporate duties." Id. at 349. So Rodriguez had the authority to waive—and did in fact waive—privilege over commu- nications between corporate officers, including Rollins, and Beskin. Beskin's subsequent testimony about those communications there- fore didn't violate attorney-client privilege.
3
4 Opinion of the Court 23-12037
II
Next, we address Rollins's claim that the district court's re- sponse to two jury questions was an abuse of discretion.2We con- clude that it wasn't.
We will not reverse a conviction for a defective jury charge unless "the issues of law were presented inaccurately, or the charge improperly guided the jury in such a substantial way as to violate due process." United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). "When a jury makes explicit its difficul- ties, the district court should clear them away with concrete accu- racy." United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 661 (11th Cir. 2016) (ci- tation modified). The district court may tailor jury instructions to
"the context of a case's facts" to ensure that "the charge . . . accu- rately reflects the law." Isnadin, 818 F.3d at 1296. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by in- forming the jury, in response to its questions, that the issuance of a loan based on false representations is a loss, regardless of whether the defendant had any personal gains. First, the supplemental in- struction accurately presented the law. Personal gain is not an ele- ment of wire fraud. See United States v. Estepa, 998 F.3d 898, 908 (11th Cir. 2021) (laying out wire fraud's elements); see also United States v. Filer, 56 F.4th 421, 436 (7th Cir. 2022) ("[P]ersonal gain is
4
23-12037 Opinion of the Court 5 not an element of wire fraud."). And the issuance of a loan consti- tutes loss or injury for purposes of the wire-fraud statute. See United States v. Watkins, 42 F.4th 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2022) (upholding a wire-fraud conviction based on fraudulently obtaining a loan). Sec- ond, the charge didn't improperly guide the jury. The jury in- quired about the relationship between personal gain and loss or in- jury, asking: "Can my personal gain be reciprocal to cause loss or injury, or must intent to cause loss or injury be the only criteria to determine intent to defraud?" Tr. of Trial at 12, Dkt. No. 129. The court's answer, which clarified what constitutes loss or injury in the context of loan-based wire fraud, was formulated to "clear
. . . away" the jury's lingering confusion. Baston, 818 F.3d at 661. It was an appropriate explanation, not improper guidance.
III
We next consider two challenges that Rollins brings to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.3We "will not overturn a jury's verdict if there is any reasonable construction of the evidence that would have allowed the jury to find the de- fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Beach,
80 F.4th 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). "The evi- dence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of inno- cence . . . for a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable
5
6 Opinion of the Court 23-12037 doubt." Id. at 1255 (citation modified). Applying this deferential standard, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports each of Rollins's convictions.
A
Rollins first contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated identity theft. The aggravated-identity- theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, prohibits "knowingly . . . us[ing], without lawful authority, a means of identification of another per- son" "during and in relation to" certain felonies, including wire fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5). A defendant uses another person's identification "without lawful authority" when he lacks the victim's permission or when he uses the identification for an unlawful purpose. See United States v. Zitron, 810 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2016).
Here, ample evidence suggests that Rollins lacked Rodri- guez's permission to use his identification to apply for the EIDL loan. Rodriguez testified that he didn't discuss with Rollins the pos- sibility of securing a loan or authorize Rollins to use his social se- curity number or date of birth on loan documents. And although Rodriguez empowered Rollins to oversee the business's day-to-day administration, the jury could reasonably conclude that taking out a disaster-relief loan worth tens of thousands of dollars exceeded Rollins's limited operational authority. See Beach, 80 F.4th at 1256 ("The jury is free to choose among alternative, reasonable interpre- tations of the evidence.").
6
23-12037 Opinion of the Court 7
B
Next, Rollins contends that no evidence supports his in- volvement in fraudulently obtaining the PPP loan. Rollins was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1343—the wire-fraud statute— and 18 U.S.C. § 2, which stipulates that "[w]hoever commits an of- fense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."
18 U.S.C. § 2(a). To establish aiding-and-abetting liability under § 2(a), the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rollins "(1) t[ook] an affirmative act in furtherance of [the wire fraud], (2) with the intent of facilitating the [fraud's] com- mission." Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014). Here, circumstantial evidence suggests that Rollins partici- pated in the fraud with criminal intent. Rollins's initials and signa- ture appeared on the PPP loan application, and the application was submitted with Rollins's driver's license, supporting a reasonable inference that he submitted the materials. The application stated that All Items Moved had a monthly payroll of $92,500 and 14 em- ployees, which was false. The application also contained a bank statement from an account controlled by only Rollins and Rodri- guez, and the proceeds from the PPP loan were deposited into that account. Additionally, a Zelle account linked to Rollins distributed loan proceeds to people who wired money to Rollins. Putting all this together, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
7
8 Opinion of the Court 23-12037 Rollins either submitted the fraudulent PPP application himself or otherwise participated in the scheme.4
* * *
In sum, sufficient evidence supports Rollins's convictions for aggravated identity theft and PPP-related wire fraud.
IV
Lastly, we consider Rollins's appeal of the district court's res- titution order. Rollins argues that the court erred by failing to off- set his restitution by the roughly $94,000 that Rodriguez returned to the fisc.5
8
23-12037 Opinion of the Court 9 This issue is moot. "A case on appeal becomes moot, and ceases to be a case or controversy, when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief." United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation modified). Here, the record shows that the government has reduced Rollins's restitution obligation by the amount that Ro- driguez returned minus a $1,000 assessment. Because Rollins has already received the credit that he seeks, this Court can provide no meaningful relief. We accordingly dismiss his appeal of the restitu- tion order as moot.
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
9